College of Distance Education

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, R.I.

An Analysis of the Argentine Center of Gravity in the Falkland/Malvinas Conflict

By

R. Walker

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Navy War College or the Department of the Navy

05 Aug 2007

On 2 April, 1982 Argentine forces invaded and captured the Falkland Islands. On 5 April, British Task Force 317 sailed from Portsmouth, England towards the South Atlantic. From 21 April, Argentine and British forces fought air, land and sea engagements on and around the Falklands, resulting in an Argentine surrender on 14 June. The Argentine military was hampered by many self-inflicted obstacles and did not achieve much operational success. The one area in which the Argentines did well was in their application of air power. In this air power we find the Argentine Center of Gravity; the Super Entendard aircraft armed with the AM.39 Air to Surface Exocet missile. This system alone had the ability and the opportunity to change the outcome of the conflict.

The land and sea elements of the Argentine forces could not be considered as a Center of Gravity for many reasons. While the Argentines had a fairly capable navy, Admiral Woodward, the British Carrier Task Force Commander, “seemed to regard surface action against elements of the Argentine navy as most likely, with a serious threat from the enemy’s two modern German 209 submarines.”[i] In reality, the Argentine Navy had no desire to engage the British Navy in direct combat. On 1 May, the British submarine HMS Conqueror torpedoed and sank the Argentine cruiser General