10/23/15
A Defense of Roush: ‘Optimism about the Pessimistic Induction
In this paper, I will attempt to reconsider Roush’s paper on the power of empirical evidence on a theory we know to be true or approximately true and to hold that it stands to any attacks that a pessimist attempting to claim a meta-inducted position on current theories. In her paper, she describes how a pessimist cannot hold their argument first on the basis of evidence collection being inherently different in both procedures of collecting evidence and content of evidence to compare theories from the past that have been ruled false with seemingly good supporting evidence compared to theories we think are true now with same level of seemingly good supporting evidence. Roush argues on this point that by comparing different evidence collection and content, the pessimist is left attempting to argue that the evidence of the current theory is not “better” than the the theory of the past. The second type of pessimist driven line of questioning is the idea of reliability of evidence as good support for its corresponding theory. Roush later argues that the scientific theories presented are becoming more reliable and, in that sense, are a good measure of a theory that we assume is the truth or approximately true.
The argument Roush lays out first begins by discussing reliability in terms of fallibility. She describes fallibility with the illustration of the preface paradox. In many cases of published literature, a preface is written that includes statements expressing that there is or could be some mistruths in the publication presented originally as fact. The paradox exists in the sense that the author inherently believes that she has not made any mistakes in the commission of the publication and that all data and inquiry presented is fact. On the other hand, those same facts are coming under question