Account for the resurgence of Muslim power between 1144 and 1187
The latter half of the 12th century can be distinctly marked and understood as the gradual and dynamic process of the unification of the Islamic Middle East. By 1187 this resurrection of Muslim authority was albeit confirmed, manifesting itself in its fundamental intent; the reclamation of the Holy City of Jerusalem. And yet while a Christian Kingdom of Jerusalem remained in the Levant till 1291 with the fall of Acre, it was crippled, never to reclaim its former holdings nor its dominion or aspirations in recreating a Christian Holy Land. As William of Tyre aptly noted of the situation in the 1180s “the strategic balance in the Near East had tilted decisively against the Franks“. Throughout the 12th century, this process of resurgence was the conjunction of several contributory factors throughout the period, both that of growing Muslim unity and strength, attached with underlying instabilities and structural ailments of the Crusader States. The impact and the role of the succession of the prodigious leadership, notably that of Zengi and his successors Nir Al-Din and Saladin, in facilitating the rise of Muslim ascendency in Syria and Palestine can be distinctly identified as a powerful driving force in this process. Ultimately therefore from 1144 to 1187 what this period highlights is the complex backdrop from which the narrative of Muslim resurgence is built upon.
As noted, the succession of exceptional and charismatic leadership and the continuation of the process of Muslim unification in the Middle East can be lofted as the main proponent in the ascendency of Muslim power. The role of Zengi therefore in providing the springboard and motivational direction from which his successors inherited, can be highlighted as a significant factor in the motivation towards Muslim unity. Having aided the Turks in quashing the Arab revolt, Zengi was entrusted the strategically significant cities of Mosul and Aleppo. What this provided was the means and capacity from which he could pursue his aspirations. Thus from such humble beginnings, we see the rise and growing role of charismatic leadership. Zengi defined himself unique from other Arab leaders, he distinguished himself as a leader who merited authority through competency in skill and quality, a factor from which will be inherited and replicated by his successors. As Maloouf substantiates, “Zangi was possessed of severity, perseverance, and a strong sense of state, all qualities tragically lacking in the leaders of the Arab World”. His ruthless authority and nature is well documented, the chronicler of Aleppo, Ibn al-‘Adim wrote of his callous approach to enemy and subject alike “When Zengi was on Horseback, the troops used to walk behind him as if they were two threads, out of fear that they would trample on the crops…if anyone transgressed, he was crucified”. Nevertheless despite his tyrannical rule, his authoritarian stature served to translate into the catalysing force necessary to rectify a fragmented Muslim Middle East, as Hillenbrand suggests, through such controls of fear and intimidation, he achieved unshakable loyalty and obedience. If Muslim resurgence can be understood as a dynamic and evolving process, then the fall of Edessa in 1144 can therefore be identified as being at the core of this gradual development, not only as it saw the first fall of a significant Latin city but that it “put an end to a half century of Frankish domination in this part of the Middle East”. When placed into context the fall of Edessa cannot be marked as purely that of the dominant rise of this great military leader, as Mayer provides in narrative, “with the Emperor of Byzantium dead and neither Melisende nor her son in any position to intervene in the affairs of Northern Syria, Zengi had an opportunity”. Therefore we can see the setting of such Muslim resurgence as the opportunistic exploitation of Crusader weakness and favourable regional circumstances, serving to be a continued theme throughout this period, and as Jonathan Phillips validates, Zengi, by this period “mark[ed] himself as the most serious challenger yet to the Christians of the Levant”.
Zengi’s contribution to the formation of Muslim resurgence therefore should not be dampened, through his expansionary and charismatic leadership he established the environment and atmosphere from which a resurrection of Muslim power could be fostered and nurtured. He instigated a transitionary period from which no longer was the Muslim in the Holy Land on the defensive, but rather he brought the first winds of change to challenge the expansion of the Latin Levant. It was through his aggressive culture from which the political and military forces of Jihad could be cultivated and adapted into a unifying political and religious force, as Ibn al-Qaysarani wrote, “if the conquest of Edessa is the high sea, Jerusalem and the Sahil are its shore”. Through this initial conquest of Latin territory, he had become a symbol of Muslim unity and strength, a beacon of Islamic resistance to Christian domination, and as Hillenbard aptly notes, “Thus Zengi’s conquest of Edessa is likened to the Prophet of Muhamad’s famous victory at Badr”.
The succession and continuation of Muslim unification by Zengi’s second son, Nur ad-Din, can be recognized as expanding and further exploiting the structure of Jihad to cement and expand the boundaries of Muslim authority, as “Jihad…which had in the early twelfth century been an idea of rather secondary importance, was turned into a driving force of Islamic politics” . By 1154 Nur ad-Din had united Islamic Syria under his dominion, with Damascus capitulating under his rule he had effectively began the gradual process of encircling the Latin Levant, finally realised with the submission of Egypt by 1169 under Shirkur . Nir ad-Din, like Zengi, had possessed the qualities and merits of great leadership necessary to unite the Muslim Near East, however his armament was not that of intimidation or fear but rather through the cultivation and nurturing of piety and the powerful unifying movement of Jihad. He applied a divine nature to his expansionary policy of Muslim dominion, which had mostly been neglected by Zengi and those before. The subject of Jihad had always been a rooted and fundamental element of Islam, but it was through his piety that he elevated and pursued with a fervent determination the idea of religious warfare that inspired and rallied the Islamic world of the Holy Land and the Near East. The brilliance of Nur ad-Din, therefore, lay not necessarily in his material gains, but in his capacity in reshaping and implementing the notion of Jihad in establishing a united culture of universal strife. Through an elaborate machine of propaganda supported through the works of poets and historical narrators, he expanded and developed a once inconsequential factor, into a powerful unifying force that swept across the immediate Islamic world. Through literature and architecture Nur ad-Din developed and slowly engrained his new format of Jihad upon the Muslim people of the Islamic Near East.
As Zengi had provided the springboard from which Nur ad-Din could manifest his control over the Muslim Near East, so too had he cemented his expansion with ideology and a unifying notion of religious warfare from which his successor Saladin could finalise the resurrection of Muslim authority throughout Palestine and Syria. From 1174 to 1187 Saladin proved to be the final death knell upon the Christian dominance of the Holy Land. Saladin just as with his predecessors inherited and possessed the qualities of prodigious leadership, and despite the strong foundations which he inherited he fully appreciated the virtues of patience and timing, “and just as Nur ad-Din, Saladin spent his first decade in power fighting fellow Muslims in order to achieve unified base…by 1183 with his capture of Aleppo, he had united Syria and Egypt under his rule”. With the stability of his empire confirmed Saladin began his campaign against the Franks which concluded with the dramatic defeat of King Guy and the near entirety of the Christian forces in the Holy Land at the Horns of Hattin in 1187. The path to Jerusalem was now open, and on the 2nd October the “physiological climax”, thwarted for almost a century, was finally reclaimed. His rule can therefore be seen as the efficient conjecture of the military and strategic fortitude of Zengi and the continuation of Nur ad-Dins projection of holy warfare. As Baha ad-Din wrote, “sacred works are full of passages of Holy War. Saladin was more assiduous and zealous in this than in anything else”. Saladin was a competent and capable military tactician and diplomat, possessing the wisdom and foresight in employing and learning of the successes of his predecessors. He inherited the foundations of a Near East Muslim Empire and fortified it with assuming the mantle of the hero of Islam, “He spared the lives of 100,000 Christians and allowed Christian pilgrims in Jerusalem after its fall. In this benevolent act, Saladin was simply emulating Prophet Muhammad as the Prophet re-entered his birth-city of Makkah”
Nevertheless when placed contextually, the resurgence of Muslim power must therefore be understood in the parallel of the decline of the Crusader States. The failure of the Second Crusade from 1145 to 1149 can be viewed as a cementing factor of the weakening circumstances of the Crusader States throughout this period. Sparked through the pious fervour generated from the fall of Edessa, the consequences of the failures of this Crusade under Louis VII and Conrad III proved to shift the balance of power throughout Palestine and the Holy Land. Having both been all but defeated in Anatolia by Seljuk Turks, their weakened forces having finally reached Jerusalem, placated itself in besieging the City of Damascus in 1148. The failure of the capture of Damascus however served to have resounding consequences that reverberated during the period both throughout the Muslim and Christian Worlds. The siege itself proved to reinforce Damascus’ likely allegiance to Nur ad-Din, turning a polarised religiously and politically important Muslim region under his sphere of influence and dominion, thus grounding the roots from which Muslim unification in Palestine could be nurtured. As Hillenbrand notes, “it was no longer appropriate to make alliances with the Franks…the shock and horror of Frankish pillaging and killing could be harnessed to a new appeal to unite in Jihad against the Franks”. The Second Crusade therefore, rather than establishing renewed security in the Holy Land, proved to act as a catalysing force of Muslim unification in the region, as Ibn Al-Qasanisi recorded, “this gracious sign of God’s favour brought rejoicing to the Muslim hearts”. The failure of the Crusade, therefore, casted a deep and lasting shadow over the Christian practice of Holy War “casting doubts on its motives and morality” as John of Salisbury exclaimed, “it had irreparably damaged the Christian faith”. It would not be until the cataclysmic fall of the Holy City of Jerusalem in 1187, when Muslim authority was albeit confirmed, that another call for Crusade was successfully replied to. The resulting “legacy of distrust between Europeans and the Franks” can therefore be attributed to the growing weakness of the Crusader States during this period, the isolation and the growing withdrawal of manpower and resources from the Holy Land by the west can be distinctly related to the evident shift of dominion from the Franks to the Muslims. Consequently therefore if the decline in holy war can be seen as a theme in attributing in the decline of the Latin Franks, the rise and unifying forces of jihad can be seen as propelling the ascendancy of Muslim unification in the region under the direction of Nur ad-Din and Saladin.
If the role and influence of the succession of strong Muslim leadership is characterising of this period, and a fundamental factor in the resurrection of Muslim authority in the Holy Land, then the lack of which in the Crusader States can be discernibly related in accommodating their rise. The Franciscan Fidentious of Padua added in his Liber Recupationis Terre Sancte a section headed ‘the lack of a leader is harmful’ in which he wrote “the inhabitants of the holy land do not have one leader whom they obey and follow…do not obey and are unwilling to obey the king of Jerusalem”. Consequently therefore just as the disunity and fragmentation of the Muslims facilitated the original foothold in the Levant, so too can this fragmentation and confliction of direction be seen as inherently undermining the security of the Crusader States. As Mayer notes, during the rise of Nur ad-Din, the lack of leadership among the Franks made his expansion for power all the more menacing. Nevertheless as Tyerman remind us, “mid twelfth century Outremer did not seem ready to capsize” and yet while the failure of the Second Crusade and the growing power of the Muslims did have significant consequences, the Crusader States did manage to stabilise their positions by the 1150’s and resume offensive operations, including the notable seizure of Ascalon. It wasn’t till the period of 1174 to 1187 that the accumulation of underlying structural issues and the fraying political situation of the rapid succession of a possible “bigamist (Almaric), a leper (Baldwin IV) a child (Baldwin V) and a woman (Sybil) with an unpopular arravist husband (Guy)” that we see the final unravelling of Christian dominance in the Levant.
Ultimately therefore, the resurrection of Muslim authority within the Middle East was a conjunction of several dynamic factors throughout the period that contributed to the destabilisation of the Latin Crusader States and to the unification of a singular Muslim identity. While it is untenable to relate to the process of Muslim ascension during this period as the sole responsibility of one factor, I do believe that when placed into context, the role of exceptional and prodigious leadership and guidance provided the capacity from which such inherent weaknesses of the Latin Levant could be opportunistically exploited. Similarly, it was through such leadership and diplomatic skill that brought to the forefront the unifying blanket of jihad that swept up the Islamic Middle East in a unifying fervour. As Ehrenkreutz pertinently highlights, “the degree to which an individual, endowed with natural intellectual and physical powers and exploiting inherited or self gained social, political, and economic advantages, plays an influential role in the process of historical change”. From 1144 to 1187 it was the unbroken succession of a continued lineage of such individuals that stimulated and maintained this process of historical change in the Levant, leading to the gradual resurrection of Muslim authority. If it was the religious fervour and unifying force of Christian Holy War that led to the great exodus of Christian armies to the Levant in 1099, then it was its Muslim counterpart of Jihad that expelled it from the Holy City in Jerusalem in 1187, permanently replacing the Christian Cross with the Islamic Crescent.

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[ 1 ]. Christopher Tyerman God's war: a new history of the Crusades (Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006) pp343
[ 2 ]. Amin Maalouf, The Crusades through Arab Eyes (Saqi Books, 2012) pp113
[ 3 ]. Carole Hillenbrand, The Crusades, Islamic Perspectives (Edinburgh University Press, 2009) pp112
[ 4 ]. Ibid.
[ 5 ]. Amin Maalouf, The Crusades through Arab Eyes (Saqi Books, 2006) pp133
[ 6 ]. Hans Mayer, The Crusades. (London Oxford University Press, 1972) pp92
[ 7 ]. Jonathan Phillips, The Crusades, 1095-1197. (Harlow, Longman, 2002), pp37
[ 8 ]. Carole Hillenbrand, The Crusades, Islamic Perspectives, pp115
[ 9 ]. Ibid. pp114
[ 10 ]. Hans Mayer, The Crusades, pp107
[ 11 ]. Amin Maalouf, The Crusades through Arab Eyes, pp174
[ 12 ]. Carole Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, pp172
[ 13 ]. Ibid. pp172
[ 14 ]. Francesco Gabrieli, Arab historians of the Crusades. (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969) pp99
[ 15 ]. Faysal Burhan, Saladin: a Benevolent Man, Respected by both Muslims and Christians http://www.islamic-study.org/saladin_(salahu_ad-deen).htm [ 16 ]. Carole Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, pp117
[ 17 ]. Ibn Al-Qalanisi, The Second Crusade: The Siege of Damascus 1148 http://www.arts.cornell.edu/prh3/259/texts/qalanisi.htm [ 18 ]. Christopher Tyerman God's war: a new history of the Crusades, pp341
[ 19 ]. Marjorie Chibnall, The Historia Pontificalis of John of Salisbury, (Oxford :Claredon Press, 1986) pp11-12
[ 20 ]. Jonathan Phillips, Holy warriors: a modern history of the Crusades (London: Bodley Head, 2009) pp98
[ 21 ]. G.Golobovich, Biblioteca bio-bilbliografica della Terra Santa e dell’ oriente francescano, II (Quarachi, 1913) p. 15
[ 22 ]. Hans Mayer, The Crusades, pp108
[ 23 ]. Christopher Tyerman God's war: a new history of the Crusades, pp345
[ 24 ]. Ibid.
[ 25 ]. Ibid. pp354
[ 26 ]. Andrew Ehrenkreutz, Saladin (Albany State University of New York Press, 1972) Pp233