Introduction ………………………………..………………………3 * Literature Review …………………………………………………..7

* Agadir Agreement
Overview and Objectives ………………………………………….9

* Impact of Agadir …………………………………………………..15
Impact on Egypt’s trade ……………………………………………16

* SWOT Analysis …………………………………………………….18

* Conclusion ………………………………………………………….20

* References …………………………………………………………..22 * Appendix ……………………………………………………………..23

* Introduction
Failing Arab, Middle Eastern and Maghreb regional integration has led to an increasing number of bilateral FTAs among the AMPC since the second half of the 1990s. With straightforward timetables for customs tariff reduction, they went beyond the traditional accords that rarely included more than a few shallow trade preferences and loose promises of co-operation. This was especially true for several major Arab countries, such as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan, which had already launched structural adjustment and economic liberalization programs. At the end of the 1990s, all of these countries had concluded bilateral FTAs with each other to accelerate the relatively slow-moving ten-year Pan-Arab trade liberalization program.

From a global point of view, however, these economies were too small to realize considerable bilateral trade potential; reciprocal provisions proved to be incompatible at times, and hindered the development of extended production chains involving several countries in the region. At the same time, these economies began to fear similar pressures as a result of association agreements with the EU. In 1999, Morocco and Egypt discussed extending their bilateral FTA to include Tunisia. The key thrust to link bilateral agreements and form a multilateral network, however, came during the Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Marseilles in November 2000. In the course of this meeting the four