On the issue of animal rights, Carl Cohen takes on the perspective of a reformist. This means that he accepts animal experimentation and meat eating, but believes that these institutions need to be improved upon. Cohen approaches the issue of animal rights using the ideas of obligations and rights, with not only the reformist perspective, but with the speciesist perspective. The conclusion he draws is that animals do not necessarily have rights just because humans have moral obligations to animals. Cohen comes to this conclusion through an analytical series of rights and obligations. His main argument is the following: (1) Humans do have obligations to animals, (this sets him apart from abolitionists) (2) not every obligation arises from a right, (3) so animals do not necessarily have rights just because humans have obligations to them. Since Cohen first mentions obligations, we will look at his analytical approach towards obligations. He admits that rights do in fact entail obligations, but states that obligations do not entail rights. “Obligations arise from commitments freely made,” (Cohen 350) is the simplest way he words it. He then uses the example of how a host will have the obligation to be courteous and cordial to their guests, but the guest absolutely does not hold the right to demand the host courteousness or cordiality. To then wrap up Cohen’s summary of his ideals of obligations, he states that it is false to believe that every obligation trickles down from another’s rights. Cohen secondly addresses rights within his three premise, thus we must look at how he defines rights to truly grasp his argument. He presents his reader with the concept that rights are essentially human and this is simply why animals may not be possessors of rights. Also, Cohen refers to this as a “human moral world,” giving this idea that all humans inherit rights the second they become a part of this Earth. A contemporary philosopher named Regan in brought up by Cohen in the argument that animals do not have rights, due to Regan’s outlook on animals. Regan refers to animals as “moral patients,” and summarizes a moral as something that cannot do right and cannot do wrong. With these ideas of obligations and rights Cohen draws to the conclusion that animals don’t have right just because human have moral obligations to them. Animals don’t have rights because it is a human moral world, and even though we make the commitment freely to treat animals with a sense of respect, thus taking on certain obligations to animals, they still do not have rights over us, or rights at all. Cohen makes the statement in his argument that animals are not a part of the moral community considering how they do not make moral claims and do not have an understand for moral propositions. This is the weakest point of his argument, thus the objection arises that infants do not hold these abilities either, yet they are still considered to have rights and be a part of the moral community. This is problematic for Cohen’s argument, because he could respond by saying it is a human moral world, and the concept of rights is inherently human. That is a massive assumption to draw, which just seems to avoid many objections for the sake that Cohen is a speciesist and his personal beliefs just see animals as inadequate to be rights holders.
Cohen wraps up his final argument by summarizing that animals are in fact valuable and we do have obligations to them, but this does not formulate grounds for them to be possessors of rights. He proceeds to say that it would be a detriment to human society to not be permitted to experiment on animals. I don not agree with Cohen’s argument simply because it arises from a bias speciesist standpoint. Cohen states that humans are autonomous, when at the same time some humans are not autonomous, and are as independent as pets. So do these humans not have rights? Cohen would once again respond by using the far-fetched theory that “animals can not be bearers of rights because rights is essentially human; it s rooted in, and has a force within, a human moral world.” (Cohen 351) This relates back to Cohen looking at Regan’s idea of animals not being moral because they cannot do right or wrong. Well if morality is based on the ability to do wrong, then that doesn’t sound like morality at all. We are not granted rights just for being human, and we certainly are not granted rights for being capable of doing wrong.