In this case the qualifier is certainly and as we move from a simple, static, uncontested argument to a complex, dynamic and contested argument once can see that the qualifier stance does not change. For instance, consumer Reports tested the effect of higher speeds on gas mileage. David Champion, director of auto testing, found that boosting the highway speed of a 2006 Toyota Camry cut gasoline mileage dramatically:
•55 m.p.h. – 40.3 miles per gallon
•65 m.p.h. – 34.9 miles per gallon
•75 m.p.h. – 29.8 miles per gallon
On a hypothetical 1,900-mile round trip from New York City to Disney World in Florida, the Camry would use 47 gallons of gas at 55 m.p.h.. But at 75 mph, it would burn nearly 64 gallons – a $70 difference. If everyone could reduce their driving by just 10 percent, the savings would total nearly 1 million barrels of gasoline every day. (Retting, 2008) In regards to the fatalities, Institute studies show that deaths on rural interstates increased 25-30 percent when states began increasing speed limits from 55 to 65 mph in 1987. A 2002 study also evaluated the effects of increasing rural interstate speed limits from 65 mph to either 70 or 75 mph. States that increased speed limits to 75 mph experienced 38 percent more deaths per million vehicle miles traveled than expected; an estimated 780 more deaths. States that increased speed limits to 70 mph experienced a 35 percent increase, resulting in approximately 1,100 more deaths. As one can see maintaining the speed limit at 55mph conserves fuel and saves more lives on the road. (Elvik, 2005)

For over four years following the breakup of Yugoslavia and the onset of war, first in Croatia and then in Bosnia, the United States refused to take the lead in trying to end the violence and conflict. While many have written eloquently and passionately to explain Washington's—and the West's—failure to stop the ethnic cleansing, the concentration camps, and the massacres of hundreds of thousands of civilians, few have examined why, in the summer of 1995, the United States finally did take on a leadership role to end the war in Bosnia. By the end of July the United States and its allies confronted a situation that required concerted action. The strategy of muddling through that had characterized U.S. policy since the beginning of the conflict clearly was no longer viable. The president made clear to his senior advisers that he wanted to get out of the box in which U.S. policy found itself. This box had been created by an unworkable diplomatic strategy of offering ever greater concessions to Serb President Slobodan Milosevic just to get the Bosnian Serbs to the table; by the long-standing refusal to put U.S. troops on the ground; by allied resistance to using force as long as their troops could be taken hostage; by a U.N. command that insisted on "traditional peacekeeping principles" even though a war was raging; and by a U.S. Congress bent on taking the moral high ground by unilaterally lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian government without, however, taking responsibility for the consequences of doing so. The US as sole superpower must lead the effort to redress intervention. (Kinsley, 2012)
First, the US must develop a National Security Strategy and supporting National Military Strategy that are based upon clearly defined interests. Definition of interests is equivalent to a declaration of pursuit of interests and effects credibility, capability, and strategic direction. These interests must be realistic, limited to those that are achievable and sustainable within US capabilities and supported by the intangibles of national will and culture. Interests require resolution to avoid contradiction and opportunistic interpretation. These interests should be limited to survival, stability, and prosperity. Humanitarian concerns should be recognized as values but not interests. Second, the US must avoid the dilemma of the defector legitimization of self-determination. (Kinsley, 2012) People around the world always have different opinions about everything that the United States does. One of the ongoing debates right now that people are discussing is whether or not the United States should intervene in the internal conflicts of the Balkans. There are several assumptions and questions that should be explored. The United States should not intervene in the Balkans because: This area has always had a history of problems and has always worked it out before. The United States is being affected negatively. It is great that the U.S. wants to help but we are not able to help all the way. If the emotion and opinions are taken away it comes down to whether or not it is lawful or justified under the UN charter for the U.S. to intervene. I believe that the United States should not intervene so much in the internal conflicts of the Balkans. Below is an argument mapping that illustrates why the United States should not intervene militarily in the conflict in Bosnia: References:

Dunn, W.N. (2012). Public Policy Analysis (5th Ed.). Upper Saddle, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc.

Elvik, R. 2005. Speed and road safety: synthesis of evidence from evaluation studies. Transportation Research Record 1908:59-69. Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board.

Kinsley, M. 2012. One Simple Rule for U.S. Military Intervention. Retrieved April 28, 2013 from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-30/one-simple-rule-for-u-s-military-intervention.html

Retting, R.A. and Teoh, E.R. 2008. Traffic speeds on interstates and freeways 10 years after repeal of national maximum speed limit. Traffic Injury Prevention 9(2):119-24.