EXPANDING THE FRONTIERS OF ABUSE OF DOMINANCE THE ASTRAZENECA CASE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA Neil Mackenzie and Stephen Langbridge1 On 6 December 2012 the European Court of Justice decided the case of AstraZeneca v Commission2. The ECJ upheld the European Commission’s finding of a novel abuse of dominance - by strategic misuse of regulatory procedures, AstraZeneca impeded the entry by marketers of generic pharmaceutical products into various European markets. The company was found to have made misleading representations to patent regulatory agencies in order to procure unwarranted extensions to existing patents, and to have strategically withdrawn the market authorisations ordinarily relied upon by generic producers to sell their products. What is novel about this? Abuse of dominance laws are typically applied to what might be described as conduct in the market. What we mean by this is the manner in which the dominant firm provides its goods or services to the market, and engages with its suppliers, customers and competitors. The AstraZeneca case applies abuse of dominance law to ‘non-market’ conduct in this case conduct in the course of engaging with regulatory authorities. This previously unchartered species of anti-competitive behaviour could be described as a ‘regulatory abuse’. This case appears, therefore, to have expanded the frontiers of European abuse of dominance law. Its implications may well be profound for the enforcement activities of competition authorities around the world, and the dominant companies whose behaviour they scrutinise. If the principles laid down by the European Commission and relevant courts are capable of adoption in other competition law jurisdictions, the already burdensome duty on dominant companies not to abuse their position will intensify. In particular, to avoid potential liability under competition law, dominant