Optional Paper:

Them four: The student-teacher constructivism avoids two extremes:
1) subjective opinion not based on objective knowledge or the exclusion of humans' innate desire for knowledge and for meaning and moral right action. objective knowledge consisting of memorization of facts or blindly submitting to an ideology such as the patriarchal, philosophic perspective of liberal education or scientific positivism

Many of the moral guidelines set out by society are based on the innate knowledge of right from wrong. Religions have established laws or commands, from their particular gods, that reflect this knowledge. They are, in a way, correct in interpreting it thus; for universal codes are the laws of nature, and subsequently, part of the universal order. For living things, other than man, there is no right and wrong, no good and evil; they simply follow the laws that nature has set out. From a human perspective, we can say that other creatures do only what is right, because no alternative exists for them. Humans have the capacity to conceive of ways that are contrary to the laws of nature, due to our intelligence, and ability to reason in the abstract; other life cannot: but perhaps that is an example of wisdom.

The philosophical/historical work of Michel Foucault has been studied in humanities courses as diverse as gender studies and rhetoric. Despite this fact, his insights have been difficult to appropriate in the realm of education. In part, this is because he said little explicitly about education, except for one scathing comparison between schools and penitentiaries. Asaresult,mostofwhatcanbe gleaned for the purposes of educational philosophy and practice must be constructed from related analyses of his work. One commonly hears that Foucault’s work is too removed from the real doings of people, too tied to linguistics, too abstract to be useful. Yet, educational philosopher Clive Beck has criticized postmodernism in general and Foucault in particular for being too practical. He has charged that postmodernism is too much about approach, rather than outlook, that it is guided too much by “attitude,” instead of cognition. He finds postmodernism fraught with problems because of what he suggests is a heavy dependence upon pragmatism that involves “a working understanding of reality and life.”
I concur with several of the labels that Beck applies to Foucault’s work, even while heartily disagreeing with his negative assessment of those labels. Consider, for instance, Beck’s charge that Foucauldian thought relies too heavily upon pragmatism. Foucault’s pragmatist bent is both pronounced and frequently overlooked. Postmodernism and pragmatism are similar in that neither seeks to replace foundationalist epistemology. Rather, these philosophies draw life from what they investigate and oppose, relying heavily upon the potential for inquiry to disrupt theories and ideas that have previously gone unquestioned. Beck’s pronouncement that Foucauldian thought is dependent upon approach more than outlook is also consonant with my understanding of Foucault. Further, it is a critique that can bemade of pragmatism equally well. William James argued that pragmatism espoused no dogmas, doctrines, special results, or solutions.3 In other words, to use Beck’s terminology, pragmatism has no specific “outlook.” Beck charges that postmodernism involves “a working understanding of reality and life.” Certainlythisistrueanditisanothercharacteristic shared by pragmatism. James, in fact, considered that the most important purpose of philosophy ought to be to determine what concrete, definite difference it would make to an individual to hold one world belief over another at some particular point in life. He believed that if holding one theory over another theory amounted to no discernable concrete difference then the theoretical differences between the two theories were insignificant. James was clear that pragmatists cannot rest upon theories, beliefs, and principles. Theories are regarded as instruments, not answers. Pragmatism’s intent is to “unstiffen” theories by making them work, testing them, asking these theories to indicate what their acceptance would mean for changing existing reality. Demonstrating how this pragmatic attitude works, James posed his now-famous question: “What difference would it practically make to any one if this notion rather than that notion were true?” James maintained that if one could determine no practical difference, then “this truth” and “that truth” are practically the same. James’s approach unabashedly adopted what Beck called “a working understanding of reality and life.”
Finally, Beck claimed that Foucault was too much about attitude and too little about cognition. Certainly attitude has not traditionally been a topic of concern for philosophers. After all, philosophy deals with the life of the mind. “Attitude,” deals with one’ s mindset. Philosophers pursue “Truth,” or “truth,” or “truths” through logic, intellectual inquiry. “Attitude” suggests that one is influenced not through valid propositions and cogent arguments alone, but that dispositions, manners, or feelings exist a priori, swaying one’s reception of intellectual information. In common parlance, one’s students exhibit good or poor “attitudes,” usually by their receptivity to our ideas or the ways in which they deal with hardship. Young people frequently use the term “attitude” in a purely negative way, referring to surly or recalcitrant classmates as having an “attitude” or perhaps a “copping a ’tude.”
At first glance, then, Beck’s concern that Foucault valued attitude over cognition may appear to be warranted. Foucault is concerned with attitude. It is here that I must part company with Beck. I will argue that Foucauldian attitude is not anti-intellectual at all, but that it stimulates greater and more diverse cognition. Further, the precedent for conceptualizing attitude in such a way comes once again from James who claimed, in fact, that attitude is the primary component of pragmatism. James said that utilizing the pragmatic method meant employing an attitude that looks away from first things, principles, categories, and supposed necessities, while looking instead toward last things, fruits, consequences, and facts.7
In what follows, therefore, I will argue that Beck’s assessment of Foucauldian attitude was incorrect. It does not supplant cognition. Instead, like pragmatism, it entails a cognitive process that asks its user to think more deeply and from different vantage points. I believe that enormous possibilities for critical thought in educational philosophy and practice could be opened if we could appropriate Foucault’s approach for thinking with “attitude.”Bio