The USSR certainly benefitted from its pre-war nuclear research when the nuclear program was re-started in 1943. Despite this, Soviet research still lagged behind American and British research at the time. Therefore, espionage was used to fill in knowledge gaps about the atomic bomb. Over 10,000 pages of intelligence was given to the USSR. Some of these pages included specific information about the atomic bomb, such as blueprints and formulas. After receiving intelligence, Kurchatov often sent back detailed follow-up questions to sources. This suggests that intelligence was somewhat tailored to fill the specific knowledge gaps that the USSR lacked at the time. It also saved the Soviets time and money on experiments since they could rely …show more content…
As the Soviets were already researching how to build an atomic bomb, one can conclude that Broda’s intelligence filled in the missing steps that the Soviets needed in order to fully build a successful atomic bomb. The use of plutonium, as mentioned previously, is another example of intelligence filling in knowledge gaps. The Soviets had already researched uranium, thus were aware of the problem of its limited quantity, but it is unlikely that they would have created an artificial element as a solution. Even if they had thought of that, the chances of them creating the specific element of plutonium is unlikely. In this case, the intelligence they received about plutonium was revolutionary in the development of the Soviet atomic bomb. To use a metaphor, the Soviets had the corner puzzle pieces of the atomic bomb puzzle figured out because they already had strong nuclear research, but they needed the middle puzzle pieces in order to complete the puzzle and build an atomic bomb. Espionage was able to provide the information needed for the middle puzzle pieces, some of which was insurmountable without espionage (such as plutonium) and other information was simply helpful (such as blueprints), and complete the puzzle, …show more content…
Although Soviet nuclear research existed pre-war, Stalin had little interest in it and shut it down to focus on the war. It was intelligence about the American, British, and German atomic bomb research that caused Stalin to re-evaluate and start Soviet research again in 1943. Without this intelligence, Soviet nuclear research would have been pushed back until 1945, when the Americans used the bomb, and even with the aid of intelligence, it would have been very difficult to develop an atomic bomb by 1949. Furthermore, espionage saved time by about two years since the USSR could rely on Anglo-American research and copy significant parts of their atomic bomb design. Moreover, intelligence filled in knowledge gaps that would have been impossible to know without stolen material, and revealed other important information that assisted the Soviets. On the other hand, Soviet scientists still had an important role as they benefitted from their pre-war nuclear research as well as from working with German nuclear scientists post-war, and they still had to carefully evaluate intelligence and conduct their own research. Nevertheless, the three key advantages of espionage – restarting Soviet nuclear research, saving time, and filling in knowledge gaps – significantly contributed to the Soviet atomic bomb being ready in 1949. Having it developed at this time also had important historic