California High Speed Rail
Anil Hirani
Concordia University Austin Texas

Dr. Catalina Zarate
April 5, 2015

Introduction and Highlights
High speed rail (HSR) was generally defined as trains capable of travelling at least 150 mph. The origin of high speed rail in California started in early 1980s, a 130-mile bullet train project between Los Angeles and San Diego was put forward as assembly bill. Financing difficulties ultimately led the American High Speed Rail Corporation’s (AHSRC) abandonment of the project in 1984.
California high speed rail authority has studied possible route alignment for the 800 mile system serving Sacramento, the San Francisco Bay Area, the Central Valley, Los Angeles, the Inland Empire, Orange County and San Diego. With two phases the study tries to concentrate the bulk of new population growth under political pressure to add stations and serve more communities throughout the state. Under the condition of, Assembly bill 3034 capped the maximum number of stations at 24.
The business plan clearly defines the possible fares of the California High Speed Rail and the revenue needed for operating. Public, Private, Partnership (P3) between state and private train company was needed to overcome the total cost of the high speed rail.

Problem Statement
Financial Funds
Alignment
Revenue Problems faced by California high speed rail was finance, alignment and revenue. Necessary funds to complete the first phase of system were expected to gather from public-private partnership (P3). Political pressure and support played a major role such as the CHSRA was established in 1996 by a bill signed by then-Governor Pete Wilson with a mandate to direct the development and implementation of intercity high speed rail service. The statewide ballot proposition to approve the $ 9.95 billion in initial bond funding had been delayed twice in 2004and 2006. The following Governor who took office in 2003 had also been lukewarm towards high speed rail in both official statements and funding. (Christian, 2010)
The estimates given by the researchers and forecasters were typically the necessary amount that is required to complete the whole phase, but before those funds get arrange the time lapse which was taken to arrange the funds will result in 25 % contingency in the cost estimate. For example, the total estimate for the total estimate for the full system (phase 1 and 2) had in fact more than doubled from $ 25 billion (1999) to $ 50-55 billion (2009).
The forecast distinguished two types of market, one for interregional or long-distance trips typically of over 200 miles, and a second for intraregional or commuting trips of less than 100 miles. According to Charles River Association in 2020 the full CHSRA system would capture 32 million interregional train trips. The total ridership would thus just exceed 42 million trips annually, based on a two-tier fare system designed to discriminate between business and non-business travelers, with train tickets priced competitively at 50 % of the comparable airfare for each class.
The revised business plan issued in 2009 used the same CSI methodology but tested slightly higher fares. That plan estimated that train fares set at 83 % of airfare would generate the greatest operating profit. At 83 % it can attract just over 40 million annual passengers whereas at 50 % it would attract 54 million.
Actions were required in the field of financial funds and revenue of the California high speed rail were financial needs can be fulfilled by allowing the private rail companies to enter with their finance and revenue policies. Revenue policies can be developed by comparing the previous records and demands, which can be helpful to set new prices to overcome the demand.

Conclusion
In conclusion we can say that the case study shows the drawbacks and loopholes with the solution around it. California high speed rail is a case study with some problems and drawbacks that can be ruled out with the help of public and political support.

References
Christian, A. (2010). California High Speed Rail Case Study .