First and most importantly, in the case of Bangladesh, it is of rationalised governance. The corporate model of the exchange under demutualised structure will enable management to take actions that are in the best interests of customers and the exchange itself. With the separation of ownership and trading privileges, an exchange will achieve greater independence from its members with respect to its regulatory functions. There will be the requisite degree of transparency. Demutualised exchanges will be forced to account to their shareholders regarding the bottom line as well as corporate governance.

Secondly, there will be more investor participation. The new corporation will be more profit orientated due to shareholder accountability. Unlike a mutual structure where often only broker-dealers maybe members, a demutualised exchange affords both institutional and retail investors the opportunity to become shareholders. A demutualised exchange will have greater flexibility to accommodate the needs of institutional investors as customers, and potentially, as owners.

Thirdly, it is the resources for capital investment. A competitive stock exchange must be able to respond quickly to global competitive forces and technological advances. With the capital raised from initial public offerings or private investment and a heightened awareness of accountability to stakeholders, a stock exchange should have both the incentive and the resources to invest in the competitiveness of its information systems. So to be competitive, products and services must not only be timely and cost effective, but also reliable.

The second part of the structural changes needs to be at the SEC of Bangladesh. The fundamental issue here is: what is the regulator doing to help minimise risk for the investors? The absolute minimum the SEC can ensure is to have risk minimising tools. As a first step