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| MGM FIRE |
|Case Study |
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| Chidozie B Nzom |
|12/04/2014 |
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Introduction

The MGM Grand fire occurred on November 21, 1980 at the MGM Grand Hotel and Casino in Paradise, Nevada, USA, now bally’s Las Vegas. The fire killed 85 people, and more than 650 were injured, mostly through smoke inhalation. The tragedy remains the worst disaster in Nevada history, which is the second largest life-loss hotel fire in United States history. It was determined during investigation that the fire originated in the wall soffit of the side stand in the Deli, one of five restaurants located on the casino level. The investigators concluded that several factors contributed to the cause of the fire, but the primary source of ignition was an electrical ground fault. At the time of the fire, approximately 5,000 people were in the hotel and casino, a 23-story luxury resort with more than 2,000 hotel rooms.

Summary of the fire incident

The fire broke out in a restaurant known as the Deli, just after 7.00 in the morning of November 21, 1980. The employee repeatedly attempted to contain the fire, but by that time, the heat, smoke and pressure build up was so intense that he was knocked down each time he tried to enter the Deli. Realizing the gravity of the fire, he decided to leave the area. At the same time, the employees noticed the spreading fire and tried unsuccessfully to extinguish the growing flames. Within six minutes of the time of discovery, the total casino area was involved in fire, at a burning rate of approximately 15 to 19 feet per second.

The Clark County Fire Department received the call reporting the fire and was the first agency to respond. Other agencies that responded included the North Las Vegas Fire Department, Las Vegas Fire and Rescue, and the Henderson Fire Department. They positioned about 1,500 GPM fire engines at the North entrance of the casino and implemented the High Rise Preplan. The crew observed black smoke emitting from the Deli, and were only forty feet into the hotel when a huge fireball burst out of the Deli and rolled into the casino, thereby hustling the crew out of the building. The company made it back to the engine as the flames sprang out the front of the entrance. A total of 85 people were killed and 650 injured, including guests, employees and 14 firefighters. While the fire primarily damaged the second floor casino and adjacent restaurants, most of the deaths were on the upper floors of the hotel, and were caused by smoke inhalation. Openings in vertical shafts (elevators and stairwells) and seismic joints allowed toxic smoke to spread to the top floor. The casino and restaurants were not protected by a fire sprinkler system because they were exempt from rules requiring fire sprinklers in areas occupied 24 hours a day.

The disaster led to the general publicizing of the fact that during a building fire, smoke inhalation is a more serious threat than flames. Seventy-five people died from smoke inhalation and carbon monoxide poisoning, four from smoke inhalation alone, three from burns and smoke inhalation, only one person died from burns alone, and one person died from massive skull trauma, caused by jumping from a high window.

Lessons learned from the incident

Taking a brief look at the MGM Grand fire, the following could provide valuable lessons that could hopefully prevent similar tragedies in the future:

• Fire sprinkler systems were not installed in the high-rise hotel, the casino, and the restaurant areas. Only partial fire sprinkler protection was provided for limited areas such as the arcade, showrooms and convention areas on the ground level. Despite pressure from fire marshal during the construction to install sprinklers, the owners decided against the recommendations made on installing the fire sprinklers, deeming the cost for sprinkler installation not to be feasible.

• According to the NFPA’s 1981 Investigation Report on the MGM fire, the fire department of the County Office for Building and Safety did not have any building code enforcing authority and a system of on-site resident inspectors’ procedure during the building process of the hotel.

• The cause of the fire was determined as an electrical ground fault inside a wall in the Deli. However, in the casino area, the presence of combustible furnishing and interior finishes, foam padding and moldings, air supply, and a very large undivided area allowed for an extremely rapid fire spread and heavy smoke production.

• The hotel lacked adequate evacuation system. More than 300 people were evacuated from the roof top by the helicopters who responded to the police pilot’s call for assistance. There were also many guests who were trapped in their rooms where they awaited rescue. The total evacuation of the building took nearly four hours.

• While the fire primarily damaged the ground floor casino and adjacent restaurants, most of the deaths were caused by smoke inhalation on the upper floors of the hotels. Therefore, impaired smoke dampers and other HVAC components, openings in the vertical shafts, stairways, and elevators, hoist ways, and the seismic joints allowed the toxic smoke to spread throughout the building all the way to the top floor.

• There were 83 building code violations, design flaws, installation errors and materials that were identified afterward that contributed to the magnitude of the fire and smoke spread. This resulted in 1,327 lawsuits against 118 companies amounting to about $223 million settlement fund that was promptly distributed to the victims within 3 years of the fire.

• Full economic impact of the fire included an estimated $300 million reconstruction cost, MGM’s $105 million settlement, 1,327 lawsuits against 118 companies, $223 million settlement funds, and hundreds of millions of dollars of downtime and the business interruptions realized. All the lost revenues from gaming and tourism that all the businesses in the entire Southern Nevada community had to endure as a result of the devastating incident was also a huge factor.

• Public image as a result of the devastating images on the national TV sent across the globe was also a business diminishing factor to be considered.

• As a result, not more than three months after the fire, the state’s building and fire codes were revised to have the most stringent fire sprinkler and life safety requirements in the country. All hotels taller than 55 feet were required to be retrofitted with fire sprinkler systems as well as all future buildings three stories.

• The MGM Grand disaster was not a fire suppression failure, but rather a major failure in plans review and construction codes enforcement. As a result, the catastrophe underlined the importance of fire prevention for the fire departments in Southern Nevada. Fire departments recognized fire prevention division’s involvement and active participation in the construction review and inspection process as an integral part of the fire service.

• Training and experience was also essential for the fire department, and remembering the importance of fire prevention duties in protecting the communities and providing safety for its citizens

References

Azarang, O. M. (2010). Fire House World, Lessons from the past: MGM Grand Fire. Retrieved from http://www.firehouse.com/article/10465399/lessons-from-the-past-mgm-grand-fire

MGM Grand fire. (2014). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 16:55, from http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=MGM_Grand_fire&oldid=622620497