Running head: The Charleston Fire
The Charleston Fire
Gary Scott Ard
Columbia Southern University
MSE 5201-10A-4A12-S1
Professor Donald Adams
Running head: The Charleston Fire
Abstract
On June 18th, 2007 nine firefighters died in the line of duty fighting a fire at the Sofa Super Store. The way of life for firefighters in Charleston, SC was thus changed forever. The history and mindset of the department would change forever following the tragic event. This event would change the department’s way of doing business forever.
The Charleston Fire Department (CFD) was established as a full time service in 1882. The department possesses sixteen engines and three ladder trucks. A large scale department with modern equipment yet stuck in an ancient time when it came to performing firefighting objectives. There had always been a ideology that a firefighter who wasn’t rushing into any situation without concern for many safety related issues was not a good firefighter. It was the mindset of many employees that rushing in and putting out of a fire was all they needed to worry about-this was a deadly mindset passed down through ranks by leadership and the Chief. This was a very outdated way of thinking in the fire service, unfortunately Charleston had fell behind the times and refused to progress as time moved forward.
The departments’ philosophy was one of interdependency and did not feel the need to look beyond their own doors for anything. Charleston felt as though they had existed well beyond a hundred years and why continue to evolve-also known as the complacent attitude of, we’ve always done it this way and nothing has ever happened so why change. There was a refusal by administration to accept the national standards, recommendations, or any other progressive method used by outside departments to more safely and efficiently extinguish fire. Firefighters in this department were essentially expected to behave like a military soldier, to follow orders; simply do as on was told-the practice of asking questions or making suggestions in reference to different tactics or ways of thinking was not acceptable. Years of practicing firefighting with these ideals finally caught up to the Charleston fire department and on June 18th 2007 in the Sofa Super Store they culminated as one of the worst firefighting disasters to ever occur. These incidents forced change not only through Charleston, but were also an eye opening experience for many countries throughout the country.
There are numerous deficiencies in the practices of the CFD, many of which are hard to even understand in this day and age, that led to the death of nine firefighters. Firstly being the absence of the Incident Command system. Even though the national standards were set forth for uniformed incident command systems to mitigate emergencies, Charleston had once again failed to adopt such a system. Self Contained breathing apparatus had been common practice in the fire service for decades, but until 1992 it was optional in the CFD. These are just a few examples of the severe neglect for firefighter safety. The actions of the CFD echoed the philosophy that every fire is pretty much the same and that what works for one fire will work for another, continually deploying the same objectives and tactics and every fire year after year. The CFD showed complete disregard for the evolution of fighting fires, despite the fact that building construction and materials etc. have caused fires to behave differently than in years past. To put it simply, every fire is different, yet CFD chose to attack them all the same way.
The death of the “Charleston Nine” revolutionized the Charleston Fire Department and many other departments throughout America. It was a normal summer afternoon when the CFD received a call to respond to the Sofa Super Store on Savannah Hwy. Upon arrival the first few units made the first of many mistakes to come when they did not establish a water supply before starting work. Numerous other units were requested and dispatched to the scene. Before long there were an extensive number of people on scene being sent into the fire without an accountability system or any formal level of incident command, these critical issues were again the failure of the CFD to comply with the National Incident Management System. The Chief Officers on scene were not trained to an adequate level for such an event, attempting to mitigate a scene like the one these firefighters encountered without the proper command training is virtually insurmountable.
It was no long after the CFD arrived on scene and became tactically involved that things changed forever. The interior of the structure instantly became engulfed with fire as the roof collapsed. The construction and the building’s roof was that of lightweight steel trusses. Fire had been impinging on the structural beams for a significant amount of time and due to the lack of training within the CFD the thought of collapse never crossed their mind. This collapse trapped nine firefighters inside the Sofa Super Store, all of whom would perish. There were as many as sixteen distress messages transmitted from inside the building by those firefighters who were not killed instantly. But none could be reached for rescue. There was no accountability or personnel tracking system initiated, therefore when the collapse occurred no one even knew how many men were missing or where the missing firefighters were located. The deficits in the CFD’s methods of firefighting finally caught up to them, causing nine men to lose their lives.
The incident initiated massive investigations into the CFD and obviously brought to light extreme failures but also initiated large scale changes within the CFD and numerous other departments all across America. One of the first adaptations was initiating the Incident Command System, on every scene there must be an incident commander and a fixed command post. The on scene position of safety officer has also been established as a part of the CFD’s standard operating procedures. Also all officers have received significant training in the area on incident safety officer. A health and safety officer has even been established as a full time position. The training has not only changed just for the officers of the department but for everyone. Firefighters are being administered much more extensive training particularly in the areas of: incident command, rapid intervention teams, firefighter survival, and building construction.
It is extremely unfortunate that it took such a disaster to change the way of thinking within the CFD. It is very likely that had the CFD not insisted on their interdependency and refusal to evolve with time that the tragedy of the “Charleston Nine” could have been diverted. If the department had complied with simple and practical national standards such as the use of an incident command system and accountability along with basic training in fire fighting principles and building construction I would probably not be writing this paper. However, as unfortunate as it is, this incident may save many future lives as it helped to change the thoughts, ideal, and methodology of thousands of firefighters around the country.
Works Cited
(2007). Fire Department Incident Safety Officer. In D. W. Dodson, Fire Department Safety Officer 2nd Edition. Thomson Delmar Learning.
Routley, C. C. (2008). Firefighter Fatality Investigative Report, City of Charleston Post Incident Assessment and Review Team, Phase II Report.
The Post and Courier. (2007, June 19). Lost of Life One of the Worst Diasters in 100 Years .