Gibson will satisfy that she had a reasonable expectation that jumping through a window would be successful in avoiding a dangerous crowd. Under Massachusetts’s law, the defendant’s must have a reasonable expectation that there would be a direct casual relationship between their actions and the alleged harm, otherwise the actions would fail to be the direct cause of abating the danger. Hood, 452 N.E.2d at 196. Thus the actions must abate the alleged danger directly. Commonwealth v. McCambridge, 690 N.E2d 470,472 (Mass. 1998). In Hood, the defendants were trespassing in order to distribute literature to try to halt the development of nuclear weapons. Id. at 196. The court found they could not have reasonably expected their actions to abate the alleged danger directly and that the trespass would automatically close down nuclear power plant, thereby stopping alleged radiation leaks. Id. In contrast in McCambridge, the court held that after accepting the defendant’s testimony …show more content…
Where there is an effective alternative available, which does not involve a violation of the law, the defendant will not be justified in committing a crime. Commonwealth v. Kendall, 883. N.E.2d 269. (Mass. 2008). It is up to the defendant to make himself aware of any available lawful alternatives or show them to be futile in the circumstances. Pike, 701 N.E.2d at 958. This does not require a showing that the defendant has exhausted or shown to be futile all conceivable alternatives, only that a jury could reasonably find that no alternative were available. Magadini, 52 N.E.3d 1049. So as long as the defendant’s evidence, taken as true, creates a reasonable doubt as to the availability of such lawful alternatives, the defendant satisfies the third element (no legal alternative which will be effective in abating the danger).