Coughlin v. Tailhook Case Analysis
LAW/531
October 4, 2010

Coughlin v. Tailhook Case Analysis

COUGHLIN v TAILHOOK
112 F.3d 1052 (1997)
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada WIGGINS, Circuit Judge: During a convention at the Las Vegas Hilton, Navy Lieutenant Paula Coughlin was attacked by a group of men in a hotel hallway outside several convention-related hospitality suites. She sued several defendants, including the hotel and the organization which hosted the convention. A jury awarded her several million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages against the Las Vegas Hilton Corporation ("LVHC") and Hilton Hotels Corporation ("HHC"). LVHC and HHC (collectively,"Hilton") appeal. BACKGROUND
The infamous 1991 Tailhook Convention served as the stage for the despicable event that led to this lawsuit. Hosted by the Tailhook Association ("Association"), the Tailhook Convention was an annual symposium and convention primarily directed at military aviators and held at the Las Vegas Hilton in Las Vegas, Nevada. Navy Lieutenant Paula A. Coughlin, a decorated helicopter pilot, attended the 1991 Tailhook Convention in her capacity as an aide to Rear Admiral John Snyder. After attending a banquet at the Las Vegas Hilton on the evening of Saturday, September 7, 1991, Coughlin returned to her nearby hotel to change out of her military uniform. She then returned to the Las Vegas Hilton to socialize with friends at one of the many convention-related social events at the hotel. Looking for her friends, she entered a third-floor area where several hospitality suites hosted by various Navy squadrons were located. As she started to walk down the hallway--now notoriously known as the "gauntlet"--she was attacked, groped, grabbed, and handled by a throng of men. Fearing she was about to be gang-raped, Coughlin frantically tried to escape. After several minutes, she was eventually able to fight her way into an empty suite. After the attack, Coughlin experienced post-traumatic stress disorder and other psychological problems related to the attack. Although she remained in the Navy for a couple of years, these psychological problems as well as other problems stemming from the attack hampered her ability to perform her duties. Ultimately, she was compelled to resign from the United States Navy. Coughlin brought this action against the Association, HHC, LVHC, and several other Hilton entities. Coughlin's negligence and punitive damages claims survived pre-trial motions against the Association, LVHC, and HHC only. The Association settled with Coughlin for $400,000 just before trial. After a trial lasting several weeks, an eight-person jury found HHC and LVHC negligent and awarded Coughlin compensatory damages of $1,695,000. After bifurcated proceedings mandated by Nevada law, the jury also assessed punitive damages of $2,625,000 against LVHC and $2,325,000 against HHC. Because of Coughlin's settlement with the Association, the district judge subsequently reduced the compensatory damages award by $400,000 to $1,295,000 and also reduced the punitive damages award to $3,885,000 under Nev.Rev.Stat. § 42.005(1). PUNITIVE DAMAGES Hilton contends that Coughlin failed to show the requisite "malice in fact" required under Nevada law in order to obtain an award of punitive damages. The Nevada statute under which punitive damages may be obtained by a tort plaintiff provides as follows: In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the compensatory damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. Nevada Revised Statutes Sec. 42.005(1) (1996). The district court concluded that Coughlin had a viable claim for punitive damages because she alleged that the appellants had acted with conscious disregard for known safety standards and measures. Conceding that "if malice in fact is required, the punitive damages claim of Coughlin's Complaint must be dismissed," the district court concluded that Coughlin's allegations, if proven, indicated implied malice, and her claim of punitive damages remained viable under Nevada law. We must determine whether the district court correctly interpreted Nevada law. In Granite Constr. Co. v. Rhyne, 817 P.2d 711 (Nev. 1991), the Nevada Supreme Court upheld a punitive damages award to a motorist injured when her car struck a wayward bull on an interstate highway. The defendant construction company had failed to honor a provision of its state highway construction contract requiring it to erect a protective fence to prevent livestock from wandering onto the highway. The two-justice plurality held that the "facts show that Granite `consciously and deliberately disregarded known safety procedures,' safety procedures which Granite expressly agreed to take care of when it signed the highway construction contract.” Thus, the plurality held that the trial judge "properly concluded that punitive damages are allowable under such circumstances." The concurring justice agreed with the plurality that a jury finding of conscious and deliberate disregard for known safety procedures could support an award of punitive damages. Moreover, in 1995, the Nevada Legislature enacted 42.001 to define malice for punitive damages purposes in accordance with Granite. Subsection (3) defines "malice, express or implied" as follows: "conduct which is intended to injure a person or despicable conduct which is engaged in with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." To the extent this newly-enacted provision says anything about the state of law in 1994 when this case was tried, it indicates that Granite's definition of "malice, express or implied" was correct. Hilton seeks to avoid the effect of Granite by focusing on a previous Nevada decision. Less than two years before Granite was decided, the Nevada Supreme Court overturned a punitive damages award in Craigo v. Circus-Circus Enterprises, Inc., 786 P.2d 22 (Nev. 1990). In that case, the plaintiff was the victim of an assault and robbery in a casino parking lot. He sued the casino and recovered compensatory and punitive damages. A two-justice plurality, consisting of different justices from that in Granite, essentially read the words "or implied" out of the Nevada punitive damages statute. Focusing exclusively on "malice in fact," the plurality stated that "it is this court's intention to restrict awards of punitive damages attributable to malice in fact to those extreme cases that convincingly demonstrate conduct motivated by hatred and ill-will and the deliberate intent to injure." Further, the plurality stated that: [w]e disapprove our prior pronouncements that would indicate that malice in fact can be shown by a willful disregard of the rights of others or a conscious disregard of safety measures unless it can be shown that in connection therewith there was a deliberate intention to injure, vex, annoy or harass. The two-justice plurality was unable, however, to convince a third justice to adopt this position. The concurring justice in Craigo agreed with the plurality's result, but disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that Nevada law limited awards of punitive damages to cases in which the evidence showed the defendant harbored a deliberate intention to injure, vex, annoy, or harass. According to the concurrence, malice required a broader definition than the one offered by the plurality. Since Granite, the Nevada Supreme Court has not returned to the issue of what showing of malice is sufficient to uphold a punitive damages award. We conclude that Granite reflects the current state of Nevada authority on this issue. Three justices in Granite agreed that punitive damages were justified where a jury "found that the defendant consciously and deliberately disregarded known safety procedures--procedures designed to protect the public from serious harm--to save a few dollars." Craigo's language limiting punitive damages to cases where the evidence shows malice in fact was not signed by a majority of the Nevada Supreme Court, leaving it with no precedential value. Furthermore, the position of the Craigo plurality was effectively rejected by the Granite majority. Also, 42.001(3), although enacted after the trial in this case, codified Granite 's definition of malice. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err when it allowed Coughlin's punitive damages claim to proceed to the jury on the theory that the appellants showed a "conscious disregard for the safety of others " amount to implied malice. DISPOSITION
The verdict and judgment in Coughlin's favor is AFFIRMED. Coughlin may execute her damage award to the extent of the district court's judgment.

Facts: Navy Lieutenant Paula Coughlin attended the 1991 Tailhook Convention in her capacity as an aide to Rear Admiral John Synder. This convention was held at the Las Vegas Hilton. After attending a banquet at that hotel on the evening of September 7, 1991, she left there to go to her nearby hotel to go change her clothes. She then returned to the Hilton to meet up with friends who were attending a social event that was convention-related. While looking for friends, she entered on the third floor of the hotel where different Navy squadrons were located and started walking down the hallway. While walking down the hallway, she was attacked, groped, grabbed, and handled by a throng of men. She feared that she would be gang-raped, so she tried to escape. After several minutes of trying to get free, she did so and went into an empty hotel suite. After the attack, she began to experience post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other psychological problems due to the fact. She stayed in the Navy for two more years before she resigned due to the fact that the psychological problems still stemmed from the attack from September of 1991. She then filed charges against the Tailhook Association and the Hilton Corporation for negligence. She then settled with the Tailhook Association for $400,000 and went to trial with the Hilton Corporation and also won that suit.
Issues: Did Coughlin have a valid claim against both the Tailhook Association and the Hilton Corporation for negligence? Should the Tailhook Association have gone to trial rather than settled the case?
Rules: In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the compensatory damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. Nevada Revised Statutes Sec. 42.005(1) (196). The Nevada Legislature in 1995, enacted 42.001 to define malice for punitive damages purposes in accordance with granite. Subsection (3) defined “malice, express or implied” as follows: “conduct which is intended to injure a person or despicable conduct which is engaged in with a conscious disregard of the rights of safety of others.”
Application: Navy Lt. Coughlin had every right to be upset after being attacked by a group of men at the Las Vegas Hotel. The Tailhook Convention which was hosted by the Tailhook Association was merely holding its annual symposium and convention primarily for the military aviators. There was no way that the association could know that this particular incident would happen. As for the hotel, there should be every precaution available in order to make guests and non-guests feel safe. The have an obligation to their customers to make sure that everything is in order and safety is a priority.
Conclusion: Coughlin did in fact have a valid claim against the Hilton Corporation. Coughlin was in an environment where she should have felt safe, but instead she was put into an uncomfortable position. Even though she was not staying at that particular hotel and at another one that was nearby, she was supposed to feel safe. Since she was attending the convention at that location, she also had a right to fell safety in that particular environment. Hilton was in fact negligent toward Coughlin. As for the Tailhook Association, if they had have gone to trial, they would have not lost their case. They were merely acting as host and did not own the location or have reign over what the particular location did as far as safety and its issues.