Memorandum
The issue being discussed within this memorandum is whether or not a person is capable, by law, to intentionally and premeditatedly commit homicide while Intoxicated; since this is usually considered involuntary or reckless, manslaughter.
Under Virginia law, murder is defined as "the unlawful killing of another with malice aforethought." Stapleton v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 825, 96 S. E. 801; Premeditation, or specific intent to kill, distinguishes murder in the first from murder in the second degree; proof of this element is essential to conviction of the former offense, and the burden of proving it clearly rests with the prosecution. Shiflett v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 609, 130 S. E. 777; Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 432, 201 S. E. 2d 749.
Joe a resident of Norfork, Virginia, is angry with his boss, Jerry, because he has just been fired. Joe goes to a bar and drowns his sorrows in 4 pints of been. Joe leaves the bar with a new degree of “liquid courage.” He goes into the hardware store and purchases a knife, he then staggers straight to Jerry’s house. He bursts into Jerry’s house, hunts down Jerry, and kills him with the knife. Joe is arrested and tried for first degree murder. The prosecution alleges that the murder was premeditated and announces that it will be seeking the death penalty for Joe. Joe claims that although the murder was planned and voluntary, he was so drunk that he could not have properly formed the intent to kill and should therefore not be subject to the murder charge. According to Virginia Code § 18.2-32. First and second degree murder defined; punishment. Murder, other than capital murder, by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or by any willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or in the commission of, or attempt to commit, arson, rape, forcible sodomy, inanimate or animate object sexual penetration, robbery, burglary or abduction, except as provided in § 18.2-31, is murder of the first degree, punishable as a Class 2 felony. In regards to our case Joe has committed a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing therefore under this Virginia definition Joe is guilty and has confessed to the act of first degree murder. Model Penal Code § 2.08(4)–(5) has distinguished three types of intoxication: 1.) voluntary ("self-induced") intoxication; 2.) pathological intoxication; and 3.) involuntary ("non-self-induced") intoxication; Joe is obviously catergorized as voluntarily intoxicated.
Malice, a requisite element for murder of any kind, is unnecessary in manslaughter cases and is the touchstone by which murder and manslaughter cases are distinguished. Moxley v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 151, 157, 77 S.E.2d 389, 393 (1953). Malice may be either express or implied by conduct. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 197, 201, 35 S.E.2d 96, 97 (1945). In our case Joe has acted with malice as implied by his conduct of buying the knife at the hardware store and then hunting Jerry down to kill him. Where death proximately results from the want of ordinary care as practiced by a reasonably prudent person, the causative negligence is actionable as a tort. If the negligence is so gross, wanton, and culpable as to show a reckless disregard of human life, a killing resulting therefrom, although unintentional, is both a tort and a crime, punishable as involuntary manslaughter. King v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 601, 607, 231 S.E.2d 312, 316 (1977). Since Joe’s actions were intentional and done with a reckless disregard of human life, Joe should not be considered guilty of involuntary manslaughter, he should be held accountable for his actions as defined under Virginia state law. Whether the defendant acted with malice is a question for the trier of fact. “Express malice is evidenced when ‘one person kills another with a sedate, deliberate mind, and formed design.’ .... Implied malice exists when any purposeful, cruel act is committed by one individual against another without any, or without great, provocation; ....” Pugh v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 663, 668, 292 S.E.2d 339, 341 (1982). Joe’s actions were both purposeful and cruel, he committed them against his boss without great provocation, and with complete disregard for the law.
According to the Model Penal Code, a Mens Rea Defense states that any form of intoxication is a defense to criminal conduct if it negates an element of the offense. [MPC § 2.08(1)] Since the Code does not distinguish between "general intent" and "specific intent" offenses, the mens rea defense is broadly applied, with one exception. In the case of crimes defined in terms of recklessness, a person acts "recklessly" as to an element of the crime if, as the result of the self-induced intoxication, he was not conscious of a risk of which he would have been aware had he not been intoxicated. [MPC § 2.08(2)] to general-intent crimes. Voluntary intoxication is a defense to specific intent crimes. Two states, Virginia and Pennsylvania, limit the defense of voluntary intoxication to first- degree murder prosecutions. In states that recognize the defense in all specific-intent crimes, if the crime of "murder" is divided into degrees, a defendant may generally introduce evidence that his intoxication prevented him from being able to form the requisite state of mind for first-degree murder.
When you annalize the referenced and cited information above it would be fair for a reasonable person to conclude that voluntary intoxication does not excuse criminal conduct. Joe had the malice necessary to be considered reckless and as the result of self-induced intoxication. This could also be held to prove he also possessed the mens rea required during his crime to be tried for the intentional and premeditated commission of homicide while intoxicated.