Chan, 1 Hiokei Chan David Benatar

Better Never to Have Been: the Harm of Coming into Existence
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2006, 237pp., $30.00, ISBN 978-0-19-954926-9 Reviewed by Hiokei Chan, Michigan State University Benatar's main argument is that “coming into existence is always bad for those who come into existence” (2006:4), thus there is moral duty not to procreate; and a fetus in its earlier stage should be aborted. It results that the existence of one person should counted as overpopulation, and it is good for human to extinct. In the introduction, Benatar first claims that his argument can be applied to all sentient beings, but his focus will be on humans. In the part subtitled “Who is so lucky”, Freud's claim that there is no good or best for the non-existent people elicits the 'non-identity' problem, which will later be solved. By speaking about the 'never-existent' which refers to nothing, Benatar is using this expression as a convenient term to mean those possible but non-actual beings. In Chapter 2, Benatar firstly claims that the expression 'a life worth living' should be specified as either 'a life worth starting' or 'a life worth continuing'. Then he tries to explain why coming into existence is always a harm by the asymmetry of pleasure and pain: (1) the presence of pain is bad, (2) the presence of pleasure is good, (3) the absence of pain is good, (4) the absence of pleasure is not bad unless it implies a deprivation. The first two points are evident, but (3) and (4) are controversial. The 'non-identity' problem can be raised against (3), since (3) can be interpreted as the absence of pain is good for the nonexistent being. Benatar replies that (3) claims that “this absence is good when judged in terms of the interests of the person who would otherwise have existed” (2006: 31). However, this reply is still problematic since it implies a