“De dicto” is a term which means “ of the word” where “de re” is a term which means “of the thing”. We use these two distinctions to express ourselves in a more intentionally accurate way. For example, Mary Jane Watson, Peter Parker’s love interest, believes that Spider Man can crawl on walls. Mary Jane believes the statement is true “de re” because Spider Man can crawl on walls and “de dicto” because Mary Jane believes those words are true. However, Peter Parker is Spider Man which means that the names “Spider Man” and “Peter Parker” pick out the same one person or thing. With that, I can restate the proposition as Mary Jane Watson, Peter Parker’s love interest, believes that Peter Parker can crawl on walls. However now Mary Jane believes this statement is false “de dicto” and true “de re”. It is false “de dicto” because Mary Jane does not know the words to be true; she is not aware that Peter Parker and Spider Man are the same one person or thing. Nevertheless the restated proposition is true “de re” because Spider Man and Peter Parker are the same one person and since Spider Man can crawl on walls it must be true that Peter Parker can crawl on walls.

Other terms that we use to clearly state our intention are rigid designators, both temporal and modal. They are terms designed to refer, denote or pick out the same thing in all possible worlds. It only refers to that thing in worlds where it exists and does not refer to anything else in worlds where it does not exist. For example, the statement ‘the governor of California had an affair with the housekeeper’. This statement would need a temporally rigid designator stating the time Arnold Schwarzenegger was governor so that we are able to pick him out. In the state of California, a governors term is four years and it is possible, without reelection, to have a new governor of California every four years. By adding on a temporal rigid designator, it allows the object to not lose its reference over time. We can restate the presentation as ‘Arnold Schwarzenegger, the governor of California in 2011, had an affair with his housekeeper’. This new rephrased proposition now becomes a temporally rigid statement.

The way this argument is presented can be construed as a little hard to follow due it being a single sentence. Spend a little time playing with the words and using the same method as the Spider-man argument. Such as Arnold is the governor of California in 2011 (and then the modal modifier), the governor of California in 2011 had an affair with his housekeeper, thus Arnold had an affair with his housekeeper. Or something along those lines, the simple sentence arrangement does not convey the argument very well.

In another world, Arnold Schwarzenegger could have been referred to by a different name. Also, in another world, Britney Spears, or any other person, could have been the governor of California in 2011 that had the affair with the housekeeper. By adding on a modally rigid designator (R), it allows the object to not lose its reference over possible worlds. If we modally rigidify ‘Arnold Schwarzenegger’ and ‘the governor of California in 2011’, then it will pick out the same person or thing in every possible world. I can designate this world, the world where Arnold Schwarzenegger is the name of the governor of California in 2011 that had the affair with the housekeeper, as “world alpha”. We can restate the presentation as ‘Arnold Schwarzenegger, the governor of California in 2011, had an affair with his housekeeper (R). This new rephrased proposition also becomes necessarily true. If it is necessarily true, then it is true in all possible worlds (from module) rather than it being possibly true. If it were possibly true, then it would be true in one possible world (from module).

The Modal Argument presented by Saul Kripke states that “Pain can exist without c-fibers firing. Therefore there is a world where pain exists but there are no c-fibers firing. Therefore pain and c-fibers firing are not the same one thing in that world. Therefore they are not the same one thing in any world.” I believe that Kripke has made a de re/ de dicto conflation in his argument. If we take the first part of his argument, ‘pain can exist without c-fibers firing’, we see that is it not necessarily true. It conflicts with the ‘de re necessity of identity’; A and B are the same one thing, then they are necessarily the same thing, de re (from module). In this world, world alpha, pain and c-fibers are part of the same one brain state. The same way Peter Parker and Spider Man are part of the same one person. If we modally rigidify “pain” and “c-fibers firing” then they should pick out the same brain state in every possible world.

We take the second part of the argument, ‘therefore there is a world where pain exists but there are no c-fibers firing’, and we find this statement to be false. There can not be such a world where “pain” exists and “c-fibers firing” do not. If we recall from earlier, rigid designators are terms designed to refer, denote or pick out the same thing in all possible worlds. Also, it only refers to that thing in worlds where it exists and does not refer to anything else in worlds where it does not exist. We move on to the third part, ‘therefore pain and c-fibers firing are not the same one thing in that world’. This goes against the necessity of non-identity, de re, which states if A and B are non-identical in one world then they are non-identical in every world. It can not be said that “pain” and “c-fibers firing” are not the same one thing in that possible world. Either term picks out the same one brain state in all possible worlds because they have been modally rigidified. The last part of the argument, ‘therefor they are not the same one thing in any world’, is false. There is no such world where “pain” and “c-fiber firing” are not the same one brain state because we modally rigidified the terms to be necessarily true. If we recall from earlier, if it is necessarily true, then it is true in all possible worlds.