Chapter 4
RSOI
An expeditionary Army depends on its ability to project combat power where needed. The process of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration is designed to rapidly combine and integrate arriving elements of personnel, equipment, and materiel into combat power that can be employed by the CCDR. This chapter discusses the segments of RSOI.
Overview
4-1. The purpose of RSOI is to build the combat power necessary to support the CCDR's concept of operation. Force closure is that point which the combatant commander determines that an adequate combat-ready force is available. Force closure requires well-defined criteria by which unit commanders can measure their readiness. Assessment of combat power begins with established standards for readiness and is based on unit capability, rather than simple tallies of vehicles and weapon systems on hand. Readiness and reporting are inherently operational matters, normally handled through operations channels.
Segments of RSOI
4-2. RSOI operations are necessary for commanders to build combat power. The four segments of RSOI are—
 Reception. Unloading personnel and equipment from strategic transport assets, managing port marshalling areas, transporting personnel, equipment, and materiel to staging areas, and providing logistics support services to units transiting the PODs.
 Staging. Organizing personnel, equipment, and basic loads into movement units; preparing the units for onward movement; and providing logistics support for units transiting the staging area.
 Onward movement. Moving units from reception facilities and staging areas to the tactical assembly areas (TAAs) or other theater destinations; moving non-unit personnel to gaining commands; and moving sustainment supplies to distribution sites.
 Integration. The synchronized transfer of capabilities into an operational commanders force prior to mission execution.
Principles of RSOI
4-3. The following principles guide the planning and execution of RSOI operations—
 Unity of command. One commander should control and operate the RSOI process - adjusting resources based upon deployment flows, controlling movements in the area of operations, and providing life support to arriving personnel.
 Synchronization. Synchronization occurs when the right units, equipment, supplies, and capabilities arrive in the correct order at the appropriate locations, and supporting activities are coordinated to operate with one another to ensure the tempo of deployment is uninterrupted.
 Unit integrity. Moving unit personnel and equipment on the same strategic lift platform provides distinct advantages for units and the force closure process. It leverages the strength of the chain of command, simplifies force tracking, and increases training opportunities. While it is impossible to put an entire armored battalion on one airplane, the increased sealift of the LMSR allows movement of all the battalion equipment on a single ship. Maintaining unit integrity during strategic lift can simplify the RSOI challenge of incrementally building combat power.
 Balance. Defining the size of the required support structure required is essential to effectiveness. The goal is to avoid burdening strategic lift, infrastructure, and the commander with more support than is necessary, yet deploy minimum assets necessary to optimize throughput of units and materiel. Supporting assets must be deployed in a properly timed sequence to leverage their capabilities and may be increased to reduce vulnerability of the overall force. Increasing the RSOI capability to clear backlogs in ports and staging areas can be a tool to reduce force vulnerability.
Security
4-4. All military operations have some element of risk. To build combat power at an acceptable rate the RSOI process must be protected from enemy threats. The arriving force is most vulnerable when it is closing on the POD and undergoing reception, staging, and onward movement. It is the responsibility of the CCDR to protect the arriving force and his staff must coordinate with the inbound unit to mitigate any risk.
RSOI Infrastructure
4-5. RSOI operations are the responsibility of the CCDR and his designated command and control headquarters, normally a theater sustainment command. The TSC controls the physical facilities and collaborates with the advanced echelon of the arriving headquarters to establish the throughput rate it can handle. The deploying forces have a responsibility for their own security, organization, and movement through the RSOI process to the extent possible. The process is supported by outside entities such as host nation operators and contractors.
4-6. The complex RSOI system is usually composed of several elements, each contributing to the process—
 In-place command and control forces
 Advanced echelon of the deploying units
 Deploying forces
 Host nation and multinational support elements
 Contractor support
 Army prepositioned stocks
4-7. The RSOI infrastructure also includes some of the theater's distribution nodes. Nodes are a location in a distribution system where a movement requirement is originated, processed for onward movement, or terminated.
RSOI Execution
4-8. RSOI effectiveness is dependent upon proper TPFDD development. For example, the combatant commander places rapid port clearance capabilities early in the TPFDD and coordinates personnel and equipment flows on the TPFDD so they can be united without delay at ports or staging areas. Decisions on force mix and sequence are critical, because adjustments after deployments begin become difficult to implement. Moreover, changes cause ripple effects and may seriously disrupt the flow of forces into the JOA.
4-9. Communication is necessary at all levels, and across all modes and nodes. The communication system must link the combatant commander, the supporting combatant commands, the deploying units, the RSOI providers, and the tactical commanders who will integrate the deploying force into their structures. Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civilian considerations (METT-TC) may cause certain units to be in high demand or necessary for immediate employment. Critical resources like heavy equipment transporters, fuel support, or buses to move personnel may have to be diverted to rapidly move these units.
4-10. Secure, assured, compatible, and reliable means of relaying deployment data is essential. Most importantly, the JFC must be able to influence the outcome of the deployment. To do this, he must know what force capabilities he has and what will be available in the near future.
Optimization
4-11. The commander's planning and operational dilemma is balancing the need for early deployment of combat forces against the requirement to deploy tailored logistical units that maximize throughput of sustainable combat forces. To resolve this dilemma, the commander must have the ability to see, understand, and balance the flow. The combatant commander defines force requirements in terms of size, location, and time while the TPFDD defines the force flow needed to meet these requirements. Knowledge of the RSOI infrastructure present in the theater, coupled with assets arriving via the TPFDD, is critical to understanding the flow.
4-12. The relationship between throughput volume and RSOI infrastructure is important to commanders trying to optimize force closure capacity. Accelerating the arrival of combat forces in the TAA requires an increased deployment of RSOI forces. Deploying additional RSOI forces costs space on strategic lift and requires additional positions in the TPFDD. The combatant commander applies the necessary command and control to ensure unity of command, and establishes communications for a seamless flow of information to manage and influence the force buildup. Achieving the correct balance will maximize the ability to throughput forces and ultimately improve force closure times.
Coordination
4-13. The Army operates in diverse environments and conducts a variety of operations as part of joint, multinational, or interagency teams. This fact increases the difficulty of RSOI and reaffirms the need for established procedures, mutually understood relationships, and robust liaison. Army commanders need to understand how best to integrate their forces into the various organizations under which they will operate.
Joint
4-14. Joint integration of planning and execution is key to successful RSOI. This, however, does not occur automatically; it requires trained staffs, pre-established procedures, and ongoing coordination. Even though logistics is a Service responsibility, the combatant commander may direct that a particular Service perform certain common user logistics functions, based on the dominant-user or most-capable-Service concept. For example, the Army may be designated the lead Service responsible to provide all common user logistics transportation and movement control for RSOI within the operational area. In this case, the Army service component commander must be familiar with the total transportation and movement control requirements of the other Services to permit optimum resource allocation necessary to address their needs.
Multinational
4-15. Major differences in logistics doctrine, mobility, resources, interoperability, and language create problems in coordinating the use of highways, rail lines, seaports, and airfields, as well as providing support and services for multinational RSOI operations. Considerable planning is required to integrate multinational forces requirements for ship berthing and unloading facilities, port staging space, transportation, and labor which are critical elements of RSOI.
4-16. While logistics is ordinarily a national responsibility, it frequently falls to the United States to provide strategic lift and logistics support. It is imperative to establish clear responsibilities, and identify support roles early in the planning process. Whenever possible, multinational organizations should be formed to coordinate RSOI operations. This should allow multinational members to use common items, and to set up commonly understood control measures.
4-17. Plans and operations for multinational RSOI should be as simple as possible, using common terms and procedures, and clear and concise language. Where possible, coalition commanders may combine staffs of two or more nations to better coordinate RSOI capabilities, facilitate exchange of vital information, and reduce friction, congestion, and duplication associated with multiple users of limited assets.
Host Nation Support
4-18. Host nation support is civil and military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war. This assistance is normally outlined in host nation support agreements mutually concluded between nations. In many cases, US forces must rely on host nation support to supplement or provide services, supplies, and facilities. This is especially significant when the combatant commander tries to minimize the support forces early in the deployment.
4-19. It is beneficial to establish host nation agreements beforehand, when possible. Where no agreements are in place, the combatant commander's staff and RSOI manager should understand the RSOI capabilities or resources of prospective host nations and the contractual procedures necessary to obtain them. It is also important that the host nation understand overall US requirements. Moreover, as early as possible, representatives, with interpreters and translators, must be sent to negotiate the acquisition of host nation services
4-20. Host nation support, by providing a variety of services and facilities, relieves US forces from the task of establishing and maintaining equivalent capabilities, thereby reducing the US logistical footprint and RSOI "overhead." Additional lift becomes available for transport of combat forces, expediting force closure. Services and facilities that might be considered for host nation support are as follows:
 Logistics support
 Medical facilities
 Construction and engineering
 Police and paramilitary organizations
 Transportation assets and infrastructure
 Labor force
 Emergency services
 Fuel and power facilities
 Communications facilities
Interagency
4-21. In the course of joint and multinational operations, the Army operates alongside US and non-US government agencies, non-governmental agencies. In most cases, these organizations and agencies will compete for space at ports, airfields, and facilities being used for military operations. They will also travel over the same lines of communication (LOCs) and may require a variety of support from the military.
4-22. To promote unity of effort and assess the impact of these agencies and organizations on the RSOI effort, the JFC can establish a civil-military operations center. In addition, it may be necessary to develop formal agreements between the military and civilian organizations to improve coordination and effectiveness.
Liaison
4-23. Liaison with forces of each Service, nation, and higher and adjacent headquarters is a prerequisite for effective RSOI and timely transfer of critical information. Whenever possible, liaison personnel should be familiar with operational organizations, doctrine, and procedures of the force with which they will work. For multinational operations, they should either speak the language of the force they are with or use qualified interpreters.
4-24. Liaison elements need to be familiar with the overall RSOI plan. They must understand how their Service fits into the overall plan for building combat power. It is helpful if the liaison members are experienced in joint/multinational operations.
Command and Control
4-25. RSOI operations will have one commander. The CCDR may designate a subordinate commander to execute RSOI, but they report to him. The commanders of the theater sustainment command, expeditionary sustainment command, or a sustainment brigade are potential candidates for the role. All organizations engaged in RSOI whether units arriving or those operating the arrival nodes report to the designated commander. There are obvious advantages of designating one organization as the RSOI command and control element. It avoids duplication of effort and competition for critical facilities. It optimizes use of valuable strategic lift and allows integrated reporting of activities related to the buildup of combat forces. Although the specific responsible organization may change from one phase to another or between different contingencies, the principle of unity of command must be maintained.
Port Opening
4-26. The planning and execution of rapid port openings are essential for expeditionary operations. The successful opening of multiple ports facilitates expansion into a robust theater deployment and distribution system. The Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO) and the Transportation Theater Opening Element (TTOE) are organizations designed to open ports and establish the initial distribution network.
JTF-PO
4-27. Responding to crisis situations ranging from humanitarian missions to major combat operations requires a capability to rapidly establish initial theater deployment and distribution operations. The joint and expeditionary nature of this requirement demands a joint force structure, comprised of air and surface elements.
4-28. The JTF-PO combines USAF, Navy, and Army capabilities to provide USTRANSCOM and the theater commander with a ready-to-deploy, trained force for opening ports and establishing the initial distribution network. In addition, JTF-PO facilitates JRSOI and theater distribution by providing an effective interface with the theater CCDR's Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC). Functions that the JTF-PO may perform in the accomplishment of its mission include:
 APOD/SPOD assessment.
 Distribution network assessment.
 Establishment of command and control (C2) connections with the JDDOC.
 APOD/SPOD opening and initial operation.
 Distribution node management.
 Cargo and passenger transfer operations and cargo movement to distribution nodes.
 Movement control including coordination for onward movement of arriving cargo and passengers.
 In transit visibility (ITV).
Transportation Theater Opening Element
4-29. When the sustainment brigade is given the mission to manage a theater opening operation it is augmented with a mix of functional and multifunctional organizations. The transportation theater opening element provides staff augmentation to a sustainment brigade headquarters engaged in theater opening operations. The TTOE provides transportation functional expertise for staff planning and supervision of units engaged in force reception and distribution operations.
4-30. TTOE functions include—
 Monitors movements program, maintains operational status, and commits transportation assets in support of RSOI operations.
 Advises on the use of assigned motor, air, and rail transport assets, monitors the status of all mode operations.
 Advises on the use of assigned terminal and watercraft operations and provides terminal infrastructure assessments.
Reception
4-31. As the initial step in introducing combat power, reception can determine success or failure of the RSOI operation. Reception from strategic lift is implemented at or near designated air and seaports of debarkation, normally under control of the combatant commander. It must be thoroughly planned and carefully executed. While the reception plan for each theater may vary, reception capacity should at least equal planned strategic lift delivery capability.
4-32. The intelligence preparation of the operating environment and analysis of theater reception capability provide an understanding of how competition for reception at airfields and seaports could affect the force flow. For example, in Desert Storm at the Port of Dammam, 33 total berths were available, yet no more than 17 were used because the remaining berths were dedicated to domestic Saudi commerce. It is also possible that Marine forces will arrive in the theater simultaneously with Army forces and compete for the same ports.
4-33. For the initial period of deployment, the aerial port is the lifeline to the front-line. All that is not pre-positioned or available from the host nation comes through the aerial terminal. Then the first surge sealift ships begin to arrive, dramatically increasing forces. Airlift remains a critical element regarding delivery of personnel, but most unit equipment to build the combat power arrives through seaports.
Reception Functions
4-34. Synchronizing transportation reception activities are critical to facilitating throughput at the ports of debarkation. They include command and control, movement control, and port operations.
Command and Control
4-35. Like any other in-theater activity, reception is under command and control of the combatant commander. However reception planning and execution is the responsibility of the commander assigned the responsibility for RSOI. In most combatant commands the commander will designate a senior leader to command and control RSOI operations.
4-36. The arrival of strategic air and sealift will be controlled by the combatant commander through the USTRANSCOM element attached to his staff. The APOD and SPOD will normally be managed by AMC and SDDC respectively, and operated by the designated logistics organization under command and control of the lead Service.
Movement Control
4-37. Efficient movement control allows commanders to redirect forces and rapidly compensate for disruptions in the LOCs. A movement control element must be positioned at each reception node, and remain in constant communication with USTRANSCOM elements on-site, and with other movement control elements in-theater. A well-disciplined and centralized system must be implemented to control movements along all LOCS. The movement control system is responsible for establishing protocols with host/allied nations concerning use of available transportation nodes and infrastructure.
4-38. Two factors determine reception throughput: reception capacity and clearance capability. All ports have finite processing and storage space, and unless personnel and equipment are cleared quickly, the port will become congested, cargo will be frustrated due to inaccurate or lost documentation, and the infrastructure will be unable to receive forces at the required rate of delivery. Factors contributing to efficient port clearance are proper documentation, professional movement control expertise, adequate materiel/container handling equipment, and trained personnel. Port operators need timely and accurate documentation including advance information on forces and equipment arriving in-theater. Efficient movement control assures best use of available infrastructure and proper metered flow of forces and equipment according to operational priorities.
Port Operations
4-39. The RSOI command and control headquarters must control the deployment flow so that reception capabilities are not overwhelmed. APODs and SPODs should be considered integral parts of a single reception complex, unless the distance separating them precludes mutual support. Reception capacity depends on—
 Port and airfield infrastructure, condition, and characteristics.
 Availability of host nation labor and port services.
 Off-loading and holding space.
 Weather.
 Enemy situation.
4-40. Port Selection. Seaport and airfield throughput capacities significantly influence the speed, order, and, to a large extent, the types of units that can deploy through them. Consequently, before thought is given to actual deployment of forces, planners must evaluate available airfield and port facilities within the area of operations, as well as the transportation networks linking them with each other and to the interior. As was the case during Operation Desert Storm, it may be better to use a world class port hundreds of miles away from TAAs rather than conduct an in-stream discharge operation or use a smaller, degraded port facility with limited capacity and throughput. Diplomatic and military contacts should be made at the earliest possible opportunity with the host nation controlling key facilities and rights of way.
4-41. The combatant commander in conjunction with USTRANSCOM selects the PODs that will be used for deployment. METT-TC considerations and the theater transportation infrastructure will drive the sequence, type, size of forces, and materiel arriving at ports of debarkation. These decisions impact the speed of combat power buildup and continued development of the theater. Ports of debarkation may need improvement and repair to accommodate high throughput rates required for rapid force closure. Thus, the early entry of units such as cargo transfer companies, Army watercraft, causeway detachments, and engineer assets can be critical to off-loading materiel, clearing ports and consequently speeding deployment.
4-42. APOD. Deployment by air is often constrained by the capabilities of the arrival airport more often than a shortage of aircraft. Issues such as concurrent civilian use, competition for landing and takeoff slots, ramp space, number of aircraft on the ground at one time, and political restrictions limit its use to military aircraft. Consequently, maximum throughput at limited airports is paramount. The APOD is by its very nature a joint facility and will likely be a multinational facility. It is a POD for deploying forces, and a POE for forces moving to other theaters and noncombatant evacuation. The host nation may limit the APOD to coalition military use, or the military may be sharing the facility with commercial activities. Governmental, non-governmental, and private organizations will likely be competing for use of the APOD along with military forces.
4-43. The APOD serves as the primary port of entry for all deploying personnel, as well as for early entry forces normally airlifted into theater together with their equipment. USTRANSCOM through AMC is the DOD-designated single port manager (SPM) for all common user APODs worldwide. The SPM performs those functions necessary to support the strategic flow of forces and sustainment supplies through the APOD. The SPM is responsible for providing deployment status information to the supported CCDR and clearing the airfield in accordance with the CCDR's priorities. Responsibility for APOD functions is divided between the USAF and the Army, with the USAF responsible for airfield operations including air terminal control, loading, unloading, and servicing of aircraft. The Army is responsible for clearing personnel and cargo off the tarmac and for required logistics support for transiting units. USAF/Army interface occurs between the USAF contingency response group (CRG)/CRE and the Army arrival/departure airfield control groups (A/DACG) and MCTs.
4-44. Necessary communication, personnel, and cargo handling equipment must be in place to facilitate rapid movement out of the airport. Both the CRE and the A/DACG must be included in the lead elements of the deploying force. The CRE controls all activities at the off-load ramp area and supervises aircraft off-loading. The A/DACG escorts loads and personnel to holding areas, thus clearing the airfield and ensures airfield operations and strategic airflow are not obstructed and limited due to the accumulation of cargo.
4-45. With responsibility divided between the USAF and the Army, and sometimes multinational forces, multiple chains of command exist within the aerial terminal, which may result in a variety of unforeseen challenges. Given this potential command relationship, potential for conflicting priorities necessitates careful planning and coordination during the reception process. For example, something straightforward as security responsibilities becomes complicated when there are two chains of commands at the same site. Special attention must be paid to ensure that airfield security, the USAF responsibility, and area security, an Army responsibility, are well coordinated among themselves as well as with multinational forces and the host nation.
4-46. SPOD. Activities at seaports are normally joint, multinational, and intermixed with commercial operations. Seaports can serve as ports of debarkation for arriving forces and simultaneously as ports of embarkation for forces deploying to other theaters of operations. The CCDR has several options for management of seaport operations in his theater. USTRANSCOM through SDDC is the DOD-designated single port manager (SPM) for all common user ports worldwide. The SPM (normally a transportation terminal group) performs those functions necessary to support the strategic flow of the deploying forces' equipment and sustainment supplies through the SPOD. The SPM is responsible for providing strategic deployment status information to the CCDR and to workload the SPOD port operator based on the CCDR's priorities and guidance. The SPM is responsible through all phases of theater port operational continuum from a logistics over-the-shore (LOTS) operation to a totally commercial contract-supported deployment.
4-47. Theater planners must consider several factors when assessing the port's capacity to receive the planned strategic flow. Some of the factors include state of repair, commercial utilization considering not only the port's capability, state of repair, commercial utilization, congestion, and throughput capacity. Throughput capability is based on the port's ability to receive, process, and clear personnel and equipment. The cargo reception function is based on the number and size of the berths, material handling equipment (MHE) and water depth; the cargo process function is based on staging area and the time it takes to marry units with their respective equipment; the cargo clearing function is based on truck and rail out loading facilities; gate capacity, and links to the theater transportation networks.
4-48. Seaport operations are similar to airport operations; once the vessels are off-loaded, unit equipment is moved to temporary holding areas within the port to be configured into convoys, rail loads, or watercraft loads. Unit equipment clearing the port moves to an intermediate staging base (ISB), an inland water terminal, or directly to the TAA.
4-49. The volume of cargo arriving in the theater in a small window of time can drive the need for multiple seaports to meet deployment timelines. The physical size of roll-on/roll-off ships and depth of water required to bring vessels of this class alongside a pier may also present a challenge. If world-class port facilities are available, off-loading can be rapidly accomplished. If facilities are less than world class or austere, then multiple ports and slower in-stream operations may be required.
4-50. The ability to receive forces in an operational area, despite degraded or austere ports is essential to the Army's force projection strategy. Army watercraft is the primary enabler in this process; they allow ships that cannot get to a pier to be off-loaded in-stream. Additional watercraft then moves the cargo to smaller coastal ports or directly over the shore. In-stream discharge operations are sensitive to weather and seas conditions and generally require a protected anchorage. (See JP 4-01.6 for additional information on LOTS).
Staging
4-51. Staging is that part of the RSOI operation that reassembles and reunites unit personnel with their equipment and schedules unit movement to the tactical assembly area (TAA0, secures or uploads unit basic loads, and provides life support to personnel. These activities occur at multiple sites in controlled areas called ISBs that are required because space limitations normally preclude reassembly of combat units at seaports of debarkation. In general, there will be at least one intermediate staging base (ISB) for each SPOD/APOD pairing.
Intermediate Staging Base
4-52. An ISB is a secure staging base established near but not in the area of operations. ISBs are temporary staging areas enroute to an operation and also may be used to sustain forces in the area of operations. ISB tasks and capabilities are contingent on the operational situation and are located where they can best support the force.
4-53. No two ISBs will be alike; some will be in operation for a few days while others will operate for an extended period. Although we refer to an ISB as if it were a single unit it is in reality a collection of brigade combat teams, sustainment, signal, military police, engineer, and support units brought together for a specific purpose. Figure 4-1 provides a graphic overview of how ISBs might be arrayed in a theater.
4-54. ISBs must deploy early to be prepared to receive deploying forces and to operate the nodes inherent in the theater distribution plan. The availability of appropriate reserve component units early in the flow is a risk in the ISB organization and may require host nation or contract support. Refer to DA Pamphlet 700-33 for guidance on establishing and operating an ISB.

Figure 4-1. Theater with multiple ports and ISBs
ISB Functions
Communications
4-55. Reliable, secure, and compatible communications are essential to operations in the theater staging base. The CCDR must know when forces are combat-capable and prepared for onward movement to give him the capability to control and employ these forces at the decisive point and time.
4-56. Force tracking provides situational awareness of combat-ready units within the operational area. While in transit visibility begins at home station, the process of force tracking begins in the staging area, where equipment and personnel are reassembled into combat-ready units. Staging operations must have the communications, data processing equipment, and personnel assets to provide and manage force tracking data. Efficient movement control can provide force tracking information but it must be able to communicate directly with operational commanders.
4-57. ITV acts as a staging enabler by providing commanders with clear pictures of locations of units and materiel in RSOI and deployment. For the ISB commander, ITV provides an awareness of the scheduled arrival of personnel and equipment, so the resources required to support them, as well as time required to assemble the unit in a mission-ready configuration, are available.
4-58. At present, there are a number of joint systems in various stages of development that provide visibility of force deployment and sustainment. Unfortunately, present systems do not completely satisfy the requirements of force tracking and much of the process must be accomplished manually.
Life Support
4-59. Regardless of time actually spent in the ISB, troops staging through it will require support, including housing, sustenance, sanitation, and health care. RSOI planners must ensure that the force provider units are sequenced early in the TPFDD to be in place and functioning by the time the first units arrive. Even if this requires displacement of some combat capability, it pays dividends later in the operation in the form of higher throughput, faster buildup of combat power, and earlier force closure. The Army Force Provider units, each designed to provide base camp support to 550 people, as well as USAFs Prime Beef and Prime Rib units, are viable options for providing support to transient forces.
Arming, Fueling, and Fixing
4-60. Equipment arriving at the ISB may require maintenance before it becomes combat ready. This includes calibration of equipment, bore sighting of weapons, replacement of parts damaged in transit, painting, and re-fueling. The ISB should provide adequate facilities to support these activities, including marshalling areas, maintenance shelters, fuel and ammunitions storage, a test-driving loop, and range areas.
Preparation of Units for Onward Movement
4-61. In addition to preparing equipment, units at the ISB undergo training and reorganization. Communications networks are established, vehicle loads are reconfigured and RFID tags are updated so that tracking systems allow senior commanders to monitor the buildup of combat power. Commanders must participate in planning the onward movement including route planning, unit tracking, and movement control.
Security
4-62. ISBs are high-value targets. Their destruction or damage results in serious delays in force closure and disruption of the CCDR's concept of operations. Maintaining the flow of forces through the ISB can be the best means of reducing their vulnerability to attack.
Force Closure
4-63. In order to meet the force closure requirements, the time that units spend in the ISB must be minimized. Staging should not be a lengthy process, but inefficiencies can cause delays, for example, personnel arriving before their equipment, equipment arriving before its personnel, frustrated cargo, and gaps in matching troops with proper equipment. In fact, a battalion-sized unit should strive to spend no more than two days in the ISB.
4-64. ISBs should be located in areas convenient to both the SPOD and APOD, with good lines of communication back to ports of debarkation and forward to designated TAAs. In addition, the ISB should have sufficient space to accommodate the largest force scheduled to stage through it, together with facilities for vehicle marshalling, materiel handling, equipment maintenance and calibration, and possibly bore sighting and test firing of weapons. All of these are needed if the ISB is to fulfill its function of converting personnel and equipment into mission-ready combat units.
4-65. Other factors affecting selection of an ISB include geography and terrain and availability of organic and host nation assets. These factors, together with the size of the deploying force, may often necessitate multiple ISBs. The requirement for multiple staging bases is most evident in the urban sprawl of Europe and Korea, particularly around seaport facilities. In many cases, it is tremendously difficult to find even one square mile of open terrain much less the total space requirement for an ISB.
4-66. Under normal circumstances, troops deploy by air, while equipment deploys by sea and or rail. The speed differential between air and sea surface transportation is the fundamental cause of complexity and potential difficulties in the staging process. Troops and equipment must be sequenced in the TPFDD so that both arrive (nearly) simultaneously, expeditiously unite, and ready themselves for onward movement.
4-67. Troops arriving too early must be provided with meals and quarters while waiting for their equipment to arrive. The TSC or one of its sustainment brigades would be expected to accommodate these needs. Moreover, the mass of immobile, unprotected troops presents an inviting and vulnerable target. On the other hand, if equipment arrives much earlier than the troops, ports of debarkation can become congested, and space management becomes critical.
4-68. Early deployment of essential support units at the expense of combat units pays dividends later by speeding the flow of the entire force, enhancing the CCDR's ability to build combat power and increase operational flexibility. Conversely, front loading the TPFDD with combat forces may jeopardize the CCDR's ability to build up forces as rapidly as required and reduce his flexibility.
Onward Movement
4-69. Personnel and equipment reassembled as combat-ready units must be moved to the TAA based on the CCDR's priorities. Onward movement is a joint/multinational effort using capabilities and organizational structures of other Services, allies, host nation and other governmental entities. It is an iterative activity in which units advance from one LOC node to another. Onward movement occurs when units move from ports to theater staging bases or forward to the TAA. Three primary factors affecting onward movement are movement control, transportation infrastructure, and security.
Movement Control
4-70. Movement control is defined as planning, routing, scheduling, and control of forces and sustainment over lines of communication, while maintaining in-transit visibility and force tracking. This is not a passive activity. Successful movement control requires continual analysis of requirements, capabilities, shortfalls, alternatives, and enhancements. Bottlenecks within the theater must be identified and potential interruptions to the flow minimized. One of the biggest challenges of movement control is rapidly adjusting to changes in the operational environment and the commander's priorities. The challenge of a theater movements program is to merge the CCDR's concept of operations and priorities in a movement plan and execute them. This challenge can be met by employing an adequate number of movement control resources, appropriately enabled by communications, to anticipate and improvise. Efficient movement control enables the commander to redirect forces and rapidly overcome disruptions in the LOC.
Transportation Infrastructure
4-71. The transportation infrastructure routes, control factors, host nation support, and specialized handling requirements must be coordinated to maximize speed of movement. Capabilities of the transportation network must be balanced against movement requirements, so that modes and routes are neither saturated nor underused.
4-72. The other services and allied forces will be competing for the same networks as the Army and congestion will result if proper coordination is not accomplished. Planners should anticipate simultaneous demands on limited infrastructure, difficulties with communications, and differences in transportation capabilities.
4-73. During onward movement, mode selection determines whether the commander of the unit in transit maintains control during the move or whether control of the move is exercised by elements of the TSC. Ideally, tracked vehicles should be moved by rail or heavy equipment transporters and wheeled vehicles should move in a convoy. Inland and coastal waterways should be used when available if they afford useful solutions.
4-74. Establishment of convoy support centers and trailer transfer points along main supply routes and other support centers at temporary airfields, rail sites and waterway drop off points, further aids onward movement. These allow units and line haul drivers to rest, eat, perform vehicle maintenance, and contact unit/movement control personnel to receive operational updates, revised priorities, and when necessary diversions.
Security
4-75. The onward movement phase can provide the enemy with numerous opportunities to inflict serious losses and delay the build-up of combat power by exploiting vulnerability of units in transit from the ISB to the TAA. Security consists of those actions taken by the unit to protect it against all acts designed to, or may impair its effectiveness.
4-76. Enemy interdiction of onward movement presents special challenges that can be partially overcome by using alternative routing and mode substitution when feasible but all units must be prepared to defend themselves. OIF convoys are organized and tightly controlled to afford a higher degree of security. Moreover, hardened gun trucks escort the convoys and additional armed personnel ride in the vehicles to immediately engage insurgents as required.
4-77. Security is an important component of warfighting. Security is the responsibility of the moving force itself and forces of the CCDR. Care must be taken to avoid or neutralize explosive devices and attacks on the movement with direct or indirect fires.
Integration
4-78. During integration, combat-ready units are transferred to the operational commander and merged into the tactical plan. The transfer may require interaction and familiarization among units and that arriving units meet certain standards before being completely integrated into the combat plan. Consequently, requirements for integration planning and coordination must occur early in the force projection process and modified according to METT-TC until force closure is achieved.
4-79. The time required for integration may vary, depending upon the size of the total force, contingency conditions, and amount of predeployment and ongoing planning and coordination. Rapid integration, however, is critical to the success of combat operations, and adequate planning and coordination can reduce integration time.
4-80. Thorough integration has to be completed before a unit is operational and can perform its mission. Integration is complete when the CCDR establishes positive command and control over the arriving unit, usually in the TAA, and the unit is capable of performing its assigned mission.
4-81. Control measures, such as liaison officers or movement control teams can reduce confusion between integrating units, RSOI forces, and receiving headquarters. These measures act as guardians of the commander's intent and focus effort on force integration. These measures should be established immediately as part of the planning process and be maintained throughout the RSOI process.

This chapter deals with reception and onward movement of units arriving in an area of operations and delineates responsibilities. Reception is a command re sponsibility. The senior Army logistics command in theater, normally a theater support command or and augmented corps support command, is responsible for the health, welfare, and life support of arriving fo rces and for assisting with their onward movement.
Onward movement is coordinated by movement control units to en sure a smooth flow of personnel, equipment, and supplies through the PODs and inland lines of communication. Transfer of data from
United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCO
M) through Global Trans portation Network (GTN) and Total Asset Visibility (TAV) programs to the gaining command is essential to plan for reception and onward movement. (See figure 5-1 that depicts the reception process.)
5-3. Reception and onward movement within the th eater of operations require extensive coordination between transportation managers and the arriving unit commanders and staffs. TC-AIMS II assists both of these elements to accomplish this needed coordination.
. The senior theater movement control element (MCE) serves the primary role in managing the reception, staging, and onward movement operations in the theate
r. The MCE is responsible for movement of unit equipment and personnel arriving at seaports and ai rfields and their movement forward through marshaling areas and intermediate staging areas to their tactical assembly areas (TAA).
5-5. The port of debarkation (POD) is the normal tr ansfer point of command authority to the supported theater commander. The responsibility of moving the un it and maintaining intransit visibility (ITV) shifts from USTRANSCOM to the senior theater MCE, which c ontinues movement control of the unit to its final prescribed location in the theater.
5-6. Theater reception begins with the arrival of forces and their sustainment at the POD. The primary challenge of this process is port clearance. Except in the case of forcible entry, port-opening forces should precede the arrival of combat forces. Other combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces may either precede or arrive concurrently with combat forces to conduct force reception and onward movement operations, establish theater distribution infrastructure, or to conduct security operations.
5-7. Transportation request procedures are required for the orderly and expedi tious onward movement of unit equipment and supplies. The same principles for onward movement from the POD apply for both aerial and sea ports n SPOD is a port designated by the theater commander in coordination with
USTRANSCOM. When vessels arrive at the SPOD, the port commander is responsible for discharging the unit equipment, staging the equipm ent, maintaining control and ITV, and releasing it to the unit. The port commander remains responsible for unit equipment and supplies until they reach the staging area where arriving units assu me responsibility for their supplies and equipment.
The port MCT coordinate, plan, control, and manage the processing of the units’ equipment for onward movement. Their actions are based on advanced manifests received via Worldwide Port
System (WPS), available transportation, theater prio rities, tactical situation, and throughput capacity.
See figure 5-2 for a notional SPOD.
As the vessel readies for off-loading, the
Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) port commander establishes a staging area for the transs hipment and accounting of equipment. The port commander determines discharge priorities based on the supported combatant commander’s guidance and assigns missions to terminal service units that discharge vessels. The port commander assumes custody of the cargo from the vessel mast er upon discharge. Equipment offloaded is then staged by support elements based on theater onw ard movement requireme nts. Transportation terminal brigades (TTB), PSAs, cargo transfer companies, and cargo documentation teams may be assigned to operate staging area s under MTMC control. As unit personnel arrive in the theater, support units transport them to the staging area to assume custody of their equipment. Units assemble their equipment and supplies, assume cust ody, and move it to the marshaling area outside the terminal
Military Traffic Management Command Responsibilities in the Staging Area
5-10. When unit personnel, equipment, and supplie s arrive in the staging area, a MTMC element is there to meet the following responsibilities:
Supervise discharge of unit personnel, supplies, and equipment from vessels.
Operates the staging area to receive and control all equipment departing the vessel.
Ensures equipment and supplies are properly documented.
Transfer custody of equipment and cargo to arriving units in the staging area.
Establishes and direct s port communications.
Establishes and directs safety policies, and physical security procedures for sensitive
(protected) and classified items. Within this general category of safety and security, plans and implements procedures for the safe handling and storage of hazardous material
(HAZMAT); and controlled, sensitive, and pilf erable items. Provides safety briefings.
Ensures that HAZMAT items are properly labeled and documented as HAZMAT, and staged and stowed IAW CFR 49 and other prescribed regulations.
Regulates military traffic within the port.
Scans or interrogates all unit equipment and sustainment cargo as it leaves the vessel.
Incident to this tracking, makes a final check of automatic identification technology (AIT) tags to ensure they are readable and properly af fixed. Repairs or re places any AIT tags or military shipping labels (MSL) that are damaged, inaccurate, or missing. Sends the data to the GTN. (MSLs and AIT tags are scanned and the data sent to WPS then passed to GTN.)
Provides vehicle operators for all types of equipment to move vehicles from the vessels to the staging area and otherwise assist unloading the vessels.
Provides vehicle recovery area during unloading of vessels.
Perform liaison with arriving units.
Unit Responsibilities in the Staging Area
5-11. Generally, arriving units are recipients of suppo rt in the staging area. Unit responsibilities in this area are very basic.
Staging area responsibilities of units are shown below.
Assume custody of equipment and supplies from the port commander.
FM 4-01.011 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Chapter 5
5-5
Assemble equipment and supplies for movement to the marshaling area.
Move equipment and supplies to the ma rshaling area outside the terminal.
NOTE:
If marshaling areas are not available, as may be the case OCONUS, units should be prepared to move directly to their tactical assembly area (TAA) or to an Army prepositioned stock (APS) site to draw equipment from the staging area. When this is necessary, marshaling area functions have to be performed in the staging area.
Marshaling areas are virtually always available in CONUS.
MARSHALING AREA
5-12. Prompt clearance of cargo from the terminal is essential to the efficiency and success of the total theater logistics system. It is also necessary to avoid serious congestion in the terminal staging area. To clear the port efficiently, marshaling areas are established. The marshaling area is a location next to the port where units their equipment and supplies to assemble, reconfigure them, and prepare for onward movement.
Support Element or Other Tasked Unit
Responsibilities in the Marshaling Area
5-13. In order to clear the port area quickly to ma intain an efficient flow and avoid congestion, the port commander ICW the receiving command establis hes support elements in the marshaling areas.
These are elements from units tasked to provide the support and frequently come from the area support group (ASG) OCONUS. In CONUS, th ey are provided by installations or other organizations tasked by the receiving command. Regardless of their source, support element responsibilities and functions that can be ex pected in the marshaling area are shown below.
Maintain a central control and inspection point.
Provide a security area for sensitive items.
Provide life support facilities.
Create a traffic circulation plan showing move ment flow into the marshaling area and from the staging area.
Provide for maintenance and fuel area for vehicles and equipment.
Assist units in unpacking containers and repacking cargo as secondary loads.
Use TC-AIMS II to consolidate movement re quirements and submit movement taskings.
Provide emergency supplies and equipment for isolating and disposing of HAZMAT spills.
Scan cargo and equipment and it enters and leaves the marshaling area and using TC-AIMS
II provide the information to the local ITV server which will provide it to GTN.
NOTE
: If there is no MCT or ITO element in the marshaling area, the port transportation officer must provide the movement coordination support.
5-15. An APOD is an airfield th at has been designated for the sustained air movement of personnel and materiel, to serve as an authorized port for en trance into or departure from the country in which it is located. It is designated an APOD by the supported combatant commander in coordination with USTRANSCOM. Reception at the APOD is coordinated by the senior logistics commander and executed by (an Air Force) tanker airlift control element (TALCE), a port movement control team (port MCT), an arrival/departure airfield control group (A/DACG), or both, depending upon the magnitude of the operations. The port MCT and/or A/DACG must be in the lead elements of the transported force. Augmentation with cargo transfer companies, cargo documentation teams, theater support contractor, and host nation support (HNS) is desired to rapidly clear the port. The port MCT has the mission of coordinating transp ort services for the APOD and ensuring quick clearance of cargo movements into and out of the APOD. Both Air Force and Army have responsibilities at an APOD. Their locations are reflected in figur
5-16. The main areas of the APOD are the off-load ramp, the holding area, and the unit marshaling area (see Figure 5-3). The TALCE supervises off-loading arriving aircraft. The A/DACG escorts loads to the holding area and assists the unit in assembling and moving to the marshaling area
TALCE Responsibilities in the Off-Load Ramp Area
5-18. The TALCE is the Air Force authority that operates the airf ield and supervises the off-load ramp area. Some responsibilities and functions of the TALCE are to:
Advise the A/DACG of the airflow and expected arrival of aircraft.
Plan and supervise aircraft parking.
Receive passenger and cargo manifests from the aircraft loadmaster.
Supervise off-loading the aircraft, incl uding removal of shoring and dunnage.
Provide all MHE and special off-load ing equipment including operators.
Provide ITV using AIT to scan cargo and equipm ent as it comes off aircraft and use Global
Air Transportation Execution System (GATES) to transmit the data to GTN.
A/DACG Responsibilities In The Off-Load Ramp Area
5-19. The A/DACG supports the TALCE in the off-load ramp area. Its mission is airfield clearance operations. Some responsibilities and functions the A/DACG are to:
Maintain coordination with the arriving unit and TALCE representatives.
Coordinate for a detail from the arriving unit.
Provide off-load teams and support equipment to the TALCE as required.
Accept each planeload from the TALCE at the established release point.
Ensure that shoring and dunnage from the aircra ft is removed and transferred to the arriving unit. Unit Responsibilities in the Off-Load Ramp Area
5-20. Unit responsibilities in the off-load ramp area are:
Provide assistance to the loadmaster.
Comply with instructions from the off-load team chief when unlashing and off-loading the aircraft. Ensure that all aircraft tie-down equipment is returned to the TALCE.
Retain all shoring and dunnage for further use.
Provide passenger and cargo manifests to the A/DACG
Unit Responsibilities in the Holding Area
5-22. In the holding area, arriving units locate their equipment, prepare it for movement to the marshalling area, and generally be gin the process of “marrying-up” with organic supplies and equipment. Arriving units perform the following:
Provide unit liaison personnel to the A/DACG.
Assist the A/DACG as required.
Assume custody of equipment and supplies.
Move equipment and supplies to the ma rshaling area outside the terminal
Planning must focus on moving units th rough the APODs quickly. Marshaling areas are established to allow rapid clearing of the APODs, and to allow units to complete the process of restoring their equipment and supplies from shipme nt configuration to op erational configuration, and get ready for onward movement. Moving these activities to the marshaling areas reduces port congestion, thus reducing the potential for work sl owdown or stoppages duri ng off-load operations
The support unit in the marshaling will:
Maintain a central control and inspection point.
Provide a security area for sensitive items.
Provide life support facilities.
Create a traffic circulation plan showing move ment flow into the marshaling area and from the staging area.
Provide maintenance and fuel for vehicles and equipment.
Use TC-AIMS II to consolidate movement re quirements and submit movement taskings.
Provide emergency supplies and equipment for isolating and disposing of HAZMAT spills.
Scan cargo and equipment and it enters and leaves the marshaling area and using TC-AIMS
II provide the information to the local ITV server which will provide it to GTN.
Use TC-AIMS II to obtain convoy clearances and special hauling permits for arriving units.
Use TC-AIMS II to arrange for movement of cargo and equipment beyond the requesting units’ organic capabilities.
Provide technical assistance to units on loading commercial assets and railcars