Divine Omnipotence and Thomas Aquinas

In the evaluation of divine omnipotence, the natural assumption that God is capable of all things must be submitted to inquiry and close consideration. Although omnipotence is technically defined as all-encompassing, unlimited power, divine omnipotence is understood by many in a paradoxical way in the view that there are certain things that God, even as an ‘all-powerful being’, cannot do. In response to the argument that God is not omnipotent because he cannot falsify a necessary truth, Thomas Aquinas would argue that God’s power does not - and rationally should not be expected to - include things that are logically impossible. Under Aquinas’ assessment of the scope of omnipotence, the necessary truth argument is unsound because the statement ‘God cannot falsify a necessary truth’ is void by the definitional contradiction in falsifying a necessary truth.

Aquinas acknowledged the difficulty in defining and comprehending God’s power: “all confess that God is omnipotent…[but] it seems difficult to explain in what God’s omnipotence precisely consists” . However Aquinas eventually comes to assert that if something can be, then God can bring it about; His power extends to anything that does not involve a direct contradiction. For example, God cannot make a circle into a square. By definition, a circle is a geometric shape with no corners and a square is a geometric shape with four corners. Fundamentally, the states of being a square and a circle are mutually exclusive. Similarly, falsifying a necessary truth is impossible; it is a direct contradiction to what a necessary truth is by definition: something that cannot possibly be false. Therefore Aquinas’ response to the necessary truth argument would be that the argument is unsound on the basis that one cannot argue that God is not omnipotent because he is incapable of making the fundamentally impossible, possible.

To apply Aquinas’ perspective to the given argument requires particular focus on the controversial third proposition. Aquinas states, “To each active power there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object…for instance the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed”1. When determining if an event is fundamentally possible or impossible, one must evaluate if the direct object is capable of receiving the predicate. In the statement ‘God cannot falsify a necessary truth’, the direct object (a necessary truth) is receiving the action of the predicate (being falsified). By the definition of a necessary truth, it is incapable of the act of being falsified, voiding the statement as a whole. Aquinas would respond that by negating the proposition’s feasibility, it is stripped of its relevance in the evaluation and discretion of God’s omnipotence.

At the core of Aquinas’ position is the simple, bottom line that God’s power does not encompass the impossible, “…since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase ‘God can do all things,’ is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible.”1 The statement ‘God can do anything…’ is only sensible with an assumed suppressed clause ‘…that does not imply direct contradiction’. One might object that God can perform miracles beyond the realm of logic like parting the Red Sea and healing the blind - doesn’t this imply the contradiction of making one who does not have sight, have sight? Aquinas would argue that God is capable of making miracles possible, but not making nonsense possible. It is no more possible for God than for any normal, unremarkable human being to carry out two mutually exclusive alternatives. The fundamental principles of logic remain applicable, even in the scope of divinity. Aquinas argues that this does not suggest God’s power meets an obstacle, because nonsense remains nonsense even when we talk about it in terms of God. To falsify a necessary truth is intrinsically impossible, not impossible due to any limits or shortcomings of God’s omnipotence, “…but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing.”1

Aquinas’ response to the necessary truth argument is very rational and grounded in insightful reasoning. However, I would argue that Aquinas’ disclaimer that God’s power does not extend to the impossible is the instinctive response as humans for us to reject the existence and possibility of things that we cannot conceive of. Aquinas argues that even God’s power is subject to the laws of what is logically possible, but does that only make sense to us because we cannot conceptualize ideas that do not fall under the rules of logic? The nature of linguistics and definitions create mutually exclusive ideas, concepts that we cannot possibly conceive of being carried out simultaneously. This makes Aquinas’ response to the necessary truth argument very reasonable, but is the nature of divine power supposed to be reasonable? When we describe God as omnipotent as Aquinas suggests, we commit ourselves to His having every power that is logically possible to possess. It is impossible to imagine coherently and account for any sense of ‘perfect power’. However I would uphold the belief that just because we are incapable of accounting for and comprehending ‘perfect power’ does not mean it does not exist. The idea that the universe consists of infinite space is beyond what we can intrinsically comprehend, but that does not prevent people from regarding this idea as true. In purely rational and argumentative terms, Aquinas provides a strong rebuttal to the necessary truth argument, but in the broader, more philosophical context, his view of divine omnipotence may not be upheld as strongly.

Among both believers and cynics of faith, the most significant questions relate to the nature and scope of divine power. Thomas Aquinas seeks to solidify and defend the omnipotence of God by arguing that His absolute power can only logically be applied to instances that fall within the boundaries of logic and the law of non-contradiction. This important notion of divine omnipotence serves as the rebuttal to statements such as because ‘God cannot falsify a necessary truth’ or ‘God cannot sin’ there are things He cannot do and therefore He is not omnipotent. Aquinas responds to these objections with the assertion that if the matter at hand is impossible because it involves a direct contradiction, it does not fall under the prowess or expected capability of divine omnipotence. One of the most fundamental statements of Scripture asserts, “No word shall be impossible with God” (Lk, 1:37) and Aquinas upholds this belief in his assessment of what exactly the nature of divine omnipotence is.