In writing Essence of Decision, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow attempt to produce not only a comprehensive academic assessment of the Cuban missile crisis, and explain the rationale that defined the shape and outcome of that event, but to challenge the conventional method of studying international relations through a single conceptual “lens,” the Rational Actor Model (RAM). The major assumptions that underlie the RAM, that states consider all available options and choose rationally in order to maximize the utility of each choice, is presented as flawed. Many facts and behavioral nuances must be ignored for the sake of fitting such an analysis within the RAM framework. Allison and Zelikow argue that it is necessary to analyze events through different conceptual lenses focused on a trio of decision-making bodies: the RAM, the Organizational Behavior Model, and the Governmental Politics model. Through each of these lenses, the authors analyze what they propose to be the three primary questions requiring resolution for a broad understanding of the crisis: “Why did the Soviet Union decide to place offensive missiles in Cuba?” “Why did the United States respond to the missile deployment with a blockade?” “Why did the Soviet Union withdraw the missiles?” (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p. 77-78). Under the RAM, dubbed Model 1 by Allison and Zelikow, governments are recognized as the primary actors in decision making and are rational in that they consider a set of objectives, evaluate their utility, choose the objective with the highest payoff, and act in a manner that will best achieve that objective. Model 1 predicates that the purpose and intention of a government’s actions can be gleaned from reflecting on how and why a rational person would act in the same way. Addressing the three illustrative questions, the model begins its explanation of the crisis by framing the Soviet installation of short- and mid-range nuclear missiles within the context of the “missile gap.” Given the large gap between the high number of ICBMs possessed by the United States compared to the Soviet Union (despite bluster to the contrary), missile-placement in Cuba was the most advantageous option for bridging that gap. The decision by the United States to implement a naval blockade of Cuba was made in an effort to avoid escalation to nuclear war while forcing the onus of next-steps decision making onto the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, faced with the prospect of mutually assured destruction by the onset of nuclear war, saw its options reduced to a single choice: remove the missiles or face a nuclear showdown; given the apparent consequences of either action, it chose the former. But Allison and Zelikow posit that, by its nature, Model 1 necessarily had to ignore numerous facts such as the odd behavior the Soviets displayed in initially not camouflaging the easily identifiable nuclear sites while they were under construction. For a secondary perspective, the authors turn to the Organizational Process Model (Model 2) that emphasizes the role of bureaucracy and organizational “outputs.” The idea behind this model is that governmental action is actually the result of self-interested organizations who rely on pre-established standard operating procedures when processing and solving a given problem. Since the actions ultimately recommended by an organization are heavily influenced by the set repertoire of institutional procedures, outputs are limited by these pre-existing structures. The nature of organizations, hence, also limits the available options for leaders to consider. Furthermore, since time and other resources are also limited, leaders cannot possibly evaluate all potential courses of action; therefore, they must turn to the first policy proposal that sufficiently resolves the conflict at hand. A sufficient proposal, as defined by Model 2, is typically one that emphasizes short term effects and that eliminates immediate policy uncertainties. Model 2 interprets the events of the Cuban missile crisis within a framework that is considerably different than the RAM. According to the second model, since the Soviets had no established missile bases beyond their sphere of influence (and continuing to keep the missile gap in mind), the country delegated the task of developing a strategy for base placement to governmental organizations which approached the issue following unique standard operating procedures. These organizations were ill-adapted for addressing the prospect of placing nuclear missile bases in unfamiliar territory such as Cuba; therefore, insufficient procedure led to flawed policy, leading to easy discovery by the United States. The U.S. had effectively two options on the table for addressing the presence of nuclear missiles in Cuba: air strikes and a naval blockade. The Air Force’s procedure for initiating an air strike would include an extensive bombing campaign that would cause severe collateral damage, a side effect President Kennedy wanted to avoid. The procedure for the blockade, to be undertaken by the U.S. Navy in a region where it maintained unapproachable arms and tactical superiority, had the advantage of having an already existing plan. The relative safety and procedural certainty of the blockade made it the most attractive option and one that the Soviets could not challenge without risking nuclear war. With no alternative plan to fall back on, the Soviets had no choice but to capitulate to American demands. As an alternative to the RAM, the Organizational Process Model buries most of its assumptions inside of the nuanced and obscured standard operating procedures of bureaucratic organizations. And though Model 2 need not use inaccurate behavioral models to make assumptions, it still overlooks some of the human complexity involved in making state decisions. To address this lack, Allison and Zelikow propose the Governmental Politics Model (Model 3) which accounts for the political bargaining games frequently involved in high-stakes decision making. Model 3 relies on a number of assumptions about how negotiation and bargaining dictate a nation’s actions, especially the relevance in this political “gaming” of the personal interests, global perspectives, and backgrounds of each of the players. According to Model 3, the leader, and the nature of the constituents within his or her entourage, has a substantial impact on final decisions which can vary based on the presence of such factors as groupthink or the allowance of internal disagreements. The power of individual leaders also varies based on personality, charisma, and personal relationships with other decision makers. For example, leaders with absolute power require no input from others and typically choose an entourage based on how well they adhere to the leader’s principles and decisions. Leaders with less relative power must forge consensuses or risk losing support due to interference by opponents. These consensuses result from considerable compromise and bargaining that sometimes may not be approved by the whole group. Despite lacking the data necessary to fully interpret Soviet actions under this model, the authors attempt to give a partial explanation based on the idea that Soviet Premier Khrushchev was under pressure from the Presidium over the international knowledge of the country’s relative lack of ICBMs in addition to American success in Berlin. Recent decisions to reduce the size of the Soviet Army and a battered economy also led to mounting pressure from military and public sectors. The emplacement of missiles in Cuba was not only the most immediate, but the least expensive way to shore up domestic support and create a general consensus. On the U.S. side, policy on Cuba was made a major elections issue by Kennedy’s opponents in Congress, especially in light of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. This political pressure prompted a swift response by Kennedy that forsook diplomacy in the name of showing strong political will and military strength. Though airstrikes were by far the most popular option favored by most of Kennedy’s entourage, his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and his special counsel preferred the blockade. Heated arguments with air strike proponents and heightened distrust of the American intelligence apparatus (specifically the CIA) helped push Kennedy towards the use of a blockade. Once the U.S. made its move, Khrushchev was again thrust into a position of weakness both domestically and internationally. In order to strengthen his hand, Khrushchev pointed to a similar situation to the Cuban crisis but with the U.S. as the aggressor: American Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Though Kennedy had to save face publicly by refusing to remove the missiles while the Soviets still threatened in Cuba, he privately agreed to remove the missiles in Turkey and to stay out of Cuba. The interpretive methods presented by Allison and Zelikow clearly present a multi-faceted perspective on interpreting foreign policy decisions, made particularly stark given the gravity of the situation the U.S. and Soviet Union found themselves during the Cuban missile crisis. As was the goal of the book, the authors demonstrated how an over reliance on the Rational Actor Model had led to flawed and incomplete explanations of past military and diplomatic events. The book even goes so far as to call use of Model 1 as potentially dangerous as it can lead to false assumptions about the real world followed by ineffective, counterproductive, or otherwise disastrous policy making. Allison and Zelikow convincingly present the Organizational Process Model and the Governmental Politics models as necessary supplements to the Rational Actor Model. The authors point to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as an example of the organizational model, clearly explaining events where the RAM falls short. Even though the U.S. received enough intelligence to expect an attack by Japan, lack of preparation was a direct consequence of miscommunication between intelligence agencies and the commander at Pearl Harbor. The commander interpreted the data as a threat of sabotage and prepared as such, while the intelligence community rightly predicted an attack. Similarly, when the authors apply Model 3 to the decision by General Douglas MacArthur to defy orders during the Korean War, they demonstrate that the action was not an indication of a change in U.S. intentions, but a personal conflict of opinions between MacArthur and Harry Truman and his entourage of policy makers. That MacArthur was even allowed his insubordination was the result of reticence on the part of the Truman administrative to interfere with the actions of a popular figure, which could lead to political backlash. Models 2 and 3 were never intended to completely explain any given event, but were presented as beneficial considerations for policy analysts who could now explore alternative perspectives that could lead to more informed and effective policy making. Indeed, the volume of information required to make the two models useful is large and often unavailable for analysis during a crisis, though this shortcoming does not negate their utility as alternatives to rational actor theories. This is in contrast to the RAM, which requires relatively little information in making approximations though is understandably limited due to this oversimplification. For qualitative, predictive purposes, the organizational and political models seem even more appropriate for long-term analysis of events after they have concluded.