Conversely Gunn argues that war was ‘Tournament through other means’ and that this was the primary motivator in Henry’s thinking. Wooding agrees, focussing on the pragmatic case that Henry warred against both Scotland and France not for security, rather because he felt secure enough to do so. Even Richardson concedes to some extent, despite the title of his article being Eternal Peace, Occasional War. He argues that by the end of the reign Francis could no longer compete for glory after Henry had clearly gained the greater amount in war. The imbalance meant there could be no more ‘Eternal peace’, so relations continued to be cold at best, hence the swift reconquest in 1550 after Henry had died. Given this evaluation, the idea of glory at least towards the end of the reign, being credited through war, seems more legitimate. Whilst it had a role to play in peacetime, the withdrawal from foreign diplomacy in 1546 strongly suggests that the glory he had achieved in war was unparallelled …show more content…
This was indirect and is a continuation of the conflicting motives of glory and security. On the one hand, Doran comments on the importance of Reginald Pole, with Henry’s execution of the Marquis of Exeter in 1538 relating to a Catholic conspiracy, being reflected in equally harsh reactions against Pole’s presence in foreign courts. Again this is an example of Henry’s over-reaction to potential threats, exacerbating the role security had to play. For example the demand for the extradition of Pole from the French Court - Wooding argues that this was merely an assertion of his jurisdiction and part of the great power politics ultimately limiting the extent to which security was a primary motive. However Doran convincingly argues that the demand for extradition in combination with his brutal retaliation to the Arran nobles who betrayed him is evidence that when it came to faction, Henry was primarily motivated by