Given the delicate nature of US relations with Cuba in the early 1960s, an ill-timed assassination could have been—to say the least—problematic. As the Marxist-Leninist political system strengthened, Cuba’s location in relation its surrounding islands and the US became more and more disconcerting: should Fidel Castro move to uproot the political systems of its close neighbors, the opportunity for success was in place. It’s understandable then that the US would seek to alter the playing field of the Caribbean—in attempting to do so, however, a potentially unauthorized plot to kill Fidel Castro became a very near reality. For a plot that appeared in many forms, its inception is still not fully understood. Further, it is unclear whether or not …show more content…
Earlier, it’s believed that in 1961 Richard Bissell was “’chewed out in the Cabinet Room of the White house for … sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime’” (141). Viewing this conversation through the lens of circumlocution and arcane meanings, it’s arguable that Kennedy in this among other instances was, by implication, authorizing the assassination of Fidel Castro as a means of shaking the Castro regime in Cuba, a precursor to the other potential sabotage operations that more officially were authorized in …show more content…
It seems most compelling to believe in light of this report that John F. Kennedy did not give authorization to a direct attempt on Fidel Castro’s life, but instead that the CIA exaggerated the scope of Kennedy’s plans for the Castro regime and took matters into their own hands, so to speak. In doing so, the CIA pursued an assassination that, while considered, was thought repeatedly not to be an effective means of upsetting the Cuban political territory. Additionally, it would seem as though the CIA knew they were toeing an unclear line and repeatedly chose not to explicitly discuss their plans. Every involved person seemed to “not recall” being given explicit presidential orders. Should the opportunity have arisen to discuss the potential for these orders, Helms made the case that “nobody wants to embarrass a President of the United States by discussing the assassination of foreign leaders in his presence” (150). The same shaky recollection of no authorization being given comes back over and over again throughout the various testimonies—William Bundy, for example, believes “Castro’s assassination was ‘mentioned from time to time,’ but ‘never that I can recall by the President’” (156). At every turn, when people directly involved in the assassination plots had the opportunity to discuss with superiors, the opportunity was forgone. With such grand