Dzhalil Atakeev
Finance 190
Professor Shlyakhov
10/21/2013

Asian Currency Crisis The Asian Currency Crisis started in Thailand. The crisis just reflected structural and policy misinterpretation of the Asian region. Fundamental imbalances triggered the currency and financial crisis in 1997, due to crisis markets overreaction and herding caused the plunge of exchange rates, asset prices and economic conditions. Everything started from Thailand, before 1997 the economy grew was very high in Thailand, it was averaging 9% per year. The rate between USD and Baht was $25 per 1 baht. The 1997 was crucial for Thailand because massive speculators attacked Thai baht. The spark on Asian crisis was when prime minister of Thailand announced that he would not devalue the baht, and government just couldn’t defend baht, which was fixed to several currencies, one of the dominant components was USD. The decrease in economy of Thailand cause massive layoffs in finance, real estate, and construction that resulted many people to return their villages and countries. The Thailand baht was devaluating and by 1998 it reached lowest value of 58 baht over 1 USD. Without any support from foreign reserves Thai government had to float the baht, so that way baht was set on currency market. Since baht was pegged to other currencies crisis spread to another Asian countries. By 2001, Thailand's economy had recovered. The increasing tax revenues allowed the country to balance its budget and repay its debts to the IMF in 2003, four years ahead of schedule. The Thai baht continued to appreciate to 29 Baht to the Dollar in October 2010.
According to many economists the Asian crisis was created by policies that distorted incentives within lender-borrower relationship. The resulting large quantities of credit that became obtainable caused a highly leveraged economic climate, and pushed up asset prices to an unmanageable level. These asset prices eventually began to collapse, causing individuals and companies to non-payment on debt commitments. The depreciation or devaluation of the Thai baht, wave after wave of speculation hit other Asian currencies. One after another in a period of weeks the Malaysian ringgit, Indonesian rupiah and the Singapore dollar were all marked sharply lower. According to Charles Hill, with its foreign exchange reserves down to $28 billion, Malaysia let its currency, the ringgit, float on July 14th, 1997. Prior to the devaluation, the ringgit was trading at $1=2.525 ringgit. Six months later it had declined to $1=4.15 ringgit. Singapore followed on July 17th, and the Singapore dollar (S$) quickly dropped in value from $1=S$1.495 prior to the devaluation to $1=S$2.68 a few days later. Next up was Indonesia, whose currency, the Rupiah, was allowed to float on August 14th. For Indonesia, this was the beginning of a precipitous decline in the value of its currency, which was to fall from $1=2,4000 Rupiah in August 1997 to $1=10,000 on January 6th, 1998, a loss of 75%. The main drive of Asian Currency Crisis was currency devaluation. That’s how all the nearby countries fell in crisis just like Thailand. Many Asian economies had started their economy progress all over again. They lost many decades of economy progress due to crisis. Beyond this, though, the crisis has raised a series of important policy questions about the sustainability of the so called Asian Economic Model, the role of the IMF, and the virtues of floating and fixed exchange rates. The crisis also has significant implications for international businesses. For a decade, the Asian Pacific region has been encouraged by many as the future economic engine of the world economy. Businesses have invested billions of dollars in the region on the hypothesis that the rapid growth of the last decade would continue. The Asian financial crisis throws the risks related with doing business in developing countries into sharp focus. For most of the 1990s, multinational enterprises have viewed Asia as a future economic powerhouse, and invested accordingly. This view in the latter part of 1997 and early 1998, the IMF provided $36 billion to backing reform programs in the three worst-hit countries—Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand. The IMF gave this financial support as part of international support sets totaling almost $100 billion. In these three countries, unfortunately, the authorities' initial uncertainty in introducing changes and in taking other measures to restore confidence led to a worsening of the crisis by causing declines in currency and stock markets that were greater than a rational assessment of economic essentials might have justified. This overrunning in financial markets aggravated the panic and added to problems in both the corporate and financial sectors. In particular, the domestic currency value of foreign debt rose sharply. While uncertainties continued longer in Indonesia, reinforced commitments were made elsewhere to carry out adjustment reforms. as not without foundation.
The Asian crisis did undeniably have some painful effects on companies with major activities and investments in the region’s concerned economies. For example, when the Malaysian government void its $5 billion Bakun hydro-electric damn project this hurt ABB, the large European based engineering firm that was a prime contractor on the project. Boeing expressed concern that the Asian crisis may result in as many as 60 orders for large jet aircraft being postponed or cancelled
The western countries had more advantage because many investors start investing in Europe and USA comparing to Asia. It brought more developing to western countries. Furthermore, several firms are reportedly taking advantage of the changing circumstances in Asia to increase their rate of investment in the region. Plunging stock markets across the region have left many Asian companies trading at prices that are less than their break-up value, while the IMF’s rescue packages have required Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand to relax restrictions on inward foreign direct investment. As a result of these factors, it is reasonable to expect firms from outside of these countries to start buying the assets of troubled companies while they can be purchased for cents on the dollar. Indeed, there are signs that that is starting to happen. In December 1997, for example, Citicorp was reported to be examining the books of Thailand’s seventh largest bank, First Bangkok City Bank, with a view to making an acquisition. Citicorp was also reported to be looking for acquisitions in South Korea
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that despite its dramatic impact, the long run effects of the crisis may be good not bad. To the extent that the crisis gives Asian countries an incentive to reform their economic systems, and to initiate some much need restructuring, they may emerge from the experience not weaker, but stronger institutions and a greater ability to attain sustainable economic growth.

Bibliography
Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti, Nouriel Roubini,What caused the Asian currency and financial crisis? Japan and the World Economy, Volume 11, Issue 3, October 1999, Pages 305–373
Kaufman, GG., Krueger, TH., Hunter, WC. (1999) The Asian Financial Crisis: Origins, Implications and Solutions. Springer
Ries, Philippe. (2000) The Asian Storm: Asia's Economic Crisis Examined