Abstract

Having fixed-term Parliaments in the United Kingdom is something that has been debated across the political spectrum for some years and, with the enactment of the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011, is no longer something which is merely debated, but a political and constitutional reality. The Act came into force with little consultation, research, or advice to or by the Government; it was exceptionally hurried legislation. This means that there is little written on the wider constitutional effects of the Act, and it is exactly that which this essay will try to examine.

To analyse the Act’s significance I have looked at the position prior to the Act and what the Act changed, before moving on to examining and critically assessing the plethora of arguments that both sides put forward.

A fuller copy of this paper is available upon request.

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The Position Before the Act and how the Act has Changed it:

The changing of election timing in the United Kingdom is something that is not often tampered with. The Meeting of Parliament Act 1694 provided that a general election for Parliament must be held (at most) every three years. The Septennial Act 1715 changed this to a maximum of seven years. Finally the Parliament Act 1911 amended this to provide for a five-year maximum term before a general election must be called.

Before the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011 the power to dissolve Parliament was retained by the Crown, under the royal prerogative. The royal prerogative ‘comprises residual powers, and functions which were originally associated with the monarch’,1 this means the powers that the Monarch still holds from the time that the monarchy was the true political power of the state. Pragmatically, Parliament was dissolved by the Crown solely on the advice of the Prime Minister, through a Royal Proclamation. The ability to do this, as a