When speaking about the use of references and definite descriptions, philosophers have had opposing viewpoints regarding the assignment of truth-values. Gottlob Frege, P.F. Strawson, and Bertrand Russell each have their own opinions on the way referring terms should be thought about. Both Frege and Strawson argued that definite descriptions cannot be assigned truth-values, and Russell believes that these descriptions can be denoted as false. Non-referring terms should not be assigned a truth-value because if they are not referring to an object in the real world. Therefore, the proposition should neither be true nor false. Kripke’s causal theory of reference aids in the understanding of how names refer to objects. In Frege’s On Sense and Nominatum, he explains that sense and reference are two different aspects of the significance of an expression. He applies nominatum to proper names, and says that the nominatum signifies the bearer of the name or the object in question. The nominatum also applies to other expressions, like complete sentences, where a truth-value can be assigned. Frege describes the sense as the thought in which the complete sentence expresses. The sense of an expression can also be called the “mode of presentation” of the item it is referring to. If comparing the sentence, “The current …show more content…
He believes that one can only assign a truth-value to a sentence if and only if the subject term has a reference. In the sentence stated above, the subject term is “the present king of Germany”. Knowing that there is no king of Germany would allow for the conclusion to be made that there is no specific reference for this subject term. Therefore, a truth-value would not be able to be assigned here. If the object in the world that the subject term is referring to does not exist, then the sentence as a whole lacks any