GLOBALIZATION BACKLASH
AND
THE RISE OF ANTI-HEGEMONIC PARTY STATES

Diego Olstein
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Contents

Introduction: Globalization and Anti-Hegemonic Party State………………………………..5

Part I: Principle

Chapter 1: Defining Anti-Hegemonic Party State………………………………………………….18

Chapter 2: Anti-Hegemonic Party State and Domestic Features of Political Regimes…………………………………………………………………………………………… 44

Chapter 3: Anti-Hegemonic Party State and Exogenous Perspective on Political Regimes……………………………………………………………………………………………75

Part II: History

Chapter 4: The Global Rise of Anti-Hegemonic Party States and Globalization Backlash 1917-1945...…………………………………………………………….91
Chapter 5: The Big Leap of Anti-Hegemonic Party States: The Second Wave 1946-1975…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………111
Chapter 6: Globalization Anew and the Marginalization of Anti-Hegemonic Party States 1976-2010………………………………………………………142

Conclusions

Introduction: Globalization and Anti-Hegemonic Party State

In 1997 the European Commission defined Globalization “as the process by which markets and production in different countries are becoming increasingly interdependent due to the dynamics of trade in goods and services and flows of capital and technology. It is not a new phenomenon but the continuation of developments that have been in train for some considerable time”.[1] Wider definitions incorporate more spheres than the economy, including the intensification of worldwide social, political, and cultural relations as well while stressing their growing extensity, intensity, velocity, and depth.[2] A working definition attempting to integrate the most outstanding features frequently included while dealing with the concept of globalization can be advanced: Globalization is an economy working on a global basis in real time relying on information superhighways and communication networks that simultaneously contributes to enhance a global culture, while in the political sphere the constitution of regional and global political institutions develops side by side with the nation-states as a central institution. The operationalization of the several definitions for globalization resulted in multiple quantifications mainly of the economic, communications, and cultural dimensions. In this vein, the huge increase in manifold parameters during the last forty, thirty, or twenty years is pointed out. For instance, the number of international companies grew from roughly 7,000 to 65,000 in almost thirty years. International trade expanded from $629 billion in 1960 to $7,430 billion in 2001. Bank deposits by non-residents incremented from $20 billion in 1964 to $7,900 billion in 1995. Since their apparition, over one billion of mobile telephones were in use by 2004 and the number of Internet users also reached almost a billion by that same year. The number of international air travelers grew from 25 million in 1950 to 400 million in 1996, and a very long etcetera.[3] Based on these parameters that stress technological innovation, globalization appears as a totally new and recent phenomenon dating to the last few decades. However, the combination of technological improvements in communications and transportation already resulted in a major turning point in world history by the mid nineteenth century by transforming unconnected regions into a unified world. The industrial revolution was responsible for the creation of interdependence between the different regions of the world. The central factor of this interdependence is the emergent new “world market”. This market was able to develop thanks to innovations in the realm of communication. The main examples are train networks, the biggest public enterprise in history, which supplemented the navigation lines now accelerated by the steamships and the Suez and later the Panama canals, and the telegraph whose cables covered a great part of the world by the 1870's. The development of communications demanded new forms of international coordination, such as the Telegraphic International Union and The Postal Universal Union. Besides their utility for businessmen, these innovations enhanced cultural developments, mainly the progress of journalism, including especially world news. Mass migration became another important factor in the process of “transforming the planet into one unique world”. It seems that by the 1870's globalization had existed as in the 1970's except for a matter of intensity: more machines, more production, and more business.[4] These transformations during the nineteenth century generate a tension between the depiction of globalization as a singular new phenomenon emerging during the last decades of the twentieth century and its recognition as a longer term development opened by mid nineteen century. A “single universal world economy” is claimed to be the achievement of “nineteenth-century liberal capitalism” besides the affirmation that “a single, increasingly integrated and universal world economy largely operating across state frontiers (“transnationally”) was established during the Golden Age (1947-1973) “for the first time in history”.[5] Is that an apparent contradiction? Or, rather, there are two separated beginnings to the history of globalization? Since the early 19th century the falling of transport costs and trade barriers enabled the integration of international commodity markets. The British hegemony provided both the powerhouse and the political leadership for this development pushing vigorously for international free trade both by lowering tariff rates and by imposing “liberal policies” through its expanding imperialism in Asia since the 1860s and 1870s. It was also a period with limited international warfare or other political disturbances. Moreover, Great Britain’s financial leadership resulted in large and stable international capital flows supported by the aggregation of appropriated legal institutions, the spread of the gold standard, convertible currencies. This integration lead to falling import prices, rising export prices, an increase in trade volumes, and commodity price convergence. That is to say, the impact of international trade reached the point of changing domestic commodity prices and commodity prices worldwide became closer. Price convergence resulted in domestic reshufflings of resources in order to influence the scale of output, the distribution of income, and the quality of life. By mid nineteenth century, the previous pattern of long-distance trade limited to non-competing goods was replaced by globalization, the “first great globalization” of 1850-1914. [6] This “first great globalization” appears to be in many ways similar to “today globalization”. Land prices fall and real wages rose in emigration countries, while the reverse occurred in immigration countries. A process of diffusion of growth from the richer to the poorer took place by narrowing the differences in productivity as new methods of organization and production were adopted by those economies capable of using them. The export/GDP ratios increased by 1913 up to 8.2 percent of total GDP, which means not overwhelmingly lower than the 12.8 percent by 1987. Also the high rate of capital flow and foreign investment that occurred during the period 1870-1914 is reminiscent of the increase in capital flow since 1973.[7] [8] Then, if humanity had experienced globalization since the mid nineteenth century how is that globalization surprised most of us as an entirely new phenomenon? Certainly, in the modern world every generation likes to depict its own time as a major breakthrough.[9] This generational-centrism can result in a bias of innovation that claims globalization as an original development of our age. The manifold innovations linked to “today globalization”, e.g. the scale of contemporary telecommunications, air travel, transworld civil society associations, and global awareness heavily contribute to this bias of innovation. Moreover, the key indicators of the “first great globalization” – trade, investment, and migration statistics – can be dismissed as relative. In short, the “first great globalization” can be differentiated from “today globalization” up to the point of disassociation between the two.[10] However, these dismissive arguments can not refute the existence of a world market based on global communications and transport since the mid nineteenth century even if without the technological innovations of the last decades. The actual major reason for the disassociation between the “first great globalization” and “today globalization” has to do with three major developments during the short twentieth century. The “first great globalization” was brought to a halt during the First World War and then to its eventual end following the 1929 economic crisis and Second World War. Increased tariffs, depression and war determined the fate of the “first great globalization” creating a deep rift between its development and those of “today globalization”. The process of globalization was reverted in such a thorough manner that when globalization was sensibly restored from mid 1970's and more visibly by the 1990’s it appeared for contemporaries as a surprisingly innovative phenomenon. However, profiting from an historical vantage point globalization appears as a U-shape development consisting of two waves of global economy integration separated by a stage of economic de-globalization. Although, amidst this valley of economic de-globalization a simultaneous and very significant global process evolved in the political sphere correlated inversely to the declining fate of economic globalization. From 1917 a particular political strategy had expanded worldwide up to the mid 1970's as an inverted U-shape. Moreover, the demise of this political strategy since the mid 1970’s correlates once again inversely with the take-off of economic globalization. The demise of this political strategy certainly contributed a great deal to the perception of “today globalization” as an entire new era. This political strategy globally widespread during the short twentieth century consist on a twofold reliance by rulers on state mechanisms and party apparatuses in order to lead to the mobilization of their societies from within and confronting the prevailing world order from without, with the ultimate goal of improving the state's position in the world division of wealth and power. From this combination of endogenous mobilization of society by a political party (party state) toward an exogenous goal of upgrading the state position in the world division of wealth and power even if challenging the world order established by the hegemonic power (anti-hegemonic). This political strategy is defined as anti-hegemonic party state. The anti-hegemonic party state enabled political leaders to maximize power accumulation and concentration. This resulted from the twofold tools utilized for power accumulation and concentration: state machinery and party apparatuses. By combining the two, rulers aimed to mobilize the society through a collectivist ideology with the ultimate goal of improving its society’s position in the world-system. The project to upgrade the place of a state and society in the world division of wealth and power through this anti-hegemonic party state political strategy posed a challenge to the world order cemented by the hegemonic power and its aligned coalition. The expansion of this political strategy worldwide, negatively correlated with the decline of globalization, represents one of the major developments of the short twentieth century. The emergence of the Soviet Union following the Bolshevik revolution during the last stages of the First World War represents not only the starting point for communist regimes but also the development of the anti-hegemonic party state political strategy. While all the attempts made soon after the Bolshevik revolution to create communist regimes in Bavaria (1918-1919), Finland (1918), Hungary (March-July 1919), Berlin (January and March 1919), northern Italy (fall 1920), Saxony and Hamburg (1923), Bulgaria (1923), and Estonia (1924) failed, the anti-hegemonic party state political strategy was successfully transmitted to the Mongolian People's Republic (1921) and to Guomintang China (1928), that is to a political regime of a different political sign. By 1922, the formation of the fascist regime in Italy brings the application of the anti hegemonic party state political strategy to Western Europe. Nazi Germany followed in 1933.

Meanwhile in the western hemisphere, the unfulfilled promises of the Mexican Revolution combined with the international circumstances and Soviet inspiration brought into fruition the application of the anti-hegemonic party state strategy in Latin America for the first time in México in 1934. Many Latin American states applied this political strategy since (Argentina 1946-1955, Brazil 1951-1954, Bolivia 1952-1964, Guatemala 1951-1954, Cuba 1959 - , Dominican Republic 1963, and Chile 1970-1973, Nicaragua, 1979-1990, Venezuela 1998- ). This mushrooming of states applying anti-hegemonic party state political strategy also occurred simultaneously in Asia (Vietnam 1945-1986, Indonesia 1945-1967, India 1947-1985, and China 1949-1976), the Middle East (Iran 1951-1953, 1979- , Egypt 1952-1970, Iraq 1958-1979, Syria 1963- , and Libya 1969-), and Africa (Algeria 1954-1988; Ghana 1957-1966, Guinea 1958-1984, Mali 1960-1968, Tanzania 1964-1985, Uganda 1966-1971, Madagascar, 1975-1982) soon after the beginning of the post-colonial period. The application of the anti-hegemonic party state strategy by powerful states as well as by a bulk of so many states simultaneously and consecutively prevented a linear development of globalization.

Map #1: Anti-hegemonic party states during the short twentieth century

[pic]

The global scope in the spread of the anti-hegemonic party state political strategy during the short twentieth century meant that it was adopted by states of completely different scale, wealth, power, and histories. Therefore, the implementation of this political strategy largely varies from one state to the other. The capacity of accumulation and concentration of power by harnessing the combined mechanisms of state bureaucracy and a leading political party varies concomitantly accordingly to the scale, wealth, and power of each state. Also the configuration of the social coalition representing the constituency of each political regime applying the anti-hegemonic party state strategy was conditioned by the social structure within each state. Moreover, the particular type of collectivist ideology guiding and justifying the political regime that applied an anti-hegemonic party state strategy derives from the particular intellectual history of each society. Finally, the aims at up-grading the position of a particular state and the range of policies challenging the hegemonic power within the world order vary concomitantly to the scale, wealth, and power of each state. In fact, the range of performances by applying anti-hegemonic party state strategies is so wide that this political strategy as a unified phenomenon remained so far overlooked. However, the application of this political strategy on a global scale is an outstanding feature of the short twentieth century and a crucial phenomenon for the history of globalization. Moreover, side by side with its remarkable internal variety, the anti-hegemonic party state remains a unified political strategy in its basic equation – mobilization from within by state and party and challenge from without – all along the wide range of states that implemented it globally. The anti-hegemonic party state political strategy as a global phenomenon of the short twentieth century was also overlooked because of the wide range of different types of political regimes that applied it. Similarly, the origins of these anti-hegemonic party states are to be found in democratic elections, military coups, or revolutions. Generally, anti-hegemonic party state strategies were applied by non-democratic regimes, but they were applied also by some democratic regimes. As a result of that by approaching anti-hegemonic party state as a unified political strategy the well established clear cut distinction between democracy and non-democracy is defied. Moreover, the notion of anti-hegemonic party state defies the concept of non-democracy as it establishes a distinction within the large non democratic block between those that applied as opposed to those that rejected it. In fact, the application or the lack of application of anti-hegemonic party states establishes a significant distinction within most of the well established categories for political regimes. Each single category for political regime such as Communist, fascist, populist, one-party states, and national liberation movement regimes is clearly divisible in two subsets. One for those Communist, fascist, populist, one-party states, and national liberation movement regimes that applied anti-hegemonic party state strategies the other for those that did not. This internal distinction brings into question the degree of unity within each of these political regimes. Conversely, the similarity derived from the same basic equation - mobilization from within by state and party and challenge from without - across different types of political regimes stresses the usefulness of the new concept, anti-hegemonic party states, in visualizing the transversal unity. The consideration of this concept allows for a reshuffling in the way we classify political regimes and establish analytic and historical connections between them. In his new book Regimes and Repertories Charles Tilly provides, as usual, an impressively parsimonious analysis, intended to classify the different approaches for the study of political regimes besides his own typology on that subject. Dealing with the varied approaches for the study of political regimes, he arranges the literature in a continuum running from the "Principle" extreme towards the "History" one. By the "Principle" approach, he refers to the depiction of regimes according to their rationales, premises, and organizing principles. By the "History" approaches, he means the identification of the particularities of every single regime as well as the tracking of recurrent processes, notably path-dependent processes.[11] This book offers these two complementary perspectives on anti-hegemonic party states. The first three chapters deal with anti-hegemonic party states conceptually, analyzing their rationales, premises, and organizing principles. The next three chapters are dedicated to the identification of the particularities of several states, the tracking of the global outreach of anti-hegemonic party states expansion, and their impact in the fate of globalization. In other words, the second half of the book is concerned with the history of anti-hegemonic party states and globalization backlash. In this way, an inclusive model in which both the static and dynamic dimensions, related to the "Principle" and "History" approaches respectively, will come to the fore. Finally, the complementary "Principle" and "History" approaches to anti-hegemonic party states are assessed in the closing chapter dedicated to the conclusions derived from the elaboration of the new concept of anti-hegemonic party state and its application to the history of the short twentieth century.

Chapter 1: Defining Anti-Hegemonic Party State

Anti-hegemonic party-state is a political strategy consisting on the mobilization of a society leaded by a collectivist ideology from within and a confrontation of the prevailing world order from without. This political strategy is characterized by a twofold reliance on state bureaucracy and party apparatuses in order to maximize power accumulation through social mobilization and its concentration, with the ultimate goal of improving the state's position in the world division of wealth and power. It is from this combination of endogenous mobilization of society by a political party (party state) toward an exogenous goal of improving the position of that society in the world division of wealth and power by confronting the hegemonic world power (anti-hegemonic) that the concept of Anti-hegemonic Party State derives its name. Therefore, the necessary conditions for identifying the application of the anti-hegemonic party state strategy by a particular political regime are:

1. The enhancement of state power by harnessing the combined mechanisms of state apparatuses and a leading political party.

2. The mobilization of society and economy through these mechanisms and guided by a collectivist ideology.

3. The confrontation of the world order in the sake of improving the state and its society’s position in the world division of wealth and power.

Considered from an evolutionary perspective, the origins of the party are in a political organization placed in the antipodes of the prevailing state. Nevertheless, at some point in its development this political organization becomes a well organized party, a mass movement, and the head of the state (although not necessarily in this order). Once holding state power, the party goes through a process of adaptation to the transition from the antipodes of the political regime to the centers of power, surviving this transformation. At the end of this process, the party state is consolidated. Once the regime holds the power concentrated by the state apparatus and the party organizations proceed to impose internal unity. One type of means for this purpose is the application of conciliatory policies between social classes in order to form a broad social coalition. The other type of measures to accomplish the unity goal is a thorough repression of dissidents in order to eliminate the opposition. These measures are derived from and/or justified by a collectivist ideology. From this collectivist ideology derives also the foreign policy in its political and economic dimensions. The ultimate goal of these policies is to up-grade the position of state and society in the world division of wealth and power. This goal implies the rejection by the regime applying anti-hegemonic party state political strategy of the existing world division of labor and the hegemonic world order. In this way anti-hegemonic party state political strategy poses a challenge to the world order cemented by the hegemonic power and its aligned coalition. Although there are a plethora of studies regarding political regimes that applied a political strategy akin to this definition, to date no attempt has been made to approach them all, and only then, as an ideal type and as a dynamic political formation in global history. On the contrary, political regimes applying a political strategy akin to that of anti-hegemonic party state have been researched from many different perspectives and arranged under different concepts such as totalitarianism (see: Arendt, Buchheim, Burrowes, Curtis, Friedrich, Brzezinski, Hermet, Schapiro, and Soper), or separately as communist and fascist regimes; populism (see: Bresser Pereira, Canovan, Conniff, Dix, Ionescu, Gellner, Knight, Taggart, and Van Niekerk), regimes headed by national liberation movements (see: Gibson, Kunert, Macfarlane, Mazrui, and Tidy), African one\single-party states (see: Carter, Huntington and Clement, Janos, Neuberger, Triska, and Zolberg), united under the concept of one\single-party states, and dictatorship/non-democracy (see: Acemoglu, Bobbio, Brooker, Chirot, Cobban, Linz, Moore, Tilly, and Wintrobe). Despite of these distinctions, many historical cases classified under one or more of these categories for political regimes share the anti-hegemonic party state features as a common political strategy. Its three necessary conditions are clearly discerned for totalitarian regimes. To begin with, all of these necessary conditions are in place in the case of the Soviet Union. Following the Bolshevik revolution, the constitution of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (1918) established a one-party state. Although the duality of party and state created overlapping inconveniences by relying simultaneously on both apparatuses, this new type of regime epitomized the monopolization on violence without relying on direct force only. To begin with, “the revolution survived [because] it possessed a uniquely powerful, virtually a state-building, instrument in the 600,000-strong centralized and disciplined Communist Party.”[12] The party provided ideological legitimization through control of the media, educational and scientific institutions, publishing houses, literature and arts. The party also dealt with the political realm, coordinating state bureaucracy and the soviets in charge of economic and social issues. The first generation of apparatchiks during the 1920s is depicted as a group of "stockholders" for whom society was their collective property, therefore running society out of high motivation and commitment. This stance was replaced from Satin's ascension to power, during the 1930s-1940s, to readiness to obey the leader's orders, transforming party members into "soldiers of the party." The other side of this political transformation was the institution of a state of total terror embodied in the purges. This centralized pattern reverberated to the provinces, where the first party secretary selected the local nomenclature and controlled all regional institutions, although under the central tutelage, aiming to fulfill plans endorsed by the Kremlin. Also in the military realm the party held the upper hand over the state through the institution of political commissars, the political deputy of the commander of all army units, the enrollment of as many high ranking commanders as possible, and by monitoring the army's personnel through the secret services. Nevertheless, the formulation of military strategies was always pragmatically conceived rather than directed by the ideology of the party.[13]

Externally, the revolutionary Bolshevik regime was also committed to the world communist revolution, which in last instance was the validating reason for its own existence, and effectively the new Soviet state attracted as a magnet revolutionary forces everywhere. Although this primary anti-hegemonic aim coordinated since 1919 by the Comintern failed, the Soviet Union up-graded its position in the world order as through planned economy it was transformed from a backward and mainly agricultural state into an industrial and military power.

Also in Nazi Germany the anti-hegemonic party state political strategy was applied. In this case, relying on a coalition conformed by the middle class, landowners, including small ones, and industrialists, with some debatable support from the working class, which as an organized class was thoroughly repressed. By July 1933 all political parties other than the NSDAP were banned, and then the elections held in November 1933 resulted in a one-party state. At the top, by adopting the title of Führer, Hitler incorporated presidential authority to his prerogatives as chancellor. At the bottom, special state governors were installed by the Nazis at the local level. Finally, the army was also Nazified. This centralization of power by the party combined with the continuity of institutions and civil service resulted in the development of parallel institutions that by competing and overlapping, as in the case of the Youth Leader of the Reich vis à vis the Minister of Education, or the Reich SS leader with the Minister of Defense and Minister of Economy, or the Waffen Schutz Staffel and the army, maximized the monopoly of the state on violence executed by the SS-Gestapo-SD complex. This concentration and accumulation of power reverberates in the economic policy. In 1936 the Four Year Plan was launched aiming at a self-sufficient agriculture, industry, and improved infrastructures. Centralized planned economy further consolidated once World War II began. The Nazi regime developed an aggressive expansionist policy transformed into a war policy, which represent the strongest anti-hegemonic attempt by any regime that applied an anti-hegemonic party-state political strategy. Starting from the destruction of the hegemonic world order arranged by the Versailles Treaty, this policy continued by incorporating the nation-states and territories inhabited by German-speakers, and ended in a further expansionist policy which aimed at either the European continent or the globe.[14]
In communist and fascist regimes much less frequently included under the concept of totalitarianism the three necessary conditions for identifying the anti-hegemonic party state political strategy are also in place. In the case of fascist Italy the application of the anti-hegemonic party-state political strategy relied on a broad social coalition composed by the lower middle class, the industrialists, the landlords, and to a lesser extent small state owners. The place of workers and peasants, the backbone of Communist anti-hegemonic party-state in the Soviet Union, was marginal in this coalition, which aimed precisely to repress these social classes. In short, the social coalition on which the Fascist anti-hegemonic party-state in Italy relied was similar to that of Germany and asymmetrical to that of the Communist anti-hegemonic party-state in the Soviet Union. The structural features of anti-hegemonic party state governance, twofold tools of state bureaucracy and party mobilizing society along the lines of a collectivist ideology, are in place also in this case as a similar process of centralization took place through two parallel processes of centralizing power. On the one hand, the party structure underwent a process of centralization through the establishment of the Fascist Grand Council (1922) and the purge of Party bosses at the local level (1924). On the other hand, a one-party state emerged through the elimination of all parliamentary opposition parties (1925), the introduction of a new electoral law, which instituted the Fascist Grand Council as a selector of all parliamentary candidates (1928), and finally by replacing the Chamber of Deputies with the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations (1939). The resulting combination a charismatic political leader, a state government and bureaucracy, a leading party, and a mobilized society are in place as in the Soviet Union (1917-1945/53) and Nazi Germany.

The empowerment of the state was progressively felt in its intervention in the economy up to the emergence of a "corporate state." This political economy design, which attempted to settle the conflict between capital and work through state control, was complemented by an autarkic policy regarding both trade and finances, and investment in heavy industry. Beyond economics, the anti-hegemonic stance was practiced in a militant foreign policy that included the penetration of the Balkans and destabilization of the French sponsored "Little Entente" of Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. At one point, this move was related to the expansionist goals in the Mediterranean and Africa, as France was again the main obstacle in these areas. By 1935 the diplomatic attempts to become the mediator between Britain and France confronting Germany for the sake of accomplishing Mediterranean and African ambitions were replaced by military intervention. First, Ethiopia was conquered (1935-6). Second, Franco's National Movement was heavily assisted in order to complete Italy's hegemony in the Mediterranean and weakening Britain's naval position while outflanking France. Third, Italy attacked Albania (1939).

The features of anti-hegemonic party states are also identifiable in a communist regime like that of the Popular Republic of China. Also in this case the dual system of state and party mechanisms with a “leading role” of the party accumulating and concentrating power is present. On the one hand, the constitution of the Popular Republic of China outlines the organization of the government. The legislative power is bested on the National People’s Congress, which tasks are conducted year round by its Sanding Committee that exercises the real authority. The executive power belongs to the State Council headed by the premier. The Military Affairs Commission is in charge of the military and finally Judiciary power relays on the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate. On the other hand, the Chinese Communist Party Constitution draws the party structure composed by the National Party Congress and the Central Committee elected by it as the highest organs of power, which tasks are effectively run by the Politburo, the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and the Secretariat. This structure is complemented by the Military Affairs Commission and the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection. The result of these double political hierarchies is interconnection and overlapping with the party having an upper hand. An example of interconnection is the role of the National People’s Congress as provider of legitimacy to policies initiated by the party. Overlapping is observed at all government levels, from the national to the local, as the most important officials are trusted party members. The case of the Military Affairs Commission, a state and party organ at a time reporting directly to the Politburo is a case in point of duplicity and party primacy. In short, neither political nor bureaucratic leadership in both civilian and military spheres should be independent of the Communist Party.[15]
This dual system absorbed the industrial sector by its nationalization. A centralized economic policy relied on the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed in February 1950 between U.S.S.R. and P.R.C., fostered the development of the P.R.C. In this framework, an extraordinary planned transfer of technology evolved implemented by 10,000 Soviet specialist visiting China and 50,000 Chinese engineers, trainees, and students visiting the U.S.S.R. These exchanges resulted in the construction of 250 industrial projects and the transfer of thousands of industrial designs. Another attempt to implement the Sino-Soviet treaty occurred as Mao treated the Korean crisis as an opportunity to launch an anti-imperialist campaign. On this count, however, the treaty did not resulted in effective support. It resulted in a direct military confrontation with the US. The US severed all ties with the P.R.C. and an economic embargo was maintained until 1971.

The anti-hegemonic party state strategy was also applied by many regimes gathered under the label of populist regimes. A major exponent recorded in the literature on populism is that of Mexico under the rule of Partido de la Revolución Mexicana leaded by Lázaro Cárdenas during 1934-1940. In 1934 Lázaro Cárdenas won the official nomination for the presidency within the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana. Even before assuming the presidency in December of that year, he consolidated a broad social coalition composed of peasant farmer associations, organized workers, and army officers and soldiers. Relying on this wide support, he was able to dismantle the centers of power on which the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana had relied so far. Plutarco Elias Calles, president during 1924-1928 and the governing figure behind the scene (Jefe Máximo) until Cárdenas’ election was forced into exile. Hundreds of ranks from the government and the army associated with the former leader were fired, and the local caciques were put under check by arming the peasantry. Subsequently, the hacienda system in the hands of the traditional landowning class was partially dismantled by a land reform that distributed fifty million acres of land to some eight hundred thousand peasant families. Later, a process of collectivization took place through the formation of 226 community farms (ejidos), in which some thirty-five thousand people raised cotton, cereals, and other crops. These internal undertakings were closely related to foreign economic policy as governmental support of ejidos aimed also to relieve the need for the importation of staple products. More prominent in this respect was the nationalization of the British and U.S. oil companies in 1938, whose refusal to comply with the decision of the Supreme Court on a labor conflict was recognized as a defiance of national sovereignty. In the same vein, a six-year-plan (Plan Sexenal), of Soviet inspiration, launched land, labor, education and health reforms, as well as electrification projects.

Again and despite the differences on scale, wealth, power, and histories of the states and categories of political regime the distinctive features of anti-hegemonic party state as a political strategy are in place. Policies enhancing state power by combining state and party apparatuses, mobilizing society guided by a collectivist ideology, and confronting the world hegemonic order in the sake of improving the state and its society position in the world division of wealth and power are also observed in states ruled by political regimes that emerged from national liberation movements. The first and foremost example for the application of anti-hegemonic party state strategy by such a regime is the case of India. The most notable political development since its independence has been the stability of parliamentary democracy. However, since Britain transferred the power to the Indian National Congress, for all but three of India's forty two years of independence until 1989, the successors of the Indian National Congress - the Congress Party and its continuation Congress Party (I) - has been the ruling party in New Delhi. In this case, the application of anti-hegemonic party state political strategy relies upon a broad social coalition composed by the middle class as its cornerstone, whose power and success progressively attracted landlords and industrialists on the one hand and weak and despised groups (e.g. untouchables, Muslims) on the other hand. This composition of a social coalition supporting the application of anti-hegemonic party state strategy starkly contrast with that observed in mutually excluding fascist and communist regimes conformed by industrialists, landlords, lower middle class and small state owners or by workers and peasants respectively. The preeminence of the Congress Party and the social coalition behind it enabled the sustainability of parliamentary democracy – instead of a "people's democracy" or the open rejection of democracy – without resorting to typical repressive measures of other regimes that also applied the anti-hegemonic party state political strategy. Opposition parties from left and right, regional and national, secular and religious operated freely. It was rather the lack of effective alternatives, particularly at parliamentary elections in the Union, which was the primary reason for the failure of the opposition. There were fair elections, free press, independent judiciary, and an unpoliticized civil service. However, as soon as the preeminence of the Congress Party was at stake, as in 1975 when a court declared Indira Gandhi guilty of campaign abuses, a state of "national emergency" was established. Political parties were banned, civil rights suspended, and the press controlled with the government holding the monopoly on the news and interpretation. As democracy was re-established in 1977 the Congress Party was defeated in the sixth general elections for the first time. Since then, the Congress Party (I), although still the most prominent political party, lost its exclusivity as a government party being defeated again in the ninth general elections (1989), in 1996, in 1998, and in 1999. Similarly, since 1989 there have been non-Congress party governments in most states of the Union. The application of anti-hegemonic party state political strategy is clearly visible in economic policy. From the very beginnings since independence, the Indian National Congress (1947-1985) held the "commanding heights". The government has been the dominant or monopolistic producer and/or supplier of military ordnance, iron and steel, ships, heavy engineering and foundry goods, energy from all sources, telecommunications and broadcasting, railroad and air transport. Public sector corporations produced automobiles, cement, electronic goods, warehousing, among others. This economic structure was developed since 1951 through sequential five-year plans issued by the Indian government's Planning Commission. Its aim was not only preventing the concentration of wealth and means of production providing for all citizens social and economic justice but also the industrialization of India through a policy of import substitution that would modify the place assigned for India in the hegemonic world order. As in the previous examples the internal features of the political regime based as an interplay between a charismatic political leader, a state government and bureaucracy, a leading party, and a mobilized society results are tightly intertwined with the attitude it adopted vis à vis the world hegemonic order. Moreover, the challenging attitude adopted by the regime in India was also expressed by its “non-alignment” policy toward the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic powers. Nevertheless, the general trend was further strengthening the relationship with Moscow as reflected by the Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation (1971). Backed by this treaty, the Indian navy asserted its position at the Bay of Bengal vis à vis the U.S. navy during the third Indo-Pakistani war (1971). This stance reflected the Indian anti-hegemonic stance facing the predominant position of the United States in the Indian Ocean. In short, backed by the Soviet Union India developed a formidable military capacity not only for self-defense purposes but for gaining a predominant role in South Asia at the expense of the hegemonic power. Another type of regime emerging from a national liberation movement referred as African one-party-state that also implemented the anti-hegemonic party state political strategy is exemplified by the case of Ghana under Nkrumah's Convention People's Party. 1947, the year of India's independence, was also the year of the foundation of the United Gold Coast Convention under the leadership of Nkrumah aiming at the immediate achievement of self-government. Its successor, the Convention People's Party, founded in 1949, became preeminent after a landslide victory in the legislative assembly elections, under British administration, in 1951. By the time that Ghana's independence was achieved, in March 1957, Nkrumah's party held an undisputed leadership validated by the presidential elections of 1960 (in which Nkrumah obtained 90% of the votes) and sealed in 1964 by constitutionally establishing Ghana as a one-party-state. Opposition was silenced from 1958 through the exercise of the Preventive Detention Law that enabled the regime to detain and imprison several hundred opposition members. On the other hand, the Convention People's Party mobilized society through the party institutions (whose membership encompassed 15% of the population) ranging from the central organs through the regional and local units, supplemented by organizations such as the National Council of Ghana Woman, the Young Pioneers youth organization, the trade union movement, and the United Ghana Farmer's Council. The typical double action of state and party apparatuses aiming to maximize control was attempted in Nkrumah's Ghana. In this case, however, the attempt accomplished meager results. Thus, regional and district state officials were subordinated to party commissioners, but there was not an effective chain of command linking the president\party general secretary with those party commissioners. Similarly, although the civil service was formally put under the leadership of the party in 1962, the party failed in effectively monitoring the civil service. To reverse that situation the Party's civil service committee replaced the Civil Service Commission in late 1965. Even more acute was the inability of the Party to control the military arm of the state. In 1963 it was announced that all officer cadets had to apply for party membership. In 1964 plans for the introduction of political commissars were announced. But these attempts to strength the party position also failed. Also in the economic sphere plans were ahead of performance. The British colonial administration initiated in Ghana in 1951 the ten-year Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the Gold Coast aiming to increase the production of agro-mineral raw materials needed by metropolitan industry. For Nkrumah's, by contrast, the increase of agricultural productivity, mainly of cocoa and oil seeds (the traditional products of colonial economy) was only the immediate and preliminary aim, whose strategic target was industrialization as the necessary step to remove Ghana’s society from the economic niche conceded by the hegemonic world order. The industrialization program was envisaged to rely in its earlier stages on foreign capital except in strategic sectors such as electricity supply, railway transport, and steel. According to this general aim the first development plan for independent Ghana scheduled for 1959-1964, aimed at raising the yields of the cocoa industry, establishing large acreages of rubber and banana plantations, and increasing the yields of cereals through the use of irrigation and fertilizers. The subsequent seven-year development plan, scheduled for 1964-1970 but interrupted in 1966 by the military coup, wanted to produce domestic substitutes for manufactured staples so far imported, while at the same time attempted to foster the manufacture and processing of agricultural and mining commodities before export.[16] Finally, from the state apparatus that the regime created by the Convention People's Party could not control came the blow that brought the regime and its anti-hegemonic party state policy to its end. In 1966 a military dictatorship was established through a military coup.[17] There are significant differences within the wide range of cases presented above deriving from the scale, wealth, power, and histories of the states and types of political regimes in question. The concept of anti-hegemonic party state does not imply any homogeneity along the different cases it includes except for the three necessary conditions listed above. The concept of anti-hegemonic party state delineates a general type of political strategy as an organizational software in which concrete performances greatly vary according to the prevailing conditions of the state and society in which it is applied and which provide the hardware. The range of states and societies was parsimoniously schematized by the World system approach, which views the modern world as a structure unified by the division of labor and articulated by the exchange and flow of goods, capital, and labor between its component societies. These societies are ruled by nation-states that are tied together in an interstate system. Societies located higher in the hierarchy of division of labor, named core societies, are those whose economy is based on quasi-monopoly products. These types of products are created and fostered by a high accumulation of capital and high technological development. Conversely, societies located at the bottom of the hierarchy, named peripheral societies, are characterized by economies based either on raw materials and/or on competitive products. The concentration on such products, whose production is possible anywhere else, allows for a narrower surplus than that of quasi-monopoly products. This is the self-perpetuating result of low capital accumulation and low technology production. The resulting trade between core and peripheral societies, therefore, has been called "unequal exchange." Between these two extremes is an in-between category of societies orientated towards both core-like and peripheral-like production called the semi-periphery. The social result of this categorical tripartite division of labor is that in the core flourish societies based on broad populations enjoying high wages, high consumption, low exploitation and low coercion. In contrast, in the periphery most of the members of the societies are low skill workers suffering from low income, low consumption, high exploitation and high coercion. This social profile is shared by semi-peripheral societies side-by-side with moderately skilled urban workers. As for the political results, states in the core have a wide fiscal basis on which the efficiency of its bureaucracy and the power of its armies depends, while the low resources of peripheral countries allows for a weak and usually corrupt state. The strength of semi-peripheral states varies along the spectrum created by the former two patterns. [18]

Figure 7: Outstanding Features of States in the Core, Semi-Periphery, and Periphery

| |core |semi-periphery |periphery |
|economy |quasi-monopoly products |both core-like and |based either on raw materials |
| |high accumulation of capital |peripheral-like production. |and/or on competitive products.|
| |high technological development | |narrower surplus than that of |
| |dominate the world-economy | |quasi-monopoly products. |
| | | |low capital accumulation, low |
| | | |technology production. |
|society |high wages, high consumption, low |This social profile is shared |most of the members of the |
| |exploitation and low coercion |by semi-peripheral societies. |societies are low skill workers|
| |formulate the discourse that interprets| |suffering from low income, low |
| |the world. | |consumption, high exploitation |
| | | |and high coercion |
|politics |wide fiscal basis, efficient |states varies along the |weak and usually corrupt states|
| |bureaucracy, powerful armies, and |spectrum created by the former |main aim of the weak peripheral|
| |strong states in the core aim to |two patterns. |states is to repress their |
| |perpetuate and foster the well-being of| |pauperized societies |
| |their societies | | |
| |establish the rules of the interstate | | |
| |system | | |

Map #1: The Core States [pic]
Map #2: The Semi-Periphery States [pic] Map #3: The Periphery States [pic]

Therefore, according to the basic features of any state the way of applying anti-hegemonic party state political strategy contemplates a wide range of possibilities in each of its three necessary conditions. This range of possibilities is simplified by establishing a principle of concomitant variation according to the position of each state in the world system. To begin with, the degree of state power enhancement by harnessing the combined mechanisms of state bureaucracy and a leading political party varies concomitantly from core to periphery. Core states are more able to obtain a massive mobilization of society. The degree of mobilization of society decreases through semi-peripheral and peripheral nation-states. Similarly, the particular aims of the modification in the world system arena for each nation-state ruled by an anti-hegemonic party state are concomitant to each nation-state’s position in it. Anti-hegemonic party state strategy in core states able to thoroughly mobilize society lead to the openly attack over the hegemonic powers in order to gain their position. Anti-hegemonic party state strategy applied in the semi-periphery appears as a struggle to achieve economic independence. Anti-hegemonic party state strategy in the periphery represents a struggle initially to consolidate their political independence and subsequently to improve their economic situation. Also the configuration of the social coalition representing the constituency of each regime applying the anti-hegemonic party state strategy is conditioned by the place of each state in the world system, according to the featured social structures observed in the core, semi-periphery, and periphery. Finally, the particular type of collectivist ideology, although related to the position of each society within the world system, is most directly connected with the particular intellectual history of each society.

Figure 11: Concomitant Variations of Anti Hegemonic Party States

|Position in World System |CORE |SEMI-PERIPHERY |PERIPHERY |
|Degree of Mass Mobilization |MAJOR |LESSER |MINOR |
|Aims at Challenging |OPEN ATACK ON HEGEMONY |REDEFINITION OF ECONOMIC |POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE |
|the Hegemonic World Order | |RELATIONS |CONSOLIDATION |

However, the concept of anti-hegemonic party state as a particular political strategy not only includes this wide range of distinctions. Important as they are, these differences within anti-hegemonic party states are a matter of degree - according to each state’s position in the world system - and not of kind. Beneath the wide range of concrete possible materializations of the anti-hegemonic party state strategy lies the substantial common ground for all of them: a political organizational software for mobilizing society from within through the parallel mechanisms of party and state, guided or justified by a collectivist ideology in order to modify the position of this state and society in the world division of labor with the outcome of confronting the hegemonic order outside.

The unity provided by this definition of a political strategy contributes to a better understanding on a conceptual level of the classification of political regimes. Because of the overlap between several concepts defining political regimes many historical cases are simultaneously portrayed by several of them. For example, among the above examples for anti-hegemonic party states, the Soviet Union and the Popular Republic of China are described as communist regimes, one/single party states, or totalitarian regimes; Mexico under Cárdenas (1934-1940) is depicted as either a one/single party-state or as a populist regime. Vietnam since 1954 appears as a communist regime, a one/single party state, or a regime under a national liberation movement; and Cuba since 1959 is depicted as either a communist regime, a one party-state, a regime under a national liberation movement, or, at least at its beginnings, as a populist regime. On the other hand, by applying the same concept for a broad cluster of political regimes formally similar, their internal substantial differences are overseen, as when disparate regimes as Mussolini's Italy and Salazar's Portugal are labeled together as fascist regimes or the Soviet Union and the Soviet Block states are labeled communist regimes. Finally, unusual combinations of formal features of several types of political regimes, such as a democratic regime ruled by a popular front coalition, and presided by a socialist president remained without a clear characterization. For instance, what kind of political regime was that of Allende in Chile (1970-1973)?

Second, the unity depicted by the Anti-Hegemonic Party State concept may eradicate the tendency consisting of identifying a geo-cultural area with a specific type of regime. In that fashion, totalitarianism is, generally, associated with the history of Europe; populism with that of Latin America; regimes headed by national liberation movements to states in Africa and Asia, and one-party/single-party states with either communist regimes or states in Africa. The result of such reification that matches between a particular concept and a geographical area is the compartmentalization of the globe into enclosed political spheres. This matching between concepts and regions results in an enhanced feedback between the two that leads to tailoring more and more tightly specific concepts for each enclosed region and to characterizing these regions more and more exclusively by these concepts. In short, as the enclosure spiral continues spinning and the global perspective is lost. The lost of the global perspective and the concept-area match also reinforces the endogenous and diachronic attributions regarding the origins of political regimes. This means that the origins of every political regime are searched and therefore also found within the boundaries of the nation-state in question and along its previous historical stages. In this vein, for example, the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and China are interpreted as long lasting autocratic and imperial traditions respectively and populism in Latin America is attributed to the continuity of nineteenth century Caudillismo. Here lies the third good reason to adopt the concept of the anti-hegemonic party state. The introduction of the exogenous perspective into the study of political regimes points towards the simultaneity or consecutiveness in the emergence of AHPS worldwide. At this point it is global and transnational histories that are called upon to contribute through their reconstruction of the processes of diffusion of this type of political regime from one state to the other as well as the global conditions that leaded many regimes to adopt similar strategies. There are a wide series of transfers involved in the diffusion of AHPS, covering the political, economic, and ideological realms. On the political level, the party structure and the combination, intertwinement, and entanglement of party and state apparatuses into a particular structure of power concentration stands out. On the economic level central planning is the most prominent feature, articulated by multi-year (five, four, or three) programs. Land reforms and collectivization is another widely diffused economic policy. Also, an especially in the semi-periphery, there is an aversion to free trade with the core. On the ideological level, the concepts of development, industrialization, modernization, nationalization and ‘catching up’ structured the discourses that oriented and legitimized AHPS. Conversely, the endogenous-diachronic perspective, typical of political regimes studies, will be reconsidered by examining the extent to which local historical peculiarities were the result of the interaction and accommodation between the local conditions, sources, and constraints and the flow of structures, policies, institutions, and ideas from the outside. The study of these processes of diffusion, adaptation, and hybridization – the fourth contribution fostered by the new concept of AHPS - will contribute to further explain the singularities of each AHPS, beyond the concomitant principle of variation, into individualization. In sum, on a conceptual level, the unity provided by this definition of a political strategy contributes to a better understanding in the classification of political regimes. On the historical level, the unity provided by the concept of anti-hegemonic party state contributes a new perspective on many historical cases. Moreover, the world wide applicability of this definition allows identifying a major global trend in the international political economy during the short twentieth century with deep implications for the understanding of the history of globalization.

Chapter 2: Anti-Hegemonic Party State and Domestic Features of Political Regimes

The particular performances resulting from the application of anti-hegemonic party state strategies greatly vary concomitantly to the defining features of the state in which it was applied. The range of variation is further enlarged by the fact that this political strategy was applied by different types of political regimes. The anti-hegemonic party state strategy was applied by Communist regimes (Communist Party, Soviet Union 1917-1928, Mongolian People's Party, Mongolia 1921-1937, Communist Party, Vietnam 1945-1986, Communist Party, China 1949-1976, Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia 1948-1980, Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas, Cuba 1959 -), a Fascist regime (Fascist Party, Italy 1922-1943), Populist regimes (Mexico, Cardenas’ Partido de la Revolución Mexicana, 1934-1940, Justicialismo, Argentina 1946-1955, Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, Brazil 1951-1954, Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, Republica Dominicana 1963, Arbenz, Guatemala 1951-1954, Mosaddeq’s Iran 1951-1953) Regimes under National Liberation Movements (Guomingdang, China 1928-1937, Sukarno’s Indonesia 1945-1967, Indian National Congress, India 1947-1985, National Liberation Front, Algeria 1954-1988, Convention People's Party , Ghana 1957-1966, Parti Démocratique de Guinée, Guinea 1958-1984, Union Soudanaise du Rassemblement Democratique Africain, Mali 1960-1968, Tanganyika African National Union, Tanzania 1964-1985, Uganda People's Congress, Uganda 1966-1971, Avant-garde de la Révolution Malgache, Supreme Revolutionary Council, Madagascar, 1975-1982), One-party states (Mexico, Cardenas’ Partido de la Revolución Mexicana, 1934-1940, National Liberation Front, Algeria 1954-1988, Convention People's Party , Ghana 1957-1966, Parti Démocratique de Guinée, Guinea 1958-1984, Union Soudanaise du Rassemblement Democratique Africain, Mali 1960-1968, Baath Party, Syria 1963- , Baath Party, Iraq 1963-1979, Tanganyika African National Union, Tanzania 1964-1985, Uganda People's Congress, Uganda 1966-1971, Avant-garde de la Révolution Malgache, Supreme Revolutionary Council, Madagascar, 1975-1982), Military regimes (Militarism in Showa Japan 1932-1945, Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Bolivia 1952-1964, ‘free officers’, Egypt 1952-1970, ‘free officers’, Iraq 1958-1963, ‘free officers’, Libya 1969-), Democratic regimes (Justicialismo, Argentina 1946-1955, Indian National Congress, India 1947-1985, Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, Brazil 1951-1954, Frente Popular, Chile 1970-1973), and Totalitarian regimes (Communist Party, Soviet Union 1929-1953, Nazi Party, Germany 1933-1945). Nevertheless, all of these cases share the common ground provided by the definition of anti-hegemonic party states: the mobilization of society from within through the parallel mechanisms of party and state, guided or justified by a collectivist ideology in order to modify the position of the state and society in question within the world division of labor, wealth, and power with the outcome of confronting the hegemonic order outside. In fact, the identification of a single political strategy underlying so many different types, but not all types, of political regimes provides a useful tool for a clearer classification of political regimes. To begin with, within most of the above mentioned categories for political regimes – Communist, Fascist, Populist, National Liberation Movements, One-party states, and military regimes - it is possible to distinguish between those cases that applied an anti-hegemonic party state strategy as opposed to those that did not. Communist regimes are defined as one-party systems ruled by a communist party resulting in a “single, centrally controlled and state-planned economy based on a completely collectivized state – or cooperatively owned economy virtually without a market.”[19] This definition encompasses the Soviet Union as well as several nation-states in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, 1946-1990; Czechoslovakia, 1948-1989; East Germany, 1949-1989; Hungary, 1948-1989; Poland, 1948-1989; Romania 1947-1989, and Yugoslavia, 1945-1990, the Socialist People's Republic of Albania 1946-1991), East Asia (People's Republic of China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Democratic Kampuchea 1975-1979, and the People's Republic of Kampuchea 1979-1989), and Cuba. This definition contributes to distinguishing communist regimes both from one-party systems in which the leading party is not a communist party (e.g. Liberia under the True Whig Party, 1878-1980; Kenya under Kenya African National Union, 1982-1990) and from nation-states in which the leading party is the communist party but not in the framework of a one-party system (e.g. Moldova, ruled by the communist party from 2001 to 2009 or Cyprus, since the Progressive Party of Working People's victory in 2008). Similarly, there are many distinctions within communist regimes. For example, the inclusion of East European and East Asian nation-states under the same category raises the issue of the division between regimes claiming to act in favor of the industrial working class in the former in contrast to the claim of governing in favor of the peasantry in the latter. However, a deeper divide does exist between those communist regimes that applied an anti-hegemonic party state strategy and those that did not. Both inner varieties of Communist regimes along the lines of industrial workers versus peasantry primacy applied the anti-hegemonic party state strategy, as exemplified above by the Soviet Union (1917-1953) and the Popular Republic of China (1949-1976). By contrast, the Communist regimes of the Eastern Block did not. By 1948 the Soviet Union accomplished the formation of Communist regimes modeled by it. Prima facie, all the defining components of anti-hegemonic party state were in place: the combined mechanisms of state bureaucracy and a leading political party, a collectivist ideology, and a society mobilized by all of them. However, the locus of power did not resided within the enhancing combination of these four elements but rather outside these regimes and societies. These states were ruled to different and changing extents by the Soviet Union itself, being the Soviet army the ultimate arbitrary. Therefore, the Communist regimes in the Eastern block are authoritarian regimes that brokerages the policies dictated by the Soviet Union. It was only in the cases of Yugoslavia that anti-hegemonic party state governance strategies were in place precisely because of the rejection of Soviet tutelage.[20] Also fascist political regimes can be defined as one-party state regimes ruled by a party informed by a set of ideologies that seek to place the nation above all other sources of loyalty in order to create a mobilized national community for the fulfillment of goals defined as national. The creation of such a national community, or process of national rebirth ("palingenesis"), implies the rejection of liberalism, conservatism, and communism as political forms held responsible for national disunity. A tight control of society, regulatory socio-economic policy, and cross-class collaboration are premises for territorial expansion.[21] Although in its beginnings fascism was idiosyncratically applied to Mussolini's regime in Italy, the concept subsequently spread over an increasing list of nationalistic regimes, including Nazi Germany, Spain under Franco, Portugal under Salazar, the first Slovak Republic under Jozef Tiso, Norway under Quisling, Pavelic’s Ustasha regime in Croatia, and Szalasi and the Arrow Cross regime in Hungary. Again, the application of anti-hegemonic party state strategy can serve as a fault line dividing this list into two different subsets. Fascist regimes that emerged and consolidated from without in Norway, Croatia, and Hungary were all achievements, either military or diplomatic, of Nazi Germany. These regimes depended upon a foreign power which controlled their policies. The bottom line of the definition of a fascist regime, a mobilized national community in search of national empowerment, does not occur under these circumstances, nor does the application of the anti-hegemonic party state strategy. Neither in all states many times described as ruled by fascist regimes and in which the regime emerged independently from within applied the anti-hegemonic party state strategy. Fascist regimes described as conservative are depicted as regimes in which power consolidation mainly relies upon the state apparatus while the role of the party remains limited, diffused, or marginal. These regimes, exemplified by Franco’s Spain and Salazar’s Portugal, implemented policies whose aims were to preserve the economic, social, and geo-political status quo in accordance to its informing conservative ideology. In contrast, Fascist regimes portrayed as a radical variant consolidated power through the duplicity of parallel state and party organs aiming to enter into every facet of society and maintain tight control and strict guidelines. This domination is intended to achieve far reaching changes within the nation-state and in the international arena in accordance to a radical ideology. In short, what makes this category distinctive within Fascist regimes, exemplified by Italy and Germany, is the application of the anti-hegemonic party state strategy.[22] Also Populist regimes are clearly divisible along the lines of anti-hegemonic party state strategy application. Populist regimes in Latin America are defined as regimes consolidated through a charismatic leader and his voters united indefinitely in a loyal relation. The emergence of such a charismatic bond is presented as an after-crisis mobilization phenomenon. This mobilization is channeled through electoral victories of the populist leader and his movement, once people gain and exercise their civil rights at the ballot box. Although the mass of supporters come from the ranks of the working class – giving the populist movement a pro-labor image – populist leaders also attract support from the middle-class and even from some upper class citizens. These regimes do not hold a consolidated doctrine, but rely on eclectic, flexible and changeable combinations taken from the wide ideological repertoire provided by socialism, communism, fascism, and democracy. The variety of Latin American populist regimes is arranged into an "early" or "liberal" type of populism during the first two decades of the twentieth century, followed by the "classical" populism of the 1930s-1960s, and a "late" or "neo" variety of populism in the 1980s-1990s. The more substantial difference between these three waves of populist regimes is that only the second one applied the anti-hegemonic party state strategy. Such was the case of the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana under Lázaro Cárdenas between 1934 and 1940 described above. Such was also the case of Vargas second presidency in Brazil (1951-1954). During the days of his Estado Novo (New State, 1937-1945) Getulio Vargas created in 1945 the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro that bound the urban workers and intended to test his party in elections. The army, however, overthrew Vargas before he was able to accomplish this. It was only in 1950 that this electoral goal took place in Brazil. The regime consolidated by the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro was supported by a broader coalition that included the regional leadership organized through the Partido Social Democratico, as well as the urban middle class. A similar development, which started in the framework of an authoritarian military dictatorship, happened in Argentina where Peron rose to power in 1943. As head of the National Department of Labor, Peron assisted collaborative trade unions by raising real wages by 10-17% during 1943-1945 and repressing uncooperative organizations, mainly those akin to the Communist Party. The unions then became the crucial instance of social mobilization that brought about Peron's release after being removed from all his positions and imprisoned by the military junta. Relying on this support by unionized workers combined into a broader coalition that included the regional leaderships and some supporters among the middle and upper classes, Peron assumed the presidency in 1946, despite the United States' open opposition, after wining 52.4% of the vote. The regime was consolidated because of its wide support on the one hand and its extensive repression on the other hand. These features are in stark contrast with the other two types and particularly with the "late"/"neo" variety of populism. The reason for this contrast is that these first and third waves of populism did not apply the anti-hegemonic party state strategy. The so called "early"/"liberal" populism depended on some charismatic leaders considered to be the precursors of populism. Although, since most of the formal conditions existing during the age of "classical" populism – large urban populations, wide impact of new technologies on them, and general suffrage rights to channel their mobilization – as well as the policies promoted by them – nationalization, protectionism, industrialization – were absent, the connection between the two appears either as impressionistic or teleological. Even more striking is the contrast between "classical" and "late"/"neo" populism. Although it is true that charismatic leaders succeeded in mobilizing a wide electorate during the 1990s as they did in the 1940s and 1950s, by opening up their economies to global competition and selling off most of the state infrastructures, enterprises, and natural resources, the substance of these so called "late"/"neo" populism regimes was precisely to undo the accomplishments "classical" populism and establish an alternative type of society, state, and political regime. In short, while all "classical" cases of populism share the combination of internal search for social cohesion and external challenge of the hegemonic order, both "early" and "neo" populism do not.[23] National liberation movements are political organizations that target the achievement of self-determination by establishing a new nation state for what they define as their nation. After those movements had achieved political independence as a result of decolonization, they consolidated a political regime in charge of the new state. Regimes constituted by national liberation movements pursued policies aimed at "catching up" with consolidated states through a process of modernization in order to become independent entities in the global arena politically as well as economically. Therefore, these movements nurtured a basic ideology of national building modernization and development elaborated from two different sets of ideologies: socialism and class struggle and nationalism and class integration. The scope of generalization provided by the concept of National Liberation movements includes at least the National Liberation movements in the Americas during 1776-1824, the National Liberation movements in Europe during the 19th and 20th centuries, and the Asian and African National Liberation movements during the 20th century. By focusing on the third wave only, the list of regimes under national liberation movements in Asia includes: Vietnam 1945-; Indonesia 1945-1967; India 1947-; Pakistan 1947-; Burma 1948-; Ceylon 1948-; Malaysia 1957-. Part of these regimes, as exposed above in the case of India, adopted an anti-hegemonic party state strategy (Vietnam 1945-1986; Indonesia 1945-1967; India 1947-1982) while others did not (Pakistan 1947-; Burma 1948-; Ceylon 1948-; Malaysia 1957-). In Africa, the defining role played by a single political party in regimes under national liberation movements resulted in the definition of African one-party states as a particular category for political regimes. As with regimes under national liberation movements at large, African one-party states emerged out of the political party that headed the struggle for independence. The major goal of the regime developed by the independentist party was the consolidation of the new nation-state in the face of the many regional, ethnic, and political centrifugal forces. For the sake of unity, a national ideology guided and legitimized the regime. The national ideology was in several cases intertwined with Marxism and Pan Africanism.[24] This wide definition embraces a large list of regimes that emerged in Sub-Saharan Africa after decolonization, which includes: Angola (1975-1991); Benin (1975-1990); Burundi (1966-1993); Cameroon (1966-1985; 1985-1990); Cape Verde (1975-1981; 1981-1991); Central African Republic (1962-1979; 1980-1981; 1985-1991); Chad (1962-1973; 1973-1975; 1989-1990), Comoros (1982-1990); Congo-Brazzaville (1964-1968; 1969-1990); Côte d'Ivoire (1960-1990); Djibouti (1981-1992); Equatorial Guinea (1970-1979; 1987-1991); Ethiopia (1987-1991); Gabon (1968-1990); Ghana (1964-1966); Guinea (1958-1984); Guinea-Bissau (1974-1991); Kenya (1982-1990); Liberia (1878-1980); Madagascar (1976-1989); Malawi (1966-1993); Mali (1960-1968; 1979-1991); Mauritania (1961-1978); Mozambique (1975-1990); Niger (1960-1974; 1989-1991); Rwanda (1965-1973; 1978-1991); São Tomé and Príncipe (1975-1990); Senegal (1966-1974); Seychelles (1979-1991); Sierra Leone (1978-1991); Somalia (1976-1991); Sudan (1971-1985); Tanganyika (1965-1975); Zanzibar (1965-1992); Tanzania (1975-1992); Togo (1969-1991); Upper Volta (1960-1966); Zambia (1972-1990); Zaire (1967-1990); Zimbabwe (1980-2009). Once again, this long list of African one-party state can be divided between regimes that applied an anti-hegemonic party state strategy and those that did not. Moreover, the very concept of one-party state, beyond the frontiers of Africa, recognizes two different varieties. Huntington and Moore had defined one-party systems as non-democratic regimes in which the principal leaders cannot be chosen at regular intervals through competitive elections in which the bulk of the adult population has the opportunity to participate. Within this category they had established a clear cut distinction between two different types of one-party states. On the one hand there are "revolutionary" one-party systems characterized by "social dynamism, autocratic and charismatic leadership, disciplined party, highly developed ideology, stress on propaganda and mass mobilization, combined with coercion and terror" as exemplified by the cases of Nazi Germany, Communist regimes, and Mexico under the PRI. On the other hand there are the "exclusionary" one-party systems depicted as a regime, which transformed by the leader ends up in the hands of technocrats who guide policy-making while marginalizing the party and its ideology represented by Kemalist Turkey, Nationalist China, and Franco’s Spain among others. In other words, as with all the political regimes explored so far, also one-party states are divisible into two subsets: those that applied an anti-hegemonic party state strategy and those that did not. The features of a charismatic leader, a political party, and state apparatuses that mobilize society through a collectivist ideology aiming a change in the state's position in the world division of labor are clearly recognizable in Nkrumah’s Ghana exemplified above. Ghana's anti-hegemonic party state was brought to its end in 1966 by a military coup that established a military regime.[25] This overthrow of Nkrumah's Convention People's Party by the army in Ghana belong to a larger pattern of military coups bringing regimes applying an anti-hegemonic party state strategy to an end and not only in Africa, but also in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East. Military coups set the stage for a particular type of political regime, the military dictatorship: a regime in which the military rule directly. The list of this type of regime across these three continents respectively includes: Algeria (1965-1976; 1992-1994), Benin (1963-1964; 1965-1970; 1972-1987), Burkina Faso (1966-1970; 1980-1991), Burundi (1966-1993), Central African Republic (1966-1976; 1981-1985; 2003-2005), Chad (1975-1979), Comoros (1999-2002), Democratic Republic of the Congo (1965-1967), Republic of the Congo (1968-1979), Cote d'Ivoire (1999-2000), Egypt (1952-1958), Equatorial Guinea (1979-1987), Ethiopia (1974-1987), The Gambia (1994-1996), Ghana (1966-1970; 1972-1979; 1981-1993), Guinea (1984-1991; 2008-present), Guinea-Bissau (1980-1984), Lesotho (1986-1993), Liberia (1980-1984), Libya (1969-present), Madagascar (1972-1975; 1977-1991), Mali (1968-1976; 1991-1992), Mauritania (1978-1992; 2005-2007; 2008-2009), Niger (1974-1989), Nigeria (1966-1979; 1983-1999), Rwanda (1973-1975), Sierra Leone (1967-1968; 1992-1996; 1997-1998), Somalia (1969-1976; local militia rule since 1991), Sudan (1958-1964; 1969-1986; 1989-1996), Togo (1967-1969), Uganda (1971-1979; 1985-1986). Argentina (1930-1932; 1943-1946; 1955-1958; 1966-1973; 1976-1983), Bolivia (1861-1871; 1876-1880; 1930-1931; 1936-1944; 1951-1952; 1964-1966; 1969-1979; 1980-1982), Brazil (1889-1894; 1964-1985), Chile (1891-1896; 1924-1925; 1927-1931; 1973-1990), Colombia (1953-1958), Costa Rica (1870-1876; 1877-1882; 1917-1919; 1948-1949), Cuba (1933-1940; 1952-1955), Dominican Republic (1916-1922; 1930-1961), Ecuador (1876-1883; 1937-1938; 1963-1966; 1972-1979), El Salvador (1885-1911; 1931-1935; 1944-1980), Guatemala (1944-1945; 1957-1958; 1963-1966; 1970-1986), Haiti (1950-1956; 1986-1990), Honduras (1903-1907; 1956-1957; 1963-1971; 1972-1982), Mexico (1877-1911), Nicaragua (1937-1947; 1950-1956; 1967-1979), Panama (1968-1989), Paraguay (1940-1948; 1954-1993), Peru (1845-1872; 1876-1879; 1886-1895; 1914-1915; 1930-1931; 1933-1939; 1948-1950; 1962-1963; 1968-1980), Suriname (1980-1988), Uruguay (1876-1879; 1973-1985), Venezuela (1908-1935; 1952-1959). Bangladesh (1976-1981; 1982-1990), Burma (Myanmar) (1958-1960, 1962-present), Cambodia (1966-1967; 1969-1975), Republic of China (1928-1975; local militia rule 1912-1928), Indonesia (1966-1998), Iraq (1949-1950; 1952-1953; 1958-1979), Japan (1936-1945), South Korea (1961-1979; 1980-1981), Laos (1959-1960), Pakistan (1958-1971; 1977-1988; 1999-2007), Syria (1951-1954; 1963-1972), Thailand (1933-1945; 1946-1947; 1948-1973; 1976-1992; 2006-2008), South Vietnam (1963-1975), North Yemen (1962-1978). A few of these military regimes outstand within this list for their difference. Instead of removing a regime because of its anti-hegemonic party state stance, they introduced the anti-hegemonic party state strategy to their states. Such were the cases of Militarism in Showa Japan 1932-1945, Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Bolivia 1952-1964, the ‘free officers’ regime in Egypt 1952-; the ‘free officers’ in Iraq 1958-1963; and the ‘free officers’ in Libya 1969-. For example, when a military coup brought Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser to power in 1952 he was backed not only by his fellow officers but enjoyed subsequently a broad popular support. The concentration of power was mainly achieved by an impressive enlargement of the state apparatuses: bureaucracy, army and paramilitary police reflected in the increase of government expenditure from 18.3% in 1954/5 to 55.7% in 1970. Even though social mobilization was not carried out by a single party, a national rally fulfilled this function - first the Liberation Rally, then the National Unity, and finally the Arab Socialist Union – together with a tightly controlled trade union (Confederation of Egyptian Workers) and other professional associations under state control. This enlarged machinery, backed by the mobilized social sectors, was in charge of implementing a series of measures in order to achieve economic development: a land reform (1952, 1961) that expropriated a seventh of all cultivated land from large landowners and distributed it among small proprietors and landless peasants, the decision to build the Aswan High Dam aiming to bring the large province between Cairo and Alexandria into cultivation, and the Helwan Iron and Steel Complex (1954). The evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal (1954) ended in the nationalization of the Canal while the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion (1956) resulted in the nationalization of foreign property. These initial steps developed by 1960 into a full fledged five-year plan (1960-1965), which included the nationalization of private banks and factories. Nationalization reached foreign investments as well, as a challenging stance was adopted in facing former colonial powers.

These military dictatorships in the Middle East are substantially different from those listed above in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. They represent a deep bifurcation within the concept of military dictatorship. In fact, these political regimes that emerged in the Middle East after independence as a result of the army stepping in politics can enlarge the lists of regimes under national liberation movements detailed above. The reason for that is that in the Middle East a particular post-colonial situation evolved as European powers withdrew from protectorates and mandates, instead of colonies, and implanted in their wake loyal regimes. By granting independence to these loyal regimes, the place of national liberation movements, so crucial in Asia and Africa, was marginalized and, as it turned out in many cases, deferred. Nevertheless, the neo-colonial attempt was temporarily brought to its end as the implanted loyal regimes were replaced by new regimes that applied the anti-hegemonic party state strategy aiming at an independent stance through the empowerment of their states and societies and the regulation of their economies. These regimes, which represent a delayed version of a regime under a national liberation movement, are collectively known as Arab-Socialist regimes and despite their singularities their share the application of anti-hegemonic party state strategy with the other types of regimes approached so far. In short, the identification of the anti-hegemonic party state political strategy underlying some of the Communist regimes, Fascist regime, Populist regimes, Regimes under National Liberation Movements, One-party states, and Military regimes but not all of them provide a profound division within each of these categories. First, for both concepts of fascist and communist regimes the internal versus external origin of the regime establishes a clear divide within each of them. Moreover, among fascist regimes – in a broad use of the concept – there emerges from within their societies a clear cut distinction between the “conservatives” and “radicals”. The first have actually “mimicked fascism,” while the second “were the revolutionaries of counter-revolution […] inasmuch as they contained people who wanted a fundamental transformation of society.”[26] Amidst the genuinely internal communist regimes a less deep distinction exists between regimes inclined to industrial or rural development depending on the conditions of the society in question. Secondly, for populism and national liberation movements there are three different settings and chronologies. For populism, the alternatives are nineteenth century Russia, the American Midwest of the same period, and Latin America during the twentieth century. For national liberation movements the options are the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the Americas, nineteenth and twentieth century Europe, and twentieth century Asia and Africa. Focusing for both concepts only on the last waves and adding to that list One-party states and military regimes, a major divide exists within each of these four types of regime according to the adoption or not of the anti-hegemonic party state strategy. Those regimes that adopted this strategy attempted to modify the role of their societies in the world division of labor seeking to improve their position in the world division of wealth and power while confronting the hegemonic world order. Those that did not apply the anti-hegemonic party state strategy positioned themselves within the framework of the hegemonic world order. If an improvement of their position in the world division of wealth and power or even a modification in the role of their societies in the world division of labor was attempted that was made with the support or consensus of the hegemonic powers, not confronting them. The combination of a massive mobilization of an internal constituency and the application of radical policies confronting the hegemonic order represent the backbone of anti-hegemonic party state political strategy. This political strategy is in stark contrast with either or both the reliance on external support and the application of conservative policies. This stark contrast produce a deep divide within each of the above discussed categories for political regimes.

Figure 4: Differences within Political Regimes

| Policy | | |
| |Conservative |Radical |
| | | |
|Support | | |
| | | |
| |Exclusionary” One Party Regime |Revolutionary” One Party Regime |
|From within |“Conservative” Fascism |“Radical” Fascism |
| |“Early” and “Neo” populism |Communism by Revolution |
| |National Liberation Mov. Regime |“Classical” populism |
| | |National Liberation Mov. Regime |
| | | |
|From outside |Fascism by invasion |Communism by invasion |

For the concept of democracy many possible ways of internal distinctions were advanced aiming to specify the broad notion that “democracy exists where the principal leaders of a political system are elected by competitive elections in which the bulk of the population have the opportunity to participate.”[27] In fact, very sharp distinctions are offered between two main types of democratic regimes. The first of them divide the democratic sphere between majoritarian democracies able at decisive leadership and coherent policies while relaying on narrow majorities versus consensus democracies that provide a more accurate representation, protection of minority interests, and broader participation in decision making at the expense of effective government.[28] Another dual classification stresses the distinction between well consolidated democratic regimes with democratic institutions properly working as opposed to formal democratic regimes that meet democratic standards by relaying on similar democratic institutions except that the political realm is ruled in practice by informal practices (e.g. the commitment of bureaucrats to democratic procedures; the degree to which political leaders, once elected, adhere to democratic practices and remain transparent and accountable in their behavior; the capacity of the regime and the state to translate electoral preferences into public policies that are then implemented; the power of nonelected but influential lobbies to influence policy makers, policy making, and policy implementation; the capacity of the regime to be fully coterminous with the state; and, more general, corruption).[29] This type of substantial distinction is reminiscent of the division between high-capacity and low capacity political regime, either democratic or non-democratic provided by Charles Tilly.[30] Moreover, democratic regimes are also classified from an aggregative approach that considers the many constitutive elements of a democratic regime: party system (two-party or multiparty), cabinet (concentration versus sharing of executive power), executive-legislative relations (dominance or balance of power), electoral systems (majority and plurality methods versus proportional representation), interest groups (pluralism versus corporatism), division of power (federal-unitary and centralized-decentralized contrasts), parliaments and congresses (concentration versus division of legislative power), constitutions (varieties of amendment procedures and judicial review), central banks (independence versus dependence), macro-economic management, and control of violence. The measurement of each of these constituent parts of a democratic regime and the several possible combinations between them result in a wide range of possible forms of democratic regimes.[31] Besides these attempts to differentiate within democratic regimes, there is still room to distinguish within democratic regimes according to the adoption or not of the anti-hegemonic party state. Although few (Justicialismo, Argentina 1946-1955, Indian National Congress, India 1947-1985, Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, Brazil 1951-1954, Frente Popular, Chile 1970-1973), the cases in which the anti-hegemonic party state strategy was applied by democratic regimes show at once the adaptability of this strategy to different types of regime as well as its basic common features despite the disparity of political regimes that applied it. It is much easier to conceive the application of the anti-hegemonic party state strategy by totalitarian regimes. In fact, out of all the categories for political regimes listed above, it is only the concept of totalitarianism that is not internally divided by the application or not of the anti-hegemonic party state strategy. Benito Mussolini originally applied the term to his own regime (1922-1943) in Italy.[32] Leon Trotsky applied the term to both fascism and Stalinism as "symmetrical phenomena" in Revolution Betrayed.[33] The academic study of totalitarianism began with broad works that defined the phenomenon as an all-embracing organization in full command of force and ideology (Arendt, 1951) or as the combined subjugation of state and society, under a utopian, non-political claim to exercise rule (Buchhein, 1962). Thus defined, the phenomenon was approached analytically, by detailing its component parts. This shift resulted in the empirical study of an aggregation of components such as a totalistic ideology, a single party committed to this ideology and usually led by one man (the dictator), a fully developed secret police, and monopolistic control of mass communications, operational weapons, and all the organizations involved in a centrally planned economy (Friederich and Brzezinski, 1956). Thereafter, each of these components was individually dealt with (e.g. the dictator by Tucker, the secret police by Barghoorn, and the centralized economy by Hardt and Frankel) and additional features were incorporated into the profile of totalitarianism such as its mobilizing character (Montias’s “mobilizational system,” Lowenthal’s “modernizing mobilization regimes”).[34] Totalitarian regimes applied ever the anti-hegemonic party state strategy.

Instead, the most contested internal distinction within totalitarian regimes divides between communist and fascist regimes. The arguments against the generalization implied by grouping fascist and communist regimes under the concept of totalitarianism argue that although both types of regimes have risen simultaneously and in opposition to the same type of political regime - liberal democracy - they did so independently.[35] Moreover, although, “apologists for fascism are probably right in holding that Lenin engendered Mussolini and Hitler”[36], the attack against liberal democracy emerged out of two different and opposed ideological directions: the ideological origins of fascist regimes are in revolutionary syndicalism and far-right nationalism and racism; the ideological origins of communist regimes are in Marxism.[37] Beyond the ideological divide, another important difference lies in the fact that fascism represents unity of thought and action since fascist ideology was put into practice in the most methodological way. In contrast, Stalinist dictatorship cannot be described as an application of Marxist ideology.[38] This last difference, however, may finally result in contributing to bridge the huge ideological gap between fascist and communist regimes, as the first put their ideology into practice while the second bore an awkward relation to its founding ideology. Nevertheless, Kershaw and Lewin insist that the two regimes nevertheless were fundamentally different in the goals of their policies: in contrast to Nazism, Stalinism employed its barbarous means toward rational goals and managed to transform itself after 1953.[39]

Moreover, this concept also raised two other major criticisms. To begin with, by defining this type of regime as highly monolithic, centralized, and implacably above the society it ruled, the concept of totalitarianism attracts much revisionist criticism. Subsequently and related to the revisionist criticism the scope of generalization of the concept of totalitarianism was criticized as too narrow. That is, as “total” power has been lately depicted as limited rather than overwhelming, more regimes other than a few unique exceptions, usually Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, may suit the category.

The usage of the totalitarian ideal-type was first brought into question due to the growth of industrialization and professionalization that had been brought about by the technical and scientific commitments of the regime, and which weakened statism.[40] Even before, a deeper criticism emerged to challenge the characterization of an all prevailing state with absolute control over its subjects’ economic and social lives, a "solid and durable political system dominating a society that has been totally fragmented or atomized," and immune to change from internal or external pressures advanced by the concept of totalitarianism.[41] The revision of the totalitarian paradigm was carried out independently by specialists dealing with the U.S.S.R on the one hand, and Nazi Germany on the other hand.

Sheila Fitzpatrick synthesized a vast bulk of revisionist literature on the Soviet Union as a totalitarian regime[42] by depicting three different levels of refutation:

"The first emphasizes that the regime had less actual control over society than it claimed, that its actions were often improvised rather than part of a grand design, that implementation of its radical policies often diverged from the policy-makers' intentions, and that the policies had many unplanned and unanticipated social consequences. The second, takes revisionism a step further, sees the regime's policies as appealing to definite social constituencies, responding to social pressures and grievances, and liable to be modified in practice through processes of informal social negotiation. The third and most challenging approach would describe such policies as the product of initiative from below rather than attributing them to the regime's initiative from above."[43]

As for Nazi Germany, Boszart pioneered the challenge on totalitarianism by characterizing it as a "polyocracy," a plurality of centers of power – the leader, the state bureaucracy, and the party – without a hierarchical relationship between them.[44] This argumentative line was further developed by Hans Mommsen and Ian Kershaw. The former stressed the conflicts within the regime as a result of overlapping of competences that resulted in policies that were "cumulatively more arbitrary in their character, more violent and radical in their implementation, more conductive to competitive struggle among the executive organs of the régime."[45] In this competitive struggle lay the roots of further radicalization of policies. Although bringing to the fore the "Hitler factor," Ian Kershaw also stresses "leadership chaos" instead of totalitarianism while synthesizing in this way the "intentionalist" approach (concentration on Hitler's intentions and ability to implement them, e.g. Bracher, Hillgruber, Hilderbrand, Jackel) and the above presented "stucturalist" or "functionalist" approach to the study of the Third Reich. Nevertheless, from a totalitarian perspective, the chaotic competition between the centers of power was reinterpreted as enhancing the comprehensive power of the regime, rather than diminishing it.[46]

Both revisionisms of the totalitarian paradigm, as applied to the U.S.S.R. and Nazi Germany, converge in a comparison between them that stresses the restorative character of both. As opposed to the modern character attributed to them by the totalitarian model, they returned to charismatic rule (rather than legal authority), and were fundamentally "feudal," "atavistic," and "barbarous."[47]

Despite these criticisms and those added by the collapse of the U.S.S.R. that portrayed the study of totalitarianism as an artifact of the Cold War (Gleason, 1995)[48], the totalitarian approach has still inspired recent works. If the disintegration of the Soviet system provided from a revisionist perspective a clear demonstration that totalitarian systems are intrinsically unstable, adherents of the totalitarian paradigm supplied the logically expected responses. One the one hand, Juan Linz argues that the collapsing regime in the Soviet Union was not a totalitarian but a post-totalitarian one. This new type of regime refers to an authoritarian one that evolved from a totalitarian regime and preserves some of its political, economic, and social structures, at least as images and memories.[49] On the other hand, Shlapentokh, sticking to the character of the regime as resistant to change by society from within or pressure from outside proper of the totalitarian paradigm and considering the Soviet Union a "normal totalitarian society" to its end, concludes that "the Soviet political system was destroyed 'from above.'"[50] Finally, the collapse of communism in 1989 brought to light new evidence of the horrors of Stalinism, and gave to the totalitarian paradigm a new lease of life.[51] However, these criticisms ended up displacing the totalitarian paradigm to a considerable extent. By discarding the monolithic character of the toughest and most implacable regimes, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, in their ability to impose themselves upon society, revisionism paved the way to a wider view of Totalitarian regimes. In this vein, Hermet, et. al. approached the intricacies of the relationship between state and civil society in regimes where a leader, a state, and party apparatuses overlap in their efforts to rule, examining not only in the classic cases of Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union, but also one-party states in China, Africa, and the Middle East.[52] Moreover, since according to the consolidated revisionist criticism total subjugation of state and society was not implacably effective as assumed by the totalitarian paradigm, wider concepts were advanced for regimes with a totalitarian ambition rather than a fulfillment of totalitarianism. Such is the case of the concept “mobilization system”. Mobilization Systems are defined by Andrain as regimes aiming to attain rapid, fundamental transformations of government and society while encouraging active mass involvement in political life relying on political organizations such as political parties, the army, guerilla forces, militias and other mass associations. A charismatic leader heads these political organizations. Andrain divides mobilization systems into "elitist" and "populists". "The elitist mobilization type closely resembles the model of a totalitarian system".[53] The elitist mobilization type consist of a powerful government led by a charismatic leader who articulates an ideological vision for a radically reconstructed society centralizes, coerces, and coordinates the state. According to the elitist rationale, a vanguard political party or movement must control, guide, educate, and direct the masses, who lack the elevated political consciousness needed to play an active role in political decision making. Elitist mobilization systems include the U.S.S.R. under Lenin and to a greater extent under Stalin, Nazi Germany, North Korea under Kim Il-Sung, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Cuba under Castro, Vietnam under Ho Chi Min, and China under Mao.[54] Populist systems represent the interest of poor farmers and factory workers while trying to capture some aspects of folk systems in differentiated societies. Opposed to capitalistic exploitation and state domination, they try to organize the unorganized, empower the weak and enrich the poor. Populist examples include 1917 Russia from the toppling of the Czar to the Bolshevik takeover; Italy during 1918-1922; Spain during the second republic (Spain under Franco is not a “mobilization system”); and Allende's Chile.[55] It is to this second variant only that Hague and Harrop refer to under their concept of "Populist-Mobilization Regimes" as an exclusively Third-World phenomenon. Populist-mobilization regimes are based on a single or dominant party which professes modernization as its central goal. They are contrasted with communist party-states by having a nationalistic rather than class-based rhetoric. The emergent nation is portrayed as engaged in a struggle against hostile forces such as Western multinationals and conservative social forces. Leadership in these regimes tends to be heavily personalized, overshadowing the institutions of the regime - as the cases of Kenya under Kenyatta, Tanzania under Nyerere, Ghana under Nkrumah, Zambia under Kaunda, Tunisia under Bourguiba, and Argentina under Peron show. The case of Mexico under the PRI is potrayed as the "foremost example" of a populist-mobilizing regime, emphasizing the period under Lázaro Cardenas (1934-1940).[56] Another generalizing alternative for totalitarianism is offered by Brooker with the concept of “ideological one-party state”. This reformulation stresses once again one-party states as a modern new form of dictatorship as opposed to other forms of non-democratic regimes, in which there is an ideology that builds up social solidarity and a party that indoctrinates society in this solidarity building ideology. This new conceptualization for one-party states, however, embraces political regimes regardless of the number of political parties allowed by the system. In this definition, the defining feature is not the exclusivity of the ruling party by law but rather its effective monopoly of power even if several other political parties do exist. In other words, no matter how many political parties do exist in a particular regime, there is just one that grasps power. This is the "substantive one-party state".[57] As the mere number of parties in a political regime turns to appears as a superfluously formal element, Brooker includes under his ideological one-party states not only regimes that allowed one party, such as Nazi Germany and the Touré’s Guinea but also others in which the ruling party existed amidst several other parties, for instance Peron’s Argentina and Suharto’s Indonesia, and even regimes that lacked a party as in the cases of Nasser’s Egypt and Ne Win’s Burma.[58] These various conceptual alternatives for totalitarianism while relaying on revisionist criticism and aiming a larger generalizing framework embrace all the types of regimes above listed - Communist, Fascist, Populist, National Liberation Movements, One-party states, and military regimes - as a single political regime or system. In this way, the singularities of each of these political regimes regarding their particular constituent elements (constitution, institutions, ideology) are lost. Moreover, the internal varieties within each of these types of political regimes as detailed above are not taken into account (e.g. a military dictatorship such as that of Suharto in Indonesia relaying on hegemonic powers while repressing its own society and a military dictatorship such as that of Nasser in Egypt confronting the hegemonic powers while relaying on the mass mobilization of his own society are considered to be examples of the same political regime). It is mandatory to recognize the singularities of each of these types of political regimes as well as the differences within each of them, as specified above. A more precise way to point at their common ground is by stressing their shared political strategy. A strategy aiming mobilization from within and confrontation from without while seeking the upgrading of the state and society in question within the world division of labor, of wealth, and of power. This shared political strategy adopted many forms according to the singularities of the states and regimes that applied it. This shared political strategy is the anti-hegemonic party state. Now, an exogenous perspective on the ways in which political regimes interact in the global arena will further clarify the crucial role of the anti-hegemonic party state strategy for a better understanding in the classification of political regimes.

Chapter 3
Anti-Hegemonic Party State and Exogenous Perspective on Political Regimes

Political regimes are in general defined exclusively by domestic features such as: governmental capacity, degree of democracy, leading social coalition, transition to commercialized agriculture, conflict between elite and citizens, civil society, sources of income and composition of wealth, political institutions, inter-group inequality, middle class, and political identity. Following these criteria as well as other domestic features political regimes are arranged along the democracy- dictatorship\non-democracy dichotomy. This dichotomy informs a great deal of the literature on this issue and has become the standard classification in comparative politics textbooks since the 1990s.[59] Since then, this dichotomy and depictures of non-democratic regimes en block also appear in books such as Chirot's study on Modern Tyrants that distinguishes between democratic and non-democratic regimes by approaching the last category as polities ruled by modern tyrants who are described as revolutionary idealists guided by an ideology, empowered by nationalism and modern science, and founded on the rejection of individualism and consumerism. [60] Also Charles Tilly bases his typology of political regimes on this dichotomy, adding a second axis which measures the variations in governmental capacity. From the combination of the extreme situations along these two dichotomies four different types of regimes emerge: high-capacity, non-democratic; low capacity, non-democratic; high-capacity, democratic; low capacity, democratic.[61] There are also studies that go beyond the typology of political regimes, searching for the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of each kind of political regime. A prominent attempt in this direction that had a long lasting impact was made by Barrington Moore in his Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship. There, the configuration of the leading social coalition amidst the process of agricultural commercialization brought about a particular type of political regime. Whenever the bourgeoisie predominated, eliminating the great landlords, proletarianizing the peasantry and bringing agricultural commercialization to its end, a democratic regime emerged. Conversely, the success of the great landlords in checking the bourgeoisie and subsuming the peasantry resulted in a fascist regime. Finally, the ability of the peasantry to rebel, overriding the power of both the great landlords and the bourgeoisie, led to a communist regime. Despite the distinction between the last two, both were underlined as dictatorships.[62] More recently, Acemoglu and Robinson found the dictatorship-democracy dichotomy as well as the search for their economic origins useful, although from a different perspective. In their view, there are four main paths of political development: from non-democracy to consolidated democracy (e.g. Britain), from non-democracy to fragile democracy destined to collapse (e.g. Argentina), non-democracy stabilized by prosperity (e.g. Singapore), and violent non-democracy (e.g. South Africa). The unfolding of each one of these paths results from the conflict over politics between the elite and the citizens. Whenever the citizens have the upper hand in this conflict, a democratic regime emerges, while a victorious elite result in a Non-democratic regime. The main difference between these regimes is that democracy is a situation of political equality in which the interests of the majority (i.e. more income) are pursued in contrast with the quest for the elite's interests in a non-democracy. Therefore, various political regimes emerge out of different societies, which diverge in their underlying economic structures.[63] Nevertheless, the need for a further specification in this parsimonious dichotomy democracy-dictatorship/non-democracy transpires even in works based on it. For instance, in his Economic Theory of Dictatorship Wintrobe founds essential to distinguish between “tin-pot” dictatorship and “totalitarian” dictatorships. The first type refers to a regime “in which the dictator wishes only to minimize the costs of remaining in power in order to collect the fruits of office”, while in the “totalitarian” type the “leader maximizes power over population”. Cases such as Somosa’s Nicaragua, Iran under the shah, or the rule of Ferdinand Marcos over the Philippines illustrate the first sub-type whereas Communist regimes, Nazi Germany, and Islamic Iran exemplify the second one.[64] Similarly, In Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick establishes very clearly the differences between Non-democratic regimes by recommending how the United States should deal with nondemocracies. In her view, the failure of Carter's administration in foreign affairs was due to the lack of distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. While the latter should be removed, the former should be supported. This type of subdivisions within the large category of dictatorship/non-democracy was already widely explored before. Explorations into non-democratic territory aiming the specification of the broad category of dictatorship or non-democracy resulted in a significant distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. This distinction in fact was the standard tripartite typology mapping all political regimes in political sciences textbooks until the end of the 1980s.[65] This tripartite typology included democracy as the regime in which whatever is not forbidden is permitted; authoritarianism as the regime in which whatever is not permitted is forbidden; and totalitarianism as the regime in which whatever is permitted is compulsory. Linz defined authoritarian regimes as "political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without either extensive or intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their developments, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones."[66] Moreover, the authoritarian regimes are further divided into several concepts such as sultanistic regimes and authoritarian bureaucratic regimes. Contemporary sultanistic regimes are those “based on personal rulership [where] loyalty to the ruler is motivated not by his embodying or articulating an ideology, nor by a unique personal mission, nor by his charismatic qualities, but by a mixture of fear and rewards to his collaborators.” Therefore this type of regime is primarily defined in terms of the power of personal rulership, the ruler exercises power to an extreme and without restriction. Under sultanistic rule the distinction between regime and state is markedly less clear than in other regimes. Power is concentrated in the hands of the ruler and his close associates (family members in particular), there is an absence or perversion of legal-rational norms, there is rampant corruption, and relationships are regulated through privileges and favors. Personalism and dynasticism are specific to sultanism. When experts come in and some rationalization is in place, this is basically to enhance the power of the ruler and his associates. Because sultanistic leaders lack charisma, they surround themselves with charismatic symbols. Constitutional hypocrisy is also a defining characteristic of sultanism, as is the narrow social bases of support. Examples of sultanistic regimes are the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic, the Batista regime in Cuba, the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, the Duvalier regime in Haiti, the Pahlavi regime in Iran, and the Marcos regime in the Philippines.[67] Another particular variant of authoritarian regime derived from a military dictatorship are those defined as authoritarian bureaucratic regimes.[68] These non-democratic regimes leaded by military and civilian technocrats are based on the repression of society at large and close association with foreign capital. This type of regime aims modernization by promoting the advancement of industrialization.[69] These several types of authoritarian regimes represent the group that Kirkpatrick recommended the U.S. to back and coincide with Wintrobe’s“tin-pot” dictatorship. More problematic are the dealings with the other non-democratic or dictatorship regimes that both Kirkpatrick and Wintrobe referred as “totalitarian” dictatorships. The definition for totalitarian regimes its vicissitudes and alternatives was lengthily presented in the previous chapter. As exposed there, this concept is rather specific and was usually applied to Nazi Germany and Stalinist Soviet Union. The application of totalitarianism beyond these two cases is contentious and in fact there are few exceptions in which this concept was applied beyond Nazi Germany and Stalinist Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the need to refer to political regimes aiming to mobilize their populations in order to transform their societies resulted in several attempts to define milder version of totalitarianism. As examined above, among this concepts appear mobilization system, populist-mobilization regimes, and ideological one-party state. However, these attempts to create a wider category for political regimes, which in most of the times are not democratic, certainly are not authoritarian and include some similarities with totalitarianism, resulted in the inclusion of too many types of political regime under a single concept. An alternative way to deal with this problem emerges by introducing the definition of anti-hegemonic party state. In contrast to political regimes that are defined exclusively by domestic features the definition of anti-hegemonic party state consist of a composite political strategy in which the internal political features – mobilization of society through the mechanisms of party and state – are interdependent with foreign policy and international political economy. In this way, the interactions between political regimes within the inter-state system are added to the endogenous dimension of political regimes exposed so far. The anti-hegemonic party state political strategy marks a divide between and within those political regimes according to the patterns of interaction within the inter-state system. Political regimes aiming to integrate the states under their rule within the global economy leaded by the hegemonic powers and accordingly to a role in the world division of labor fomented or accepted by them do not apply the anti-hegemonic party state political strategy. By contrast, those regimes that attempt to disentangle their states from that global economy and or transform their role in the world division of labor apply the anti-hegemonic party state political strategy. Similarly and in accordance to that, a divide between and within political regimes can be established following the application of a friendly or hostile foreign policy vis à vis the hegemonic powers. In short, anti-hegemonic party state establishes a distinction between political regimes which policies are responsive to the hegemonic world order as opposed to those that are anti-hegemonic. To sum up, by stressing the relationship between internal and external features, the definition of anti-hegemonic party states further clarifies the distinction between and within political regimes. On the one hand, there are regimes that lead their states to fully integrate within the hegemonic world order. These regimes assume their states position within the world division of labor, wealth, and power. Any attempts to foster the well being of their societies and the empowerment of their states takes place within this framework. On the other hand, there are states lead by a political regime that refuses to accommodate within the world division of labor, wealth, and power as established or reproduced by the hegemonic world order. The source of conflicts confronting states in the periphery and semi-periphery with the hegemonic powers is the economic unequal exchange derived from the world division of labor. Attacks upon the hegemonic powers and the hegemonic world order coming from the periphery and semi-periphery are carried out by anti-systemic movements. These social and political movements confront the world-system from two standpoints: class struggle within each state and national struggle confronting the hegemonic world order.[70] This confrontation with the hegemonic powers is also carried out by political regimes that emerged out of these anti-systemic movements and once consolidated in power apply an anti-hegemonic party state strategy. In the core of the world system, the source of conflict is the struggle for the hegemonic position in order to dominate the world-economy, to establish the rules of the interstate system, and to formulate the discourse that interprets the world.[71] That is, a challenger power confronts the hegemonic power in order to gain its highest position within the world system. Historically, this role corresponded to France during the Napoleonic wars (1792-1815) and during the first half of the twentieth century to Germany that applied the anti-hegemonic party state strategy from 1933 until its defeat in 1945. [72] The combination of these two stances vis à vis the hegemony (rule player or challenger) with the three basic types of locations within the world system (core, semi-periphery, and periphery) leads to six broad categories:

Figure 7: Typology of states by their location within the world system and their attitude towards it.

|Position in World-System |Attitude towards its Position |
|CORE |RULE PLAYER |
|CORE |CHALLENGER |
|SEMI-PERIPHERY |RULE PLAYER |
|SEMI-PERIPHERY |CHALLERGER |
|PERIPHERY |RULE PLAYER |
|PERIPHERY |CHALLENGER |

Therefore, when viewed from the exogenous perspective of interaction within a globalized world, states are first and foremost classified by their place in the world division of labor, wealth and power and by their attitude towards it: hegemonic core states, challenger core states, semi-peripheral states, challenger semi-peripheral states, peripheral states, and challenger peripheral states. These exogenous characteristics and the concomitant internal features for each state are closely related to the type of strategy that political regimes adopt. On the one hand, there is an evident correlation since 1945 between democracy and core states. The unusual periods of detachment from democratic regimes by core nation-states before 1954 and the adoption of dictatorship or non-democratic regimes coincided with their move out of the hegemonic order and towards a challenger position, as in the cases of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. However, following the defeat of both fascist and Nazi regimes the challenger position adopted by Italy and Germany came to an end and democracy was reinstituted. According to their position in the world division of wealth and power, in core states there exists a strong affinity of interests between state and civil society, a large middle class which provides a confident buffer between citizens and elite, resulting in a solid foundation for democratic regimes. There is a broad literature affirming the tight correspondence between the economic development typical of core nation-states and the sustainability of democracy over time.[73] These democratic regimes in the core never adopted an anti-hegemonic party state strategy. As Hobsbawm putted it when referring to the stability of democratic regimes after the Second World War:

“Where governments have enough to distribute to satisfy all claimants, and most citizens’ standard life is steadily rising in any case, the temperature of democratic politics rarely rises to fever-pitch.”[74]

This core-democracy correlation became opaque due to the establishment of democratic regimes in the semi-periphery or periphery, notably during “the third wave”. Nevertheless, democratic regimes in the semi-periphery or periphery generally fit into the subcategory of formal democracies or low functioning democratic regimes in which even if the standard democratic institutions are in place democratic practices are not.[75] Moreover, several democratic regimes in the semi-periphery or periphery adopted the anti-hegemonic party state strategy (e.g. Argentina, India, Brazil, and Chile) in contrast to democratic regimes in the core. On the other hand, the fragile and problematic condition of democratic regimes in semi-peripheral and peripheral states is linked to a second outstanding correlation between these types of states and dictatorships or non-democratic regimes. The alienation between the state, as an instrument of the local elite, and society within these polarized societies leads to the recurrence of non-democratic regimes. Nevertheless, among these dictatorships or non-democratic regimes a crucial difference is established by those that adopted an anti-hegemonic party state strategy as opposed to those that did not. These last defended the local elite and its convenient self-serving relationship with states in the core while repressing the society under their rule. The former, instead, refuse to accommodate with their state position in the world division of labor, mobilize society, and adopt a challenging attitude towards both the local elite and the hegemonic world order. The dichotomy between regimes that play the rules of the hegemonic world order as opposed to those that adopt an anti-hegemonic stance and pose a challenge to the hegemony contributes, therefore, to clearly differentiate within non-democratic regimes as well as within democratic regimes. Wintrobe’s “tin-pot” dictatorships recommended to be supported by Kirkpatrick are those that did not apply the anti-hegemonic party state strategy and they coincide with the authoritarian categories of sultanistic regimes and authoritarian bureaucratic regimes surveyed above. Conversely, Wintrobe’s “totalitarian” dictatorships, those that should be eradicated according to Kirkpatrick, are better defined as those non-democratic regimes that adopted the anti-hegemonic party state strategy. From this new perspective the substantial difference between the antagonistic forms of non-democracy emerge not only from their internal defining features, but also regarding the way they confront the world division of labor and power. Authoritarian regimes aim to protect the established insertion of the local elite in the world division of labor and power by terrorizing the society it rules. In this case, non-democracy is represented by three basic forms of authoritarian regimes: tyrannies, sultanistic regimes, and military dictatorships. Both types constitute variants of authoritarianism that rely on the army in order to protect the alliance between the local elite and the hegemonic order. More frequently, tyrannies rule over pre-democratic nation-states while sultanistic regimes and military dictatorships rule over nation-states that experienced other forms of regimes first. Instead, non-democratic regimes applying the anti-hegemonic party state strategy, by mobilizing wide segments of the society it rules and terrorizing the rest, attempt to reformulate the way in which that state is integrated into the world division of labor, wealth, and power. It is therefore mandatory to make a clear distinction between non-democratic regimes as a function of their relationship with the society they rule and their insertion in the world system. Generally, authoritarian regimes foster the goals of local elites and their relationship with the hegemonic order while anti-hegemonic party states mobilize wide segments of society in order to confront the hegemonic power. Moreover, the concept of anti-hegemonic party states also challenges the unity of democratic regimes in the democracy versus dictatorship or non-democracy dichotomy. The eradication of “totalitarian” dictatorships recommended by Kirkpatrick was supported several times by the hegemonic power even if the removed regimes were, in fact, democratic (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile). The crucial fact for their removal was not their form of political regime but their anti-hegemonic party state strategy. This means that the distinction within regimes established by the adoption or not of the anti-hegemonic party state strategy is also valid for distinguishing within democratic regimes. The reliance on one party by adopting the anti-hegemonic party state strategy does not necessarily mean that the regime is a non-democracy. This party can rule both in the framework of formally established one\single-party states as well as in the context of constitutionally democratic regimes. The anti-hegemonic party state strategy emphasizes the role of one party not because there is only one-party in the entire political system, but because this party is the sole one that succeeds in holding power and mobilizing society to confront the world system hierarchy, even if there are competing alternatives within a working democratic constitutional framework.[76]

Therefore, by introducing the concept of anti-hegemonic party state, it becomes clear that the democracy versus dictatorship or non-democracy dichotomy is analytically and historically flawed. Democracies and non-democracies (authoritarian regimes) opposing both democratic and non-democratic regimes applying the anti-hegemonic party state strategy constituted together the hegemonic coalition while both democracies and non-democracies applying the anti-hegemonic party state strategy were at odds with it. [77] It is to the global emergence of the anti-hegemonic party state strategy and to the challenges it posed upon the hegemonic world order and upon globalization as it economic achievement that we now must turn.

Chapter 4
The Global Rise of Anti-Hegemonic Party States and Globalization Backlash 1917-1945

The political world order that created the “first wave of globalization” is that of the British Hegemony. This hegemonic order relayed on British mastery of the European balance of power since 1815, British leadership in the liberalization of trade in the Western world since 1848, and British leadership in empire-building in Asia and Africa since 1837 and informal empire in Latin America since 1820. The British world empire controlled roughly a quarter of humanity and the globe through its colonies, protectorates, informal empire, and Commonwealth. It was under these political conditions that globalization took off since the 1820’s rapidly growing until the beginning of the 1870’s.[78]

[pic]

Map #1. Before 1914: The hegemonic world order

However, all of these political conditions were modified by the last quarter of the nineteenth century. By 1870, the European balance of power was shacked by the unification of Germany, the Great Depression of 1873-1896 removed Great Britain as the prevalent workshop of the world, and empire seeking became a generalized draw among European powers. The combination of protectionist policies at home and monopolistic trade with the colonies abroad resulted in the first significant backlash in the history of globalization. [79]

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The end of the Great Depression of 1873-1896 and the second bust of industrialization signaled the beginning of the recovery in the globalizing trend. However, the disruption of the balance of power within Europe evolved into an escalating bipolar conflict between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente that resulted in the First World War.[80] This attempt by the central powers to modify the British hegemonic world order that created the “first globalization” during the First World War had failed. The globalized economy resumed soon after. The latecomer powers (in political unification, imperialist expansion, and/or industrialization), instead, suffered setbacks of varying degrees, from loss of power and territory to total extinction as a political entity paving the way for the emergence of new states as well as new political regimes. Moreover, the First World War has showed the tremendous power that states can obtain by a massive mobilization of their societies. It was within this context that a crucial political phenomenon in the fate of globalization emerged in semi-peripheral Russia. There a new type political regime came to provide an alternative model of political organization which will change the history of globalization during the entire short twentieth century. The emergence of the Soviet Union is not only the foundational moment of the first communist state but also the first anti-hegemonic party state. The revolutionary Bolshevik regime succeeded in its state-building enterprise relying in the 600,000-strong centralized and disciplined Communist Party despite the civil war and international intervention. Moreover, the revolutionary Bolshevik regime was also committed to the world communist revolution, which in last instance was the validating reason for its own existence. Effectively, the new Soviet state attracted as a magnet revolutionary forces everywhere. However, the international isolation of the Soviet Union after the failed attempt of defeating it during the civil war together with repression of revolutionary outbreaks whenever they emerge succeeded in neutralize the revolutionary potential. Such was the fate of the attempts made soon after the revolution in Russia in Bavaria (1918-1919), Finland (1918), Hungary (March-July 1919), Berlin (January and March 1919), northern Italy (fall 1920), Saxony and Hamburg (1923), and Bulgaria (1923).

Nevertheless, while the goal of a world communist revolution was contained through the defeats of communism in those attempts, the Soviet experience was channeled toward the South rather than the West losing in the way its ideological contents and political goals, but exporting central features of its organizational elements. Soon after the defeat of the Communist world revolution the world wide diffusion of the anti hegemonic party states started in Mongolia (1921) and China (1928).

The victory of the Red Army assisted by Mongolian units over the ruling Baron Ungern von Sternberg, a White lieutenant–general, in 1921 resulted in the institution of a new anti-hegemonic party state in 1924 in Mongolia founded by the People's Party Under the Soviet auspices. In 1924, following Bogd Khan's death, the Mongolian People's Republic was proclaimed. The consolidation of the new regime was followed in 1928 by the expropriation of the nobility and the monasteries, crop rising on state farms, and the collectivization of herding. The state also started a modest industrialization of animal husbandry products. Transportation, communications, domestic and foreign trade, and banking and finance were nationalized. By 1937 Soviet assistance became a full fledged phenomenon as, in facing Japanese expansionism, the Soviet Union deployed troops in Mongolia. The anti-hegemonic state in Mongolia transformed into an authoritarian Soviet satellite that purged and demobilized the People's Party, adopted the red army as its new backbone, and readjusted its economy according to Soviet Union guidance. In this way, this pre-World War II Soviet satellite state anticipates the pattern of state to emerge after that war in the Soviet Block.

Another prolonged impact of the Comintern was imprinted on China where on the basis of Soviet advice and assistance the Guomintang emerged as a Leninist party after its reorganization by Sun Yat-sen in 1924, which ruled China as an anti-hegemonic party state from 1928. The regime relied on a series of both party and government institutions that aimed to achieve centralization, such as the Central Legislative Council, the Central Organization Department, and the Central Planning Board, overseen by the Central Party Office managed by the Central Executive Committee. The Guomintang anti-hegemonic party-state relied on a social coalition conformed by urban middle class and perhaps even more support from the wealthy overseas Chinese. This concentration of power was articulated to reassert China's sovereignty and to transform China into a powerful industrial country. Both goals are intertwined and complementary in their search to modify China's place in the world division of labor and power. Sun Yat-sen's Industrial Plan was the first attempt to envisage an integrated developmental economic plan based on recruiting foreign capital for industrializing a socialist China. However, due to the economic depression of the 1930s, very little foreign investment entered China cancelling the developmental strategy conceived. Economic development, therefore, proceeded without any single or coherent strategy but still centralized by the National Economic Council. This institution, counting on the collaboration with the League of Nations, promoted a series of reforms of sericulture that improved the silk industry, one of the most important exporting industries; initiated projects for flood control and water conservancy; built roads, railroad networks, and introduced civil aviation; began the development of oil fields and mines as well as the planning of an hydroelectric power station and an electrification program; and fostered public education in order to enable economic development. These economic developments were disrupted in July 1937 by the outbreak of war with Japan.

Meanwhile, another country disaffected by the end results of the First World War started its march toward the consolidation on anti hegemonic party states as their leading regimes to confront the world order. By 1922, the formation of the fascist regime in Italy brings the application of the anti hegemonic party state model to Western Europe. Here the anti-hegemonic party-state relied on the lower middle class, the industrialists, the landlords, and to a lesser extent small state owners. The place of workers and peasants, the backbone of Communist anti-hegemonic party-state in the Soviet Union, was marginal in this coalition, which aimed precisely to repress these social classes. In short, the social coalition on which the Fascist anti-hegemonic party-state in Italy relied was asymmetrical to that of the Communist anti-hegemonic party-state in the Soviet Union. However, the combination of state, party, and leader mobilizing society were also in place. The party structure underwent a process of centralization through the establishment of the Fascist Grand Council (1922) and the purge of Party bosses at the local level (1924). On the other hand, a one-party state emerged through the elimination of all parliamentary opposition parties (1924), the introduction of a new electoral law, which instituted the Fascist Grand Council as a selector of all parliamentary candidates (1928), and finally by replacing the Chamber of Deputies with the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations (1939). The empowerment of the regime was progressively felt in its intervention in the economy up to the emergence of a "corporate state." This political economy design, which attempted to settle the conflict between capital and work through state control, was complemented by an autarkic policy regarding both trade and finances, and investment in heavy industry. Beyond economics, the anti-hegemonic stance was practiced in a militant foreign policy that included the penetration of the Balkans and destabilization of the French sponsored "Little Entente" of Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. At one point, this move was related to the expansionist goals in the Mediterranean and Africa, as France was again the main obstacle in these areas. By 1935 the diplomatic attempts to become the mediator between Britain and France confronting Germany for the sake of accomplishing Mediterranean and African ambitions were replaced by military intervention. First, Ethiopia was conquered (1935-6). Second, Franco's National Movement was heavily assisted in order to complete Italy's hegemony in the Mediterranean and weakening Britain's naval position while outflanking France. Third, Italy attacked Albania (1939). The result of these initiatives was, however, the relative military weakening of Italy from 1936 to 1939 while at the same time all the other major powers became stronger. This situation resulted in the subsidiary position allocated to Italy in the Rome-Berlin Axis, which ended in the subsidiary Italian Social Republic (Salo Republic) in 1943.

This weakness in foreign policy corresponds to the internal weaknesses of the Italian anti-hegemonic party-state, as expressed in the failures of the party to subordinate the political system of local prefects at the bottom and the king at the top, to control overwhelmingly the cultural sphere, and to systematize the use of terror. Both external and internal weaknesses resulted from Italy's marginal position in the core of the world system: its limited industrial base and the resulting concomitant share of power. A thorough accomplishment of the internal and external features of an anti-hegemonic party-state occurred when a similar social coalition crystallized in a powerful core nation-state following the Great Slump of 1929.

Also in Germany the Nazi anti-hegemonic party state relied on a coalition conformed by the middle class, landowners, including small ones, and industrialists, with some debatable support from the working class, which as an organized class was thoroughly repressed. However, in this case, there were no constraints to the centralization of power: by July 1933 all political parties other than the NSDAP were banned, and then the elections held in November 1933 resulted in a one-party state. At the top, by adopting the title of Führer, Hitler incorporated presidential authority to his prerogatives as chancellor. At the bottom, special state governors were installed by the Nazis at the local level. Finally, the army was also Nazified. This centralization of power by the party combined with the continuity of institutions and civil service resulted in the development of parallel institutions that by competing and overlapping, as in the case of the Youth Leader of the Reich vis à vis the Minister of Education, or the Reich SS leader with the Minister of Defense and Minister of Economy, or the Waffen Schutz Staffel and the army, maximized the monopoly of the state on violence executed by the SS-Gestapo-SD complex.

The economic policy until 1936 was reminiscent of the "corporate state" in Italy: elimination of trade unions, unemployment reduction, and control of wages. Except that the autarkic policy implemented there was replaced in Germany by a policy of convening favorable trade agreements with nation-states in the Balkans and South America as providers of raw materials and recipients of credit for purchasing German industrial products. In 1936 the Four Year Plan was launched aiming at a self-sufficient agriculture, industry, and improved infrastructures. Centralized planned economy further consolidated once World War II began. Germany was the only Western state which succeeded in eliminating unemployment between 1933 and 1938.[81] The similarity of this economic policy to the type of planned economy implemented since 1928 in the Soviet Union enlarge the list of influences moving from the foundational AHPS towards the Nazi regime, which includes mobilization tactics, the system of local party committees, destruction of political enemies, and the consolidation of a one-party state. These influences were acknowledged by central contemporary actors, such as Mussolini, Hitler, and Bukharin, as well as highlighted by scholars who depicted these regimes as "Totalitarian Twins".[82] However, these political regimes consolidated their power by the support of different social coalitions pursuing different goals. From this crucial difference derived an alternative view also referred by contemporaries and scholars alike that stresses the deep divide between the supposed "Twins". Allegedly, most of the workers and peasants, as well as industrialists and bankers could tell the difference.[83] For modern scholars the Nazi Regime, baking by traditional elites and big business, is a rotten product of capitalism, while the Soviet regime was anti-capitalist.[84] Also the location of the states within the world division of labor and power conditioned the difference of targets. Being Germany a major core power, the Nazi regime developed an aggressive expansionist policy transformed into a war policy, which represent the strongest anti-hegemonic attempt by an anti-hegemonic party-state. Starting from the destruction of the hegemonic world order arranged by the Versailles Treaty, this policy continued by incorporating the nation-states and territories inhabited by German-speakers, and ended in a further expansionist policy which aimed at either the European continent or the globe.[85] Meanwhile in the western hemisphere, the unfulfilled promises of the Mexican Revolution combined with the international circumstances and Soviet inspiration brought into fruition the emergence of the first anti hegemonic party state in Latin America. In 1934 Lázaro Cárdenas won the official nomination for the presidency within the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana. Even before assuming the presidency in December of that year, he consolidated a broad social coalition composed of peasant farmer associations, organized workers, and army officers and soldiers. Relying on this wide support, he was able to dismantle the centers of power on which the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana had relied so far. Plutarco Elias Calles, president during 1924-1928 and the governing figure behind the scene (Jefe Máximo) until Cárdenas’ election was forced into exile. Hundreds of ranks from the government and the army associated with the former leader were fired, and the local caciques were put under check by arming the peasantry. Subsequently, the hacienda system in the hands of the traditional landowning class was partially dismantled by a land reform that distributed fifty million acres of land to some eight hundred thousand peasant families. Later, a process of collectivization took place through the formation of 226 community farms (ejidos), in which some thirty-five thousand people raised cotton, cereals, and other crops. These internal undertakings were closely related to foreign economic policy as governmental support of ejidos aimed also to relieve the need for the importation of staple products. More prominent in this respect was the nationalization of the British and U.S. oil companies in 1938, whose refusal to comply with the decision of the Supreme Court on a labor conflict was recognized as a defiance of national sovereignty. In the same vein, a six-year-plan (Plan Sexenal), of Soviet inspiration, launched land, labor, education and health reforms, as well as electrification projects.

The First World War was, therefore, the first trigger for the emergence of anti-hegemonic party states. However, economic globalization was significantly restored in its aftermath as nation-states in the semi-periphery as well as the dependent colonies in general readjusted to the hegemonic imperialist ties. The Great Slump of 1929 represented the second trigger as it brought to power anti-hegemonic party states in a major core country already discontent with the end results of the First World War, Germany. This great economic crisis brought to the closure of the first wave of anti-hegemonic party states emergence, which during the years 1917-1934 includes the rise to power of the Communist party in Russia (1917), the Mongolian People's Party in Mongolia (1921/4), the Guomingdang in China (1928), the Fascist party in Italy (1922), the Nazi party in Germany (1933), and Cardenas’ Partido de la Revolución Mexicana in Mexico (1934).

Map #2. 1917-1939: The first wave. Communist Party, Russia 1917-1945; Guomingdang, China 1928-1937; Mongolian People's Party, Mongolia 1921-1937; Fascist Party, Italy 1922-1943; Nazi Party, Germany 1933-1945; Mexico, Cardenas’ Partido de la Revolución Mexicana, 1934-1940

[pic]

The immediate consequence of the Second World War was, by contrast, the decline of all these anti-hegemonic party states. The opening of the theater of operations in Asia in 1937 brought the end to Guomingdang’s China as an effective anti hegemonic party state following the Japanese invasion. Also in this context, Mongolia lost its character as an anti hegemonic party state, as the Japanese invasion brought it under Soviet control becoming an authoritarian satellite under the control of the Soviet Union. During the Second World War Nazi Germany succeeded in establishing a counter-hegemonic world order comprehending most of Europe. This achievement did not change the Anti-Hegemonic stance adopted by Nazi Germany since its very beginnings.

Map #3. 1939-1941: The Nazi counter-hegemonic order [pic]

By the end of the Second World War Nazi Germany and its counter-hegemonic sphere collapsed and this anti-hegemonic party-state in the core was defeated. In the aftermath of the defeat of anti-hegemonic party-states in the core democratic regimes were reinstalled in Italy and Western Germany. The defeat of these anti-hegemonic party-states in the core also resulted in their re-introduced into the hegemonic world order.

However, the military defeat of anti-hegemonic party-states during World War II was only partial. The Soviet Union, which fought on the side of the hegemonic powers, secured its survival and empowerment. There are several lines of continuity in the basic features of the Soviet Union regime before and after the war, such as the constitution, bureaucratic and party structures, and a command economy based on five year plans aiming at industrial development to create a military power. These continuities were punctuated by temporary interruptions of certain policies due to the war. That was the case of certain decentralization of some economic activities, the displacement of the party apparatus by the state mechanisms – especially the State Committee for Defense (GKO) – and the use of terror.

Nevertheless, aside from continuities, the Second World War also resulted in significant changes for the Soviet Union in two opposite directions. On the one hand, the country was demographically and economically devastated, both in the agricultural and industrial sectors as well as in all kinds of infrastructures. On the other hand, the Soviet Union emerged from the war as a new superpower, with vastly expanded territory and arsenal upgraded by the atomic bomb in 1949 and further upgraded during the arms race. These opposite results on the fate of the Soviet Union found their synthesis by referring to it as "Third World country with rockets".[86]

The empowerment of the Soviet Union is also attested by the emergence of the Eastern block, which it accomplished entirely by 1948 through the formation of one party states modeled and controlled by it. Although, these one-party states were by no means anti-hegemonic party states since they emerged out of the Soviet conquest, occupation, and tutelage. These regimes did not rely on a broad social coalition but on the Soviet army. Their goal was not to relocate their nation-states in the world division of labor and power but to follow the directives from Moscow. Therefore, these regimes belong to the authoritarian category. Their resemblance to anti-hegemonic party states is only formal, in their essence, since by contrast, they are diametrically opposed. It was only in the cases of Yugoslavia and Albania that an anti-hegemonic party state regime ruled.

In contrast with the Anti-hegemonic stance held by the Nazi counter-hegemonic order, the Soviet counter-hegemonic order largely abandoned its original anti-hegemonic stance even after the collapse of the great alliance. The challenge posed by the Soviet Union was limited to the support of many of the subsequent emerging anti-hegemonic party-states, which were confronted by the hegemonic power and the world hegemonic coalition it presided over since 1945.

Map #3. 1942-1989: the Soviet counter-hegemonic order

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Finally, also the anti hegemonic party state in Mexico under Cardenas’ Partido de la Revolución Mexicana ruling from 1934 to 1940 was brought to its end in the context of the Second World War. Cardenas’ succeeding president, Manuel Ávila Camacho, strongly aligned with the United States and resumed diplomatic relations with Great Britain. This shift in foreign policy coincides with a rearrangement of the ruling party domestically. By purging the militant cadres of Cardenas’ Partido de la Revolución Mexicana and replacing them with a conservative bureaucracy, Ávila Camacho succeeded in demobilize Mexican society.

In short, the emerging world order following the end of the Second World War wiped out all the Anti-Hegemonic Party States that emerged during the first wave. Italy, Germany, and Japan reincorporated into the hegemonic order following defeat. Guomingdang’s China as an effective anti hegemonic party state collapsed in 1937 following the Japanese invasion. In this context, also Mongolia lost its character as an anti hegemonic party state, as the Japanese invasion brought it under Soviet control becoming an authoritarian satellite within USSR’s counter-hegemonic sphere. In the aftermath of the defeat of anti-hegemonic party-states in the core democratic regimes were reinstalled in Italy and Western Germany. The defeat of these anti-hegemonic party-states in the core also resulted in their re-introduced into the hegemonic world order. Also Mexico’s regime now realigned with the United States was transformed from within into an authoritarian one. Finally, the USSR, the first anti hegemonic party state that inspired and partially orchestrated the first wave of anti hegemonic party state transmuted it character by consolidating its counter-hegemonic sphere under an authoritarian post-totalitarian regime.

Map #4. 1945: A world without AHPS. The hegemonic and counter-hegemonic world orders [pic] The consolidation of this bipolar new world prevented USSR counter-hegemonic sphere, probably more than a 13% of world GDP in those years, from integration into the global economy.[87] Nevertheless, during the first decade after the Second World War a rapid increase in the indicators of economic globalization toke place within the sphere under U.S. hegemony. [pic]

However, from 1955 and up to the beginning of the 1970’s a remarkable slow down occurred in the pace of globalization recovery. A second wave of anti hegemonic party states succeeded in containing globalization once again. The origins of this second wave are to be found on the model provided by the anti-hegemonic party states of the first wave, mainly the Soviet Union, and the profound shocks produced on the one hand by the Great Slump of 1929 and on the other hand by the Second World War.

Chapter 5 The Big Leap of Anti-Hegemonic Party States 1946-1975

The Great Depression of 1929 resulted not only in bringing the first wave in the rise of anti hegemonic party states into full fruition but it also planted the seeds for the second rising wave. As the great depression of 1929 plunged the entire globe into the greatest and most dramatic economic crisis it had known since the industrial revolution it also had strengthened and expanded the initial impulse in the emergence of anti-hegemonic party states. While so far the emergence of anti hegemonic party states was limited to nation-states directly implicated either in the First World War and\or supported by the Soviet Union, the Great Slump contributed to the expansion of the anti hegemonic party state software worldwide and through diverse ways. As the benefices of the “first globalization” world order crushed, several realignments occurred within each society. On the one hand, it was a great conjuncture for social and political forces opposed to the structure of the world economy as it impacted upon their societies. Conversely, the beneficiaries of the “first globalization” either succumbed to it or joined their opponents. Moreover, this swing in the balance of intra-societal power from the social and political forces associated with the local economies created by the “first globalization” towards those against it coincided with the emergence of mass society and mass media that enabled the politicized oppositions to spread their messages among their fellow countrymen. Finally, as the global crisis unfolded the major anti-hegemonic party state already established, the Soviet Union, not only appeared to be immune to the damages of the crisis but from 1929 to 1940 its industrial production, at the very least, tripled.[88]

For nation-states in the core of the world system, it was clear that since the economic threat came from outside, there is an impendent need to protect their economies and societies from the outside world created by the “first globalization”. For nation-states in the semi-periphery, it seemed that their role in the world system, consolidated during the “first globalization”, as primarily exporters of primary products should be modified. Also in the periphery, as the prices of the exporting commodities in which their economies were based collapsed and the metropolis applied protectionist policies, anti-imperialist activity built up in the colonies.

In the context of global discontent with the world order epitomized by the “first globalization” and with the alternative political and economic path offered by the model of the Soviet Union, the Second World War provided the definitive blow for the blooming of anti hegemonic party states. This second wave of Anti-Hegemonic Party States, by contrast with the first one, arises along the periphery and semi-periphery of the world system.

Map#5. 1946-1975: The second wave [pic] In distinction with the first wave of anti hegemonic party states in which major core states were involved impacting the world order through military conflagration, the second wave of anti hegemonic party states did not resulted in a major conflagration. However, many of the anti hegemonic party states in this second wave were supported by the Soviet counter-hegemonic sphere and\or were tackled by hegemonic United States becoming in this way engulfed within the context of the Cold War. The major way in which this second wave impacted the slow down of globalization was by economic means, as anti-hegemonic party states in the semi-periphery and periphery attempted to escape the hegemonic division of labor by attempting importation substitution through the industrialization of their economies. The protectionist measures applied to these ends represented together with the closure of the Soviet counter-hegemonic sphere roughly a third of world GDP blocked for the global economy (Soviet counter-hegemonic sphere 13%, Latin America 7%, China 4.6%, India 4.2%, and other countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa).[89] First and foremost, this development of a second wave of Anti-Hegemonic Party States became evident in Latin America, soon after Second World War. There, unfulfilled expectations of social transformation, the decline of the British Hegemony, the challenge posed to the hegemonic coalition by anti-hegemonic party states at the very core of the world system during World War Two, and the inspiration and relationship that anti-hegemonic party states in the core offered, enabled the emergence anti-hegemonic party-states that rose along semi-peripheral Latin America from mid-1940s and up to mid-1970s. The conditions derived from the challenge posed to the hegemonic coalition by anti-hegemonic party states at the very core of the world system as well as the inspiration and relationship that these anti-hegemonic party states offered, enabled a second wave of anti-hegemonic party-states that rose along semi-peripheral Latin America from mid-1940s and up to mid-1970s. These anti-hegemonic party-states, normally referred to as classical populist regimes, were based upon broad social coalitions that included the urban and rural working classes, segments within the middle class, and even elements from the upper class. The consolidation of such broad coalitions was further strengthened by the control of the media and education systems on the one hand and the repression of opponents on the other hand. The mobilization of this coalition aimed to improve the social conditions of the masses, to uphold national sovereignty in front of foreign pressures and interests, and to catch up economically with industrialized nations. The outstanding anti-hegemonic party-states of this wave were Getúlio Vargas' presidency in Brazil (1951-1954), and Juan Domingo Perón's presidencies (1946-1955) in Argentina. In 1937 Getulio Vargas established in Brazil the Estado Novo (New State) aiming to consolidate a strong government able to foster modernization through a corporative management. This authoritarian regime neither mobilized a social coalition through a party nor confronted the hegemonic coalition. On the contrary, this regime banned all political parties and established a close alliance with the United States. By 1945, however, following his industrialization and economic development program while protecting the interest of the working class, Vargas created the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro that bound the urban workers and intended to test his party in elections. The army, however, overthrew Vargas before he was able to accomplish this. It was only in 1950 that this electoral goal and the subsequent emergence of an anti-hegemonic party-state regime took place in Brazil. The anti-hegemonic party-state led by the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro was supported by a broader coalition that included the regional leadership organized through the Partido Social Democratico, as well as the urban middle class. This regime combined an economic developmentalist policy that checked the elite's wealth accumulation and favored rights and social programs for the working classes with a protectionist and nationalist stance. These twofold policies are expressed in the protection of natural resources, economic planning, and wealth distribution. Petroleum development and refining was nationalized in 1953. The nationalization of electric power utilities was also pursued although without success. A national development bank was created in order to provide public loans to basic industry. Labor laws, social security, and welfare services were fostered. In 1954 a military coup brought the Vargas presidency to its end, interrupting the government of the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro anti-hegemonic party-state. Nevertheless, the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro anti-hegemonic party-state re-emerged from 1961 until 1964 when a tough military dictatorship lasting for over two decades brought it to an end. The rule of the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro anti-hegemonic party-state moved Brazil from its agro-export role in the world division of labor into an attempt at industrialization through nationalization of resources and import substitution policy. The removal of this regime by an authoritarian military dictatorship coincided with the emergence of a neoliberal era dominated by the World Bank, the IMF, and transnational corporations. Later on, in 1988 the authoritarian military dictatorship was replaced by a democratic regime. A similar development, which started in the framework of an authoritarian military dictatorship, happened in Argentina where Peron rises to power in 1943. As head of the National Department of Labor, Peron assisted collaborative trade unions by raising real wages 10-17% during 1943-1945 and repressing uncooperative organizations, mainly those akin to the Communist Party. The unions then became the crucial instance of social mobilization that brought about Peron's release after being removed from all his positions and imprisoned by the military junta. Relying on this support by unionized workers combined into a broader coalition that included the regional leaderships and some supporters among the middle and upper classes, Peron assumed the presidency in 1946, despite the United States open opposition, after wining 52.4% of the vote. The regime was consolidated because of its wide support on the one hand and its extensive repression on the other hand. A developmentalist economy based on nationalizations, import substitution, five year programs, and a shifting balance of power between capital and labor favoring the latter, followed suit. Telephone and railroad companies were purchased from their foreign owners and nationalized. The percentage of national income going to workers increased by 25% between 1946 and 1950. In 1955 the Peronist anti-hegemonic party-state was assaulted by the military resulting in a military dictatorship that opened a cycle of military dictatorship - low efficient democracy regime alternation. During a decade and a half the Peronist Party was banned. A partial removal of that banning in 1970 brought Perón back from exile and the Peronist Party to power. The thorough repression of the military dictatorship put an end to the Peronist anti-hegemonic party-state and paved the way for the reintegration of Argentina into the international division of labor as designed by the hegemonic power and its coalition. Comparable experiences of anti-hegemonic party-states emergence and defeat occurred also in Bolivia - where the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario rose to power in 1952 under Víctor Paz Estenssoro and carried out a sweeping land-reform, rural education, and nationalization of the country's largest tin mines until his overthrown by a military junta in 1964, and in Guatemala where Árbenz assumed the presidency in 1951 enacting an agrarian reform program until his overthrow by the CIA in 1954. The emergence and fate of part of this second wave of anti-hegemonic party states in Latin American from the 1950s onward in Cuba, Republica Dominicana, and Chile appears intertwined with the context of the Cold War. The stabilization of Western Europe after the Second World War under the leadership of the United States, the new emerging hegemonic power, facilitated the attrition and overthrow of anti-hegemonic party-states in Latin America. As stated above, in most of these countries it took at least two waves of military dictatorships to clash with these leading parties and their legacies, paving the way since the 1980s for the institution of low-effective democratic regimes.

Map #5: The second Wave in Latin America: Justicialismo, Argentina 1946-1955; Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, Brazil 1951-1954; Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Bolivia 1952-1964; Arbenz, Guatemala 1951-1954; Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas, Cuba 1959 - ; Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, Republica Dominicana 1963; Frente Popular, Chile 1970-1973

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The Second World War also had deep consequences for the prospects of the anti-hegemonic party state in China. The Guomindang, unable to stand up as an effective resistance to the Japanese, was removed from its political power bases in the lower Yangze region. The Communists, instead, resisted behind the Japanese lines. At the end of the war, the Communists transferred land ownership to the poor peasants in the "liberated areas" gaining the peasants’ support, who became the social backbone of the emerging regime. The agricultural sector went from 1947 to 1952 through a land reform that redistributed 40 percent of China's arable land to 300 million peasants. The number of landlords executed has been estimated from 800 thousand up to around 2 million. The progressive defeat and repression of the landlords combined with the alienation of the urban middle class by the Guomintang due to its exploitation, corruption, and failure to stop runaway inflation resulted in the scramble of its social basis. The Communist victories in 1948 and the subsequent collapse of the nationalist army resulted in a swift take over of the country to the south of the Yangzi and ultimately to the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The second anti-hegemonic party-state in China was more thorough in power concentration and relentless in the repression of opponents, wider in geographic terms and deeper in its dominance over society and economic planning. It built upon the state control of industry already achieved by the Guomingdang anti-hegemonic party-state, which ruled over 90% of metallurgical industries, 73% of machine building, and 75% of chemicals. Moreover, by taking over all Japanese held property, the industrial sector became part of the anti-hegemonic party-state machinery. Following nationalization, a developmentalist economic policy relied on the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed in February 1950 between U.S.S.R. and P.R.C., which replaced the previous treaty between Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek. In this framework, an extraordinary planned transfer of technology evolved implemented by 10,000 Soviet specialist visiting China and 50,000 Chinese engineers, trainees, and students visiting the U.S.S.R. These exchanges resulted in the construction of 250 industrial projects and the transfer of thousands of industrial designs. Another attempt to implement the Sino-Soviet treaty occurred as Mao treated the Korean crisis as an opportunity to launch an anti-imperialist campaign. On this count, however, the treaty did not resulted in effective support. It resulted, although, in the US severing all ties with China and an economic embargo maintained until 1971. In this context, the once anti-hegemonic Guomingdang party-state, relocated in Formosa Island, leaning on the protection of the U.S.A, adopted since the 1950s a free market agenda of unpopular policies of economic liberalization becoming simultaneously an authoritarian regime.

Beyond the close ties with anti-hegemonic party states in P.R.C. as well as the long lasting support of North Korea, the inspiration, assistance, or support by the Soviet Union in conjuncture with the decolonization process that resulted from the Second World War significantly contributed to the establishment of many anti hegemonic party-states through several new nation-states in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. In many cases the formation of nation-states and the emergence of an anti-hegemonic party-state regime were coincidental. The anti-hegemonic party-state basic equation – power maximization through state and party relying on a broad social coalition in order to improve the nation-state placement within the world distribution of labor and power – in the context of the new emerging nation-states of the Third World meant the drive to establish control over the whole of the new national territory and to maintain internal security , the aim of fostering economic development and the social reforms perceived as necessary for that goal, and the assertion of political independence as well as the pursuit of economic independence. The Cold War also played it part in the new anti-hegemonic party states that emerged in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

Map#7. The second Wave in Asia: Communist Party, Vietnam 1945-1986; Sukarno’s Indonesia 1945-1967; Indian National Congress, India 1947-1985; Communist Party, China 1949-1976

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The independence of India in 1947 is the turning point from which the process of emergence of new nation-states in Asia and Africa evolved. The most notable political development in India since its independence has been the stability of parliamentary democracy. However, since Britain transferred the power to the Indian National Congress, for all but three of India's forty two years of independence until 1989, the successors of the Indian National Congress - the Congress Party and its continuation Congress Party (I) - has been the ruling party in New Delhi. Therefore, the case of India amounts to a one-party state, even if under a democratic regime, whose political organization, economic and foreign policies amounts to a particular case of an Anti-Hegemonic Party State. Its peculiarity derives, to a great extent, from the singular social coalition that sustained the regime. So far, the Anti-Hegemonic Party States presented relied either on a coalition conformed by workers and peasants or a coalition conformed by industrialists, landlords, lower middle class and small state owners. The case of India adds to these self-excluding types of coalition a third one characterized by the crucial role of the middle class as the cornerstone of the social coalition, whose power and success progressively attracted landlords and industrialists on the one hand and weak and despised groups (e.g. untouchables, Muslims) on the other hand. The preeminence of the Congress Party and the social coalition behind it enabled the sustainability of parliamentary democracy – instead of a "people's democracy" or the open rejection of democracy – without resorting to typical measures of Anti-Hegemonic Party States. Opposition parties from left and right, regional and national, secular and religious operated freely. It was rather the lack of effective alternatives, particularly at parliamentary elections in the Union, which was the primary reason for the failure of the opposition. There were fair elections, free press, independent judiciary, and an unpoliticized civil service. However, as soon as the preeminence of the Congress Party was at stake, as in 1975 when a court declared Indira Gandhi guilty of campaign abuses, a state of "national emergency" was established. Political parties were banned, civil rights suspended, and the press controlled with the government holding the monopoly on the news and interpretation. As democracy was re-established in 1977 the Congress Party was defeated in the sixth general elections for the first time. Since then, the Congress Party (I), although still the most prominent political party, lost its exclusivity as a government party being defeated again in the ninth general elections (1989), in 1996, in 1998, and in 1999. Similarly, since 1989 there have been non-Congress party governments in most states of the Union. The erosion of the Congress Party position as the head of the Indian anti-hegemonic party state is concomitantly related to the transformation of its defining economic and foreign policies.

The Indian anti-hegemonic party state, in consonance with this type of political regime, held the "commanding heights" in its hands. The government has been the dominant or monopolistic producer and/or supplier of military ordnance, iron and steel, ships, heavy engineering and foundry goods, energy from all sources, telecommunications and broadcasting, railroad and air transport. Public sector corporations produced automobiles, cement, electronic goods, warehousing, among others. This economic structure was developed since 1951 through sequential five-year plans issued by the Indian government's Planning Commission. Its aim was the industrialization of India through a policy of import substitution while preventing the concentration of wealth and means of production providing for all citizens social and economic justice. And yet, the protectionist policy suited also the great industrial houses, which prospered below the state level in the framework of a mixed economy. The liberalization policies applied by the Congress Party since the second half of the 1980s opened the displacement process of the state from the "commanding heights," which sealed the fate of the Indian anti-hegemonic party state.

Indian foreign policy primary concern has been Pakistan. The conflict between the two centered on Kashmir conflated with the Cold-War, Sino-Indian hostilities, and Sino-Soviet tension. The strongest feature of India's foreign policy amidst these situations has been "non-alignment." In the Cold War context, Pakistan became an ally of the United States since the 1950s. Unsurprisingly, even if nonaligned, India strengthened its relation with the Soviet Union. Although "non-alignment" paid off as both the United States and the Soviet Union came to India's side during the Sino-Indian war (1962), the general trend was further strengthening the relationship with Moscow as reflected by the Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation (1971). Backed by this treaty, the Indian navy asserted its position at the Bay of Bengal vis à vis the U.S. navy during the third Indo-Pakistani war (1971). This stance reflected the Indian anti-hegemonic stance facing the predominant position of the United States in the Indian Ocean. In short, backed by the Soviet Union the Indian anti-hegemonic party state developed a formidable military capacity not only for self-defense purposes but for gaining a predominant role in South Asia at the expense of the hegemonic power.

In the Middle East, five major anti-hegemonic party states emerged during the 1950s up to the 1970s in Mosadeq's Iran (1951-1953), Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Algeria.

Map#8. The second Wave in the Middle East: Mosaddeq’s Iran 1951-1953; ‘free officers’, Egypt 1952-1970; ‘free officers’ and Baath Party, Iraq 1958-1963-1979; Baath Party, Syria 1963- ;‘free officers’, Libya 1969-

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In 1952, a military coup brought Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser to power backed by his fellow officers and enjoying subsequently a broad popular support. The concentration of power was mainly achieved by an impressive enlargement of the state apparatuses: bureaucracy, army and paramilitary police reflected in the increase of government expenditure from 18.3% in 1954/5 to 55.7% in 1970. Even though social mobilization was not carried out by a single party, a national rally fulfilled this function - first the Liberation Rally, then the National Unity, and finally the Arab Socialist Union – together with a tightly controlled trade union (Confederation of Egyptian Workers) and other professional associations under state control. This enlarged machinery, backed by the mobilized social sectors, was in charge of implementing a series of measures in order to achieve economic development: a land reform (1952, 1961) that expropriated a seventh of all cultivated land from large landowners and distributed it among small proprietors and landless peasants, the decision to build the Aswan High Dam aiming to bring the large province between Cairo and Alexandria into cultivation, and the Helwan Iron and Steel Complex (1954). The evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal (1954) ended in the nationalization of the Canal while the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion (1956) resulted in the nationalization of foreign property. These initial steps developed by 1960 into a full fledged five-year plan (1960-1965), which included the nationalization of private banks and factories. Nationalization reached foreign investments as well, as a challenging stance was adopted in facing former colonial powers.

The anti-hegemonic party state software was exported from Egypt to Syria during 1958-1961 through the creation of the United Arab Republic, and to Iraq after the revolution of 1958 and during its Arab union policy from 1963-1964. In both of these countries a parallel set of policies regarding centralization of power, economic development, and determined foreign policy can be observed. As in Egypt, also in Syria and Iraq the state enormously increased its personnel; in the Syrian case it raised from 34,000 to 251,000 state employees between 1960 and 1975. A land reform, which expropriated the landed elite, redistributed about a fifth and almost a half of cultivable land in Syria and Iraq respectively, while keeping the rest to be administrated directly by the state and the party through a village council, a branch of the party, the Peasant's Union, and even by officials from the ministry of agriculture who provided instructions regarding the types of crops, and the methods to be employed in their growth and marketing. Similarly, the state was in charge of programs of large-scale industrialization and nationalization of industries in order to substitute the importation of simple consumer durables and to pursue the catching-up by producing iron, steel, and later on machinery. The major difference compared to Egypt, however, is that a well structured party, the Ba'th Party, played a crucial role. The singularity of this party, in contrast to the multi-class feature observed so far, was based on the support of a particular sect or region. This was the case of the Alawis in Syria since 1966 and that of the Sunni region between Baghdad and Tikrit in Iraq. The anti-hegemonic party state software was also exported from Egypt to Libya. Started by the Libyan Free Unionist Officers' Movement, through the constitution of the Revolutionary Command Council after the seizure of power in 1969, and up to the measures to concentrate power and mobilize popular support Ghadhafi's path resembled very closely that of Nasser. The announcement of the State of the Masses (Jamahiriya) in 1977 added another dimension of concentration and mobilization through the establishment of the General People's Congress and various revolutionary committees. In Algeria developments followed a slightly different course as in these countries anti-hegemonic party-states emerged directly out of the national liberation movements as opposed to the previous Middle Eastern cases in which anti-hegemonic party states displaced the authoritarian regimes settled by the colonial powers before their departure. This original difference resulted in a series of concomitant variations. For instance, state ownership of land resulted, first and foremost, from the seizure of lands left behind by the departing French colons and only later, in the early 1970s, by expropriation of landlords in which various types of state supervised cooperatives were established.

This same pattern of direct transition from colonial rule to nation-state rule by an anti-hegemonic party state regime, opened by India's decolonization, was observed across much of Africa. 1947, the year of India's independence, was also the year of the foundation of the United Gold Coast Convention under the leadership of Nkrumah aiming at the immediate achievement of self-government. Its successor, the Convention People's Party, founded in 1949, became preeminent after a landslide victory in the legislative assembly elections, under British administration, in 1951. By the time that Ghana's independence was achieved, in March 1957, Nkrumah's party held an undisputed leadership validated by the presidential elections of 1960 (in which Nkrumah obtained 90% of the votes) and sealed in 1964 by constitutionally establishing Ghana as a one-party-state. Opposition was silenced from 1958 through the exercise of the Preventive Detention Law that enabled the regime to detain and imprison several hundred opposition members. On the other hand, the Convention People's Party mobilized society through the party institutions (whose membership encompassed 15% of the population) ranging from the central organs through the regional and local units, supplemented by organizations such as the National Council of Ghana Woman, the Young Pioneers youth organization, the trade union movement, and the United Ghana Farmer's Council. The typical double action of state and party apparatuses aiming to maximize control was attempted in Nkrumah's Ghana but with meager results, exemplifying again the generally concomitant declining capacities of anti-hegemonic party states in the periphery. Thus, regional and district state officials were subordinated to party commissioners, but there was not an effective chain of command linking the president\party general secretary with those party commissioners. Similarly, although the civil service was formally put under the leadership of the party in 1962, the party failed in effectively monitoring the civil service. To reverse that situation the Party's civil service committee replaced the Civil Service Commission in late 1965. Even more acute was the inability of the Party to control the military arm of the state. In 1963 it was announced that all officer cadets had to apply for party membership. In 1964 plans for the introduction of political commissars were announced. But these attempts to strength the party position also failed. It is from this state apparatus that the blow that brought Ghana's anti-hegemonic party state to its end came in 1966 through a military coup that established a military dictatorship.[90]

The tension that emerged in the internal political realm due to the attempt to apply the power maximizing software of the anti-hegemonic party state into peripheral society hardware is also observed in the arenas of economic and foreign policy. Since his first administration in 1951, even under British rule, Nkrumah worked out ten different Development Plans of which four were fully implemented. The British colonial administration initiated in 1951 the ten-year Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the Gold Coast to mitigate anti-colonial agitation, on the one hand, and to increase the production of agro-mineral raw materials needed by metropolitan industry, on the other hand. However, Nkrumah's empowerment following the elections of this same year led to a reformulation of the developmental program. The increase of agricultural productivity, mainly of cocoa and oil seeds (the traditional products of colonial economy) was only the immediate and preliminary aim, whose strategic target was industrialization. The industrialization program was envisaged to rely in its earlier stages on foreign capital except in strategic sectors such as electricity supply, railway transport, and steel. The future nationalization of private enterprises would be compensated according to a pledge in the national constitution binding every government. According to this general framework, the second five-year development plan, the first for independent Ghana scheduled for 1959-1964, aimed at raising the yields of the cocoa industry, establishing large acreages of rubber and banana plantations, and increasing the yields of cereals through the use of irrigation and fertilizers. The subsequent seven-year development plan, scheduled for 1964-1970 but interrupted in 1966 by the military coup, wanted to produce domestic substitutes for manufactured staples so far imported, while at the same time attempted to foster the manufacture and processing of agricultural and mining commodities before export. Regarding the results, the attempts to modernize agriculture through the establishment of co-operatives under the guidance of United Ghana Farmers' Co-operative Council engulfed some 870 co-operatives and 123 State Farms with a total membership by 1965 of 15,300 and 20,000 farmers respectively. Considering that by then over 70% of Ghanaian population consisted of subsistence-based small holder production the marginality of the achievement becomes evident. On the industrial sector the program appeared to be too ambitious and therefore abandoned in 1961. Following this experience, the emphasis of the seven-year development plan was on manufacturing local raw materials, while the investment in infrastructure, light and heavy industries failed, resulted in heavy foreign debt.

The financing of industrialization attempts highlights the foreign dimension of Ghana's anti-hegemonic party-state. In his industrialization efforts, Nkrumah sought persistently assistance from the socialist camp. The Soviet Union and its subsumed Eastern Block provided Ghana with favorable credits refundable in twelve year periods with interest rates of 2-3%. China offered free interest loans that included a grace period. Simultaneously, Nkrumah approached Western countries as well in order to finance his development plans. It is this twofold orientation towards the West and the Communist block at once for bargaining assistance, aid, and support of the main characteristic of anti-hegemonic party-states in the periphery amidst their aim to solidify political independence on the basis of economic independence. In the case of Ghana, this twofold addressing became a Damocles' sword. Ghana's heavy indebtedness coincided with the fall of cocoa's price. While the Communist block granted Ghana a three year payment moratorium, extension on credits, and enlargement of cocoa importation, hegemonic creditors conditioned further help by an agreement with the IMF. This agreement included cutbacks in government expenditure, removal of subsidies to state-owned enterprises, reduction of the price of cocoa, discarding the monopoly of Ghana's Shipping Line (Black Star Line), reduction of trade with the socialist block, and the creation of a more liberal climate for western investment. Two days after Ghana's Finance Minister made public the rejection of these reforms, Ghana's anti-hegemonic party-state was overthrown by the army.[91]

Map#9. The second Wave in Africa: ‘free officers’, Egypt 1952-1970; National Liberation Front, Algeria 1954-1988; Convention People's Party , Ghana 1957-1966; Parti Démocratique de Guinée, Guinea 1958-1984; Union Soudanaise du Rassemblement Democratique Africain, Mali 1960-1968; Tanganyika African National Union, Tanzania 1964-1985; Uganda People's Congress, Uganda 1966-1971; ‘free officers’, Libya 1969- ; Avant-garde de la Révolution Malgache, Supreme Revolutionary Council, Madagascar, 1975-1982

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By 1976 most of the second wave anti hegemonic party states was dismantled. In Latin America anti hegemonic party states were removed by military dictatorships supported by the United States or even by its direct intervention. Guatemala (1954) AHPS was overthrown by U.S. intervention. In Brazil (1954), Argentina (1955), Dominican Republic (1963), Bolivia (1964), Chile (1973) AHPS were overthrown by military dictatorships.

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Map # 10: End of the second Wave in Latin America

In Asia, instead only one military coup brought the Indonesian anti hegemonic party state under Sukarno to its end in 1967. The other major anti-hegemonic party states in Asia transformed themselves by liberalizing their economies and entering the global economy and hegemonic order amidst institutional continuity. China adopted this road following Mao’s death in 1976, India since 1985, and Vietnam since 1986. Since 1976 the political regime in China was transformed from a totalitarian one under Mao into an authoritarian one under Deng.[92]

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Map # 11: The End of the second Wave in Asia

Also in the Middle East internal transformation produced by the regimes themselves resulted in the end of anti hegemonic party states. Although in contrast with Asia the main driving force was not economic liberalization. The anti hegemonic party state in Egypt became an authoritarian regime simultaneously with Sadat’s alignment with U.S. in 1976. The Ba’ath anti hegemonic party state in Iraq was transformed into a post-totalitarian authoritarian regime by S. Hussein in 1979 by purging the Bath Party, terrorizing society and aligning with the United States and its hegemonic Coalition. Also in Syria the Ba’ath anti hegemonic party state was transformed into an authoritarian regime. Therefore, only the first anti-hegemonic attempt essayed by Mosaddeq was defeated by an external force orchestrated by the C.I.A. in 1953.

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Map # 12 :The End of the second Wave in the Middle East

The demise of anti hegemonic party states in Africa provides examples of the several fates observed in the rest of the areas of the world. Anti hegemonic party states in Ghana (1966) and Uganda (1971) were brought to their end by military coups. Anti hegemonic party states in Guinea (1984), Tanzania (1985), and Madagascar (1982) adopted a rapprochement policy with IMF in face of their desperate economic situation in which their policies resulted. The anti hegemonic party states in Algeria succumbed in 1988 to mass protest.

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Map # 13: End of the second Wave in Africa

The consecutive defeat of the anti hegemonic party state model since the mid 1950’s and through the mid 1970’s opened up markets for globalization under U.S. hegemony. The pace of globalization, therefore, increased simultaneously with the collapse of anti hegemonic party states. By 1976 when the second wave came to its end globalization openness index reached its highest figures until then. By this time, nothing of the anti hegemonic wave remained to counterweight the tendency towards globalization. Moreover, even the Soviet counter-hegemonic became progressively absorbed within the global economy. With this political conditions prevailing in the entire world system, only economic problems could challenge the economic integration. Anti hegemonic party states, a widely adopted political regime of the short twentieth century became marginal as the century approached its end.

Chapter 6:
Globalization Anew and the Marginalization of Anti-Hegemonic Party States 1979-2009

Map#14: 1979 – 2009: The third wave. Sandinista Nicaragua, 1979-1990, defeated by attrition; Islamic revolution, Iran, 1979 - ; Movimiento Quinta República, Venezuela 1998-

[pic]

-----------------------
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Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism (London: Verso, 1979)
Candido Mendes De Almeida and Gray Cowan, Beyond Populism, trans. Gray Cowan (Albany: Graduate School of Public Affairs, State University of New York at Albany, 1977)
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[24] Gwendolen M. Carter, ed., African One-Party States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964) Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds., African Independence: The First Twenty-Five Years (London: Hutchinson, 1985)
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Peter Meyns and Dani Wadada Nabudere, eds., Democracy and the One-party State in Africa (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 1989)
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Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Decline of the Party in Single-Party Africa States," in Political Parties and Political Development, ed. J. La Palombara and M. Weiner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 201-14.
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[27] Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-party Systems (New York, Basic Books, 1970), p. 509.
[28] Arend Lijphart. Op. cit., pp. 258-259. Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999)
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[30] Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006)
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[37] Ian Kershaw, Hans Mommsen, and Joachim Fest
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[40] Ian Kershaw, Hans Mommsen, and Joachim Fest
[41] Zeev Sternhell, "Fascism," in International Fascism, ed. Roger Griffin (London: Arnold, 1998), p. 34.
[42] Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin, Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.
[43] Carl J. Friedrich, Michael Curtis, and Benjamin R. Barber, Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views (New York: Praeger, 1969)
[44] Bertram D. Wolfe, Communist Totalitarianism: Keys to the Soviet System (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961)
[45] Jerry F. Hough, William McCagg, Robert W. Thurston, and J. Arch Getty, Totalitarianism Revisited-USSR ?
[46] Sheila Fitzpatrick, p.146. title
[47] Boszart 1969 title
[48] Hans Mommsen, "Introduction," The 'Fuhrer State': Myth and Reality. Studies on the Structure and Politics of the Third Reich, Gerhard Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacker [eds.], (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), p. 27.
[49] Hildebrand ?
[50] Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin, Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison (New York: Cambridge University Press 1999), p.27.
[51] Abbott Gleason, Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

[52]Juan Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), pp. 245-6.
[53] Vladimir Shlapentokh, A Normal Totalitarian Society: How the Soviet Union Functioned and How It Collapsed (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 102.
[54]Among the many new publications based on the concept of totalitarianism ... Steven Soper, Totalitarianism: A Conceptual Approach (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985); Slavoj Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? (London; New York: Verso, 2001); Michael Halberstam, Totalitarianism and the Modern Conception of Politics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999); or as an economic enterprise based on “substantive irrationality” (economic policy relying on the falsification of bankruptcy evidence) that stems from the will of the leader and on a system of forced labor (O’Kane, R. 1996).[55]

[56] Guy Hermet et al., Totalitarismes (Paris: Economica, 1984)
[57] Charles F. Andrain, Comparative Political Systems: Policy Performance and Social Change (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe), p. 71.
[58] Charles F. Andrain, Comparative Political Systems: Policy Performance and Social Change (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe), pp. 103-114.
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[62] Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-party Systems (New York, Basic Books, 1970), pp. 23, 40-41, 509-510.
[63] Frank L. Wilson, Concepts and Issues in Comparative Politics: An Introduction to Comparative Analysis (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1996)
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[64] Norberto Bobbio, Democracy and Dictatorship: the Nature and Limits of State Power, trans. Peter Kennealy (Oxford: Polity, 1989)
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[65] Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006)
[66] Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1966)
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[68] Wintrobe
[69] Samuel E. Finer, Comparative Government (London: Penguin Press, 1970)
Mark N. Hagopian, Regimes, Movements and Ideologies: A Comparative Introduction to Political Science (New York and London: Longman, 1978)
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Roy C. Macridis, Modern Political Regimes: Patterns and Institutions (Boston; Toronto: Little, Brown, 1986)
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[70] Juan Linz. “An Authoritarian Regime: the Case of Spain,” in Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems, ed. Erik Allard and Yrjo Littunen (Helsinki: Westermarck Society, 1964), p. 255.
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[71] Houchang E. Chehabi and Juan Linz, eds., Sultanistic Regimes (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998)
[72] Also named: “military-technocratic-bureaucratic authoritarian” regime (Linz 1975:293), “techno-bureaucratic-capitalist authoritarian” regime (Bresser Pereira 1993:70, 1981), “military authoritarianism” (Angell 1984), “modern military authoritarian regime (Munck 1984: 287-95), “anti-popular dictatorships” (Touraine 1989:369-78).
[73] Guillermo O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1979)
[74] Wallersten, Immanuel. “New revolts against the system,” New Left Review 18 (2002), 29-39.
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[75] Immanuel Wallerstein, World System Analysis. An Introduction (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004)
Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times (New York: Verso, 1994)
Ramón Grosfoguel and Ana Margarita Cervantes-Rodríguez, The Modern/Colonial/Capitalist World-System in the Twentieth Century: Global Processes, Antisystemic Movements, and the Geopolitics of Knowledge (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2002)
Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Age of Transition: Trajectory of the World System 1945-2025 (London: Zed Books, 1996)
Immanuel Wallerstein, "The State and State Transformation: Will and Possibility," Politics and Society I, 3 (May 1971): 359-64.
Immanuel Wallerstein, "The States in the Institutional Vortex of the Capitalist World-Economy,' International Social Science Journal, XXXII, 4 (l980): 743-5l.
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Concept of National Development, 1917-1989: Elegy and Requiem (Binghamton, N.Y.: Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1991)
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements and the Civilizations (New York: Cambridge University Press, l984)
Immanuel Wallerstein, "Response: Declining States, Declining Rights?" International Labor and Working-Class History 47 (Spr. 1995): 24-27.
Immanuel Wallerstein, "Socialist States: Mercantilist Strategies and Revolutionary Objectives," in Ascent and Decline in the World-System, ed. Edward Friedman (Beverly Hills: Sage, l982), pp. 289-300.
Immanuel Wallerstein, "States? Sovereignty? The Dilemmas of Capitalists in an Age of Transition," in States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy, ed. David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger and Steven C. Topik (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 20-33.
Immanuel Wallerstein, "The New World Disorder: If the States Collapse, Can the Nations be United?," in Between Sovereignty and Global Governance: The United Nations, the State and Civil Society, ed. A.J. Paolini, A.P. Jarvis & C. Reus-Smit (London: Macmillan & New York: St. Martins Press, 1998), pp. 171-185.
William G. Martin, ed., Semiperipheral States in the World-Economy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990)
[76] George Modelski, ed., Exploring Long Cycles (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1987)
George Modelski and William R Thompson, Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of Global Politics and Economics (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1996)
George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1987)
[77] Mark J. Gasiorowski and Timothy J. Power, "The structural determinants of democratic consolidation: Evidence from the third world," Comparative Political Studies 31, 740-771.
John B. Londergan and Keith T. Poole, "Does High Income Promote Democracy?" World Politics 49, No. 1 (Oct 1996), 1-30.
Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, "What Makes Democracies Endure?," Journal of Democracy 7.1 (1996), 39-55.
Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," World Politics 49, No. 2 (Jan., 1997), 155-184.
[78]Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, 1914-1991 (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 137.
[79] Samuel P. Huntington, The third wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, Norman)
Andras Sajo, "Corruption, Clientelism, and the Future of the Constitutional State in Eastern Europe," East European Constitutional Review, 7 (1998), 37-46.
Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transition in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)
Larry J. Diamond, Juan Jose Hartlyn, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), pp. 3-27.
Guillermo O’Donnell, "Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies," Journal of Democracy 9 (1998), 112-126.

[80] Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982)
David F. Schmitz, The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1965-1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, 1914-1991 (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 217.
[81] Arrighi
[82] Christopher Chase-Dunn, Yukio Kawano, and Benjamin D. Brewer, "Trade Globalization since 1795: Waves of Integration in the World System," American Sociological Review 65:1 (2002), 77-95.
[83] Arrighi
[84](h93)
[85] Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harvest, 1973); Furet; Gary M. Grobman; Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime 1919-1924 (New York: Vintage Books, Random House), pp. 252-259.
[86] Michael Parenti
[87] Daniel Singer
[88] For the debate on the scale of expansionism see Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation (London: Arnold, 1985)
[89] Taylor, p.181
[90] Angus Maddison, p.263
[91] Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, 1914-1991 (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), p.96.
[92] Angus Maddison, p. 263.
[93] Trevor Jones, Ghana's First Republic 1960-1966: The Pursuit of Political Kingdom (London: Methuen, 1976)
[94] Ansa Asamoa, Socio-Economic Development Strategies of Independent African Countries. The Ghanaian Experience (Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 1996), pp. 48-87.
[95] Jie Chen and Peng Deng, China Since the Cultural Revolution: From Totalitarianism to Authoritarianism (Westport, Conn.; Praeger, 1995)