Since the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics in 1979, the classical school of realism, which suggests that state actions are driven by self-interest only, has been challenged by the school of “neoliberal institutionalism” and the idea that constructivism is a formidable school of thought in itself. This essay challenges the idea that “institutions” or “norms” guide the international system, rather arguing that classical realism, with elements of offensive realism, is what truly drives the international system, with states being the primary actors. While non-state actors (“NSA”) and transnational civil society is recognized as playing a part, it will be argued that it is ultimately the states that make the decisions.
To this end the analysis will be from two different perspectives; the campaign against the anti-personnel landmines and the signing of the Ottawa treaty; and the rise of China despite ignoring “international norms” regarding human rights. Thus the analysis will be, first, an issue-based analysis and then an actor-based analysis.
Landmines and the Ottawa Treaty
Landmines have traditionally been used as an effective tool to prevent attacks by the enemy. Yet the downfall of having such a weapon in one’s arsenal is obvious, the weapon is indiscriminating; once set up it cannot and does not distinguish between soldier and civilian, thus leading to great civilian casualty and therefore seemingly going against the principles of just war . In the mid-nineties therefore there grew an increasingly large voice for the banning and destruction of the stockpiles of landmines that were kept by countries. This effort was largely led, and continues to be led, by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines , which is an NSA. In 1997, after several years of concentrated efforts, the Ottawa Treaty, or the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction came into effect. Until April 2010, 156 states have signed the treaty, while two states have signed but not ratified, who along with 37 non-signee states form the 39 non-party states .
Therein lies something to celebrate and lament over. While neoliberal institutionalists would point to the collective efforts in having brought the treaty to life, and constructivist point to the norm mongering brought about by non-state actors compelling states to act in a way perhaps undermining their security, realists would suggest that the Ottawa Treaty is not a success, in fact it is a rousing failure .
It is pertinent not only to look at the raw numbers of how many signatories there are but rather also who the signatories are, or, in this case, who the non-signatories are. Among the 39 states that are non-parties to the treaty, three of them are permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, Russia & USA), a couple others are nuclear powers (India & Pakistan), and the list also includes countries such as both Koreas, with mines being actively used in the “demilitarized” zone between both countries . The limitations of the treaty itself also need to be noted, not all mines are banned; only anti-personnel mines are banned, which means other forms of mines such as anti-tank mines, anti-handling mines and other static explosive devices are not banned . Yet, the countries with the largest amounts of mines refuse to sign on to an internationally accepted treaty.
O’Neill, Balsiger and VanDeveer have argued that the preference of state actors is shaped over time by NSA’s, and the tipping point is the normative change brought about by international compliance and enforcement institutions . However, there are two criticisms to be made of this idea. First, the tipping point has clearly come and gone, the zenith of the anti-landmine campaign came with the commencement of the Ottawa Treaty in 1997, and since then there has little movement on the issue, despite annual reviews. Secondly, the notion of an enforcement institution does not exist in the current structure of the international community, nor is one foreseeable in the near future. International treaties do not usually contain enforcement mechanisms, and for good reason, having a penalty or enforcement clause would undoubtedly create deterrence to signing up for said treaty , defeating the purpose. But such reluctance to enforce signing up or regulate those who have already signed up is another indication of states acting only when it is in their benefit to do so, or when there is no active harm to them.
Ultimately, the Ottawa Treaty fails in its desire and attempt to rid the world of offensive landmines, and this undoubtedly is, at least partly, due to the desire of some states to cling onto the form of weaponry, despite the various attempts by NSAs to create an international norm against the use of anti-personnel landmines.