Hydraulically Operated Doors Aboard Seagoing Vessels
New Safety Regulation Proposal
David Smith

There have been a startling number of marine related safety accidents in the recent past, and if we examine them and critically think about them maybe we can come up with worthwhile regulations that do not add any increased demand on often already overworked crews, at the same time mitigating the amount of change required to current operating equipment. As rare as death is in all of the marine incidents over the past 24 years, according to the transportation safety board, there are 5 reported deaths in Canada due to accidents at sea, one which was caused by a hydraulic door. To that end, this paper will focus on preventing injury and death caused by hydraulically operated doors and hatches that operate either manually or automatically.
A vessel is divided by watertight bulkheads to survive flooding, following a collision or grounding. The more watertight bulkheads there are, the safer the ship is against capsizing and sinking. However, a high number of bulkheads may restrict the use of spaces on board and make it hard for the crew to move between the divided spaces. So, watertight doors are fitted in between bulkheads which should be watertight. Doors can usually be closed from the bridge, or other control room, for the purpose of saving the ship, and can also be opened and closed locally, allowing personnel to pass through, as well as to escape in an emergency. Saving the ship has priority, so usually the bridge can take control of all doors to close them. There are many different regulations pertaining to the operation of these doors depending on the class, and type, of ship it is. However, there is no all encompassing safety regulation to prevent injury or death due to accidental door closure. The Canada Shipping act has some regulations pertaining to these doors under their Hull Construction Regulations and it states: “… handles for controlling the power system shall be provided at both sides of the bulkhead in which the door is situated and shall be so arranged that any person passing through the doorway will be able to hold both handles in the open position simultaneously...” (Section 16 Para 5). This regulation does not go far enough with regard to crew and passenger safety.
As stated above, of those 5 deaths mentioned, only one in Canada can be linked to a malfunction of hydraulically operated equipment. However, there are many other injuries attributed to the operation of these doors, and many other incidents can be found in other parts of the world. If Canada were to implement a cost effective way to stop these accidents, it would most likely be easy to adopt elsewhere. Due to the above information pertaining to the risk involved with hydraulically operated doors, it is recommended that the following regulation be enacted as soon as practicable to prevent further injury or death aboard any vessel which uses these devices:
“All seagoing vessels, that have installed onboard any type of hydraulically operated doors or hatches, shall be required to have, in conjunction with all other required safety equipment, an infrared sensor system of an approved type, fitted to all doors or hatches that are operated either locally or remotely, so as to prevent the closure of that door or hatch should an object be in the line of the sensor. Overrides can be fitted but shall only be used if the operation of that equipment will prevent further injury or death. Additional overrides can be fitted at the request of the operator and at the approval of the TSB.”
This regulation would require some work to be done onboard current ships to meet the standard, and would have a cost associated with it, however the cost to implement this option is negligible compared to the overall cost of most other systems onboard a modern vessel, and the prevention of injury or death would outweigh any cost. This same type of system is used in passenger elevators and is common place, making the technology attainable and affordable. It would also be easy to implement when building new ships.
Should a regulation such as this be enacted it would surely prevent future accidents involving these systems which cause injuries to passengers and crew. One such accident that could have been prevented if this system was in place, was when a crew member of the fishing vessel Katsheshuk II lost his life when a hydraulically operated shutter door closed on him as he was exiting the holding tank in the vessel’s processing hold. The incident happened on the 10th of February 2012. Though the crew member responsible was given a formal tour of the ship and its lifesaving equipment, no tour was given of the processing area. It was also stated that the operation of the shutter doors to the processing area was not explained to him. Though we would all like that ships follow procedures and properly brief all members on all equipment they are to use, the weak link here is the crew members themselves. In this case the opening is used to move product into the holding tank, and sometimes needs to be lowered to limit the amount flowing through, thus it would require an override to turn off the sensor during processing activities, and that overrides would have to be approved for use. If this door had an infrared sensor system installed this accident could have been prevented.
Another recent case of injury that could have been prevented was aboard the ro-ro passenger ferry Confederation, when a crew member sustained severe crush injuries due to a hydraulically operated door. The incident happened on the 27th of June 2005. According to the official transportation safety board report, “Shortly before the vessel was due to arrive at the ferry terminal, one of the crew members left the engine room to retrieve a part to complete the job.

At approximately 1727, the crew member was noticed caught in a horizontal sliding watertight door by his co-worker.” Additionally it was noted that “There was no observer to the occurrence and the exact circumstances leading up to the occurrence could not be determined.” Notwithstanding the recommendations made by the TSB, which may have prevented this accident, the new proposed regulation would have taken it a step further and would guarantee that this accident wouldn’t have happened.
In summary, this new proposed regulation is an easy and relatively cheap way to ensure the safety of passengers and crew who are utilizing hydraulically operated doors and hatches, without the need to rely on crew training as the main failsafe to prevent these types of accidents.
References
Canada Shipping Act: Hull Construction Regulations. (2007, March 27). Retrieved November 11, 2014, from http://www.tc.gc.ca/wwwdocs/Rqs/documents/231.htm

Marine Investigation Report M12N0003. (2013, July 4). Retrieved November 11, 2014, from http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/marine/2012/M12N0003/M12N0003.asp

Marine Investigation Report M05M0052. (2005, October 25). Retrieved November 11, 2014, from http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/marine/2005/m05m0052/m05m0052.asp