Camille Karnatz
Philosophy 290, Environmental Ethics
Professor Mark Bernstein
February 8, 2013
“Identities that are not grounded in meaning can be contested.”- Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment, Page 54
When we say something is right or wrong, good or evil, of value or worthless, we are characterizing the subject based upon a previous notion. We can’t explain where these preconceived ideas come from, nor why we use one level of definition over another, as in something may be ‘good’ but not ‘great.’ Regardless, these descriptions are accepted in society without question. I would like to pose the argument that these identities can be contested and further that no identity is grounded in meaning. I strongly believe that through the use of moral language and expressivism, one can alter any definition and not one identity is stable.
Before I begin to defend my thesis, I would like to review the background theories I will use in my case. This particular thesis reflects the category of meta-ethics. Meta-ethics is one of three branches of ethics, the others being Normative ethics and Applied Ethics, which focuses on the definitions and understanding of ethical statements, or more accurately, moral language. It does not discuss whether certain subject or acts are good or bad, but rather this branch of ethics questions the nature of good and bad, what is it to be good or bad. Meta-ethical questions ask whether the language used is asserting a claim or expresses a certain attitude (Jamieson, 46). For example, when we state, “Dogs are better than cats,” we have no reference to define what makes one animal “better” from the other. Dogs are dogs, and cats are cats; stating that one is worth of more value than the other is irrational. How do we define “better.”
This brings us to the understanding of moral language. Moral language uses words that reflect expressions rather than facts. These dictionary defined words pose difficulty when speaking of them in general context. For instance, “The dog is black,” is correctly stating the fact that indeed the dog is the color black. However, when reciting, “The dog is cruel,” how can we accurately assume that all things in that dog’s nature are sincerely cruel.
Finally Expressivism is the theory that tries to understand moral language. According to the theory, Expressivism uses moral language as non-fact stating properties, and advances on a subject’s psychological state. Expressivists do not believe that moral sentences have truth value. They hold the view that there are no moral facts that moral sentences that describe or represent, and no moral properties or relations to which moral terms refer. Thus I believe that this theory strongly supports the lack of true, grounded identities.
I am a realist. I believe that moral language states facts and I take the descriptions at face value. However, my argument is not that identities and moral words can be contested, but rather that there are no true grounded identities. I believe that every subject matter can be perceived differently and is dependent on those who are observing it. Therefore, moral language is a powerful tool in the voice of its speaker, because successfully characterizing, respectively, in what I see as the undefinable, is nearly impossible. Let me explain.
A dog is a dog, correct? It is not a cat, by order of genetic makeup and scientific studies. However, when a so-called ‘dog lover’ thinks of a dog, they think of a cute, lovable creature; “man’s best friend” if you will. In contrast, when someone who despises dogs or is extremely allergic to them, like myself, defines a “dog,” I would view the beast as walking petri-dish. I, nor my contender, are not claiming that the animal is not a dog; we both are simply defining the animal in our own terms, our own moral language. My point being, same object, different perspectives, therefore, identity not grounded, or unstable.
What if I were to ask about the tree in my back yard? Is this tree “valuable?” One can make the argument that yes, this tree and all trees are a valid part of the environment. A mature leafy tree produces as much oxygen in a season as ten people inhale in a year. That’s valuable. A tree also absorbs carbon dioxide. To produce its food, a tree absorbs and locks away carbon dioxide in the wood, roots and leaves. Carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas. A forest is a carbon storage area or a "sink" that can lock up as much carbon as it produces. Finally, shade resulting in cooling is what the tree is best known for. The tree is so tall that it covers a portion of my house from the sun. Shade from this tree reduces the need for air conditioning in my home in summer. In winter, the tree breaks the force of winter winds, lowering my family’s heating costs.
I think it’s a valid statement when I say that yes, this tree is valuable. What if the scenario changes? Perhaps a horrible storm hits in my neighborhood and this magnificent tree is hit by lightning. The tree splits and falls onto my house, breaks through the roof, and crashes into my sister’s bedroom. No one was hurt, but the roof is destroyed. The tree that once provided a mass amount of oxygen, filtered the carbon dioxide, and kept my house shaded from the sun does not seem so valuable anymore. The tree has turned instantly into a inconvenience, or hazard, that promotes risk as it is planted to close in distance to our home. What if my sister had been in her bedroom during the time of the storm? What if she had been injured? The identity of the tree has been altered. It is no longer “valuable” and the most plausible answer to the scenario would be to chop down the tree immediately. From “valuable” to “hazardous,” the identity was contested by a scenario, and uprooted from the ground (pun intended).
Perhaps we should discuss a more controversial topic: is it wrong to kill someone? Sure. Is it wrong to kill your mother? Of course! Is it wrong to kill the person who murdered your mother? Interesting. The game has changed. Is it still wrong? If you answer No, then clearly the definition of wrong has changed. The “wrong” identity is consequently no longer grounded in meaning. All of the sudden, we re-evaluate our beliefs. Perhaps we don’t automatically agree that we must end the life of our mother’s murderer, but we do take a moment to weigh out the moral impact this decision would have on us.
As stated in Ethics in the Environment:
“In addition to the fact that particular questions do not always fall neatly into one category or another, reasons for accepting views in one area may depend, in part, on views in other areas.” (Jamieson, 47)
We see that identities can be easily broken given certain circumstances. Granted that I used a very severe circumstance, but the extreme tend to leave an impression. I would like to make the final statement that identities are only as strong as their current state. They can easily be manipulated with words, moral language, the cost of a loved one, or a present state of mind.