A Cup of Coffee with the Linovamvaki
Reviving ethnic and cultural integration on the island of Cyprus

Michael Apicelli
IRP-601 Dayton
18 December 2006 The island-nation of Cyprus, although small, serves as the location of the most long-standing UN Peace-keeping mission in the world. The UN-established “green line” divides Cyprus into two parts, the lower 2/3 of the island known as the Cypriot Republic, is almost exclusively populated by denizens whose ethnic identification is classified as Greek. The northern third of the island, occupied by self-avowed Turkish Cypriots, recognizes itself as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The only other country in the world that recognizes the TRNC is Turkey, while the Republic of Cyprus is recognized internationally. While the international community recognizes the Republic of Cyprus as having jurisdiction over the island as a whole, in fact the Republic’s authority stops at the green line, a fact which has led at a number of confusing international issues, including Cyprus’ and Turkey’s EU accession bids.
The Beginnings of Cypriot History Cyprus is an island state that has only recently achieved sovereignty. Inhabited for well over two thousand years, it has a four hundred year colonial history of shared culture, language, and mores between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots that populate its scenic mountains, plains, and beaches. These shared mores and sense of culture will prove essential to my discussion of how to best address the current conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The island’s strategic location approximately 40 miles south of Turkey and 400 miles east of Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean, at the crossroads of three continents, coupled with its expansive coastline and small size (approximately 3,572 square miles), has historically made it an attractive target for invading powers. Its current population of roughly 800,000 is composed 80 per cent by Greek Cypriots, 18 per cent by Turkish Cypriots, and 2 per cent by Armenians, Maronites, and others.[1] Although ethnic conflict has not only played a major part in the events shaping Cyprus, but actually defined its role in world politics since 1955, historical records indicate that before 1955 the two major communities coexisted peacefully.[2] Sources indicate that there had never been any ethnic tension or rivalry between the two communities until the 19th Century; neither the Turkish Cypriot nor Greek Cypriot ethnic group had felt threatened by the other prior. In fact, despite some differences both material and symbolic in relevant traditions and customs, the two enjoyed an almost surprisingly amicable state of affairs by today’s standards, even sitting in coffee shops, considered by both communities to be the epicenter of friendship, belonging, and loyalty, together.[3] It is these coffee shops that will serve as a locus of new community life in my proposed project for managing the current harmful conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Because of its strategic positioning, the island of Cyprus has been occupied by a long line of conquering powers – Egyptians, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Ptolemies, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Crusaders, Lusignans, Venetians, Ottomans, and, of course, the British – before gaining its independence in 1960.[4] Among all these rulers, however, only the Greeks and Turks have had a significant and long-lasting demographic impact on modern Cypriot society.[5] The Greeks settled on the island during the second half of the second millennium BC, and sources more or less agree that Turkish occupants began to appear on the island in 1571, after the Ottoman Empire wrested control of the fortuitously located island from the Venetians. The new occupying powers immediately began settling, effectively imposing the institution of Ethnarchy on the political representation of the Greek Cypriots.[6] Under the Ottoman millet system this institution benefited ethnic Turks as the ruling powers. During the years of British rule some 400 years later, however, it allowed Archbishop Makarios, a religious figure, to act also as the president of the state, representing largely Greek interests. But at the crossroads of the 17th century at any rate, Turkish Cypriots, the ethnic group holding more political capital, considered Cyprus to be a Turkish national territory, largely because it was held by the Ottomans.[7] Sources disagree, however, both over whether or not the Ottoman occupation contributed towards the creation of Cyprus’ current ethnically bicommunal disposition, as well as the degree of ethnic separation existing on the island. Typically, sources indicate that the Ottomans imposed a clear ethnic division between the indigenous Greek and settling Turkish Cypriot populations. Joseph states that the Turkish millet administrative system distinguished the two communities on the bases of religion and ethnicity, levying taxes on groups dependent on denominational basis. In order to achieve these means of taxation, the Turkish occupiers dispelled all elements of the Venetian Roman Catholic Church, and encouraged the restoration and consolidation of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus, since more religions meant more separate communities to be taxed and greater bureaucratic inefficiency.[8] As the Muslim Turks were living under Islamic Law, the idea of the heads of church and state being one in the same intuitively made sense. Accordingly, there was only room in the administrative system for two religions to represent the two ethnic populations. Because the Turkish overlords already possessed an intuitive understanding of an administrative system that did not differentiate between heads of church and state, the framework imposed on the Greek Cypriots by the latest conquerors elevated the patriarch of the church to the sole authority representative of the Greek Cypriots as a whole.[9] Ramady agrees that the Turkish millet system acted to distinguish the two communities religiously and ethnically. Moreover, he states that although the Greek Cypriots easily composed a majority of the island’s population, in the Ottoman Empire’s administrative structure they were considered a small ethnic and religious minority.[10] On the other hand, Ramady also points out the surprising amount of blurring between the two populations’ ethnic lines for purposes of marriage and friendship during the Ottoman period of domination. For example, the degree of mixing was significant enough to produce a distinctly recognizable ethnic group, known on the island as the “Linovamvaki.” Literally meaning “flax and cotton,” the Linovamvaki were a group that shared blended Turkish and Greek backgrounds, and were generally accepted as such.[11] It is only during the later period of British rule that some gradually became “full” Turks, while others reverted to their “Greekness.”[12] Coufoudakis in his essay on Cyprus’ ethno political separation states that Cyprus’ historical record is “replete with instances of intermarriage, common opposition to oppressive taxation and administration, and even the evolution of a Cypriot dialect common to both communities of the island.”[13] Further, the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities socially

[a]spire towards the same goals and hold similar beliefs about family ideals and honor … A common core of Cypriot custom has been evolved that embraces hospitality, respect for elders, the desire to maintain one’s honor, … and the desire to work hard so that one’s offspring can do better educationally than their parents. There is little to separate Greeks or Turks, at least outwardly, for racially, their facial characteristics seem the same and they dress alike. The only differences between the Greek villages and Turkish villages are the religious symbols of the different denominations – the Church and the Mosque, otherwise the houses look alike, and inside both Greeks and Turks share common tastes both artistically and in the food they prepare…. Perhaps living together under difficult economic conditions throughout the last three hundred years has made both Greeks and Turks of Cyprus share a special set of customs – customs which cannot be traced to be exclusively Greek or Turkish[14] (emphasis in original).

Although some revisionists have attempted to prove post-1974 that the Turks of Cyprus share a common culture with their mainland brethren, Ramady states that aside from isolated works of art created by Turkish exiles to Cyprus during the Ottoman period, Turkey has little in common artistically or culturally with the island.[15] Finally, Patrick, by examining census records and conducting his own field work, has shown that Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities have experienced progressive segregation throughout the 80 year period of 1891 to 1970. In 1891, census records designated 49% (346 of 702) total Cypriot communities as “mixed” – meaning ten or more people of a second ethnic group were residents in that community.[16] In 1931, 36% (252 of 694) communities were designated “mixed;” in 1960, 18% (114 of 623); and by 1970, only 8% (48 of 602). Thus although Ottoman rulers facially imposed a system of separation, at the time of turnover to the British, the communities were relatively integrated. These shocking numbers indicating the decline and all but complete disintegration of biethnic communal living arrangements on the island of Cyprus in the 20th century are placed into perspective next by the following sections of this focusing on the 20th century period of British colonial rule. In her essay on social and identity conflict management, Terrell Northrup advocates a five-component model for conflict analysis.[17] As she explains, conflicts are evolutionary, rather than static. Even though symptoms of conflicts may appear to be discrete, tangible consequences of a monolithic and fixed conflict, conflicts actually must be viewed as evolutionary processes. Symptoms of these processes manifest themselves differently depending on the stage of conflict. Not all means of managing a conflict may be relevant at all conflict stages.[18] Conflicts are also psychosocial processes, which are affected greatly by “the greater social, cultural, historical, and political context of the conflict.”[19] When parties to conflicts address the issues, they tend to do so from a “proxy conflict” position. Mediators may exploit this aspect of conflicts through usage of framing. For example, an effective mediator may reframe a bitter divorce conflict, in which the two parties are adversely opposed, to a question of how to best fulfill the needs of the parties’ children. Doing so recasts the focus of the conflict from one based on irreconcilable issues between parties to a team-work project, in which the parties must work together in order to meet a common goal (what is best for the children). Further, Northrup contends that most conflicts share both subjective and objective framework.[20] That is, even though the objective issue of a conflict may appear to outside observers to be obvious, each party to a conflict experiences the conflict through its own subjective lens. Tractability is affected directly by the differing sets of rational assumptions each party brings to analysis of the conflict. Finally, Northrup’s fifth element is distribution of power between or among parties. When one party shares a significantly lower proportion of the power in a conflict, it may appear to be in that party’s interests to prolong the conflict.[21] In this instance, the Ottoman Turks were in control of the island for most of its history since 1571. As discussed above, the governing system was an ethnarchy, in which a minority of the population held a disproportionate amount of power, and in which each ethnic group promoted its own social and political agenda. However, the power imbalance that Northrup highlights was never an issue between the two communities because both groups participated in a high degree of “ethnic blending” socially. As Northrup explains, where there is no “core” construction of self and identity being targeted, there is no awareness of threat.[22] Even though the Ottoman Turks held a radically disproportionate share of the power, Greek Cypriots never felt threatened. They were allowed to have their own political and religious structures, and a significant amount of “blending” took place between the two groups. So much so, in fact, that a third distinct ethnic group widely accepted by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots was emerging. Under there circumstances, the “constant presence of threats, danger, discrimination, or potential harm” necessary for heightening a sense of exclusive social identity was entirely absent. The two sides also shared a sense of “interdependence of fate”[23]In other words, even if we were to disregard the sense of shared culture and values that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots felt in the period of Ottoman dominance, conflict still failed to break out because the two groups shared a sense of common destiny. Greek Cypriots were allowed a substantial degree of political freedom and equality under law. In return, the Greek Cypriots, although composing a majority of inhabitants on the island, were ruled over peaceably. In a sense, both groups held a significant stake in maintaining friendly relations, since both sides gained from the power-sharing arrangement. Greek Cypriots gained a stable and effective governance and administration, while the Ottoman Turks and their Cypriot brethren maintained a high degree of control over the affairs of the island. While the former group benefited through a stable and effective form of government, the latter managed to maintain their imperial hold over a majority population. Because each side had something to lose through open conflict, neither side chose to wage a conflict. In the next section, we will see how during the British colonial occupation of the island led to an upset of the balance that had been established between the two groups. By introducing a new external actor, priorities of the two groups began to change, and nationalism emerged as a vehicle for aggression and conflict.
The British Period of Colonial Dominance: Discord Flourishes As the Modern era approached, the Ottoman Empire relinquished control of the small but valuable island. In 1878, after facing military defeat by the Russians, the Ottomans agreed to allow British administration of Cyprus in return for assistance should the Russians decide to make a military attempt on the island. In 1914, Britain annexed Cyprus officially. Nine years later, at the peace conference in Lausanne, Turkey renounced control of all territories outside of its own boundaries, including Cyprus.[24] Two years afterwards, Cyprus became an official British crown colony. During the British occupation, Turkish Cypriots accordingly (and predictably) viewed Cyprus as a British territory.[25] Meanwhile, the Greek Orthodox Church, which had been solidifying its hold on the cultural and political institutions of the Greek population, mobilized towards the idea of enosis, or political unification of the island under Greek Cypriot control.[26] The British wholesale adoption of the existing millet system for administering the island may explain why the two populations diverged so hazardously during the British Colonial period, escalated towards conflict throughout the teens, twenties, and thirties, and finally exploded into armed fighting in the latter half of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, however, sources give no satisfactory or comprehensive account of why the Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived in harmony for the duration of the Ottoman rule, but came to violence under the British colonization and subsequent independent statehood. Why had cultural norms and institutions shifted under British rule, if the millet system of bureaucratic governance had remained intact? Possibly the Greek Orthodox Church gained power and sway with the Greek population steadily over those three hundred years of Ottoman reign. The late 19th century is also regarded as the period in which the “Megali Idea” pan-Hellenistic sentiment recalling the days of the Byzantine Empire began to spread throughout Greek communities.[27] In reaction, Turkish Cypriots began to call for taksim, or the partition of Greece into Greek and Turkish sections, which further exacerbated the problem of separation between the two ethnic groups.[28] Further, the rivalry that emerged between the two “parent” states of Greece and Turkey in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as well as British misrule, were instrumental in the creation of separate ethnic identities between the Cypriots. The British, alarmed by early murmurings amongst the Greek Cypriot population encouraging enosis, or the reuniting with the Greek state, began implementing a system of “divide and rule” to deal with recalcitrant populations.[29] The two ethnic groups were dealt with as entirely separate ethnic populations for administrative purposes, not only preserving what differences already existed between the two, but actually carving out new cleavages in the population.[30] This inept administration, coupled with antagonistic national loyalties, church-induced fragmented ethnic education, and church dominance, led to political polarization and schism that would endure and grow over subsequent generations. In the long-run, “four hundred years of communal commingling and geographic proximity did not produce inter-communal bonds strong enough to counteract the dividing effects of religious, administrative, educational, social, and cultural distinctiveness.”[31] A growing sense of distrust between the two groups ensured that ethnic and communal divisive issues would govern Cypriots for the subsequent years following independence. Historically, the explanation for a sudden outbreak of conflict between the two communities may appear to be inexplicable. From a conflict mediator’s frame of reference, however, the cause is obvious. As the British occupation wore on towards the early twentieth century, Greek mainland political pressure waxed, while Turkish mainland influence waned. As will be discussed in the next section, as the Greek Cypriot population began to become aware of its newfound political will, the symbiotic balance between the two communities was disturbed. In addition, the British administration, in order to cope with a rising Greek Cypriot demand for independent home-rule, began to favor the local Turkish population. Playing the two sides off against each other allowed the British government to maintain control of the island until armed resistance was taken up. The initiation of this armed resistance then led to a growth in threat-level to the Turkish Cypriot population, resulting in open conflict.
The Greek Cypriot Demand for Independence British colonial rule in Cyprus during the 20th Century is characterized by the following developments: 1. A growing Greek Cypriot demand for enosis 2. Further antagonism between Greek and Turkish populations 3. Greek Cypriot demands for self-determination exploding into armed resistance to British rule 4. The emergence of Archbishop Makarios and General Grivas as prominent Greek Cypriot figures strongly in favor of enosis and 5. Growing interest from world superpowers. During the British colonial rule, ethnic hostilities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots were further fanned, as each group came to identify increasingly with its “parent” country. Essentially, an exponential negative feedback loop ensnared the two peoples as nationalism became more prominent, and as Turkey and Greece encourage nationalism on Cyprus for their own strategic purposes. During the late colonial period, Greek and Turkish Cypriots adopted the flag, national anthem, and national holidays of their respective parent countries. During the 1912-13 Balkan wars, the First World War, and the Greek-Turkish war of 1919-23, Cypriots from both ethnic groups fought as volunteers on opposite sides.[32] It is not difficult to imagine the divisive nature of these conflicts on the already loosened cultural ties between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The heretofore pacific Cypriots, who had known no serious armed conflict throughout their history were for the first time participating in wars of nationalistic pride. Also for the first time in modern history, Cyprus was producing charismatic war hero-leaders such as the founder of EOKA[33], General George Grivas. Thus, both groups felt the pangs of nationalistic sentiment: Greek Cypriots’ desire manifested itself in a call for enosis, while their Turkish counterparts reacted by promoting taksim. These notions are telling, as they strongly recall rules 4 and 5 of Stuart J. Kaufman’s 7 Rules of Nationalism.[34] The Greek Cypriot desire for self-determination was fueled by the pan-Hellenic notion of enosis. Because the Greek Cypriots composed such an overwhelming majority (80%) of the population, the tendency for them to view Turkish Cypriots as a minority population living within their ethnic state was very strong. After all, the Turkish Cypriots were (relative) newcomer pilgrims who had over the centuries adapted to the particular mode of living on the island that did not closely resemble that of Turkey. By contrast, the Turkish Cypriots experienced their nationalistic sentiments largely as a reaction to the Greek cry for enosis. Due to their fear of powerlessness as a relatively small population in reference to the Greeks Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots would live in fear of oppression by the majority if left unprotected. Thus, the Turkish Cypriots voiced their response to these fears by promoting taksim, a movement that endorsed separation, insulation, and protection from the Greek majority. After divvying up the population of Cyprus along ethnic lines, Turkish Cypriots would then be able to form their own republic and subsequently engage in their own sort of enosis by furthering relations with Turkey. Such was the de facto outcome after the independence of Cyprus was established. Here Northrup/Tajfel’s theory of social identity becomes more relevant. While in the “golden age” of Greek and Turkish Cypriot relations the two groups lived in harmony and interdependence, by this stage of the island’s history both sides were suspicious of each other. This new-found lack of mutual empathy resulted in a widening of the gap between the two populations. As Greek Cypriot demands for enosis became more prevalent, any British sympathy for the Greek Cypriot plight quickly dried up. More than once in the 20th century did Greek Cypriot frustrations and sense of abandonment flare up into rioting and guerilla activity.[35] In 1950, once elected Archbishop, and, by Ottoman custom Ethnarch, or leader of the ethnic Greek Cypriots, Makarios III escalated the conflict with British rule by holding a plebiscite in Cyprus, in which 98% of the population was reported to have voted for enosis.[36] This referendum vote thrust the Cyprus problem onto the world stage, attracting international attention in NATO and UN forums.[37] In addition, these events only served to solidify the sense of threat[38] that all of the stake-holders on the island felt. Greek Cypriots became increasingly recalcitrant towards a British administration that favored the Turkish minority. The Turkish Cypriots, no longer in control of the island’s government, began to feel both resentment towards the Greek Cypriots for their troublemaking and fear due to lack of empowerment as a minority group with no significant governmental control. Makarios traveled to Athens in 1950, where he first met George Grivas. The two of them discussed the perceived draconian oppression of the British colonial government, as well as prospects for an island-wide Greek Cypriot uprising.[39] The resistance to British rule generated by Grivas and the militant-nationalist EOKA forces would prove successful beyond their wildest dreams in effecting independent rule. Greek Cypriot leaders could not predict, however, the amount of international interest they would draw to the formulation of the subsequent 1960 Cypriot constitutional convention. Nor did the Greek Cypriot leaders ever consider the amount of resentment their increasing stockpiles of weaponry and pitched cries for independent home-rule were eliciting in the Turkish Cypriot population.
The Establishment of an Independent Cypriot State After ten years of rebellion, riots, civil strife, negotiation, truce, and eventually capitulation, the British government agreed to Cyprus’ scheduled transition from a crown colony to an independent Republic within the Commonwealth.[40] With the granting of independence secured, Cyprus entered into a new phase of development. The years between 1960-1974 were characterized by heavy intercommunal strife between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and eventual complete separation of communities due to third party military intervention leading to partition of the island. Anticolonial sentiment spread like wildfire throughout the international community in the 1950s, and at the behest of Makarios, Greece raised the issue of independence and, of course, enosis, to the UN General Assembly on principles of equal rights and self-determination during the five consecutive years of heaviest revolutionary fighting, 1954-1958.[41] Americans also began applying pressure to Britain, Greece, and Turkey to seek a solution as expediently as possible in order to heal the rifts that had developed between Greece and Turkey, so deleterious to NATO’s goal of collective defense against the Soviet Union.[42] As a result, in early 1959 a series of tripartite talks were held in Zurich between Great Britain, Turkey, and Greece in order to hammer out plans for Cypriot independence, including a constitution and treaty agreements of guarantee. Although Greek and Turkish Cypriots signed all final agreements and documents, they took no part in the negotiations.[43] In effect, the agreements were conducted bilaterally between Greece and Turkey under British directorship. Factors and considerations emanating from the ethnic, historical, linguistic, cultural, and religious ties of the two Cypriot ethnic groups with their respective motherlands defined the context within which the settlements were reached.[44] The treaties laying the political foundation for the independent rule of Cyprus were the Treaties of Establishment and Guarantee, and the agreement on the Structure of the Republic of Cyprus, which was eventually adopted as the Cypriot Constitution. All three were signed into agreement on 16 August, 1960 in Nicosia, the Cypriot capitol. The Treaty of Establishment, aimed at safeguarding British military interests on the island, provided the establishment of two sovereign military bases of 99 square miles. The Treaty of Alliance was a defense pact between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, which provided for the permanent stationing of Greek and Turkish military forces on the island, comprising 950 and 650 troops respectively. With the Treaty of Guarantee Cyprus undertook to “ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security [and prohibit] any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any state or partition of the island.”[45] Turkey, Greece, and Britain, as guarantor powers, were allocated the responsibility of unilaterally or jointly enforcing the status quo of Cypriot independence mandated by the Treaty. The Constitution of Cyprus organized the island into a bicommunal republic based on the current linguistic and religious lines. It effectively loosened the bonds of kinship that Cypriots had enjoyed since the coming of the Ottoman Empire and the first Turkish settlers, while simultaneously solidifying their separate identities and ties to parent countries. The Constitution aimed to regulate and protect the interests of the two communities as distinct ethnic groups.[46] For the first time, then, Greek and Turkish Cypriots were referred to in a state-sponsored official document exclusively by their ethnic affiliations and origins. The Constitution granted the right “to celebrate respectively the Greek and Turkish national holidays,” and to use “the flag of the Republic or the Greek or Turkish flag without any restriction.”[47] The two populations were also guaranteed the right to continue their already growing affiliations with Greece and Turkey on educational, religious, cultural, and athletic matters. The Constitution also established communal dualism in all spheres of government activity. The executive branch of Cyprus was to be composed of a Greek Cypriot president and Turkish Cypriot vice president, each elected by separately by the two communities. A council of ten ministers was also established, seven seats to the Greek Cypriots and three to the Turkish Cypriots. While decisions of the council of ministers were taken by absolute majority, the president and vice president had the right to veto, jointly or separately, all matters pertaining to the execution of laws, including decisions on foreign affairs, defense, and security. Legislative powers were vested in a house of representatives and two communal chambers. The house, composed of thirty-five Greek Cypriots and fifteen Turkish Cypriots, was also elected separately by the two ethnic groups. Following form, the president of the house was Greek Cypriot, while the vice president of the house was Turkish Cypriot. Laws in the house were passed by a simple majority, except in cases of modifications to the Electoral Law and adoption of any law relating to modifications of any law relating to the municipalities and laws imposing duties and taxes, which required a separate simple majority of the both ethnic groups.[48] The two communal chambers were independent legislative bodies elected separately by the two communities, possessing authority on all matters religious, educational, cultural, teaching, and religious.[49] They controlled administrative justice dealing with civil disputes relating to personal status, and communal matters, such as religious, sporting, and charitable institutions.[50] Finally, the two chambers possessed the power to levy “personal taxes” and fees on their communities in order to finance communal activities and institutions.[51] In short, each ethnic group was guaranteed the ability to run its affairs separately from the interests of the other. Communal dualism was also instituted in the court system, where the membership of the panel of judges was determined by the ethnicity of the parties; plaintiffs and defendants who belonged to the same ethnic group were adjudicated by judges belonging to that community.[52] The supreme court was composed of a Greek Cypriot, a Turkish Cypriot, and a presiding neutral judge, who could not be a citizen of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, or Britain.[53] Finally, the Constitution created dual ethnic municipalities in the five largest towns of Cyprus, elected separately by each community, and it forbade the alteration of the agreements. “In other words, the political framework was not only awkward and unworkable, but also rigid and unalterable.”[54] Britain foresaw its fatal error of providing the Turkish Cypriots with a disproportionate sway in the legislative and executive branches, so it allowed the formation of ethnic legislatures as a sort of overflow valve to ensure that the government would not become entirely deadlocked. What Britain either failed to foresee or ignored entirely, however, was that by allowing the communal chambers the freedom to legislate bills for monetary appropriations and other basic state functions, in essence, Britain was allowing the formation of separate bicommunal federated states. Rather than work their way through compromise in the main Legislature, representatives could simply cut the Gordian knot, allowing the ethnic contingencies to vote on their own legislation. Unsurprisingly, this is exactly what happened when the legislature met for the first time. Because of disputes over effective implementation of tax legislation in the unified legislature, each communal chamber drafted and approved its own, resulting in the formation of separately funded programs and institutions in the communities.[55] Additionally, the president and vice president frequently vetoed actions of the legislature benefiting each community separately, and Greek fears rose, as Turkish communal chambers passed legislation effectively separating each municipality along ethnic lines, creating a de facto state of taksim.[56] Because the president and vice president failed to agree on the creation of a Cypriot army, the communities formed their own on ethnic lines, further detracting from the power of the Cypriot state. It is difficult to say with any clarity, however, where exactly this conflict became intractable. According to Kriesberg’s six phases of intractability,[57] it would appear that this attempt to rush through drafting an independent Cypriot constitution contributed to phases 3 and 4: failed peacemaking efforts and institutionalization of destructive conflict.[58] Because a legal constitutional framework was now in place that not only officially divided the population by ethnicity, but also doled out the proportion of power to be shared, the Turkish Cypriot population found itself in a position of permanent powerlessness. Not only did the constitution escalate suspicions between the two groups; it also failed miserably as a solution to the power-sharing problems the two groups were experiencing and institutionalized the absolute division between ethnic Greek and Turkish Cypriots. That is to say, it made each group even more cognizant of its role to play and power to share in the arrangement by codifying it into the supreme law of the country. Rothman agrees: “[a]s long as parties locked in an identity-based conflict fear that their identity needs will be neglected or negated by a conflict settlement, they will not be motivated to engage in negotiations to settle it. Thus, we hypothesize that many conflicts that have appeared ‘settled’ but have later re-emerged with greater virulence are, in many cases, conflicts whose true source (identity issues) has not been adequately articulated and engaged first.”[59] Problems that seem to involve “classic” disputes of interests often confound traditional approaches to conflict mediation because of their identity-based component. So while the Cypriot constitution may have appeared to be a solution to the conflict between the two groups, it in fact only deepened the ethnic divides that had already been established during British (mis)rule. Separating the two communities legislatively led to a deepening sense of mistrust, as no incentive existed for the two sides to innovate new compromises to conflict management. In addition, a number of myths and stories about the groups developed during British rule. The Turkish inhabitants of Cyprus tend to view the world in terms of “all good” and “all bad.” Greek Cypriots, of course, are taken as “the bad,” while Turkish Cypriots are “the good.”[60] Thus, a Turkish Cypriot would tend to revere and gawk at Byzantine cathedrals for their obvious beauty and architectural splendor, while scorning Greek Cypriot churches, widely accepted as the pinnacle of Byzantine architecture, as crude and ill-formed monoliths.[61] Turkish migrants and colonizers first began appearing in Cyprus in 1571, with the Ottoman deposition of the Venetian Empire, yet because Turkey is geographically so close to Cyprus (40 miles separate the two coasts), Turkish Cypriots believe that at one time the two were connected, and regard Cyprus’ very shape as stretching out towards its motherland.[62] The Greek military junta’s imposition of reactionary enosis hardliner Nicos Sampson was especially instrumental to stirring up fears in the imaginations of both mainland and Cypriot Turks alike.[63] Often photographed with one foot on a slain Turk, Sampson regularly bragged about how many Turkish Cypriot “dogs” he had killed, which played heavily on the Turkish Cypriot minority’s fear of extinction.[64] Further, the ethnic Turks adhered to a view of ethnic Greeks as facile, manipulative, aggressive, loud, and domineering.[65] Finally, and perhaps most insulting to the Greek population, Turkish Cypriots disparaged Greek Cypriot claims to “Greekness” as misplaced and outmoded. In the eyes of their fellow islanders, while sharing the same language and religion as the mainland Greeks, Cypriot Greeks were not actual Greeks, but rather a type of Mediterranean Islander.[66] These fears of extinction are not shocking ones for a minority. The population in a binary system with fewer weapons and a smaller private standing army, Turkish Cypriots experienced armed conflicts as geared towards exterminating them wholesale. Such notions were evident during the 1963 Christmas Massacre, which Greek Cypriots experienced as a systematic revolt on the part of the Turks, and Turkish Cypriots experienced as a systematic extermination on the part of the Greeks.[67] The concept of enosis was tantamount to death for the Turk Cypriot, and extinction of Turkish culture on the island. Northrup states that in some conflicts, “a low-power group may believe that it is actually not to its advantage to negotiate, that existing injustices may be perpetuated and even legitimated through cooperation.”[68] In such instances, it actually becomes beneficial to a group to maintain or escalate the conflict in order to heighten public awareness. In this situation, the Turkish Cypriots became more interested in further entrenching their position because of their relative sense of powerlessness. The Greek Cypriot population was not without its own neuroses. From the early 20th Century, when enosis first became a rallying cry for Greek Cypriots and a thorn in the British Colonials’ side, the British subscribed to the notion of “divide and rule.” The Imperials subdued the Greek Cypriots, the larger population frequently calling for self-determination, by siding with the Turkish population, which created a wide-spread sense of alone-ness and abandonment throughout the Greek population.[69] Greek Cypriots also perceived British colonials as highhanded, condescending, ignorant of local customs, arrogant, and oppressive.[70] The perception of Turkish Cypriots as acting in league with British colonialists would have been negatively affected by the years of oppression. In general, Greek Cypriots view their Turkish (non-)compatriots as overly cautious, suspicious, quiet, and submissive.[71] The Greek Cypriot, due to his or her perceptions of the British and Turkish Cypriots, is placed on an uncomfortable middle ground position. The Greek Cypriot senses herself as inferior to the British, because her culture is misunderstood. Yet simultaneously, she considers herself superior to the Turkish Cypriot, who typically has less money, is less well-educated, and allies himself deceitfully with the colonizing power. The Greek Cypriots also considered themselves to be a primarily peaceful, placid people, who “could be fanned into flame by one strong breath.”[72] General Grivas, an especially persuasive and flamboyant public speaker, frequently capitalized on the Greek Cypriot positive response to melodrama and high-flown overly idealistic rhetoric, allowing him to easily recruit for EOKA ethnic warriors. Ultimately, the Greek Cypriot’s almost blind devotion to enosis would play a main role in exacerbating the current conflict.
From Independence to EU Membership The years following the adoption of the Cypriot Constitution were full of communal strife and actual armed combat between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot populations, and elite leaders in both communities would not give up on enosis and taksim ideas. As Northrup points out, a build-up of arms and predominance of threatening gestures and beliefs are indicative of an increasing rigidification of conflict.[73] At the heart of their respective cries for taksim and enosis were Turkish and Greek Cypriot attempts to shut out and invalidate the other. By forming rigid ethnic lines of identification, the members of each group were separating physically, and placing distance between the self-group and the other group which threatens the self-group.[74] The two diametrically opposed theories of island-partition and complete home-rule each threatened the other population with the prospect of annihilation equally. The Greek Cypriots in particular were displeased and frustrated with the Cypriot Constitution, believing it to have fallen far short of creating a unified Republic of Cyprus. Because the Constitution allowed for separate communal institutions, Turkish Cypriots found themselves in a stronger bargaining position, closer to fulfilling the goal of taksim. Where once the two populations lived under a regime that stressed mutual interdependence, under the new Constitution each side benefited by pitting its own interests directly against those of the other group. Further, fierce and aggressive maneuvering in the political arena, coupled with a schism between the moderate now-President Makarios and the enosis-dedicated General Grivas led to independent guerilla warfare from EOKA to ensure their goals.[75] The Greek Cypriot community resorted increasingly to violence, triggering events such as the 1963 Christmas Massacre, in which Greek units launched an attack on a predominantly Turkish suburb of Nicosia to “rescue a pocket of surrounded Greeks.”[76] Subsequently, thousands of hostages were taken on both sides, and Turkey sent jet fighters low over Nicosia as a warning to the Greek Cypriot population. This activity, of course, incensed both Greece and the Greek Cypriots, and the imminent violence was only halted by NATO appeals for peace and the formation of a British peace-keeping body.[77] President Makarios petitioned the UN in March, 1964, and the UN responded by adopting Security Council Resolution 186, which created the longest-standing peace keeping mission in the world, UNFICYP.[78] A truce committee set up under British chairmanship drew up an agreement on neutral zones, a Green Line was established, and hostages were subsequently returned.[79] Grivas, however, was still actively conducting guerilla warfare in several Cypriot cities, now also spurring intra-communal conflict by targeting Greek Cypriots who disagreed with achieving enosis by militant means.[80] As the Turkish response to Greek Cypriot guerilla activities became more threatening and immediate, dissention in the Greek Cypriot ranks grew more pronounced. In turn, the moderate Greek Cypriots, led by Makarios, initiated good-will negotiations with Turkish Cypriots, led by vice president Denktash.[81] These efforts, unfortunately, were frustrated by the military junta government in Greece. Greek agents acted to depose Makarios and install a reactionary military dictator on the island, Nicos Sampson. In response to this Greek act of direct intervention in the domestic affairs of Cyprus, the Turkish government, under the legal rationale that it was upholding its responsibilities dictated by the Treaty of Guaranty, invaded the island with 40,000 soldiers.[82] The island was the divided along its current lines, with Turkey occupying the northern third of the island, in 1974.[83] Shortly after the invasion, Turkey began expelling Greek Cypriots from their communities in the occupied north causing considerable internal displacement and human suffering.[84] Currently, as seen below, only ethnic Turks live in northern Cyprus, and ethnic Greeks in southern Cyprus.
[pic]
In the aftermath of the Turkish military occupation, several attempts at peacemaking were made by NATO, the UN, leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, and, most recently, the European Union. None, however, have resolved the conflict satisfactorily to all sides involved. Over time, Turkish Cypriots have established their own autonomous administration over northern Cyprus, and in 1983, they proclaimed the territory under their control to be the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.[85] Although Turkey has pledged its support by recognizing the seceded state, no other country in the world has extended any such diplomatic relations. In fact, the UN Security Counsel has denounced the declaration and adopted a resolution declaring the purported secession as illegal.[86] Since 1974, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, as well as the Turkish troops, have generally respected a state of cease-fire and military status-quo.[87] In April, 2003, Secretary-General Kofi Annan submitted to the estranged governments a comprehensive peace agreement, known as the Annan plan. With Cyprus’ April 16, 2004 European Union accession quickly approaching, the Secretary-General had hoped to negotiate successfully for the accession of a unified republic. Unfortunately the Security Council announced these efforts to have failed by April 14, 2004, “due to the ‘negative approach’ of the Turkish Cypriot leader.”[88] Although Cyprus’ accession to the European Union proceeded as planned, the entire island did not gain membership due to the division, leading to a patently absurd and paradoxical outcome. Because the Cypriot Parliament of the Republic, which claims sovereignty over the entire island, voted in favor of EU accession in 2004, EU law is applicable to the entire island. Thus, all those who held Cypriot citizenship as of 1974 at the time of the Turkish invasion and partition of the island are eligible for EU citizenship[89] even though the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has never agreed to EU accession. As the situation currently stands, although peace in real terms (i.e. no armed conflict and ethnic violence) has existed on the island since 1974, the conflict lives on by dividing a once-common people. Perhaps the most convincing evidence of the prior communal affinity that once existed between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot is Patrick’s demographic study. How a population can decline from a community intermixing rate of 49% to scarcely 8% in a matter of eighty years, especially considering the four hundred prior had featured both populations living more or less side by side in harmony, even building to some limited extent a common dialect is astonishing. Greek and Turkish Cypriots have not always adhered so adamantly to the identities of their “parent” states. The emergence of nationalism, experienced by the Greek Cypriots as enosis and the Turkish Cypriots as taksim, in the early twentieth century has sunk its claws into even a people who had heretofore experienced their identity as one in the same. While UNFICYP has, through its vigilance, insured against any further escalation of the Cyprus conflict, it has not acted outside of its role as a peacekeeper to bring the conflict to an end, as doing so would be outside of its mandate. Although Greek Cypriots requested that the UN force disarm Turkish Cypriots, Secretary-General U Thant claimed that doing so would constitute an interference in domestic Cypriot affairs. Further, a lack of clear mandate in the Security Council enabling Resolution exacerbated the mission’s confusion.[90] The Cypriot Constitution, poorly negotiated and drafted, was a major institutional obstacle to resolution. Great Britain failed in the task of mediation and equalization, most notably in the drafting of the Cypriot Constitution, which excluded Greek and Turkish Cypriots from negotiation.[91] Amazingly, the only parties to the negotiation were the mainland Greeks and Turks. Because Great Britain only acknowledged the interests of the “mainland powers” of Turkey and Greece, rather than paying attention to the population that actually possessed the highest stake in the outcome (i.e. the Cypriots), it preempted addressing the actual issues, fears, and concerns of the islanders in favor of pacifying the NATO powers. Great Britain failed especially in its role as a mediator, because it caved to Turkey’s demands and granted the Turkish Cypriots a disproportionate amount of sway in governance of the island, and endorsed the grid locking institutions of ethnic legislature and executive. Britain was forced to give in to Turkey’s demands, because it faced pressure from the United States to maintain NATO’s unified front towards the Soviets, and Turkey was threatening to leave the Organization if its demands were not fulfilled. Britain, upon formation of the Cypriot Republic, pledged to maintain two sovereign military bases, created not to monitor the conflict, but rather to maintain a British military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The European Union has failed once by allowing a divided state to accede, but it may yet play the part of a highly effective negotiator and mediator to the conflict. With negotiations currently underway for the Turkish accession to the European Union, the bargaining chips are heavily stacked in the EU’s favor, should it decide that it possesses a vested interest in resolving the conflict. Project Proposal As discussed more completely above, substantial evidence exists to suggest that the actual difference between ethnic Greek and Turk Cypriots is nowhere near as pronounced as either group had assumed in the modern era. Racial mixing and intermarriage during the Ottoman era were regular enough that a distinct ethnic group, the Linovamvaki (half and half), gained recognition and its distinctive nomenclature. Much like the Hutu and Tutsi people of Rwanda, little exists in the way of physical evidence to differentiate the Greek from the Turkish Cypriot populations. During the early British colonial period, the common social, communal, and cultural bonds shared between the two populations were substantial. The houses they lived in looked the same, they dressed the same and shared common culinary and artistic tastes. Culturally, both cultures honor their parents extensively and provide warm hospitality. My proposal is to open a number of coffee houses in the border town of Pyla. I have chosen Pyla as the site of this project because it is the only major town in Cyprus to be located within the UN buffer zone. As a border town, Pyla is home to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots groups.[92] It is fascinating to note that in the Cyprus instance, during the years of Ottoman and early British rule, it was not uncommon to witness Greek and Turkish Cypriots sitting together and chatting in a coffee shop. As sources have indicated, the social importance of a chat in a coffee shop, while perhaps trivial in the western world, is not to be overlooked in Cyprus, due to its public nature. When two people meet at a coffee shop in one of Cyprus’ towns, word spreads throughout the community quickly. Greek and Turkish Cypriots would not be seen in a coffee shop, the epicenter of friendship, belonging, and loyalty, unless they felt a true affinity for each other. If the two populations could do it two hundred years ago, why not now? The Cypriot people would benefit from good-will ambassadors who are able to cross the Green Line into “the other’s” community and reestablish those cross-cutting ties that once existed. With relationships rebuilt, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot demands might not seem quite so foreign, while each side might soften its demands in order to avoid imposing too heavily on the other. The key to my proposal is discussed in Simmel’s idea that memberships need not be limited to just one group. Holding multiple identities does not necessarily cause an implosion or psychosis in an individual. In fact, it strengthens the individual, as she learns to cope with the difficulties of so-called “dual-membership” and then harmonizes them.[93] So accordingly, the coffee-shop plan will help Cypriots, whether Greek or Turkish, to recall a time[94] of common and harmonious co-existence, allowing each to feel herself simultaneously to be both ethnic and Cypriot. The success of the project is not predicated on the so-called reunification of the Cypriot state, nor is the objective of the project is not to reunify the state. Coffee shops can achieve no such lofty goal. Rather I hope to encourage an open dialogue between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot people – a dialogue that history and circumstance has robbed them of. As an illustration to exactly what I hope to accomplish through this project, I refer to Northrup’s model of intractability transformation, which is composed of three parts: level one changes that are external or peripheral to individual sense of identity; level two changes that those that influence the dynamics of relationship between two (or more) parties; level three changes are those that redefine the identities of parties.[95] The changes that I hope to accomplish through this project will initially be limited to level one. I do not claim that by drinking coffee together in one border town Turkish and Greek Cypriot populations will overnight forget their differences. My purpose is only to encourage the re-integration of the two people by dispelling some of the harmful myths that have accumulated over the past 100-200 years. As Northrup explains, changes at level one might involve “the process of providing new information or of educating parties in a particular way [to] facilitate change in the nature of the dispute.”[96] My hope is that by drinking coffee together in a public setting, as they once had so long ago, Greek and Turkish Cypriot populations will learn to re-humanize each other, and find resonance in each other’s core identities. This resonance, as explained by Rothman, allows parties to the conflict to explain what they care about and why. By creating a reflexive dialogue, the disputants reframe the conflict in a more positive light.[97] Instead of viewing each other as enemies, the Cypriot people might learn to rely on each other both for protection and for more effective governance. By finding common grounds and realizing that the “other” is not as inhuman or one-dimensional as the common mythos dictates, Cypriots will be encouraged to cross the Green line that separates their cultures and communities in order to see and understand how the other side lives. Once each group has had significant exposure to the other’s side, way of thinking, system of mores, etc., it is my belief that both parties will realize that they are not as different as they had assumed. Assuming that this project might seem hopelessly idealistic, I refer you to instances of theory and practice. In theory, Kriesberg argues that just this sort of project would herald the first step in the right direction towards loosening and lubricating this intractable conflict. The influx of information about the “other” will be essential to undermine the institutionalization of this conflict. It is especially important for young people to frequent these coffee houses, as they tend to be more flexible in their characterizations of the other. In addition my project will cater especially to young people, because there is now an entire generation of young adults working and soon-to-be making policy in Cyprus that has grown up never knowing anything but a divided state. If, for example, this generation of Greek Cypriots comes to political maturity without ever having known or even met a Turkish Cypriot, they will not have any incentive to work with the Turkish Cypriots to set policy beneficial to both sides of the conflict, whether in the capacity of separate or unified governments. This approach to conflict management has been tried in the past, and the results have been favorable. Dr. Ifat Maoz executed a project in which Israeli and Palestinian youths were chosen to participate in special cross-cultural dialogues.[98] The purpose of Maoz’s experiment was to promote a “transformative dialogue,” in which both sides to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could “come to construct themselves and the other differently, extending the boundaries of the self and including parts of the other within the self, and thus including the other within the realm of relational moral responsibility.”[99] Through this reflective dialogue, both sides will learn to reconsider their prejudices against the other. Maoz placed four major conditions on his experiment: 1. the two groups participating should be of equal status, at least within the contact situation; 2. successful contact should involve personal and sustained interactions between individuals from the two groups; 3. effective contact requires cooperative interdependence, where members of the two groups engage in cooperative activities to achieve super ordinate goals that depend on one another’s efforts; and 4. social norms favoring equality must be the consensus among relevant authorities.[100] Maoz’s results were very positive. She found that prior to the experiment, an overwhelming majority of both Palestinians and Jews had never made friends with or even met people from the other group.[101] Both sides shared negative perceptions of the other, which changed dramatically over the course of and after the peace-building activities and dialogues.[102] Before, the Israelis viewed Palestinians as terrorists, while Palestinians mythologized Israelis as violent soldiers. Interaction on a personal level in workshops, however, moved each side to characterize the other as “tolerant,” or “considerate.”[103] The results from the Maoz experiment show both that “intergroup contact can improve attitudes, even under conditions of realistic conflict over scarce resources…”[104] and that “transformative practices can still be effective, and possibly even more relevant, in the harsh context of a violent conflictual sociopolitical society.”[105] My proposed project takes on much the same approach to conflict management as Dr. Maoz. The coffee house experiment will be entirely voluntary. Only those who wish to enter any of the several coffee houses established in the town of Pyla will participate. Because my goal is to foster interdependence between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, once inside, those who choose to hold intergroup dialogues in a mixed ethnic setting will be rewarded with a free cup of coffee. Because the coffee-house culture is so pervasive in this part of the world for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike, and patrons typically discuss political, social, religious, and family matters over coffee, the participants’ interactions will by nature be personal and sustained. My expectation is that, much like in Maoz’s experiment, many participants will be meeting and chatting face-to-face for the first time with members of the opposite group. I expect that attitudes will change some measurable amount, in that Greek participants will cease to view Turkish Cypriots as suspicious, quiet, and submissive, while Turkish participants will abandon their views of Greek Cypriots as facile, manipulative, and domineering. Both sides will, I believe, rediscover their common cross-cutting cultural bonds. In sharing narratives about what it means to live on the island of Cyprus, as well as what values and cultural mores are held in common by both groups, the two populations will hearken back to a period in their shared history, where interdependence and integrated co-existence was the norm rather that the exception.
Evaluative Scheme I will evaluate the effectiveness of this project through use of quantitative as well as qualitative methods. I will leave at every booth questionnaires, which will include a number of criteria for evaluating the extent to which participants had had prior experience with the other ethnic group, the participant’s reason for deciding to come to the coffee house, whether the participant interacted with a member of the other ethnic group during her or his time in the coffee house, how the participant’s current views of the other group are characterized, and demographic questions. Questionnaires will, of course, be filled out anonymously. Because the coffee house project will be ongoing for a number of years, I will not use a questionnaire regime that seeks to divine respondents’ attitudes on a “before-and-after” basis. Instead, I plan on comparing responses from questionnaires on a “rolling” basis, meaning that every quarter-term (3 months) questionnaire results will be compared against those of the prior term. In addition, I will, at random, conduct interviews of project participants from both groups once every quarter to ascertain qualitative personalized views on attitudes towards the other group. Again, the results of these interviews will be compared against those conducted prior. I believe the results will show, over a period of years, a gradual positive change in attitude towards members of the other group. There are a number of obstacles that the project and evaluative scheme may encounter. The participants are not likely to be a true random sampling of the Cypriot population at large. Probably only the most tolerant and liberal-minded of individuals will choose to frequent the coffee house. I hope to overcome this obstacle through the offering of free coffee for those who sit and discuss in mixed groups. I think that a free cup of coffee will likely be worth the discomfort to the population of sharing a booth with an individual from the other group. In addition, maintaining a tolerant atmosphere in the coffee house will help dispel a sense of embarrassment or distress that average Cypriots might feel at the prospect of participating. In addition, participants might choose not to fill out evaluations. If this proves to be the case, then the project will offer more incentives for filling out the survey, like additional free coffee or pastries. Some Cypriots might be reticent to enter a coffee shop that is staffed by outsiders, only Greek or only Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, I will ensure that each coffee house is staffed by as close a 1:1 ratio of Greek and Turkish Cypriots as possible. Finally, the evaluations might be difficult to compare, as there will be no control group, and no before-and-after comparison. As I have stated earlier, I believe this obstacle will be overcome by analyzing questionnaire responses on a rolling quarterly basis. Because I am more concerned with overall population perceptions towards the other group than with individual perception, I will use the questionnaires returned as a sort of random sample of the population at large. There will be no concrete measurement for success of the program, as such an abstract term as improvement in attitudes cannot be objectively measured. The program simply seeks to make a slow but steady improvement in the way that Turkish and Greek Cypriots view each other over the course of several years. Ultimately, should the island decide to split itself into two separate ethnic states, this project will assure that relations between the neighbors are normalized and friendly. By building resonance between the two groups, it will help keep peace between the states. Conversely, should the island remain united as one country, the project will do much to heal the rift between the ethnic groups, resulting in an effective and unbiased governance. Michael Apicelli The Flax and Cotton Foundation 418 Cherry St. Syracuse, NY 13210

Mr. Robert Kushen
Director of International Operations
Open Society Institute
400 West 59th Street
New York, NY 10019

December 16, 2006

Dear Mr. Kushen:

On behalf of the Flax and Cotton Foundation, I am pleased to submit this proposal to the Open Society Institute. With this request, the Foundation asks that you make available a grant of $500,000 to support the operation and maintenance of several coffee houses to be established on the Island of Cyprus, in the border town of Pyla. These coffee houses will serve as common safe spaces in which Turkish and Greek Cypriots alike may freely discuss a wide variety of subjects, from cultural mores to domestic politics and world affairs. We have chosen the site of Pyla, because it is the only town remaining on the island in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots coexist peacefully.

By providing the funding necessary for this program, you are contributing to the revival of the common Cypriot traditions of inter-ethnic harmony and interdependence. Even if the politically divided island does not experience a reunification, these coffee houses will emerge as the foci of a reintegrated Cypriot communal consciousness, either within or across state lines. If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me at (609) 216-3592. Thank you very much for your consideration of this proposal.

Sincerely,

Michael Apicelli
President

MA/ta
Enclosure
-----------------------
[1] Farid Mirbagheri. Cyprus and International Peacemaking. New York: Routledge, 1998, 13.
[2] Mirbagheri, at 13.
[3] Mirbagheri, at 13.
[4] Charles Foley and W. I. Scobie. The Struggle for Cyprus. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1975, 1.
[5] Joseph S. Joseph. Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics. New York: St. Martin’s Press Ltd, 1997, 16.
[6] Mirbagheri, at 29.
[7] Richard A. Patrick. Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971. Ontario: University of Waterloo, 1974, 329.
[8] Joseph, at 17.
[9] Joseph, at 17.
[10] M. A. Ramady. “The Role of Turkey in Greek-Turkish Cypriot Communal Relations,” in Coufoudakis. Essays on the Cyprus Conflict. New York: Pella Publishing Co., 1976, 4.
[11] Ramady, at 4.
[12] Ramady, at 4.
[13] Van Coufoudakis. “The Dynamics of Political Partition and Division in Multiethnic and Multireligious Societies – The Cyprus Case.” Essays on the Cyprus Conflict. New York: Pella Publishing Co., 1976, 32.
[14] Ramady, at 4.
[15] Ramady, at 5.
[16] Patrick, at 12.
[17] Terrell A. Northrup. “The Dynamic of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict,” in L. Kriesberg, Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation (1989). Syracuse: Syracuse University Press
[18] Northrup, at 58.
[19] Northrup, at 58.
[20] Northrup, at 60.
[21] Northrup, at 61.
[22] Northrup, at 66 (quoting Deutsch).
[23] Northrup, at 66 (quoting Lewin).
[24] Mirbagheri, at 29.
[25] Mirbagheri, at 29.
[26] Coufoudakis, at 32.
[27] Coufoudakis, at 32
[28] Joseph, at 18.
[29] Joseph, at 18.
[30] Joseph, at 18.
[31] Joseph, at 18.
[32] Joseph, at 18.
[33] Ethnike Organosis Kyprio Agoniston (or the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters)
[34] Respectively: If a majority of our people live there, it must belong to us – they must enjoy the right of self-determination. If a minority of our people live there, it must belong to us – they must be protected against your oppression.
[35] Foley and Scobie, at 3.
[36] Foley and Scobie, at 9.
[37] Linda B. Miller. Cyprus: The Law and Politics of Civil Strife. Harvard University, 1968, 3.
[38] Northrup, at 68.
[39] Foley and Scobie, at 15.
[40] Miller, at 3.
[41] S. G. Xydis. Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-58. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967.
[42] Joseph, at 20.
[43] Joseph, at 20.
[44] Joseph, at 20.
[45] Treaty of Guarantee, art. I.
[46] Joseph, at 21.
[47] Cypriot Constitution, art. I.
[48] Joseph, at 22.
[49] Joseph, at 22.
[50] Joseph, at 22.
[51] Joseph, at 22.
[52] Joseph, at 23.
[53] Joseph, at 23.
[54] Joseph, at 23.
[55] Joseph, at 26.
[56] Joseph, at 26.
[57] Louis Kriesberg. “Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability.” Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 68.
[58] The phases in complete are as follows: 1. eruption of conflict; 2. escalation marked by destructive qualities; 3. failed peacemaking efforts; 4. institutionalization of destructive conflict; 5. de-escalation leading to transformation; 6. termination and recovery
[59] Jay Rothman and Marie L. Olson. “From Interests to Identities: Towards a New Emphasis in Conflict Resolution.” Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 38, no. 3. 295-296.
[60] Vamik Volkan. Cyprus: War and Adaptation: A Psychoanalytic History of Two Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1979, 13.
[61] Volkan, at 13.
[62] Volkan, at 13.
[63] Volkan, at 18.
[64] Volkan, at 19.
[65] Volkan, at 19.
[66] Ionnis D. Stefanidis. Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem. New York: New York University Press, 1999, 212.
[67] Volkan, at 18.
[68] Northrup, at 58.
[69] Foley and Scobie, at 31.
[70] Foley and Scobie, at 4-5.
[71] Volkan, at 19.
[72] These words were spoken by EOKA General Grivas in Foley and Scobie, at 14.
[73] Northrup, at 71.
[74] Northrup, at 71.
[75] Patrick, at 21.
[76] Foley and Scobie, at 162.
[77] Foley and Scobie, at 162.
[78] “Cyprus – UNFICYP – Background” available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unficyp/background.html.
[79] Foley and Scobie, at 162.
[80] Patrick, at 23.
[81] Patrick, at 23.
[82] Foley and Scobie, at 175.
[83] Mirbagheri, at 88.
[84] Mirbagheri, at 88.
[85] Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Steven R. Ratner, and David Wippman. International Law: Norms, Actors, Process. New York: Aspen Publishers, 2002, 36.
[86] Dunoff, at 36.
[87] “Cyprus – UNFICYP – Background.”
[88] “Cyprus – UNFICYP – Background.”
[89] “Endeavours on reunification and accession to the EU,” available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyprus_dispute#Endeavours_on_reunification_and_accession_to_the_EU.
[90] Miller, at 36.
[91] Joseph, at 20.
[92] “Pyla.” Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyla
[93] Georg Simmel. “The Web of Group-Affiliations.” American Journal of Sociology 78(6):1360-80.
[94] or alternatively to create a myth
[95] Northrup, at 77.
[96] Northrup, at 77.
[97] Rothman, at 296.
[98] Ifat Maoz. “An Experiment in Peace: Reconciliation-Aimed Workshops of Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian Youth.” Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 37, no. 6 721-736.
[99] Maoz, at 722.
[100] Maoz, at 722.
[101] Maoz, at 726.
[102] Maoz, at 732.
[103] Maoz, at 732.
[104] Maoz, at 733.
[105] Maoz, at 733.