Will A Nuclear Deal with Iran Impact the Iranian Regime’s Behavior and Change the Regional Dynamic in the Middle East?
Mike Maleki December 06, 2014

Illustrated by Paul Combs of the Tribune Media Services.

Many in the West have expressed concern about a possible failure of the P5+1 countries – the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany – to secure a comprehensive deal with Iran on its controversial

nuclear program. These concerns, however, represent a somewhat myopic view of the bigger picture concerning Iran’s nuclear ambitions. A thorough look at the Iranian regime’s domestic and foreign policies reveals that a nuclear deal would, in fact, have very limited effect on the behavior of Iran’s authoritarian theocracy and change very little about the dynamics in the

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Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution changed the balance of power in the Middle East. Following the revolution, Iran, a pillar of the US’ regional Cold War policy, became increasingly isolated as it quarreled with its majority Sunni neighbors for influence and sought to export its Islamic revolution as far as to Europe.1 However, Iran attempted to overcome its isolation as a Shiite and majority Persian state by tempting the aspirations of the region’s Arab population with its support for radical anti-Israel/anti-US regional movements, thus successfully establishing a web of proxies and surrogates – the so-called “axis of resistance.” Furthermore, since 2003, the Iranian regime has effectively engaged Western powers in extensive nuclear negotiations aimed at halting Iran’s nuclear program. The current Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, who has been referred to as the architect of Tehran’s nuclear diplomacy, directed nuclear talks with the EU3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) until 2005. Rouhani revealed in his 2011 memoir,2 and later reiterated in an interview,3 that during the 2003-2005 negotiations Iran had, in fact, played for time. He described in his book that while talks were taking place in Tehran, Iran completed the installation of sufficient number of centrifuges for conversion of yellowcake4 at its Isfahan plant. The nuclear ambition of Iran’s revolutionaries dates back to when today’s regime officials were still lingering in exile. Approximately a year prior to the 1979 revolution, a group of Iranian scientists visited Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was in exile in Paris, attempting to convince him of scrapping Iran’s then-nascent nuclear program. Despite the scientific delegation’s warning to Khomeini that Iran’s nuclear program was inefficient and

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Brigadier General Naghdi, commander of Iran’s Basij militia, said in an interview with the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Broadcasting (IRIB): “[the] ideology of the Islamic Revolution has reached the Muslim communities as far as in Bosnia, in the heart of the Europe.” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SKKxcckgmr0

2 “National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy” Published in Iran and available only in Persian, the book covers Rouhani’s time as the country’s chief negotiator on nuclear policy from 2003 to 2005. 3 Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani stated on Iranian state television that he utterly flouted a 2003 agreement with the IAEA in which Iran promised to suspend all uranium enrichment and certain other nuclear activities. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q6-­‐gJ1zI3D4 4 Yellowcake, the solid form of mixed uranium oxide, is produced from uranium ore in uranium recovery facilities, which is then transported to a uranium conversion facility, in preparation for fuel production for nuclear reactors.

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costly, he dismissed their claims and decided to preserve Iran’s nuclear inheritance.5 However, during the first two decades of the Islamic republic, the regime’s priorities were heavily invested in consolidating power, managing Its war with Iraq, while funding and training militias in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. However, despite severe international sanctions and Iran’s ailing economy as a result of an eight-year war, Khomeini and his successor Khamenei never halted nor negotiated over the regime’s regional proxies and surrogates, further cultivating its doctrine of exporting Iran’s Islamic revolutionary ideology.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ missile command frequently visited North Korea in the early 90’s. Seen in this picture is General Moghadam, known as the “architect” of Iran’s missiles program, specifically the Shahab-­‐3 ballistic missile. He died in an alleged Mossad-­‐planned explosion on a military base in Iran. A November 2011 report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed that its inspectors had found evidence that Iran had, at some point, conducted 7 research on producing a nuclear warhead designed for a Shahab-­‐3.

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While it took close to two decades for the Iranian regime to advance its pre-existing nuclear capability to a point of concern for the international community, the regime did manage to promptly establish its footprint across the region. Under an eroding war with Iraq, extreme regional isolation, domestic opposition and severe economic conditions, the Iranian regime managed to create, fund and train armed militias in many regional countries within the

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What will Iran’s new president do? His memoir offers some clues 6 The official website of Brigadier General Mohsen Rafighdoost, one of the founders of the IRGC. “The IRGC’s missile command network in North Korea alongside [Brigadier General] Rafighdoost,” Apr 30, 2013 http://rafighdoost.com/fa/news/109 7 Report by the Director General, IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Nov 08, 2011. https://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/IAEA_Iran_8Nov2011.pdf

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first decade of its inception. In the 35 years since the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s foreign policy has not lost its revolutionary zeal and the regime has even attempted to cast itself as the leader of the “Islamic awakening” in the Middle East. What’s more, Iranian support for radical movements in t he region, such as Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, and several militias in Iraq, in addition to strategically favorable regimes such as Bashar al-Assad in Syria, remain the cornerstone of Iranian foreign policy. From the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan to the rise of the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL), Iran has effectively utilized its regional influence as leverage in dealing with Western powers. By creating internal rifts, inciting and exploiting sectarian and political conflicts in countries such as Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Yemen, Bahrain, Iraq and Afghanistan, and by maintaining a proxy presence at Israel’s borders (Gaza, West Bank, Lebanon and Syria), Iran has been able to perpetuate chaos in the region without having or maintaining a direct presence in each location. Domestically, the regime has exploited the continued Arab-Israeli discord to rationalize its revolutionary rhetoric and costly proxies and surrogates in order to shore up support in Iran. Meanwhile, Iran has been able to successfully keep terrified world powers locked in a prolonged nuclear negotiations campaign, which has deterred any serious action from regional or extraterritorial actors. Furthermore, the regime has exploited international sanctions and concerns regarding its nuclear program as proof of Western coercion and oppression, in order to convince domestic audiences that the West is an enemy of Iranian interests. "Our nuclear program is only an excuse for the US to continue its hatred and animosity towards our nation. Now, they are bringing up other excuses such as human rights and missiles," said Khamenei in remarks earlier this year.8 Even sixty years after the 1953 coup in Iran, which resulted in the overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddegh and was partially orchestrated by the US and British intelligence agencies, Iranian officials readily incorporate the events of 1953 when referring to the West’s nuclear concerns as a way to influence domestic sentiment. Furthermore, regime officials

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Farsnews, “Leader: West Using N. Program, Human Rights Only As Excuse for Pressuring Iran,” Mar 21, 2013 http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930231001058.

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frequently remind the Iranian people of the US-sponsored coup in parallel to the US nuclear attacks on Japan, while explaining current US-Japan ties as the result of US colonization of Japan. Despite the fact that the political views of Mosaddegh – the prime minister of Iran’s first democratically elected government – have been widely condemned and dismissed by current regime officials, his overthrown in the coup clearly benefited them. As Khamenei said in one of his recent speeches about the 1953 coup; “The US overthrew Mosaddegh’s government even though he showed no animosity against them. Although he did stand up to the British, but he trusted the Americans. Since he had friendly relations with them, he hoped that the Americans would come to his aid. He had expressed humility toward them. And still the Americans toppled such a government. It was not as if the government in power in Tehran had been anti-American. No, it had been friendly toward them. But the interests of Arrogance [the US] required that they ally with the British."9

An Internet meme tweeted by Ayatollah Khamenei’s official twitter account on Aug 18, 2014, titled “Anyone Who Trusted the US Regretted it,” depicting Mossadegh in his trial after he was overthrown in the 1953 coup. The picture also shows various former world leaders meeting with their American counterparts before being toppled under different 10 circumstances. While Twitter and Facebook are banned and blocked in Iran, prominent regime officials including Ayatollah Khamenei, President Rouhani, and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif have an active presence on these social media sites. During the 2009 post-­‐election crackdowns, the Iranian regime blocked Twitter and Facebook and prosecuted multiple protesters for their activities on these sites. Iranians who bypass the censorship and use Facebook and/or Twitter to express political 11 views risk imprisonment, torture and even death.

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Ganji, Akbar, “Who Is Ali Khamenei? The Worldview of Iran’s Supreme Leader,” 2013. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139643/akbar-­‐ganji/who-­‐is-­‐ali-­‐khamenei 10 Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net, Iran,” 2014 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-­‐net/2014/iran 11 Kamali-­‐Dehghan, Saeed, the Guardian, “Iran accused of torturing blogger to death.” Nov 08, 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/08/iran-­‐accused-­‐torturing-­‐blogger-­‐death

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The Iranian regime’s calculated foreign policies, including the nuclear hoax, are part and parcel of its ongoing survival battle. As such, it would be naïve to presume that a nuclear deal would greatly alter the regime’s oppressive domestic and provocative foreign behavior. In the early 80s, only a few years after its inception followed by mass executions of opponents and under severe political instability,12 the Islamic Republic successfully engendered patriotism by inciting religious fervor in the interest of regime survival using the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. By effectively intertwining Islam with the war effort, Ayatollah Khomenei had delivered an "unquestionable rationale for the war," 13 while creating the concept that fighting for the Islamic Republic’s survival was equal to fighting for the survival of Islam. Rather than accepting Iraq’s cease-fire proposal in 1982, Khomeini hastily opted to continue the war for another six years, sustaining close to a million more Iranian casualties.14 When Khomeini finally accepted Saddam’s cease-fire offer in 1989, without any battlefield gains, the loss of millions of Iranian lives – which according to the regime is “the ultimate fulfillment of a religious duty” – did not matter to him but the failure to expand Iran’s influence over Iraq did. As Khomeini announced his acceptance of the cease-fire, he declared, "Blissed are those who have advanced through martyrdom. Doomed am I that I still survive and have drunk the poisoned cup. We do not regret, nor are we sorry for our decisions during this war. Have we forgotten that we fought to fulfill our religious duty?"15 Since then regime officials have openly acknowledged that the eight-year war with Iraq came as a “miracle” to prolong the Iranian regime’s existence by granting it legitimacy in protecting the country against “foreign intervention.”16 Similarly, Iran’s current 12-year nuclear battle with the West serves as another tool for the regime to once again portray itself at war – this time with “Western oppression.” This narrative is evident in the following

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Ahmadi, Ramin, “Tensions in Tehran: Iran’s Mullahs vs. the Revolutionary Guards,” Oct 2013, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/tensions-­‐tehran-­‐iran’s-­‐mullahs-­‐vs-­‐revolutionary-­‐guards 13

Menashri, David, ”Iran: a decade of war and revolution,” 1990,

http://books.google.com/books?id=EcltAAAAMAAJ&q=Azadi, (P320) 14 New York Times, “Iran Rejects Iraq's Call For Cease-­‐fire,” June 13, 1982, 15 Karsh, Efraim, “The Iran-­‐Iraq War,” (P77), 2009.

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http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/13/weekinreview/iran-­‐rejects-­‐iraq-­‐s-­‐call-­‐for-­‐cease-­‐fire.html State-­‐affiliated news agency Farsnews, http://www.farsnews.com/13930718000815, Oct 10, 2014.

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statement by Ayatollah Khamenei as he addressed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) officer graduation ceremony in March, 2014: "Raising issues like the nuclear issue, human rights and other subjects by the bullying powers against the Iranian nation are just some excuses as they are attempting to dissuade the Iranian nation from resistance against their bullying, but this will never happen.”17 Since the 2002 exposure of Iran’s undeclared nuclear activities, the regime has managed to effectively place the nuclear dilemma within a nationalist framework, portraying Iran's nuclear program as inseparably connected to the principles of independence, reverence and righteousness, which form the cornerstone of the 1979 Revolution. Just as with the Iran-Iraq war, this narrative has provided the Iranian regime with the opportunity to convert international disapproval of its nuclear program into domestic political support. In this case, the regime’s nuclear narrative portrays Iran as the victim of “Western Oppression,” presenting its opaque nuclear activities as a legitimate right while illustrating international efforts to curb its development as an assault on the Iranian nation.

An Internet meme tweeted by Ayatollah Khamenei’s official Twitter account on Jun 29, 2014, accusing the West, particularly the US, of sponsoring the devastating chemical attacks on Iran during the Iran-­‐Iraq war.

While the economic impact of nuclear sanctions has challenged national support for the regime's continued defiance of the international community, an apparent surrender to Western powers would undermine the credibility of the regime’s victimizing narrative, which has

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Leader: West Using N. Program, Human Rights Only As Excuse for Pressuring Iran, http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930231001058, Mar 21, 2014.

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served it well for over three decades. Therefore, while preparing for domestic consequences of a nuclear deal and simultaneously attempting to thwart external/international repercussions of a no-deal, the regime has reverted back to Khomeini’s strategy of expanding Iran’s influence in the oil-rich Middle East as an added insurance policy for regime survival. After all, the post-Khomeini regime has capitalized entirely too much politically on its “Victims of Foreign Oppression” narrative to simply reverse its course now with a nuclear deal. “Victims of Foreign Oppression” Narrative: The foundation of this narrative is built on the theme of the good struggling and resisting the persecution and oppression of evil, which is prominent in Iran’s Zoroastrian tradition as well as in Shi’a Muslim thought.18 This narrative portrays the righteous Iranians in a constant struggle against the oppression of foreign forces. This perception of being under attack by great adversaries echoes the most prominent figures in Shi’a Islam itself, which places a special emphasis on lamenting the sacrifice of martyrs such as Imam Hossein, the “martyr of martyrs” who was killed in 680 AD. 19 While the “Enduring Persia” narrative, which was utilized by the pre-revolutionary regime for decades, focused on Iranian regional superiority, the “Victims of Foreign Oppression” narrative acknowledges that this prominence has been tarnished by foreign intervention and interference in the country’s politics over the past several centuries.20 While “Taqout” (meaning one who revolts against God, and used as a reference to prerevolutionary regimes) failed to protect the Iranians against foreign oppression, “Velayat e Faqih” (the Guardian Jurist), who represents the Shiite hidden Imam, will. This narrative blames the majority of the country’s problems and shortcomings on external powers, which are constantly plotting to suppress Iran and Islam. Furthermore, it embraces any offensive stance toward these oppressive “outsiders” as justified, as evidenced by a televised 2007

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William Beeman discusses the Zoroastrian and Muslim roots of the concepts of good versus evil, and how these concepts inform Iranian interactions with foreign powers, in: William Beeman, The “Great Satan” vs. The “Mad Mullahs”: How the United States and Iran Demonize Each other. University of Chicago Press, 2005. Print. P. 122. 19 Iran expert Kenneth Pollack notes “the martyrdom of Husayn and the mythology of the fatally doomed cause became important touchstones of the Shi’i faith.” Pollack notes that Iranian influencers throughout history have tapped into this important facet of Iranian history: “Shi’i Iran was reared on the story of Husayn’s martyrdom and taught to glorify the suicidal sacrifice in pursuit of the noble but hopeless cause…” Kenneth Pollack, Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America. Random House. 2004. Print. p. 11, 59. 20 “Monitor 360” interview with Ali Ansari (University of St. Andrews), 16 November 2010.

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speech in which Ayatollah Khamenei stated: “We believe that the world owes us something. Over the issue of the colonial policies of the colonial world, we are owed something.”21 This narrative originally targeted a wide range of Western countries and Israel as the sources of Iran’s economic and political troubles. However, after the regime’s recent diplomatic overtures to some Western countries, the United States, Israel and Britain are only countries implicated as oppressors in this narrative. Regime officials have used the “Victims of Foreign Oppression” narrative in blaming Western powers as the cause of Iran’s problems in a wide range of political situations. One of many such examples is the demonstrations and opposition movement, which followed the wake of Iran’s disputed 2009 presidential election.22 The ruling party, for instance, uses this narrative to delegitimize opposition movements such as the Reformist movement and the women’s rights movement. By implying that these movements are organized and funded by foreign powers seeking to destabilize Iran, officials are able to rally condemnation of these groups and their aims. In an address to the United Nations in 1998, then-President Mohammad Khatami described Iran as a “great and famous nation which has had a civilization since tens of centuries ago,” one that has relied on its strong history to endure many instances of “foreign interference” including “an imposed war that lasted eight years [Iran-Iraq war, 1980-88], pressures, sanctions, and various kinds of slanders.”23 “The US Betrayal” and “The Great Satan” Narratives: “The US Betrayal” narrative has been used by the regime to insist, in two specific ways, that the US-Iran relationship is unique from Iran’s relations with other countries. First, this narrative sets the United States apart from other foreign adversaries, such as Britain and

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“Leader Backs Government’s Petrol Rationing Plan” Islamic Republic News Agency. 30 June 2007. A religious resolution published in September 2009 accused foreign actors of supporting the unrest following the 2009 presidential election. An excerpt from the Qods Day resolution published by Press TV in Iran stated: “Iran condemns foreign interference especially by the United States, Britain and the Zionist regime in the incidents following the epic presidential election of June 12. We praise the unprecedented 85 percent turnout of Iranians which led to the formation of the tenth government and regard the well-­‐calculated move of the parliamentarians in their decisive vote of confidence to presidential nominees, the pick for the defense ministry in particular as a revolutionary move against media hype and adverse propaganda launched by the world hegemonic powers.” Press TV. 16-­‐21 September 2009. 23 “Iran’s Khatami Addresses United Nations,” Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network. 22 September 1998.

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Russia, by reminding Iranians that the United States and Iran were once on friendly terms. Second, not only does the alleged betrayal frame the United States as unique among foreign enemies, it has also become the historical seed for additional anti-US master narratives such as the “Great Satan” narrative, which focuses on fears of a US “soft cultural war” against Iran. Events such as US support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s; Iranian perceptions that the United States failed to “follow through” on President George H.W. Bush’s promise that “goodwill begets goodwill” after Iran negotiated the release of hostages in Lebanon in 1991; and President George W. Bush’s designation of Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil” in 2002 despite Iran’s cooperation in Afghanistan, have all been substantially exploited by the regime to portray the US as “untrustworthy.”

A drawing contest in an elementary school in Tehran called “The Great Satan, Obama.” According to a 2007 analysis of 115 Iranian school textbooks and teacher’s guides, the Iranian regime has developed an educational system in which “Iran prepares its school children to fight the West – the US and Israel in particular – as an indispensable complementary 24 phase of the Islamic Revolution.” So, is the Iranian regime prepared to fundamentally alter the curriculum of its educational system in the case of a nuclear deal and a possible normalization of US-­‐Iran relations?

As such, the “Great Satan” narrative has been touted by the regime to denounce “Western cultural influence,” whereas the “US Betrayal” narrative emphasizes the stormy history of US-Iran political relations. Rooted in the United States’ perceived conspiracy with the Shah before and after the 1953 coup, the “Great Satan” narrative portrays the US as a corrupting influence on Iran. Soon after the 1979 Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini popularized the term “Great Satan” in an effort to demonize the US as an enemy to the newly established Islamic Republic. For instance, Khomeini used this narrative to back the Iranian hostage takers and to

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Groiss, Arnon, “Iran Global War Curriculum,” Nov 02, 2007. http://www.impact-­‐ se.org/docs/articles/PolicyPaperEnglishFINAL(GeoPoliticalAffairs).pdf

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justify the US embassy siege as a “second revolution” against the “Great Satan” during a speech in 1979.25 The Iranian regime has used these narratives for the last three decades to rally the Iranian people behind a common enemy and to justify the regime’s refusal to cooperate with the international community. With regard to US-Iran relations, and particularly when delivering messages to internal audiences, Iran’s leaders emphasize the US’ deceitfulness as grounds for ignoring US objections to the Iranian regime’s actions, such as its development of nuclear capabilities. In a 2010 speech to supporters in the city of Tabriz, supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei accused the United States of “utter[ing] lies against Iran over its nuclear program,” but noted that “nobody believes these lies because the United States never seeks to serve the interests of nations in the region and it has even trampled upon this region for its own illegitimate interests.”26

Students entering the College of Engineering of Tehran University have to step on the Israeli and US flags to enter the building. The flags are usually repainted at the beginning of every semester. Abbas/Magnum Photos.

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Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic. Holt Paperbacks. 2006. Print. P. 24. “IRAN: Khamenei delivers fiery message, without hint of compromise, to Obama administration,” Los Angeles Times. 17 February 2010: http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2010/02/iran-­‐khamenei-­‐clinton-­‐obama-­‐ iranelection-­‐ahmadinejad-­‐nuclear-­‐green-­‐mousavi-­‐karroubi.html?cid=6a00d8341c630a53ef012877b25c78970c.

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”The Defender of the Muslim Middle East” Narrative: This narrative is aimed at justifying Iran’s political and military interference in other countries in the region and underscores Iran’s aspirations to be a regional leader. The roots of this narrative lie in the ideology of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, after which Ayatollah Khomeini lobbied for a “revolution without borders” that would bring Iran’s new theocratic model to the rest of the Middle East.27 Even during the devastating and costly Iran-Iraq War, Khomeini sought to implement this vision away from the war front, in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza. While the untrained and amateur Iranian youth were fighting in the bloody Iran-Iraq “holy war,” Khomeini sent his IRGC forces to the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, where Iran founded, financed, trained and equipped Hezbollah to operate as its proxy.28 “The Defender of the Muslim Middle East” narrative is fueled by several themes: The regime’s animosity toward Israel as a “Zionist colonizer;” a sense of Shi’a solidarity that is selectively generalized to include all Muslims in order to justify Iran’s support of the Palestinians; and a belief that Iran has a right to return to its historical leadership role in the region. Given that most Iranian-backed Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are Sunni, Iranian officials deliberately broaden the focus of this narrative to include support for all “oppressed” Muslims, rather than just the Shi’a Muslims, when directing messages to external audiences. The Narrative of the Advocators of a Nuclear Deal: Many US-based non-governmental organizations – either self-motivated or tasked-tolobby – have argued that any nuclear deal with Iran would greatly benefit the US and its regional objectives. On the one hand, these institutions, individuals, and even policy makers, who usually portray themselves as human rights supporters, avoid discussing how a nuclear deal can substantially serve the survival of the same regime they occasionally criticize for

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Takeyh, Ray, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs. Oxford University Press. 2009. Print. P. 204. 28 Geraghty, Timothy J., Alfred M. Gray Jr. (Foreword) (2009). Peacekeepers at War: Beirut 1983—The Marine Commander Tells His Story. Potomac Books. pp. 165–166.

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violating the basic rights of its citizens. On the other hand, they refuse to admit that a nuclear deal will not benefit the ordinary Iranians, as evidenced thus far by the multiple installments of recent sanctions relief.29 Moreover, any sense of economic improvement in Iran as a result of the West’s sanctions relief would jeopardize the regime’s 35-year emphasis on the notion that Western countries will always plot and conspire against Iran and any other country that they cannot control. Interestingly, these “peace-seeking” entities and lobbyists, using media outlets, seminars and conferences based in Western countries, constantly message US policy makers about the Iranian regime’s regional influence as another reason for securing a nuclear deal. However, they avoid mentioning that ordinary Iranians are the ones who have to carry the burden of the Iranian regime’s costly regional influence, which is paid from the sanctions relief and the meager oil revenues. After all, and as can be expected, maintaining popularity and spreading influence in the oil-rich Middle East costs the Iranian regime hundreds of millions of dollars every year.30 The proponents of a nuclear deal with Iran always refer to at least one, if not all, of the following reasons in order to create a sense of urgency in reaching a deal with Iran: “Nuclear Sanctions Have Failed” Advocates of this line of reasoning insist that the nuclear sanctions did not provide the impetus, which ultimately brought the Iranian regime to the negotiating table. Furthermore, these advocates argue that the US’ “directionless” economic sanctions have failed, since they only managed to hurt the ordinary Iranian people, inflaming anti-American sentiment among the Iranian population. “In Iran the impact of sanctions has been devastating […] the health of millions of Iranians has been compromised due to the shortage of Western medical drugs and supplies,” a former associate of the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) said in a 22

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Lakshmanan, Indira A.R., “Iran Reaps Less Cash From Eased Sanctions Than Predicted,” Nov 25, 2014 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-­‐11-­‐25/iran-­‐got-­‐less-­‐and-­‐more-­‐than-­‐expected-­‐from-­‐sanctions-­‐relief.html,. 30 Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, State Department, Office Of The Coordinator For Counterterrorism, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195547.htm, July 31 2012.

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January New York Times’ article.31 “Organizations like the Iranian Hemophilia Society are reporting that access to medicine is being closed off, and the lives of tens of thousands of children are now at risk […] these are all abuses of human rights -- due to the sanctions,” said Trita Parsi and Jamal Abdi from NIAC in an op-ed published by Newsday on 5 August 2013.32 These journalists and institutions deliberately or unintentionally act on behalf of the Iranian regime to influence public opinion and convince the US and Iranian citizenry that the US-imposed nuclear sanctions have caused a shortage of food and medicine in Iran, leading to the death of thousands of Iranians. While the Iranian regime has established a carefully devised method of using Western journalists, in addition to its lobbyists, in order to disseminate its propaganda, the fact still remains that the medicine scarcity in Iran is actually a crisis by design and imposed upon ordinary Iranians by the regime, which remains intent on diverting funds to its proxies and surrogates. As case in point, five days before the aforementioned article by NIAC was published, in which the group warned about a shortage of medicine in Iran, the Iranian regime granted the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad $3.6 billion credit to buy oil products.33 Moreover, former Iranian Minister of Health Masoemeh Dastjerdi said in an interview, prior to her dismissal, that her department has been unable to access the foreign currency and subsidy that she had been promised by the administration. In the interview, Dastjerdi was quoted as saying, "In the first half of the year, the administration has not allocated any fund for the import of medicine and/or medical equipment. We need $2.5 billion to meet the basic needs of our medical sector, but only $650 million has been allocated."34 Meanwhile, a former Head of the Research Unit of the Iranian Parliament publicized that subsidized funds and foreign exchange credits that should have been given to the Ministry of Health had instead been allocated to the import of “shovel handles, saddles, and luxury cars including Porsches

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Farshneshani, Beheshteh. In Iran, Sanctions Hurt the Wrong People, New York Times, Jan 22, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/11/19/sanctions-­‐successes-­‐and-­‐failures/in-­‐iran-­‐sanctions-­‐hurt-­‐the-­‐ wrong-­‐people

32 Parsi, Trita, and, Abdi, Jamal. Opinion: Sanctions against Iran hurt the people, not the regime, August 5, 2012. http://www.newsday.com/opinion/oped/sanctions-­‐against-­‐iran-­‐hurt-­‐the-­‐people-­‐not-­‐the-­‐regime-­‐opinion-­‐1.3881126 33 Al-­‐Khalidi, Suleiman, Iran grants Syria $3.6 billion credit to buy oil products, Jul 31, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/31/us-­‐syria-­‐crisis-­‐iran-­‐idUSBRE96U0XN20130731 34 “Challenges of Importing Medicine into Iran,” VOA Persian, Dec 17, 2012.

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and Maseratis.”35 What’s more, before being shut down by the government, the Arman newspaper revealed that the regime had refused to allocate $650 million in import funds of essential medical equipment. 36 “A Nuclear Deal Will Empower the Moderates in Iran’s Political Spectrum, Paving the Way for More Iranian Nuclear Compliance” Advocates of this narrative insist that the “election” of the “moderate” Hassan Rouhani, and not the nuclear sanctions, provided the impetus for Iran agreeing to negotiate over its nuclear program. As such, this camp argues that reaching a nuclear deal could further empower the pragmatic politicians within the Iranian regime. These analysts claim that a political unity among “moderate factions,” coupled with the Iranian people deciding to thwart the prospects of a recurrence of the 2009 election fraud, as well as their rejection of the economic miss-managements of hardliners, led to the election of “moderates” in Iran. Thus, referring to these contradictory assumptions, they urge the international community to seize the opportunity to cut a deal with these so-called “moderates” within the Iranian regime. “The success of the Rouhani administration and his coalition alliance is critical to reaching a mutually beneficial deal on the nuclear program and for advancing a more moderate and politically inclusive Iran,” said Payam Mohseni in his commentary contribution to Cmonitor.com. 37 Contrary to such assertions, the Iranian political system is not a democratic one but an authoritarian system, which cloaks the rule of the clerics with a façade of representative government. In all elections, either parliamentary (legislative) or presidential (executive), the clerical regime selects the contending candidates from an initial pool of hundreds of nominees who seek to run for office. The senior clerics, who chair the Guardian Council, vet the

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“Tenfold Increase In Bank’s Non-­‐Performing Loans, Sources of Emulation Worry About Start of Social Revolts,” Radiofarda, December 30, 2012. See also “Rumors About Sacking of the Health Minister, Revelations About Allocation of Medicine Funds To Saddles,” Radiofarda, Dec 15, 2012. 36 Ibid. 37 Mohseni, Payam, “Make no mistake, America: Sanctions didn’t force Iran into nuclear talks,” Nov 20, 2013. http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2013/1120/Make-­‐no-­‐mistake-­‐America-­‐Sanctions-­‐didn-­‐t-­‐force-­‐ Iran-­‐into-­‐nuclear-­‐talks

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candidates, strictly narrowing the choices to less than 1 percent of the original nominees. While anyone can register as a candidate, final candidates must be approved and certified by the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council is made up of six clerics (Faqihs) – identified as experts in Islamic Law – and six jurists – identified as specialists in various areas of law – who examine candidates’ Islamic and legal qualifications. While the six clerics of the Guardian Council are directly selected by the supreme leader, the six jurists are picked by the head of the Judiciary branch, who is also appointed by the supreme leader. Ultimately, this grants the supreme leader the final say in the matter of who runs in the elections, while allowing the regime to portray a sham democratic system with elections and “different” political factions. As a whole, this system has resulted in a selection rather than an election process, in which the Iranian people basically serve as spectators instead of voters. As I personally witnessed during Iran’s 2001 presidential election, many participants admitted to selecting between “bad and worst, as cherry-picked by the supreme leader.” While many in the West still perceive the Iranian regime as a government comprised of rival personalities and quarrelling parties, the Iranian people themselves call it Hokoomat or Nezam – meaning a political system separate from the people. Over time, Khomeini, Khamenei and their co-opted institutions, such as the IRGC, have reshaped Iran’s political system from Jomhouriy-e Islami – Islamic Republic – to Hokumat-e Islami – Islamic government – ruled by the supreme leader. The late Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, who was once the designated successor to Ayatollah Khomaini but spent the last several years of his life under house arrest, called the regime “neither Islamic nor a republic, but a military.”38 After the 2009 post-election demonstrations, the Iranian regime sought to “engineer”39 a 2013 election that at least appeared to be legitimate and widespread, while also complying with Khamenei’s requirement of having a president who would continue acting as his prime minister, rather than an independently governing elected official. As a result, the regime’s electoral apparatus took great pains to carefully and successfully eliminate the true reformists

38

Torfeh, Massoumeh, “Neither Islamic nor a republic,” Aug 29, 2009. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/aug/29/iran-­‐clergy-­‐infighting-­‐ayatollah 39 The Economist, “Make No Mistake,” Feb 02, 21013, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-­‐east-­‐and-­‐ africa/21571135-­‐time-­‐ali-­‐khamenei-­‐determined-­‐put-­‐one-­‐his-­‐own-­‐charge-­‐make-­‐no

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and oppositionists, leaving Hassan Rouhani as the perceived “moderate” among the remaining presidential candidates. And once again, the Iranian people went to the polls to select between “bad and worse.”

"My husband is an engineer. He engineers elections." (By cartoonist Maya Neyestani)

Naturally, President Rouhani, as the champion of a fundamentally undemocratic political process, is himself neither a moderate nor a democratic leader. The majority of Rouhani’s political life has been spent in the midst of Iran’s conservative establishment. In fact, during his appointment as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Rouhani led the regime’s brutal crackdown against peaceful protests by university students in 1999.40 Furthermore, Rouhani, who also served as the lead negotiator for Iran’s nuclear program from 2003 until 2005, has described one goal of Iranian nuclear policy as “cooperating with Europe in order to cause a division between Europe and the US.”41 What’s more, in a domestically televised debate during the recent presidential election discussing Iran’s nuclear program, Rouhani boasted that under his watch Iran [in violation of the NPT] was able to “import foreign nuclear technology from abroad,” while stressing that supreme

40

Erdbrink, Thomas, “From Inner Circle of Iran, a Pragmatic Victor,” Jun 16, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/17/world/middleeast/from-­‐irans-­‐inner-­‐circle-­‐a-­‐pragmatic-­‐victor.html 41 “National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy” Published in Iran and available only in Persian, the book covers Rouhani’s time as the country’s chief negotiator on nuclear policy from 2003 to 2005.

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leader Ali Khamenei “guided his nuclear diplomacy.”42 This is not to suggest that there are no disagreements among key actors within the regime. However, the system has forged a consensus on core issues such as repressing dissent and preserving the essential trajectory of the nuclear program. Reform the System to Save the System Although President Rouhani can be considered a reformist to certain extent of the word – he does want to change some aspects of Iran’s economic policies and the tone of Iran’s foreign relations – his purpose of reform is not to overhaul the Iranian regime. Rouhani’s true objective is the same as that of the former reformist president, Mohammad Khatami – reform the system to save the system.43 Therefore, it would be a very serious strategic mistake for US policy makers to fall for the argument that Rouhani needs some Western nuclear concessions, in order to win a domestic battle with Iranian hardliners and bring about fundamental policy changes in Iran. Instead, his selection by the supreme leader (as opposed to election by the people) demonstrates the regime’s need to achieve a certain degree of relief from the economic pressure that it is under and, as such, has decided to launch a charm offensive in its foreign policy aimed at lifting the crippling international sanctions. Conclusion: As detailed by the evidence described in this paper, US policy makers ought to understand who President Rouhani really is and what the Iranian regime seeks to accomplish through him. As such, the US should base its foreign policy on facts, not on assumptions and hopes. As the P5+1 prepares to, yet again, start a new round of negotiations with Iran to finalize a comprehensive nuclear agreement, we must realize that while President Rouhani and his administration know that Iran truly needs a nuclear deal, they also know that they are unable to deliver on a final nuclear deal. For the Iranian regime, any final nuclear deal should be domestically presentable as a major victory against the “Great Satan,” while enabling the

42 43

“Hassan Rouhani Recounts Nuclear Negotiations,” Feb 18, 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3y_ETSX0A9c Khatami’s public speech on one of his last days as president. “This is Khatami’s real intention,” Jul 31, 2010. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fIVzMZx7uOk,

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regime to keep its menacing nuclear program and allowing it to continue, and expand, its regional malign influence. Therefore, as the Obama administration eased the sanctions, hoping for a policy shift in Iran, the regime wisely invested the incentives of the sanctions relief on its regional proxies and surrogates, taking hostage the regional interests of the US and its allies. While empowering its covert, military and political presence in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria, the Iranian regime has also managed to turn the vicious emergence of the Islamic States in Iraq and the Levant into an opportunity and leverage in the nuclear talks. As such, US policy makers need to realize that the problem with the Islamic Republic is not limited to its grievances with the West or its nuclear program; they should also closely consider the Iranian regime’s inhumane, aggressive and expansionist ideology. Finally, let’s remember some facts: The year prior to the start of the nuclear negotiations, Iran’s economy shrank by 5.4 percent with an inflation rate of 44 percent;44 in 2013, the new Iranian administration’s main objective was to improve the country’s economic situation by way of improved relations with the West. Therefore, despite all the baseless arguments to the contrary, US policy makers should remember that sanctions did work in forcing Iran to the negotiating table. Now, the only way to truly curb Iran’s nuclear program and prevent a regional nuclear arms race is to keep the pressure on the Iranian regime. So, if diplomats think that there is no harm in talking in perpetuity as Iran collects millions of dollars each month in sanctions relief, they should think again!

44

Iran’s Meli Bank News Site, “Iran’s economy shrank 5.4% in past calendar year: Central Bank,” Sep 11, 2013. https://www.bmi.ae/bmi/en/news204

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