What is international security?
We could start thinking about the security council of the UN
But also about the invasion of Afghanistan (chapter 7 UN in order to secure the international security)
We can also think about security in terms of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This was a unilateral act of war, but sure it can also mean other things
We can think of the national security agency, the agency in charge of spying all the signals and communications to a certain extent.
What’s interesting about the NSA, it is seen as a threat to the security of the privacy.
Lately, with the reports of the UN development programme, we start talking about HUMAN security (not military security, but rather the security of individuals, having a livelihood that’s acceptable).
Whether security is international or not, it can be a rather confusing word
The protection of values we hold dear. We search for it, we pursue it, we achieve it, we deny it to others. * what is to be secured? Is it the security of states? Or individuals? * What is the actual threat that we’re facing? Primarily to be dealing with military threats, or are there other types of threats we are facing.
Essentially contested concept
A concept that ‘inevitably’ involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users – Walter Gallie
There can be ambiguity (one persons freedom-fighter is the other’s terrorist).
A concept that is debated in its essence.
We can think about a lot of situations in which ones security is the other’s INsecurity.
So, how we go about studying a matter for which we are not able to find a definition?
We rather think of it a label, as people calling some things security, in order to call for measures, then we suddenly realize it is important: WHO is talking about security, and WHAT is the referring object. What is this thing we want to protect.
Why does somebody consider something a danger, whereas some other people do not think it is a security threat?
Brief history about how thinking about security has emerged
How do we start?
One possibility of course and many handbooks start this way, would be to make a list of what very smart people before us have thought about security? Clausewitz, Machiavelli? We could start from there and look at what they have to tell us, and we can even make them into security analysts.
BUT if you just scratch the surface, we see a Chinese General, van Clausewitz was a soldier, Machiavelli was a philosopher. They were not talking to a security audience.
100 years ago security was not a particular body of knowledge, considered important.
When DID this happen? When did we start thinking about security as an academic profession?
4 parts: 1. the key role of academia during WW2 and the importance gained by science in the politics 2. The golden eras of security studies 3. The process of institutionalization in the ‘60s/’70s 4. At the end of the cold war: two different paths. One in the US, and one that is typical of European approach. IN THIS COURSE MAINLY THE EUROPEAN APPROACH
1. The birth of security studies
* A new era of mutually assured destruction * A civilian control of the army * The establishment of the national security apparatus
Starting to speak or think about something that is security that would be different than war, that would consider ethics, is QUIET RECENT. Emerges in a moment that would be quiet radical for the community the moment the community realizes it can destroy itself. HERE people started to think different.
International context:
First half of 20th century dominated by WW1, 20 years later WW2, eventually involved all the great powers etc. Germany surrendered to the allied forces, but the war in Asia went on till essentially the nuclear attacks by USA. Profoundly shocked the entire humanity. FOR THE FIRST TIME HUMAN KIND WAS ABLE TO KILL AT SUCH A LEVEL TO DESTROY ITSELF.
Mutually Assured Destruction (M.A.D) both sides have enough weapons that the other side after the first attack would have enough to give a second strike back Von Neumann.
The nuclear capacity dominated by superpower competition, the arms race between these two superpowers, technological rivalry and the conflict in many proxy countries like Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan.
The study of war is not really a new thing.
Around the 1940s/1950s in the US academics of all sorts were asked to think about security. Something that is very specific in time and space IN THE US, NOT ELSEWHERE. Why give civilians and academics the task to think about security? 1. Academics have been quite useful, credibility establishment. Why? The nuclear bomb would have been impossible without the help of academics. Another important tool computers. Computers proved extremely important, in particular in cryptography. Coding ones communication and de-coding the communication of the rival.
The emergence of a new way of doing social science that advocated solving social and political issues with methods that were very similar to the natural sciences 2. Was crucial for the US government to keep tabs on what the generals were doing. US has always been suspicious of the army. US did not have a standing army before 40s/50s. it was quiet important to tame, to restrict, the power these generals were starting to have. 3. After WW2 it wouldn’t be enough to prepare, fight and win wars only with military knowledge. In this nuclear era, finally, the whole point of war became TO AVOID IT. If you had a nuclear war, that’s it.
After all, all these lunies in the universities might be useful.
The whole point of the cold war WAS TO HAVE NO WAR. If you have been trained your whole life to fight wars, how to become prepared for one you should not fight?
“nuclear war spurred theorizing because it was inherently more theoretical than empirical: none had ever occurred” – Richard Betts
THE KEY MOMENT is the signature of the national security act in 1947 by Truman, creates national military establishment, creates a national security council and creates agencies like the NSA and CIA. This is the moment in which it is not about war anymore, but about security making sure war won’t happen again.
Emerges as a new perspective
Emerges in a context of great optimism for the solution of social problems
Emerges as civilians are called in to counterbalance the importance of generals.
2. The golden Age
1. Interdisciplinary creativity 2. Important theoretical developments
A massive outburst in the disciplines. These theories will have a huge influence on the way the security apparatus is organized.
Game theory: incorporate the enemy in your thinking. Trying to find out what the enemy thinks you would do. How would your enemy behave in response they think you would do?
What goes on inside of this round corporation?
Theorization and the application of new methods. The application of new methods is the coding of events in computers, computers becoming stronger and stronger, BUT also psychological experiments, mathematical knowledge etc.
Game Theory * Prisonner’s dilemma * Nash equilibrium (J.Nash) * Bargaining theory (T. Schelling)
John Nash, was one of the key thinkers of the game theory. Of course the part that is not always told about Nash, is that he becomes so obsessed with the idea that self-interest is the only true way of solving dilemma’s, essentially it is discovered that he suffers from paranoid schizophrenia. This is the spirit of the times and of course mental illness is something sad.
Schelling developed on the different theories of game theory proving a certain number of key aspects, in particular the fact that bargaining was necessary, was not always a zero-sum game.
Deterrence:
The use of threats to dissuade an adversary from initiating an undesirable act. This can be modelled/ theorized.
Also other innovations at that time system analysis was a method to basically rationalize the resources within the military and the allocation of these resources.
What vision of security do these different theories have?
Essentially quite simple ones. State: main actor. Threat: military. States are rational and International Relations are essentially a zero-sum game. This is essentially the core of what we call security studies in the golden eras.
The Golden Age is marked by strong theoretical innovation, coincides with the development of a very influential theory which is still very much in application today, but also produces a language of justification and ratification of the theory. It was a way to rationalize and give the sense that we could control.
Concepts for a reassuring reality * “Second Strike Capability” * “Extended deterrence” * “Escalation”
3. A period of Decline (1965-1980) OR of institutionalization and stagnation
1. Theoretical stagnation 2. A US dominated discipline 3. The Emergence of Peace Studies
There is a theoretical slowdown, but the fact that it enters academia is that it stops being this interdisciplinary field, it becomes codified as ONE of the two main things that IR is supposed to study: International Organizations AND International Security.
We have important schools, Harvard, Yale etc. starting to think about these things.
Also, US starts defusing out of the US. Is it purely an American Phenomena? YES!
In fact, most of the time in Europe, it is basically an importation of the American theories, nothing new produced.
On the other hand we have the think tanks, producing practical documents.
Hedley Bull, Raymond Aron and Pierre Hassner (Romanian immigrant who had a key influence in the diffusion of these thinkings).
SU also had some think tanks in the same way the RAM-corporation had. The main thinking was Marxist? Still strategic thinking in mathematical way. Nowhere in Europe there has been a movement similarized to the RAM-corporation.
The 60s a time of contestation of the US-hegemony, the US is fighting communist guerrilla, but many on the left are supporting the opposition to the US. In this contest the idea of communism/socialism were very very present. Most intellectuals would think, maybe not tomorrow but the day after, we would have a revolution.
In the 60s and 70s they wanted to present a counter to the security studies PEACE MOVEMENTS.
The UNESCO has tried to come up with some kind of theory of war. But in the 70s a new movement emerges which tries to incorporate the scientific method into the opposite. In Europe peace research comes to criticize the US security studies. 1. Critique of purely military dimension 2. Also critique on the state as the unique actor 3. Also a critique of the very substance of the theories. Senghaas critiques deterrence by arguing that deterrence does not provide more security, deterrence IS the problem. He advocates for the change of perception and for de-escalatioin rather than escalation.
Structural violence
Manifest injustices with physical material consequences, for instance hunger-related deaths in the third world, but also to phenomena with a less immediate, bodily impact like illiteracy.
FIRST slow-down and a division of labour. It is time for the institutionalization, handbooks, programmes, PHD-students.
THIRD peace studies as a counterweight. The thinking in terms of security is already a problem for them. They propose to take an alternative concept.
4. The EU/US Separate Renewal (1980-2015)
1. US: Dominant Power problems 2. EU: The development of critical approaches to security
In the US there are a few contestations on the narrow vision of the state. A diffusion of neo-realism and offensive neorealism.
In Europe in the 90s something much more interesting happens. Something similar that happens with the RAM-corporation in the US.
The first element is the publication of a book: People, States & Fear by Barry Buzan. Buzan starts questioning the primacy of the military approach to security studies.
The second most relevant element for the questioning is the inability of the main IR-scholars in the US, despite their claim they could predict, they were entirely unable to predict the end of the Cold War. And so, what is the value of prediction, if the only predictions you can make are of the past.
The crisis and war in Yugoslavia in 92, the break-up of Czechoslowakia in 93 bring international migrants. In this specific call the EU starts calling this as a security. 94 UNDP: argues that security is not only military, but also components of what they call HUMAN security. Finally, if this was not enough, 9/11 happens. The attacks of Al Qaeda, one of the most important events of international politics, is carried out not by a state, but by a terrorist-organization a type of entity that fits in NONE of the schemes of traditional US security studies.
What happens after that is a split in how we do theory
“Problem Solving” versus “Critical theory” – Robert. W. Cox
Problem Solving Theory
“Takes the world as it finds it, the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised as the political….”
Critical Theory
“Does not take institutions and social and power relations ofr granted but calls them into question… critical theory is directed to the social and political complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts”
* R. Cox, 1981
We try to understand, why is the question posed like this in the first place. When you move into the critical theory you move in linguistics and you enter into sociology, why a specific socialization also makes a difference. This is essentially the division that takes place.
The distinction between defensive and offensive remain untouched.
In Europe we could parallel this to the upcoming of the theories. Many of these take place in the peace institutes. The emerge out of the peace-movements and anti-nuclear movements try to understand, HOW we can best understand and provide alternative answers to what government has to say about security. Here we see the emergence of securitazation theory. There are also other places that will develop the other approaches (Critical Security Studies, International Political Studies).
This new emergence of security studies in Europe will try to recapture meanings of security within the field, NOT like peace studies.
Key Points
ZIE BLACKBOARD VOOR KEY POINTS
Lecture 2
April 1st, 2015
Traditional Approaches to International Security
15th of April won’t be a session, probably the 16th.
None of this should be entirely new. Rather he will like to give us a sense of the genesis of the discipline. Questioning the traditional assumptions, what is it that we are questioning? What is the background, what is it they grew up with etc.
How do different historical contexts have an effect on the production knowledge, what is the influence of specific visions of the world on the definition on what constitutes security?
Key relationship between International Politics and security
RECAP:
Looking through the optimism of the ‘50s, wizzkids, scientific and rational approach etc.
Key points from last session
* Security is an essentially contested concept * Security replaces war * The ‘golden age’ is marked by theoretical innovation and policy influence
On Monday we talked about the outsiders to the academic field, today the story comes from the other side. How was it to experience the arrival of these guys with their equations etc. 3 main ideas:
* how traditional realism and liberalism was first and foremost a practical type of diplomatic knowledge, blended history, law, philosophy, not really a curriculum but the knowledge every diplomat should basically have. * How neo-realism and neo-liberalism are an attempt to bring this diplomatic vision into a scientific method with positivistic things. * Deeper in the idea of how both traditions have dealt with basically the end of the conditions in which they emerged the cold war, and how they have dealt with the issues like the end of the cold war and 9/11.
Today we are starting somewhere else: 1954. At 3 pm on May 7th 1954, organised by the Rockefeller organisation. The conference financed by the RF is filled with essentially white old men. Several of them European refugees from WW2. In other respects they can be seen as the founding fathers of IR. For the moment the very least we can say is that these people are worried. The reason why they are meeting. Who exactly is sitting in this room: some of the founding fathers of IR: Hans Morgenthau at this point 50, most famous book Politics among nations. Born in Germany, Student of Hanz Geltsen. Wrote a dissertation in French on International Law, reality of norms and norms of international law. Emigrated to US in 1937.
Reinhold Niebuhr 62 years old, born in 1892 from a family of German immigrants in Missouri. Father is a German evangelical pastor, quickly becomes one important public intellectual in the church. Starts becoming very anti-communist and supporter of nuclear weapons.
Paul Nitze German ancestors, 47 at the time of the meeting, University of Chicago and Harvard. Investment banker in Wallstreet, then becomes head of policy planners staff in US and then retires in 1953 and goes to the University of John Hoppkins. He invents a school in this University.
Kenneth Thompson 32 years old, born in 1921, former student of Morgenthau, becomes an important people from INSIDE the Rockefeller Foundation
Arnold Wolfers 62, born in Switzerland, professor at Yale, graduates in law from the University of Zurich.
As you see we have a group of people with generally speaking a training we could think about as humanities and law. Very different training from the engineers and mathematicians we discussed.
Why are all these people here? Carefully selected by Thompson and Morgenthau for a few specific reason: * all established theory of IR as a set of knowledge * All worried about a new trend that consist in believing that science can solve political problems * They share quite conservative political views and believe that the new social science is dangerous from political and methodological point of view.
What does this matter for them? Essentially afraid of being out of a job very soon. In complete contradiction of how they see IP.
In the mid 50s IR did not really exist as a discipline. There were departments of IR here and there. In 1919 the first Chair was created, this is where E.H. Karr starts teaching. The essential idea was to train the diplomats of the League of Nations (where Morgenthau studied). We start seeing departments at LEC. In fact all of these places are teaching a mix of international law, history, philosophy etc. BUT there is no course of IR. All the concepts and theories were borrowed from other disciplines.
“..A specialist in one of the basic fields, ordinarily political science, who is compelled to draw upon the relevant research work of specialists in other subsidiary fields” – Klaus Knorr.
“Its most obvious weakness in comparison with economics is the lack of interest of political scientists in the development of such an agreed foundation in theory”
We needed to find a unified body of knowledge. Why the need of a discipline. Now after WW2 there started to be a pressure for this discipline? WHY * The demobilization of US army created a whole number of military that wanted to go back to school * Scholars of IR were worried they would not be able to continue their research autonomously.
Why the urgency?
There were young upcoming social scientists. Those of the RAM corporation and other think tanks who had a lot to offer. Not only they tackled the most important questions of the time (nuclear weapons, cold war), they had clear theories and methods and finally offered to solve complex political problems with these theories. Now for a set of reasons these were the exact opposite conceptions of the Rockefeller Foundations. If they wanted to stay, they needed theories.
Who was the enemy? Charles Merriam
Since the 30s the US had seen a movement within academia that argued that it could bring scientific methods to human behaviour behaviouralism. Born in the interwar years. Chicago in particular was one of the places it developed, Charles Merriam founding father. Principles of Behaviouralism we know well. Established relations between dependent and independent variables, pay attention to observable and measurable phenomena, keep ethical assessment and empirical foundations SEPARATE.
Classical Realist Critique of Behavioralism
* Value-neutral objectivism first main problem was that it separated values from the empirics. Considered that you could produce knowledge about politics and society without taking sides, without formulating an ethical side.
Most of Rockefeller people came from Germany. What happened in Germany during the Interwar years? The emergence of Nazism. A few of the people were Jewish and had first-hand experience with Nazism and fascism was the reason why they were in the US. What’s the connection believe that the idea of value-neutral science had led to relativism. This value-neutral version of science had justified and legitimized the division of races in many ways the social science of the time with strong believe in positivism had led to this.
‘Modern science and methods have led to an ethical, religious vacuum, for they have offered nothing to distinguished between good and evil etc.’ there is this idea that if you remove the ethical judgement, you are able to justify even the worst kind of ideology * the belief in the explanatory power of rationalism for many of these scholars, after Nazism, no one could take for granted that the idea of politics will always be rational. Not because they were rational that germans voted to support the Nazis, but the idea that these people were able to mobilize deeper values of the soul. The belief that massacring a group of people could rinse an entire race. Are they really rational? They are NOT!
It was useless to analyse power through rationalism. The will to dominate, charisma etc. are factors as well.
“because it was not merely physical coercion but also an appeal to rational and emotional faculties, its “two sided character … already marks political science off from natural sciences. It makes it impossible to measure power relationships as one measures the behaviour of external nature” – Franz Neumann.
Why? Because nature always follows laws, but human beings have a free will. Therefore thinking that we can apply the same rule, is a mistake.
Instead of fighting the whole idea of political science, we will defend our own small corner and call it the IR. Because we are the US we will say we have a theory and that we are legitimate. This was a science of prudential maxims, of advises to the government, of careful observation of the human behaviour.
The idea that policy making should not be the preserve of rational things, but of wise men.
What do you need when you want to establish a discipline? 1. Boundaries, a clear reason why what you are studying is different than the others. How did realists do that? Explained that in international sphere states are the main actors, no rulers over the states, no way to regulate states behaviour rules are completely different. It’s anarchy and we need to understand how this works. States main actor in anarchy, and because there is no institution assuring that justice would be enforced it is everybody for themselves self-interest 2. Invent yourself a very strong tradition: you are just the representative of a legacy of deep-rooted traditions. Lets take Machiavelli, Hobbes etc. and call them realists 3. Apply a certain number of rules, law and theorems.
“No political thinker can expect to be heard who would not, at least in his terminology, pay tribute to the spirit of science” – Morgenthau
essentially you will see the notions of power, critique of internationalism, and the key notion of the security dilemma by John Herz.
One of the other things you do when you invent a discipline and set yourself as a descendent of a strong discipline: define the enemy. Real enemies of realists are the behaviouralists. But they are there and can speak, so why not take enemies that cannot speak.
Invention of a debate between idealism and realism. Who wants to be an idealist if you can be a realist. The first so called debate between idealism and realism, was essentially a retrospective reading of the position that certain journalists have taken between the wars. Who were these idealists? The people who hadn’t been able to prevent WW2 from happening. If you look at who the idealists really are, there is a hudge-pot of different people. People from the LoN, people who are vaguely publicists, journalists etc. it is only after WW2 these were integrated at IR. These people who are branded as realists have had an absolute horror of WW1 and wanted to find a system of international regulation.
Liberal positions * Cobdenism (based on ides of cobden, wanted to advocate free trade and non-intervention) * Hobbesian Idealism (e.g. David Davis, who actually was a Welsh Liberal Political figure who gave the money to create the first money. Had views about the international, advocated the creation of an International Police Force) * New Liberal Internationalism (were the ideas propagated by Wilson, emphasizing the fundamental good at the core of human nature. Proposed the League of Nations.
This were exactly the type of ideas that realists believed had led to the disaster of WW2 were unable to look at the reality of politics, the only way you could actually guarantee peace is by being cynical of the behaviour of states, not optimistic.
What were the idealists concerned with? 1. First idea the setting up of International Organizations, was the idea of keeping the centrality of states, but nevertheless bringing in the power of International Law. One thing they shared with the realists was the focus on the state, came from their training as diplomats etc. 2. Normative emphasis, normative interest hoping that another WW could be avoided by establishing ideas of collective security. 3. Role of economics. The idea that trade could be fundamental to guarantee world peace
Key points from section 1: * Realism constitutes itself as a discipline in order to resist behaviouralism * It is grounded in a pre-rationalist conception of science as embedded in philosophy, understanding also the irrational behaviour of men * “Idealists” were mostly liberal legal scholars and publicists engaged in other intellectual debates
I. REALISM & LIBERALISM: SECURITY As THE ART OF GOVERNMENT 1) Realism: Inventing the Theory of International Relations a) The Rockefeller meeting of 1954 b) International Relations: a subject, not a discipline c) Why the need for a discipline? ? d) The “menace” of behaviouralism e) The basis for a new discipline 2) “Idealism”: the Perfect Enemy a) The “First Debate”: The debate that never was b) Who are the “idealists”? c) Dominant discussion in inter-war Liberalism Conclusion: Summary points
-------------------------------------------------
Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism: Security as a “hard science”
Why do we talk about all of this and do not really go into detail? Most of the debates we will talk about later will be referring to what was said before. This will not be the centre and core, but it is important to have it in mind.
IR becomes a discipline established in universities. But our friends realist did not really get what they wanted. Main notions of neo-realism and neo-liberalism.
What’s the national and international context?
By the ‘70s the Cold War was going on, had a several anti-weapon treaties. Vladivostok summit ’74. Ironically the non-ideological realpolitiek, the strategy pursued by Nixon administration between 69 and 74.
Provides evidence to many scholars in IR that international system was not after all so inflexible and cynical as they thought. Seek alternative explanations to world politics. The explanatory power of realism suffered from further events later on, oil crisis in 73 and 79. Some issues of security that were not military security. What happened to different departments across the world? The behaviouralists took over. Rationalist and empirical social science. This kind of vision took over. Interesting is that it developed out of the social reform movement. Wilsonism and IL-movement extended this belief into the International Sphere who is going to benefit from social reform. The same rational methods would solve the problem of International Politics. Exactly the project that realists oppose.
1. Neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane, Nye)
Power and Interdependence. Neoliberalism is particularly important in IS Studies by focusing on the economic dimension, approach attempting to broaden the concept of security, also make it about economics. So, neoliberals suggest that military forces are declining as a tool of foreign policy. As states seek to get greater economic interaction interdependence. Mutually dependent one on another primarily for economic reasons. This interdependence Is what brings the possibilities of cooperation in the world of anarchy. While hard power stays important for realists, there is reducing the likelihood of conflicts because of transnational economic connections.
Transnational economic connections and corporations give hope to neoliberalists.
Neoliberal idea is that International Anarchy, the idea that everyone is there for themselves, no police, is true to a certain extent, but refuse the idea that this is the only thing there is. Refuse the idea that states are always there for themselves, ARE WAYS they can cooperate. There are other ways, that way is by establishing international institutions, trade organizations, the EU, these are the things we have in mind. If we force them to sign treaties, we can guarantee the possibilities of peace. Therefore advocate for arms-control programmes, international regimes, banning of chemical weapons, reduction of nuclear war heads. 2. Michael Doyle, Democratic Peace Thesis. The argument that democracies do not fight each other. Was first initiated by Doyle, and the idea was that there was a difference in liberal practices towards liberal societies and illiberal societies. Would hardly ever enter into conflict with democratic states. Why? Liberalism had a cooperative foundation. And so, Doyles argument is not a philosophical argument, he is a neo-liberal scholar. Bases on a large database at Michigan Universities. While looking at these lists, he realizes that liberalist states have almost not fought against other liberalist states. Liberal-peace theory draws ideas on e.g. Immanuel Kant’s essay on perpetual peace.
Democratic peace theory
Takes inspiration from Kant’s essay on Perpetual Peace * Civilian population most adversely affected * Participation in the political process * Avoiding war
Kant’s rational has been adopted by the democratic peace theory. Has long been presented as one of the rules that IR has produced about IS.
Are essentially the products of a becoming atmosphere where the cold war is becoming less intense.
While these theories had started to question the primacy of realism in the discipline, if you want the exact opposite of what the realist wanted to happen (not only the intellectual opposite, but the realist camp itself!!!)
Waltz: theory of International Politics. 1979. In which he moves the tradition away from the emphasis of human nature and focuses instead on the system. The way of a particular configuration of states on an international level. Very much inspired by the behaviouralist revolution. His aim is to make realism acceptable and scientific. Argues that we cannot measure perception, fear and all those things realists were concerned about. We should focus on objectives and what we can count: e.g. military power. BUT looking at the broader picture are we looking at a bipolar world, or do we have a unipolar world with only one super power.
While Waltz argued that states were subject, there were still fundamental units. It is this ordering system of anarchy that provides self-help, not because the individuals or states, but because of the set-up of the international system.
Waltz’ structural realism 1. Structural power of anarchy 2. Not anymore an emphasis on human nature, like realists 3. Provides clear and testable framework, rigour of natural sciences 4. Distribution of capabilities was taken into account
All of this a disaster for our Rockefeller buddies. A reduction of the world to a simple set of variables.
Particularly important in the realist tradition were the things between defensive realism and offensive realism
Weather states are satisfied with relative gains, or if they are always power-hungry to the point they want the position of hegemony
Defensive: * Waltz, Walt, Jarvis * Relative gains: only survival * Goal: balance of power * Nuclear weapons make defenders stronger
Offensive: * Mearsheimer * Absolute gains: states never satisfied * Goal: hegemonic power
Mearsheimer writes very clearly and easily, argues that essentially states are there to take everything. Aim is absolute hegemony. Because every state wants to pursue the hegemony, wants to control everything, the only option that states have is to do the same, to become offensive themselves.
What is the consequence of this for IS? The two are there fundamentally cut from the same cloth with one difference: the perception of frequency and degree of state conflict. Useful contrast is given by Mearsheimer about China.
Offensive: China’s strategy based on rapidly becoming the sole hegemon of Asia. Likely to draw an assertive counteraction from the USA
Defensive: security competition between USA and China. They argue that China will also pursue incremental increases to prevent any counter-rising from its rising. Act as a check on Chinese aspirations.
The differences are based on different assumptions on behaviour of states.
Key points from section II.
* Affirmation of behavioralism * Failure of the Realist Project * Neorealism adopts behavioralism * International is anarchic, states are main actors (ONE THING THEY ALL SHARE IN COMMON) * Only liberalism advocates economic power as key for security
II. NEO-REALISM AND NEO-LIBERALISM: SECURITY AS A “HARD SCIENCE” 1) Neoliberalism: International Relations through Behavioralism a) Behavioralism and quantified social science a) Main concepts: Neoliberal institutionalism b) Main concepts: Liberal Peace Theory 2) Neorealism: a “Scientific” Approach a) Kenneth Waltz and the renewal of Realism
-------------------------------------------------
b) Main concepts of Neorealism
What happens next? The end of the cold war.
Even these theories that make predictions had nothing to say about why this happened. Had nothing to say about why the biggest superpower, the SU, suddenly collapsed. Only a few specialists of Soviet history had understand what was going on. But IR had the idea that what was going on inside the states had nothing to do with the international system, had no idea.
Critique on the relevance of neorealism and neoliberalism. In particular because for the realists had failed to predict the end of the cold war. Dissatisfaction, a number of new approaches were introduced: away from state-centred military focused. For the first time in IS studies we see the appearance of new theoretical traditions: critical security studies, etc.
Certainly no denying that traditionalism in IR and IS studies, particularly the realist, had some serious questions. Had to come up with answers and some new things to say about the changing world. Mearsheimer and Waltz tried to re-invent the realist agenda.
One interesting attempt is the attempt of Walt to go away from Balance of Power to Balance of Threat. From there we will see the emergence of neo-classical realism, going back to the pre-rationalist understandings of realism. The idea is to recover the approach that Morgenthau, Karr and others had argued.
As well as the end of the primacy of realism, we saw the world entering the liberal age. A time of high optimism of how the world would become a more peaceful place. UN would ‘really bring peace to the world’. And so liberals started to question that after all realism could not explain the changes of the ‘90s. despite that, still continued to work with the same assumptions as realists.
The final blow to the discussions was 9/11.
What is 9/11 as an act? Who was behind 9/11? Which state was behind 9/11? NO STATE. It is not a state that is behind one of the most important events of International Politics in the past 15 years. How do these theories account for what just happened, that are state-centred.
A post-state theory was needed. What did the 9/11 mean to the traditional theories? The attack of 9/11 were both problematic and ugly reassuring for neorealists.
Reassuring: somehow the world was becoming a horrible place again. Still the most important features of international politics.
Problem:had to adapt to the idea that this was not a state. Still at odds to make sense of it.
‘The promince of globally networked non-state actors raised questions about state centrism and the rationality assumptions that underpinned traditionalist thought’ – Buzan
Response to 9/11:
The invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq proved just as opposing to liberalists. The mechanisms of conflict resolution? This again was proving liberals wrong about the importance of international institutions. The USA went against the institutions.
For democratic peace:
The actions of the US and the UK, two of the most liberal states, had a failure to more clearly define why the imposs between them is not objected on other states. How democratic are states which do not respect their own democratic values?
The ideological response of the Bush administration was an extreme manifestation of both Kanthian ideals (democratic peace) and Wilsonian goods (fundamental good of people), and added some power to it.
Iraq even though had a brutal dictator, had not been a very big threat to the US and should not be invaded.
Continuity In traditional approaches * State centric * Military, power based action * For traditionalists: applicability of old approaches * For critics: their intellectual failure
Key concluding points
* Realists and Liberals (traditionalists) remain integral part of Security Studies * Traditionalists want a limited understanding of “security” * Traditionalists still speak the “problem-solving” language of the governments.
They still take the world as it is and try to look for the possible alternatives in which governments and states can act. Both an understanding of the world and a set of principles of how to behave. This is something that will be fundamentally questioned by the next approaches. !!
III. AFTER THE COLD WAR: CHALLENGES FOR TRADITIONAL THEORIES 1) Surviving the Critical Revolution: Traditionalism in the 1990s a) A changing context b) Challenges to traditionalism c) The questioning of Realism within Traditional IR d) Defending a scientific vision of IR 2) Traditional Approaches and 9/11 a) Attacks by a non-state actor b) 9/11: Challenges for the Realists c) Afghanistan and Iraq: challenges for the Liberals d) Reinforcing the Realist / Libeal opposition e) The continuity of Traditional Approaches
Main Concepts
- Realism, Liberalism, “Idealism”, Neorealism, Neoliberalism/Neoliberal Institutionalism
- Behavioralism
- Value-Neutral Objectivism
- Rationalism
- Security Dilemma
- Liberal Internationalism
- State-centric approach
- Liberal Peace Theory
- Defensive and Offensive Neorealism
Lecture 3
April 8th, 2015
Realism, liberalism & Constructivism
Before we start, 2 things: 1. Requested to turn in assignment BEFORE your workgroup on turnitin and bring a physical copy to the workgroup. 2. INSTEAD OF 15 APRIL April 9.00-11.00, Gorlaeus 2
Instead of 22 April Tuesday 28 April, 17:00-19:00 hrs in SC01
Look at a very concrete example in the first hour: negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme. Background on why is it we have a negotiation, why is there a nuclear programme in the first place.
In the second hour we will look at constructivism, constructivist theories and the crisis in Iran through the constructivist perspective.
I. Traditional security approaches and the ‘Iran deal’
1. Iran’s Nuclear Program 2. A realist interpretation 3. A liberal interpretation
The story of the relations between Iran and the rest of the world are dominated by questions of oil and interference of Western powers in their politics
Iran previously called Persia.
Bordering with some pretty interesting countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan. Syria is not very far, nor Saudi Arabia.
Before 1979 * WWII: Reza Khan had bad idea of taking sides with Germany, Japan and Italy in WWII, * 1941: Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, after Russia and the UK invaded the Son of Khan became the Sha, They made deals for the oil * 1951: Mohammad Mossadeq democratically elected as prime minister, was a nationalist and does not see very well this idea that the UK and the US and different allies have such a strong hand in the economy nationalizes the oil fields to kick the Western powers out * 1953: Fazlolah Zahedi (support of CIA)
US decided to organize a coup, democracy was not a good deal for their oil, decide to
From 1953 they have a regime supported by Western Power, a dictator ship lasting for 26 hours the political police terrorizes and makes sure that the population of Ira does not revolt (the SAVAK). Received beneficial training from the CIA.
The regime lasts from 1953 until 1979.
What happens: good people of Iran fed up of living in a dictatorship.
Have Marxists, socialists and islamists. At the head of this islamists is Ayatollah Khomeini, who will become the new supreme leader of the state which will after the revolution be called the Islamic State of Iran. * Ayatollah Khomeini * US Embasssy hostages
What are the demands of the Iranian militants who take over the embassy?
They want the sha to return from the US to put him to trial.
Second, demand a public apology for the coupe of 1953. They want US to officially admit they participated to the coupe
Finally, demand US to stay entirely clear of Iranian Affairs in the future.
Does not go really well with the US. * First US sanctions * Curtailed Freedom of Expression
Not because it is a revolution. As soon as the first years and ambiguities are passed,the Marxists are quickly all thrown in jail. Everyone who is against the regime gets killed or in the jail. Curtailed freedom of expression, curtailed rights for women.
1980-89 Iran-Iraq Wat
Iraq afraid that a huge part of their population (Iran is Shia, Iraq is a mix of the two. South Shia, North and the Kurds are Sunni. Sadam Hussein used sunni politics). 1979 Shia revolution. Hussein afraid, might be an uprising in the South. But also thinks he can play his cards during this revolution to become one of the important powers in the region, so, starts a war. US is very happy to support Iraq!!
1980-89 Iran-Iraq War * US supports Iraq * Chemical weapons
In particular lethal gas and all sorts of other weapons provided by France, US and other countries * 500k/ 1M deaths
A Regional Power * Hezbollah, Syria (in Lebanon, highly supported by Iran. Syrian regime, somehow belonging to Shia, are also supported by Iran. At that time Hezbollah starts taking hostages during the conflict in Lebanon. This gives Rise to: * 1985: Iran-Contra Scandal
Secret negotiations that the Reagan- administration had. US would provide weapons to Iran to get out the hostages.
Tensions between Iran and US continued to rise.
The Nuclear Program
* 1995 US Sanctions
Economic weapon strongest weapon they can use to contain Iran. Accuses Iran of supporting terrorism and spoiling peace in East. Accuses Iran of nuclear weapons
1997 moment in which things COULD HAVE changed. For first time in a long period, moderates are elected in parliament in Iran, who advocate less tensions with US, normalization of the relations with the rest of the world. What happens? 9/11. Iran was fighting Taliban on his borders, so could have been * 2002 Axis of Evil
Speech by Bush: North-Korea, Iraq and Iran were defined by the Axis of Evil. Why? Countries that were considered to be broke states, damaging world peace and a specific danger to US * 2003: Invasion of Iraq makes it clear: if you do not have nuclear weapon and you are on Axis of Evil list, you might get invaded. Deterrence suddenly becomes very very clear for Iranian Government * 2003: First Nuclear Reactor
With the help of Russia in the city of Bushehr. Starts worrying everybody, in particular one institution of UN: International Atomic Energy Agency. In 2003 the IAEA gives Iran a few weeks to prove it is not pursuing an atomic weapon program. Iran says it is only for energy, developing nuclear technology, for civilian purposes for electricity * 2005: Ahmadinejad
Elected as president. In Iranian politics conservatives take over. What they do: relaunch the nuclear program, still argue it is not for military purposes * 2006: Natanz
You do not need the same level of Uranian for a bomb or electricity. To enrich the Uranium you need a centrifuge. Iran says it does not build a nuclear weapon, but IAEA worried they are.
In 2007 they say Iran is capable of building a nuclear weapon in 8 years. If we do not do anything Iran is going to build a nuclear weapon * 2007: more sanctions.
US imposes toughest sanctions on different sectors of economy, UN as well
Obama: Some hope? * 2008: Obama elected
Ahmadinejad welcomes him. Negotiations between P5+1 (Permanent members of UN security council: US, UK, China, Japan Russia + Germany) * 2009: Negotiations * 2010: UN Sanctions * 2010: Stuxnet: virus that causes the centrifuges to work improperly. Turns out it was very probably a virus created by the US and Israel. All kinds of actions going on on the table * 2010: more sanctions from US, EU, UK in particular on oil exports * 2012: 80% currency value loss. Because of sanctions
Towards a deal * 2013: Rouhani
Reducing the program, negotiations are on good direction * Reduction of enrichment * $7 BN sanctions relief * 2014 AIEA: Iran is reducing enrichment * 2014: Islamic State. See Islamic state as direct enemy, Iran supports West coalition * 2015 deal looks like it is very likely to be a deal
Terms of the Iran deal
* Reduction of centrifuges * Increased breakout time
The time Iran would need from when it leaves the negotiations to build a weapon breakout time * Transformation of Nuclear Facilities (Fordow&Natanz)
Nuclear facility of Fordow, in centre of country, buried under really high mountains, needs to be transformed into essentially a laboratory. And Natanz becomes a purely civilian facility inspected by IAEA * International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Inspections * If all agreed, sanctions will be lifted!
I. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO SECURITY AND THE “IRAN DEAL” 1) A Brief history of Iran’s Nuclear Program
(Neo)-realism * Anarchy * States * Zero-sum game * Objective threats (military) * Security dilemma
Realism/Bei0realism
Interests: human nature/rationality
Perceptions: matter/ don’t matter
Goal: survival or hegemony
What did they say about the crisis?
Kenneth Waltz, king of neo-realism:
Why would Iran want nuclear weapons? 1. looking at the map: Pakistan and Afghanistan. Not directly stable countries, to the West Iraq. For 8 years war against Iraq. If Iran really feels more comfortable when US presents great military force in Iraq? Makes that part of the world not really safer 2. if you have a president of the US who says three countries form an Axis of Evil (Bush) and procedes to invade one of them. What are Iran and North-Korea to think: MAYBE WE ARE NEXT. No way to deter US other than by having Nuclear Weapons. If you think the US constitutes a threat, what are you going to do nuclear weapons. If YOU were making the decisions for Iran, what would you say? Let’s do everything we can to get nuclear weapons. Would be strange if Iran would NOT want to have nuclear weapons AND I do not think we have to worry if they do: Deterrence has ALWAYS WORKED.
Basic security dilemma. Iran versus US. Of course, the other reasons is the uncertain regional environment.
Iran’s Nuclear program * Fear & Security Dilemma * Uncertain Regional Environment
US & Western Foreign Policy * Double containment at first, then roll-back
Iraq AND Iran?! * US Primacy, the US CAN * Domestic Politics: neoconservatism * Israel Lobby (Walt & Mearsheimer)
This idea that had George Bush and others pursue the idea that you could implement democracy through power, by invading countries, but also for an argument that came quite controversial: the interest of the US was perverted by the Israel Lobby: not the Jewish lobby, but includes some Jewish-American organizations and some other organizations that will always side with what Israel wants.
2) Realism: A Convincing Interpretation of the Escalation a) Principles b) Arguments c) Limits
Realists good at explaining why we got deterrence. Does not make sense from a realist point of view to NOT want to have a nuclear weapon. Is what is happening now, realists do not have a clear explanation for that.
Neoliberal institutionalism HAS! * Anarchy * States * NOT a zero-sum game * Objective threats (military, economic)
Not necessarily economic. * Cooperation through regimes and institutions
Most important aspect in neoliberal institutionalism. All these institutions are able to bring states to cooperation
Liberalism & Iran * Power of sanctions (economic threats work!!) * Domestic politics matter
Because we have a more liberal regime, we can have now a negotiation * International Regimes (thanks to IAEA) * Create cooperative habits * Enforce compliance
Might use Sanctions or military force * Punish defectors
3) Liberalism: a good interpretation of the negotiation. a) Principles b) Arguments c) Limits
Key Points:
What Neorealism and Neoliberalism explain * Neorealism: Security Dilemma * Neoliberalism: Cooperation
What is left to explain * How do we go from one structure to the other?!
This is what constructivists are able to explain!!
4) Conclusion a) What the theories have in common b) What they explain well c) What the theories leave out
1. What does “social construction” mean 2. Identities and Norms are mutually constituted 3. Implications for the security dilemma 4. A constructivist reading of the “Iran Deal”
Money is a piece of paper, but a piece we all decide has some value. We all decide that we can get a meal for 20 euros, although the physical worth is not 20 euros. What does that mean?
Reality is made up of two types of things
Philosopher of Language John Searle: * Brute Facts * Institutional Facts
Brute facts are things we can essentially measure through instruments (atoms, wood, cement, gravity). These are brute facts. The fact that, even if you are not there to see it and a tree falls, the tree still falls, it is actually still there.
An institutional fact is something that exists because we agree it exists.
An institutional fact requires to provide a certain meaning to something you can only recover by talking to somebody else, to use language.
Imagine an alien arrives on our planet today, does not speak our planet. Alien would be able to see: some kind of place composed of sand. Plastic derived from oil, and these humans are continuing to give each other pieces of paper. WHY?
The only method to find out why is to ask a person why. Another example we can take is a football game. You can look at two ways at a football game: 1. Purely as a brute fact: these games tend to happen generally around twice 45 minutes, one ball, generally 11 players on each side (people who run around). Measure the speed they run around with. You can basically calculate and derive a certain number of physical observations. 2. If you want to understand what is football and what are the rules of football, you need to ask somebody. Why is it when the ball goes out from the sides is one thing, but from the field another. We need to understand rules, meaning and agreement that has been made between the different players.
World composed of these two type of facts.
2 very common mistakes that ignorant people do about constructivism: 1. if it is constructive it does not exist. Well no!! you have to use social constructs all the time. The construction of social reality MEANS IT IS a reality. Socially constructed facts are facts, just as brute facts. The way in which they are constituted is through social agreement, the only difference. 2. He does not remember the second thing.
If it is agreed upon, if we all agree, then we can change it. This is one of the main premises of social construction. This thing, what you think is just there in nature, is actually the product of a certain number of agreements. Until not long ago, homosexuality was considered a natural disease. Then scientists have had to show: well, this is a social construct.
Socially constructed means it has a reality, but constructed through society.
Meaning is socially constructed and inter-subjective (Berger & Luckman)
One of the other main points of two of the main thinkers of this new trend.
So, what we attribute and how we recognize a social construct, is the product of…
It means that some things we all agree on (money is money, police has the right to check your ID papers, this is a classroom). There is some social construct in which we can all basically agree, they are stable. But even the most stable social construct can easily be destabilized are bitcoins money?
There is other things we might have different interpretations of. Does Leiden University have a good reputation? Will we be considered a failure if we do not pass the exam of IS? Being a failure is in that sense much less clear of how it is defined.
If we think about this on international level, we got different questions: * Is Russia being a threat to Ukraine, or defending its own interests in Ukraine? * Is China a communist regime?
INTERSUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS the type of meaning you attribute, are shared.
II. CONSTRUCTIVISM 1) What Does “Social Construction” Mean? a) Money as an example of social construct b) Brute Facts and Institutional Facts c) Meaning is Intersubjective
Wendt: one of the most important faces of constructivism.
How is it we go from a world of realism to a world of liberalism? * because the rules that realists and liberalists have considered to be brute facts, are actually social constructs. The security dilemma is a security construct, the structure of the international is a social construct. Anarchy itself, is a social construct. It does not exist independently of the agreement that all states have that it should be anarchy.
The world of realists is anarchic, because the states believe it is so. But it can be otherwise. And the same thing counts for liberals. Why Is there cooperation? Because states believe that there can be cooperation
Identities and Norms are constructed and mutually constituted * Threats are socially constructed * Threats are shaped by and shape identities * Identities, not cost/benefit, rational calculations explain state behaviour
Strong incentives to help other people because you have been helped yourself, OR being a shark because everybody else is. What you are as a person is the product of the environment you are in. this is the main idea behind construcitvists when they say: identities (states) and Norms (general rules that states follow or are supposed to follow) are constructed and mutually constituted.
Wendt: if all states behave like sharks, then the world will be a shark aquarium. If all states behave normal, then the world will look like a Leiden Classroom.
MUTUAL CONSTITUION: societies are composed by individuals, and individuals are the reflection of how a specific society works. It is not that one the one hand you have norms, identities and on the other hand rational calculations, there is a constant stabilization between those two.
If nor rational calculations, what determines state identities * Domestic Politics * Socialization to international norms * But identities also inform norms:
“Anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt)
the atmospheres, norms in your flat, go from the norms of a liberalist to the norms of a realist. The consent idea: identities are informed by norms. Who you are is constituted by how people are behaving around you. Who you are as a state is made by who the states are around you, BUT ALSO BY DOMESTIC POLITICS
External Formation of Identities
SEE SLIDES!!
Wendt: anarchy is what states make of it. And so, he explains that essentially there are different understandings of how the world can be organized: Hobbesian world of realism, Grotian world of liberalist and the Kantian world of Kant (democratic peace). Depends on how states behave for how we go from one world to the other
2) Identities and Norms as Mutually Constituted a) Threats are socially constructed. b) Identities explain state behavior c) Identities are determined by (1) Domestic politics d) Identities are determined by (2) Socialization to International Norms e) Identities also determine International Norms (3)
Implications for the security dilemma:
‘ social structure composed of intersubjective understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about each others’ intentions, and as a result define their interests in self-help terms’ (Wendt)
Even if you hate this course, you are not going to scream that in the middle of the class: not done, not appropriate, not how we should behave. Generally speaking, the idea is that: STATES ARE LIKE PEOPLE, states behave according to social rules. Not because of cost-benefit calculations.
3) Implications for the Security Dilemma a) Security Dilemma is a Social Structure b) Social Structures can change over time c) Undertanding The International System as a Society
Partially domestic politics (who the US are)
Invasion of Iraq * Identity of US * Identity of Iraq * Breach of international norms
Iraq breached international norms of proper state behaviour. You let instructors see if you have nuclear weapons. Iraq was not following the rules of PROPER STATE ETIQUETTE. Misbehaving in an international regime dominated by the US, in which the rule is to comply with the UN and comply with the proper behaviour and non-agression to your neighbour
KEY POINTS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM
Do not say that 9/11 happen, do not say is a social construct. But the MEANING we give to 9/11 depends on who we are
* ideational factors matter * main actors are still states * states are like people, therefore the international system is a society, take much from Headly Buhl, the English school of IR. As in every society: rules, appropriate forms of behaviour. * the international is like a society
HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE IRAN DEAL?!
Iran’s domestic identity * Nationalism * Religious Da’wa * Justify the Status Quo
The pursuit of the nuclear program is not only cost-benefit calculation, also nationalism: long history of being an empire, being a dominant power, in fact Iranian see themselves as more advanced than their neighbouring countries. Iran also, in terms of its identity as a state, saw itself as an alternative to the west and the east. In particular the ideology of the islamists that was at the basis of the Iranian revolution: COULD BE A THIRD WAY between capitalism and communism Islamism.
And so, it sees itself, what constructivists would argue (NOT HIS VIEW): Iran can establish itself as an alternative to western modernization. Another form of being modern and advanced that would not be either communism or capitalism.
Another concept that the revolution brought about:
Da’Wa: expansion of the Islamic faith. The idea behind this, and actually not a very new idea, the idea to export the revolution: other states should benefit from this beautiful event that happened in Teheran: should help other movements around the world to pursue the vision of Islamic modernity.
We do not understand the importance of the nuclear program if we do not understand how this served the Iranian elite to justify the status quo: * Iraq is still threatening us * US is going to invade us * National security danger * Not the time to ask for anything that bothers the regime, because we have a threat coming from abroad creation for a specific way Iran would justify and look at the program.
A dilemma of perceptions * Westphobic vision * Iran as a rogue state * Mutually reinforcing perceptions
US have all the reasons to believe the opposite: can be a threat by holding hostages.
Mutually reinforcing perceptions:
Not necessarily part of the natural interests of the countries, but social constructions. In the sense that we can look at these events and think about them in another way. And so therefore, the possibility of having negotiations right now, linked to the fact that the world is not ruled by fundamental unchangeable rules by anarchy, but rather that anarchy is what states make of it.
If Iran and US decide to use international organizations, they can change their identity into cooperation.
RULES OF THE GAME NOT ESTABLISHED, CAN BE CHANGED.
Explaining the deal * Change the security dilemma * Change of actors identities * Passage from a Hobbesian to a Grotian Structure
4) Understanding The “Iran Deal” through Constructivism a) Explaining Iran’s pursuit of the Nuclear Bomb b) A dilemma of perceptions c) Explaining the Current negotiations
Key points
SEE SLIDES
Assumptions of traditional security studies * Anarchy * States * Rational and influence by structure * Causal relations * Interest formation is key for analysis (how states decide whether to do this or that)
Main differences of Constructivism * State interest derived from identities and norms * Norms constrain state behaviour * Norms and identity are mutually constituted * Anarchy is therefore not a permanent feature of the international system
III. CONCLUSION
Main concepts (constructivism)
- Social construct
- Brute facts and Institutional facts
- Inter-subjective
- State Identity (Constructivism)
- International Norms (Constructivism)
- Socialization
- Social Structure
Werkgroep 1
10 april 2015
Theorieën en concepten
* Difference between Realist and Liberal approaches * Difference between Classical and Rationalist approaches * Difference between problem-solving and critical theory * Core concepts * Security Dilemma * Deterrence * Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)
Structure-agency debate:
Structure door de omgeving bepaald
Agency door actoren
Realism& liberalism focus on anarchy the structure of the political field
Rationalists focus more on agency it’s not about the structure, but states/actors make rational choices with cost-benefits-analysis
Difference between problem-solving theory and critical theory
Problem-solving theories are the positivist theories.
Critical theories are a reaction to the classical theories they see everything as a given, but norms and values and context matter.
Critical theories state that there are no objectives that are measurable, interpretation is important.
Why is this important within the Security Studies?
Problem-solving theories could not explain the transitions from one system to another, critical theories can.
Its about re-defining what a threat is. What a threat is has a lot to do with how you interpret this it’s a social construct!
Security Dilemma
Het internationale systeem wordt vaak als een anarchie beschouwd, waarmee wordt bedoeld dat er geen centraal gezag is boven de staten. Dit kan zorgen voor een security dilemma. Als een staat (Staat A) zich onzeker voelt, kan deze meer militaire defensie binnenhalen ter verdediging. De andere staat (staat B) ziet dit en wordt onzeker, waardoor deze haar defensie sterker maakt. Staat A concludeert hierdoor dat staat B daadwerkelijk een bedreiging is, en vergroot haar defensie zelfs meer. Staat B ziet dit en vergroot haar verdediging. Dit is een eindeloze cirkel waarbij de defensieve acties van een staat worden opgemerkt als een offensieve actie door de ander.
One state’s accumulation of power- even if only for self-defense- can be interpreted as aggression by other states. Because all states pursue their own national interest, international alliances and cooperation are doomed to fail over the long term.
The solution to the security dilemma is the balance of power.
Deterrence
* One of the reasons why a BoP leads to a stable system * Fits into rationalism because the goal is to survive in the international system you need more weapons for deterrence
Polarity: * unipolar * bipolar * multipolar
Offensive versus defensive realism (neo)
Offensive (Mearsheimer) states seek to become a hegemon
Defensive (Walt) states do not seek power-maximization.
Was the Cuba crisis offensive or defensive?
SU already was protected still decided to expand offensive
As a reaction to US missiles in Italy defensive
The use of threats to dissuade an adversary from initiating an undesirable act
In other words, it is a strategy of intimidation
A credible deterrent ‘must be always ready, yet never used’ (Bradie, 1959)
Whether a deterrent is credible depends on: 1) The military balance 2) Signalling and bargaining power 3) Reputations for resolve 4) Interests at stake (Berlin for Americans)
Nuclear deterrence: Growth of nuclear weapons arsenal to assure stable second strike (led to irrational levels of production and targeting by the 1980s)
Cheap talk versus costy signals
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)
Strategy based on theory of deterrence- don’t strike or you will be wiped out
Logic: Because suicide is irrational, no one will start a war
Genesis: West felt military inferior (especially in Europe) and tried to deter conventional attack by threatening nuclear response
For MAD to work second strike capability
How to assure a second strike capability: * number of nuclear weapons * the spread * naval and air forces
Consequences
* need to increase your arsenal and diversify your second strike options (bombers permanently airborne; submarines; hardening of rocket sites) * Defensive system (anti-ballistic missiles) seen as destabilizing and prohibited (ABM Treaty)
Effect of the fog of war:
Rational theories will state that all information is available, otherwise you will not be able to make rational decisions
Thus information is very important within this theory
Lecture 6
April 20th, 2015
International Political Sociology or the “Paris School”
Essentially the project of two important scholars:
Broader than just a specific approach to security studies. A lot of scholars who are part of this broader movement, it’s also a journal.
Sometimes referred in a narrow manner just to his particular approach. To clarify things: we can also refer to this particular approach as the Paris school.
Three schools of critical security studies
* Critical Security Studies: The Welsh or Aberystwyth School (Ken Booth) * Securitization Theory: the Copenhagen School (Ole Waever) * International Political Sociology: the Paris School (Didier Bigo)
Key points from last session
* Securitization is located in the constructivist intellectual tradition * Security problems do not exist “out there”, they are constructed through speech acts * Securitization is generally considered as a process to be avoided
The process of Securitization requires * A securitizing actor * A referent object * An audience * An existential threat that justifies exceptional measures
What is the added value of the Paris school: generation of the discourse after the Cold war on Global Security
What we think security is (to react to threats, to identify problems out there and respond to them) might not be how it works
Constitution of the field of the security fields… etc.
Threat perception during the Cold War * Domestic * Crime, law& Order * International * War and deterrence
Mostly the question of nuclear weapons, security dilemmas that could emerge at that stage.
A clear distinction between what’s inside and outside.
The rules that are happening inside the state are not the same as those between the states. Inside the states we have police, judges, elections to make sure that these laws and orders are in accordance with the population. Outside it’s anarchy: every state for itself, a jungle – Liberals and Realists
The emergence of “global crime” and “global terrorism”
SU not as a threat anymore, but something totally different from the ‘end of history (Fukuyama)’, and world peace.
* Inter-state war less plausible * Liberia, Yugoslavia, Algeria
Small wars (Liberia), Failed states as Somalia, Civil Wars as in Yugoslavia * Failed states, Mafias, War Lords, “New Wars” * 11 September 2001 * Dirty Bombs, Al-Qaeda
Authority of the government does not reach all parts of the territory in failed states.
9/11 not a state as main actor, but a transnational corporation.
What is inside and outside now? It is not so clear anymore, in many ways these new threats (global crime, global mafia) are defining a world where the internal and external suddenly become blurred.
From “state violence” to “transnational” violence * The West endangered by the “rest” * A new common sense: * Failed states and disorder * A new “cold war” * “others instead of SU”
Networks that are proliferating. Networks of traffickers, illegal migrants, terrorists, mafias new threats of the post-Cold War World
The classics and the moderns * Classics * Criminal Police * Traditional Intelligence * Armed Services * The Moderns * Special Squads * Private Security Companies (e.g. Erik Prince- Blackwater) * Think Thanks
If you only have a hammer, you want to paint all the problems of the world as nails. Bigo: this vision of the world as being composed of these transnational things, is not shared by everyone: it’s from the moderns
These new emerging actors which are gaining more and more influence in the arena of security. Intermediary agencies costumsofficers, police with military states (Marechausee) forces that were not clearly defined as the classics were.
This distinction is somehow, says Bigo, something we need to keep in mind when we think about whether the world looks like the Cold War (vision of classics, clear distinction between inside and outside. This is what they know, where they can fit in). But the moderns argue that the world has changed completely.
“Global Insecurity”: A vision of the Moderns * 9/11: a “proof” of the “global insecurity” thesis * The need for a “permanent state of exception” * War on terror: imposing a benign empire
not just a fact, but a spin on the fact. A set of problems that are put forward and privileged above the others.
The response of the neo-conservatives and US created this permanent state of exception: in which the general rules do not apply. For security reasons, you can detain people. States of exception are in democratic countries things that are there for states of exception.
9/11 has created a “permanent state of exception” all over the world: CIA torture programme, somehow acted in the name of the permanent state of exception.
This is ‘necessary’ when we have global insecurity. The vision of the world is that of a benign empire, in which the US is acting as an empire, but a good empire: provides democracy and liberty, guarantees that freedom is diffused in the world. Resonates with a very neo-conservative view of the role of the US. Somehow is the vision that many of the moderns have of both the problem and solution of global insecurity.
“Global Insecurity”:
Resistance from the classics
* Defense of the “homeland” * Fences and territorial wars (Afghanistan, Iraq)
The actual response to 9/11 was a combination of the classics and the moderns happening in a network.
Moderns would argue: invading a country will not work if you work in a network. Classics: this is how we now and how we do.
The struggle of “moderns” vs “classics” * No specific party or political view * Outcome of struggles between transnational networks in different countries * Views independent from political actors.
The traditional military forces around the world share the same vision of the world: classic vision.
If you take another agency, across the world, they also share the same view of the world, other than those from the traditional military forces modern vision.
Somehow autonomous in relation to their politicians. So, the CIA, the AIVD, etc., share a lot of values, share a vision of the world that makes it that they make it that they have more in common with each other than with other types of agencies within their country.
Merging of security fields * Military must operate inside, to collect information * Police must operate outside, to fight crime and restore law and order * Eg. Eurogendfor
Military called not to wage a war, but actually to cooperate and collect information about citizens. NSA has a mandate to collect information about people outside the US, suddenly collects information inside.
Also police is forced to operate outside.
International Collaboration
* Intelligence services, police, justice must have to cooperate and share information * E.g. Europol
Must share the ability to arrest people. Interpol and Europol gain a particular important power: bring together police forces and intelligence from all European intelligence and police: organize the passage and sharence of information.
The Questioning of Sovereignty * Sovereign borders don’t appear as reassuring * Cooperation and alliances are mandatory
The problematic effects of the “Global Insecurity” discourse * Impact on civil liberties and relations between states * Impact of competition between security agencies * Not a complete answer to the changing logics of security.
When the border-guards or police tells you: we need more technology because there is a big threat of mafias: Bigo says this is only a part of the story. Huge other part of the story you’re missing. WHY: Threats do not exist out there. If threats are constructed, then somebody needs to construct them. If we agree with political security studies and securitization studies that threats are constructed either through speech acts, maybe constructing the threat is also about following your own interests.
The question is not: does mafia exist. But: is this the full story. Why do we prioritize them above e.g. car deaths. Why is it that some threats are hyped, and others are not.
We need to understand what is going on inside this particular club of people/
II. Concepts of the “Paris School” 1. Intellectual influences of the Paris School
Based on a few key thinkers. One is Pierre Bourdieu most influential sociologists of the 20th century. He has some extremely important insights.
Field Theory
* Focus on practices * Three concepts of practice * Position-Taking (Discourse) * Dispositions (Habitus) * Positions (In the field)
Divides his theoretical explanation into: why does somebody say something (take a certain position). In order to understand why, we need to understand two things: crucial to understand how us as human, we function.
Habitus: in the word habitus you hear the idea of habit: YOUR SOCIALIZATION. Your education, past-experiences everything that has made what you are, but which is not genetic. Everything that has constituted you as a human being. This is the habitus.
We also need to understand something else: what is the specific configuration in which this specific person is. The idea of identities and norms. Disposition is somehow related to identity. Positions something that we could see as norms.
In each of this fields, each of us with our own habitus and identities, are able to play different games.
* Field as * A field of force
They attract people. If you want to be a musician in the NL, you can call it a milieu, a scene, being around the musicians: the idea that unites all these musicians. They appreciate some and do not appreciate others. Same thing for security agencies: something unites all the military, police, criminal police. They all have in common the management, of something we can call security * A field of struggle
Musicians are in competition to have the best concert, being the most recognized. In the same way these security agencies are in competition to get the funding from the state. * A field of domination (autonomy/heteronomy)
Some fields completely autonomous: only they have the ability to determine what is a good … and what is not (e.g. mathematicians). * Practice = Habitus + Field
Some fields are deeply embedded in other fields. And so, the point about the field of security: essentially not entirely heteronomous: pretty autonomous. In practice, the security field is a bit autonomous: has ability to determine things in itself. We speek of the autonomy of some parts of the intelligence agencies that are going broke, or doing things that politicians are not even aware of.
Michel Foucault
A very important philosopher from the 2nd half of the 20th structure: post-modernism, post-structural thought.
Theory of Power * Relation between power and knowledge * Power not as a “thing” but as a relation
Not a thing that you have, but always a relation. * Not the “why” of power, but the “how” * Sovereign * Disciplinary * Governmental
Foucault: is not a clear set/notion of truth out there. Always related to specific configurations of power. Depending on who speeks/what interests, they will depict the truth in a certain way.
If you are powerful in a society, you are able to impose a certain view. If the power is organized differently in a society, what is truth, is realized different.
The question of prisons and the notion of punishment and discipline. In the handbook there is more explanation.
Power and Truth are intimately related!!
It’s more interesting to discuss HOW power works. Not always in the same way. Foucault argues that there is a clear distinction between disciplinary power in the 19th century (to discipline bodies, to make sure they fit and correspond with a certain plan disciplines it into an idea. Structures and organizes things in a specific way.
Governmental power: Arises with liberalism: you can govern through freedom. Govern people and make sure they do what you want them to do by letting them free and let them do what they want.
RBJ Walker
Rob is one of the key figures of the ‘80s. used to manage a rock band before he became one of the key political philosophers. Considered to be the Mearsheimer or the Kenneth Waltz of Post-structuralism in IR. Inside/Outside International Relations as a Political Theory.
Inside/Outside * The world is not divided in domestic and international * This vision is the product of a simplistic understanding of the modern state
Politics are not divided between an inside and an outside.
2. The transnational field of (ins)security professionals
Didier Bigo
Main Argument of the “paris school”
* “Global Insecurity”: not only the changes in transnational violence * It is also the outcome of practices of the transnational field of (in)security professionals * Who is speaking (Position, Habitus) * What are the bureaucratic routines? * What are the characteristics of the field?
Look at the practices, the everyday life. Look at: who is dominating, how autonomous, how heteronomous is it?
Definition of security * Security is always about sacrifice: * The security of X * Leads to the insecurity of Y * Security and Insecurity are therefore interrelated: (in)security * Similar to ‘security dilemma’ * But not states, actors in a “field”
Security is not the opposite of insecurity. Security and insecurity are the same thing when you guarantee the security of something, you guarantee the insecurity of something else.
4 Characteristics of the field of (in)security professionals * Autonomization * De-differentiation * Transnationalization * Technologization
Autonomization
* “Upper World”/”Underworld” * Reacts to the practices of violence of “underworld” * But defines risk, opportunity& threat * Routines and habits * Inter-agency rivalry * Politicisation of matters of security
The police react to the type of violence that happens in the underworld, but it also defines risks, opportunity and threats of the underworld according to other criteria:
ROUTINES AND HABITS. Bureaucratic routines: the way you know how to do things, is the way you are most likely to use. If they know how to do is to wait on a specific drug dealer on a specific small corner this is the way they will do it, independently of the changing world routine. Police, intelligence etc. have routines.
There is also inter-agency rivalry: this is a classic one of crime-movies. Local police investigating, FBI comes in and says: we will take it over from here. Security agencies are also always in competition with each other. The police against the marechaussee. The FBI against the NY police department etc.
Finally, some things look good for politicians. Fighting terrorism gets a lot of votes. Very rarely you have campaigns about traffic control or car deaths. This is not a statistic that is as important as terrorism and organized crime.
So, the UPPER WORLD, reacts to the threats, but also has its own dynamics.
* Hierarchy of threats * Routine: crime, trials, defense of territory * Excluded: car accidents, domestic violence * “Hyped”: “terrorism”, mafias, illegal migration * Evolution of violence changes positions, but is only partial explanation.
The field of professions of security have their own way of defining what is important and what is not.
De-differentiation * Giddens: Modern state and the separation of army and police * Increased coercion in war * Decreased coercion inside
Merging, but it is not merging because it was not separate in the first place.
Process of separation has happened between on the one hand the army, on the other hand the policy. Before it were just the people with arms. As the modern state has evolved, war has become increasingly violent, whereas the domestic has become less and less violent.
* Division of army and police * A guarantee for democracy (to avoid coups) * Liberalism: * Police to fight crime, not populations * Submission to judicial power * Legitimized by law and order
* Cold war * “Freezing” of internal and external roles * Survival only linked to the “external” * End of the Cold War * Decline of importance of the “Classics” Military, Criminal Justice * Rise of “intermediary agencies”: Border Guards, Gendarmes, KMar, etc. * Topology of the Moebius Ribbon
We are moving away from a metaphor of just ‘inside and outside’, but also from the “Moebius Ribbon” which side is inside and which side is outside. If we want to understand the contemporary typology, we have to think about the Moebius Ribbon.
Transnationalization * Ultra-specialization * Interpol: anarchists in the 1920s * Europeanization * 2nd pillar: Justice and Home Affairs * 3rd pillar: Common Foreign and Sec. Policy * SEE SLIDES
Technologization * Use of the same technologies * Fingerprinting * Biometrics * Databases * Satellite Surveillance
3. Theoretical Implications
* Traditional Security Studies & Mainstream Constructivism: * Rational Choice does not explain international relations * States are not the central actor of IR * Bureaucracies are more independent than expected * Central institutions of the state no longer central * Bureaucratic solidarities no longer national
Think about the NSA and all the national agencies in Europe that are part of it state is not important anymore.
States are not relevant anymore.
2nd because actions are understood as an outcome of their habitus: their bureaucratic routines and their specific context: they do not make rational decisions in the sense of a strict rationality: BOUNDED by their specific habitus and specific location.
* Critical Security Studies
“Security is not “good” * Securitization Theory: Not only speech acts, but also practices * Positions (in the field) * Dispositions (habitus) * Position-taking (discourses, practices and technologies)
The centrality of networks in the EU internal security * Former informal networks: e.g.. TREVI * Networks of administrations * Networks of information technology * Networks of liaison officers
The redefinition of roles and… SEE SLIDES
Customs officers: the expansion of the border
* Traditional focus: border lines * Public health, hygiene, transport * A new focus: border zones * Networks of traffickers * Illegal Migrants * Terrorists * Invest in technology as a way to “compensate” * EUROSUR
This used to be a job for intelligent services and criminal justice police. Border guards are claiming they are the most entitled ones to fight these threats.
Police with military status * Gendarmerie, Mkar, Carabinieri etc. * Re-frame their position as frontlines of “dangerous” policing * Domestically * France: Banlieues * Internationally * Bosnia, Kosovo
New Military Domains
* Re-frame the danger as the “internalization” of the border * Phone tapping, communications, etc. (NSA, MIVD) * Infrastructure, Civilian Protection * Cyber-Security * Practices reinforced by * PMC, PSC & Think Tanks (dual use)
Werkgroep 3
24 april 2015
Verschil tussen Sieve Europe en Fortress Europe
1. Field
Field of transnational professionals komt niet meer overeen met de staat opereren niet meer binnen de bureaucratie van de staat maar zijn een autonoom gebied en opereren met dezelfde agencies in andere landen als field.
4 dimensies:
Field of force: aantrekkingskracht waar mensen plaats in willen nemen.
Field of struggle: actoren binnen het veld ook met elkaar in competitie: ze willen allemaal de meest relevante actor zijn om problemen op te lossen
Field of domination: proberen om op een bepaalde manier zelf regels te kunnen scheppen en belangrijker worden dan andere velden
Transversive field: houdt meer te maken met de autonomie en de manier waarom velden met elkaar verbonden zijn en ook niet autonoom kunnen opereren. (onder globalized insecurity field van BIGO) 2. Ban-Opticon
Is een gevangenis, bedacht door een filosoof, waarin in het midden een bewaker staat en die constant alle gevangenen in de gaten kan houden zonder dat de gevangenen doorhebben dat de bewaker naar hun kijkt.
Ban: een verschil tussen de eigen gemeenschap en de andere die plaatsvindt onderscheid tussen…
Definitie: je eigen gemeenschap moet je het makkelijker voor maken en voor andere gemeenschappen moeilijker, maar in praktijk maak je het voor beide moeilijker.
Komt van het idee van Ban-Opticon: creëert een bepaald gevoel dat iedereen continu onder controle plaats zelfde vindt plaats in de samenleving en wordt door de regering als het ware goedgepraat. In de praktijk kunnen ze daar niet onderscheid tussen maken en moeten ze wel degelijk iedereen controleren.
De overheid probeert het op zo’n manier uit te leggen dat alleen degenen die ongewenst zijn gecontroleerd worden en die controle van die personen leidt tot meer vrede en veiligheid voor ons. 3. Onderscheid tussen boundary/frontier/border
Border: een fysieke lijn tussen twee gebieden en creëert een gevoel van wat er binnen en buiten de grenzen is. Grensaanduiding in territoriale zin.
Boundary: veel meer een beperking dan echt een border. Hoeft niet per se een grens te zijn, kan ook een economische boundary hebben. Boundary kan ook een grens aan gedrag zijn. Meer immaterieel en gevoelsmatig dus.
Frontier: een institutie…?! In praktijk kunnen we zien dat grensbewaking een institutie op zichzelf zijn geworden en mensen controleert ver voordat ze bij de grens zijn en als ze de grens al over zijn. institutie in de zin dat het niet zozeer meer een fysiek weergegeven lijn is maar meer een krachtveld van verschillende actoren die proberen controle uit te oefenen op wat er omheen gebeurt/ 4. Sieve Europe/Fortress Europe
Laat niet zien wat het zou moeten zijn, maar laat zien dat ze het tegenovergestelde willen bereiken. Sieve wil meer toe naar Fortress, Fortress wil juist naar een Sieve Europe.
Bigo beargumenteert dat ze allebei gebaseerd zijn op een mythe: gaan ervanuit dat grenzen uberhaupt te controleren zijn, maar hij stelt dat dat in de praktijk niet het geval is. 5. Dilemma of (il)liberalism
Dilemma of illiberalism is een term die gaat over dat om de liberale staat te kunnen beschermen er vaak illiberale maatregelen worden genomen zoals het minder rekening houden met mensenrechten waardoor ordes in naam van de liberale staat steeds illiberaler worden.
Bigo: desondanks niet zo dat we daardoor een autoritaire staat worden. We zijn nog steeds wel liberale staten, zijn niet als een autoritaire staat dat we alles controleren wat de bevolking doet. Tegelijkertijd onmogelijk om echt de controle uit te oefenen over het grensbeleid als je geen autoritaire staat bent. 6. “Classics” vs. “Moderns”
Het grootste verschil daarin is dat classics graag criminal police, armed force en classic intelligence gebruiken. Moderns zijn van special squads, private security companies en think tanks we hebben gecompliceerdere middelen nodig om de insecurity oplossen. Ook die klassieke actoren moeten zich in het nieuwe veld een nieuwe rol geven. Bijvoorbeeld tweedeling binnen de agenten: niet alleen maar boetes uitschrijven maar ook agenten die gericht zijn op het voorkomen van bepaalde dreigingen meer achter de schermen, hogeropgeleiden. Risico-analyses en patronen afleiden. Vaak lastig racistische en discriminerende implicaties.
Professionals of Politics vs. professionals of (in)Security
“Als we willen blijven profiteren van de voordelen van het vrije verkeer, dan moeten we bereid zijn om de negatieve neveneffecten ervan te bestrijden- van verdringing tot uitbuiting. Dat is in het belang van alle EU-burgers.”- Asscher, min. Van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (PvdA)
Lecture 8
April 29th, 2015
Lecture 8- Terrorism and Political Violence
The border is not a border more of stopping or letting everybody pass, but a border of surveillance as a specific way of governing
Sovereignty and territory should be one and the same is a very contemporary and modern idea. So therefore if we want to think of security we will have tot think about a set of relations..
Homegrown terrorism terrorist acts committed by people born and living in Europe Van Gogh 2004 e.g.
A context of a series of attacks.
The Kouachi’s Bio
* 1980s Childhood in Paris * 1994 (mother, overdose)/1995 Death of parents * 1990s childhood in orphanage in center of France * 2000 back to Paris, living from odd jobs * 2000s Mosque Adda’wa- meeting with Farid Benyettou at the Parc des Buttes Chaumont (radical view!) Fighters to Iraq gang of des Buttes Chaumont * 2005 Chérif arrested but released (Iraq recruitment) * Meets Amedy Coulibaly in Prison * Meets Djamel Beghal (historical figure of a conflict which seems to have no connection, but has a lot: key figures of the Group Islamique Army military clandestine group that opposed the government in Algeria in the ‘90s) group that was connected with the attacks in Paris in ‘95 * Travels to Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen
Syria and Yemen is quite sure now.
Adult years
* 2010 Chérif suspect of helping Smain Ait Ali Belkacem to escape (GIA member).
Freed.
* Amedy condemned to 5 years * 2011 US authorities alert French intelligence of travel in Yemen (training camps) * 2014 French surveillance of brothers ends
Attacks: 2015 * January 7 Kouachi Brothers on Charlie
Several questions * What is terrorism? * Why is terrorism used as a method? * Why do people radicalize? * What can be done to prevent the next attack?
I. Terrorism in Context
Defining Terrorism (1)
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (US Department of State 2001)
Only sub-national groups. The Idea of clandestinity (operating outside of the official institutions) and the key idea is that the objective of a terrorist attack is not the killing of people only, but to influence an audience.
“Political terrorism is the use, or threat of use, f violence by an individual or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety or… SEE SLIDES”
here is a definition which does not take into account only sub-national groups…. STATES can do this as well?!
“Terrorism is a term without any legal significance. It is merely a convenient way of alluding to activities, whether of States or of individuals, widely disapproved..
“Terrorism”
Hard to define, no consensus at the UN about the definition of the term, and no consensus amongst scholars and experts
* A phenomenon that is hard to define * No consensus * No consensus among scholars or practitioners * Difference between definition (1) and (2): “state terrorism”? * USSR 1930s, China 1960s * Argentina, Chile in the 1970s * Debate: “terrorist” or “freedom fighter”? * Irish Republican Army (IRA)? * African National Congress (Nelson Mandela)? Was officially called a terrorist by the South African State, now seen as the equivalent of Gandhi. We can also think about the more recent groups Hamas? PKK (Kurdish)?
Terrorism can be defined through certain methods, but it is very politically contested.
Two definitions of radicalization (something that preceeds terrorism!) 1) Violent Radicalization: emphasis is put on the active pursuit or acceptance of the use of violence to attain the stated goal; 2) Broader sense of radicalization: emphasis is placed on the active pursuit or acceptance of far-reaching changes in society, which may or may not constitute a danger to democracy and may or may not involve the threat of or use of violence to attain the stated goals.
States were first only looking at violent radicalization, now normal radicalization plays also a role.
Until Van Gogh you did not really have questions about radicalization. It was understood that they came from the outside and that we needed to protect the borders. Now becomes clear that they are also coming from the inside.
“Radicalization”
SEE SLIDES
“Political Violence” (Della Porta)
“Any observable interaction in the course of which persons or objects are seized or physicaly damaged in spite of resistance” (Tilly 1978: 176). Poltiical violence then, is the use of physical force to damage political adversary. SEE SLIDES
Della Porta: “Clandestine Political Violence”
* The importance of politics * Terrorism is not a separate phenomenon from protest movements and political mobilization * Focused on the choice to go underground * The focus on violence as a repertoire of contention
SEE SLIDES
Specify of clandestine political violence * NIET GELIJK AAND armed resistance * Targets non-combatance
I. TERORISM IN CONTEXT 1) Terrorism, radicalization or political violence? a) Terrorism b) Radicalisation c) Clandestine Political violence
1880s: Anarchism
* Anarchist movmeents in Russia and Europe * Assassination of Tsar Alexander II (1881)
1960s-1970s: The radical Left * Class struggle and support for decolonization * Rote Armee Fraktion/ Baader-Meinhof Group (Germany) 1970-98 * Brigate Rosse (Italy) 1970-1988 * Weathermen Underground (USA) 1969
This type of terrorism was limited to the 60s and 70s
1980s- now Islamic-inspired movements
AGAIN separated in waves
* First Wave: 1980s Afghan Fighters * Second Wave: 1990s Al Qaeda (organized Al Qaeda with Bin Laden and different leaders at the head of the organization) * Third Wave: London, Madrid, Paris, Copenhagen franchised set of people, lone wolves do not respond to a direct kind of leadership, but instead act following a set of ideologies and principles which are loosely connected to the network itself.
2) The “waves” of terrorism b) The first wave (1880s’): Anarchist Movements c) The second wave (1920’s-1960’s): Decolonisation Movements d) The third wave (1960’s-1970’s): The radical Left and Right e) The fourth wave (1970’s-2010’s): Islamic-inspired Movements
A numerically limited phenomenon
* Very few deaths apart from 9/11 in the West * Madrid ’04: 191 dead * London ’05: 52 dead * A minority of Islamic-related terrorism * Most attacks and most deadly attacks occur outside of the West
Techniques
* 5% suicide bombing * 75% Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) * Suicide bombing 5 times more lethal because of the ability of people who carry the bombs to adapt to the particular situation
Profiles
* Stereotype: young single Muslim man * Many “terrorists” are women * 1/3 of suicide bombers in Iraq * 40% female: LTTE (Hindu, not Muslim) * Profiling gets it wrong: e,g, Muriel
3) Facts & Figures about the phenomenon [from the handbook] a) A numerically limited phenomenon b) Techniques c) Profiles II. “STAGES” models: terrorism as a personal process
‘Why do they hate us?” (George W. Bush) * “They hate our freedoms’: freedom of religion, speech, assemble and disagree * “Drive Israel out of the Middle East, as well as Christian and Jews out of… SLIDE
“New Terrorism” (Walter Laqueur) * Motivations: fanaticism, rage, sadism, paranoia * Terrorists: irrational and incapable of negotiation * Loose, networked structures make it more dangerous
Limits of traditional terrorism studies * Huge but poor academic production * 50 books in the 1990s, 3000 in the 2000s * 20% of publications bring new data * Mainly influenced by policy concerns * Links to governments and counter-terrorism * “Terrorology” SLIDE SLIDE
Critical Terrorism studies is brenching out and provides a critique of traditional terrorism studies: the publications are directly funded by governments etc. most of the work in terrorism studies comes to justify the positions of counterterrorism
1) The War on Terror: “Terrorism” as irrationality a) “Why do they hate us”? b) Promises of the phase models c) Personal characteristics
Phase model of radicalization of Danish Intelligence Agency?!
Phase 1:
Contact between ‘radicalisator’ and a person open to radical ideas
Phase 2:
Gradual change of behaviour- change in religious behaviour, new communication habits (internet)
Phase 3:
Narrowing of social life to include only like-minded inividuals- social bonds with family and former friends are cut off or restricted
Phase 4:
The radical often goes through a process of… SLIDE
Promises of the “phase models” * Prevention * Detection * Surveilling * Prediction * Intervention
Personal Characteristics & Experiences * Consensus that terrorists are not: * Narcissist personalities * Mentally ill * Do not share psychological profile * Personal experiences * Response to traumas * Need for “cognitive closure” (preference for order, stable knowledge)
Problem of the “stages” approaches * “Sample on the dependent variable” * Only successful cases (not the cases with the same variables, but no radicalization) * No control groups * Statistical discrimination * Numbers are not enough representatives (NL: 0.3% of the Muslim population sympathizes with Salafi ideas)
Problem of the “stages” approaches * Deterministic/ No Free Will * Many people change behaviour but are not violent * Many people are outraged but are not violent (ex. Cartoons)
The model says: once you enter the phases you will go through them, linear. Many people might adopt radical ideas, but an extremely tiny minority have the guts to actually commit acts of violence (shown by studies)
Two main issues
* In sum: * no attention to social context * no explanation of individual behaviour * Models have concrete consequences * Ex. Sentence of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev
2) Limits of the model a) Sampling on the dependent variable b) Statistical discrimination c) Deterministic models d) Models have consequences III. ROOT CAUSES models: terrorism as a STRUCTURAL PROBLEM
Terrorism as a war tactic * Dominant framing in the 1970s * Context of War in Vietnam, Algeria, etc. * Military Tactic * Rational “weapon of the weak” * 1980s: Terrorism as Cold War * Leftist movements, Iran hostages * Reagan: rhetoric of war between the Free world and the Soviet
If you do not have an army, you can have a guerrilla: hide in the population, do attacks etc..
Robert Pape * Little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism * Suicide terrorism: strategic Objective * Lebanon, Israel, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Chechnya * Establish or maintain political self-determination * By compelling democratic power to withdraw from territory * Majority of suicide terrorism: US Occupation
The “Root causes” model
Has two dimensions!!
Macro level (Structural element)
Micro level (Individual element)
1) Cold War and Decolonization: “Terrorism” as war a) The dominant framing in the 1970s b) 1980s Terrorism as Cold War c) The “Root Causes Model”
Poor integration * Social integration (work, unemployment) * Racism * Muslims in the West * Discrimination * Unemployment * Political underrepresentation
Poverty
Deprivation:
SLIDESSSS
Globalziation & Communications * Competition on the global market * Wiktorowicz: * Transnational diffusion of ideologies via internet (social media, Skype, www)
Catalysts & Tirgger events (Crenshaw) (root causes, but some need triggers) * Martha Crenshaw 1981 * Root causes * Trigger causes
These root causes must be complemented by other factors
2) Structural Factors a) International Relations b) Poor integration c) Poverty d) Globalization and communications e) Catalysts and Trigger events
Social Identity * In group/out group * Identity Crisis * Cognitive Opening (Wiktorowicz) * Sense of Belonging * Mutual support
Cognitive openings: in which you will be receptive to somebody who will propose to you the belonging to a certain group
Group Processes * Shared demographics (self-selection) * Experiences * Social influence and peer pressure * “Bunch of Friends” (Sageman) * Authority figures justify violence * Internet (anonymous friendships) * Prisons you have the opportunity to meet eachother
Relative deprivation * Ted Gurr: RELATIVE DEPRIVATION. Not people who are very poor, many people are quite educated, do not suffer extreme poverty relative deprivation. Not in absolute terms, but the frustrations you have in relation to your expectations you have. Middle classes who aspire a better status. * Why men Rebel (1970) * Frustration related to expectations
Catalysts & Triggers * Role of recruiters: A top down (Kepel) * E.g. Murielle Degauque * Self-recruitment: bottom up (Sageman, Colsaet) * e.g. 9/11 Hamburg Cell
3) Individual factors a) Social identity b) Social interaction & group processes c) Relative Deprivation d) Catalysts and Trigger events
Limits of the Model * Focuses mostly on groups and individuals: state is overlooked * A-historical model of radicalization * Not “Why men Rebel?” (Gurr) but “Why don’t men rebel more often? (Tilly)
Missing peace of the equation MOBILIZATION
4) Limits of the model a) Focus only on groups and individuals: state is overlooked b) A-historical model c) “Why don't men rebel more often?”
III. MOBILIZATION models: terrorism as escalation
Social movement theory: mobilization 4 main concepts.
Why is it that people who want social change engage in a movement, and how does it work?
You need a Political Opportunity Structure (TRIGGER EVENT, specific moment in which the existing order seems to be moving). We can imagine the end of the Cold War, the opening of the Berlin War, or the change in particular governments. However, a movement does not happen if it does not have a KEY ELEMENT: MOBILIZING STRUCTURES (TILLY HAS THIS, vergeleken met GURR). You need institutions, leaders, recruiters. These two together create the possibility to FRAME a specific event (framing as a specific religious problem) or e.g. framing into protecting human rights. Finally, the final point, is repertoires of action. Every movement and every organization has at its disposal a certain number of ‘way of doing things’. Have a whole set of non-violent repertoires of action. Organizing a sit-in or a petition REPERTOIRES. If you think about repertoires and this model, how does terrorism fit in this picture?
TERRORISM WOULD BE ONE SPECIFIC REPERTOIRE VIOLENT
SOCIAL CHANGE, POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES , FRAMING, REPERTOIRES
Why is SMT relevant for study of T?
* Clandestine political violence & waves of protest * Members in protest organizations * Repertoire on a continuum: marches, boycotts, petitions, occupations, roadblocks, etc. * Objective: de-exceptionalize violence and locate it in broader political context
Donatella Della Porta adds three specific features to this model * Relational approach * Interaction with state authorities (police, etc.) * Interaction with competing organizations * Constructivist * External opportunities are not sole factor * Framing and emotions are key * Emergent conception of violence * Violence develops in action + logic of its own * Reinforces group cohesion, individual commitment and strategies
MECHANISMS: ESCALATION IMPORTANT GOED MODEL !! 1) Political Opportunity Structures and Mobilization a) Social Movement Theory (SMT) b) Why is SMT relevant? c) Della Porta: Relational, Constructivist, Emergent 2) A relational approach: Terrorism as escalation a) Mecanisms: Escalation b) Revisiting Kouachi’s and Coulibaly’s radicalisation
CONCEPTS
Terrorism
Radicalisation
Clandestine Political Violence
Waves of Terrorism
Phase models
Root causes models
Relative deprivation
Mobilization models
Social movement theory
Escalation
