The Sources of Japanese Militarism
Source: J.B. Crowley, “A New Deal for Japan and Asia: One Road to Pearl Harbor” (1970)1

Introduction
While the events of Pearl Harbor (1941) became “a date which will live in infamy” for the Americans, it is doubted by many if the attack was to be expected due to the rigid U.S. policy toward Japan. Crowley argues that by not acting against the 1931 Japanese intervention in Manchuria the U.S. “condemned itself to Pearl Harbor and the Pacific War”. In the perspective of the Vietnam War the aspects of Asian nationalism, the heritage of colonialism, communist ideology & national movement emerged. America’s role in Asia should be reassessed, and a better understanding of Asian racism and nationalism is needed. In this perspective Pearl Harbor will be seen as a by-product of Asian nationalism and as a conflict between an Asian country and the Occidental nationalism. As he assumes for the Japanese Pearl Harbor portrayed “a blow against the efforts of the Occidental powers to strangle Japan”. He quotes Tokutomi Sohō’s comment on the Imperial Declaration of War: “We must show the races of East Asia that order, tranquillity, peace... can be gained only by eradicating... [the Anglo-Saxons] ...and by making Nippon the leader of East Asia.” The essay of Crowley aims to help the better understanding of nationalism, colonialism, communism and imperialism in the Asian setting.

The post-WW1 situation
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Besides this essay, I relayed on the Wikipedia articles of historical events as my source.

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The essay argues that the nationalistic sentiments in Japan are rooted in several post WW1 diplomatic events which showed that Japan was not recognized as equal of the Anglo-Saxon nations. Article 156 of the treaty of Versailles (28 June 1919) transferred German concessions in Shantung(China) to Japan rather than returning sovereign authority to China after WW1. Chinese outrage over this provision led to demonstrations and a cultural movement known as the May Fourth Movement and influenced China not to sign the treaty. China declared the end of its war against Germany in September 1919 and signed a separate treaty with Germany in 1921. The dispute with China was mediated by the United States in 1922 during the Washington Naval Conference, and the sovereignty of Shantung was agreed to be returned to China. Crowley claims that this draw-back from the Versailles Treaty was motivated by the economic interest of Western countries that each wanted a chunk of the market in China and feared Japan claiming special rights to the exploration of this market. He refers to Australian Prime Minister Hughes (1921). Even though the Washington Naval Conference (1921-22) ended with a Treaty and it was considered a diplomatic success to restrain Japanese naval expansion, and Japan pledged to respect Chinese sovereignty and the Open Door Principle, he claims that it did not create “viable sense of community among the sea powers and no sense of collective security”. He supposes that Chinese nationalism and the growing power of the Soviet Union confronted Japan’s economic and security interests. The agrarian recession, the 1923 earthquake, the 1927 bank crisis, the 1929 Great Depression pushed Japan into a major depression by 1931. And while – according to Crowley – itwas evidently due to the failure of political leadership (the Minseitō cabinet), the Japanese features of the political system did not make the criticism possible.

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The early thirties
In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and created the Manchukuo puppet state. She was looking for an international recognition of the state, but failed. After the League of Nations investigated the case and in the Lytton Report (1932)explicitly condemned Japan as an aggressor in the incident, Japan departed from the League of Nations in 1933. In his essay Crowley claims that the invasion of Manchuria was the consequence of Japanese discontent with Versailles (Shantung) and the Washington Naval Treaty. In my view, the invasion was to a large extent due to the economic interests of Japan in Manchuria and due to the Chinese antiJapanese boycott. Also, the 1930 London Naval Conference agreed at a 10:6 ration in heavy cruisers, but as Crowley assumes it had a sever domestic backlash in Japan. He argues that Hamaguchi (who signed the agreement) was assassinated because he “had flaunted the constitution and endangered the empire”. He refers to Article XI of the Meiji Constitution that entrusts the right of supreme command to the general staff. The essay describes the dilemma of the Japanese government that had a domestic pressure to settle the Manchurian crisis by force, while the international community demanded a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Since they had the power, they decided on the intervention. As the agrarian problems were still unsolved, they led to the assassination of the industrialist Takuma and Premier Inukai. The activists wanted to restore the imperial rule inYamato damashii. In essence, as the essay puts it, the assasins “assumed the Western values had anesthized the nation’s leadership.” The new cabinet was “oligarchic” that was responsible only to the throne. Many consider this demise of party cabinets as the beginning of fascism in Japan. But, as Crowley noted, this centralization of the government after the Great Depression was an international trait of the 1930’s – not having a charismatic leader in Japan.

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The crisis of 1936 and the China War
According to Crowley, the whole-nation cabinets of Admiral Saitō and Admiral Okada were opposed to any direct confrontation with China, and sanctioned a successful reflationary program. They failed, however in answering the problems of the agrarian and small business sector. Based again on the conviction that the cabinet was not acting according to “the wishes of the Throne”, some army officers proclaimed a divine mission and slain Saito and General Watanake on February 26. The new Hirota cabinet and the Diet formally terminated the naval-limitations treaties and started an armament expansion. After the 1937 spring elections, Prince Konoe became the premier, but he was more concerned with domestic policy, so he wanted to “freeze the North-China scene as it was.” Officially the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, 1937. Due to Japan’s lack of interest, it was only one month later when China attacked Shanghai when the first major battle of the war was fought. As Crowley describes, the Chinese were driven by fears of further Japanese attacks and growing nationalism. The essay fails to give an account of the fact that after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Japanese army captured Beiping and Tianjin that was considered strategically important for the Chinese government, a “breaking point”. According to Crowley, in 1938 Prince Konoe committed to build a “new China”, wishing to bring about “eternal peace” in Asia, but he could not accomplish this goal. He resigned the premiership in favour of Baron Hiranuma who sought the alliance with Nazi Germany. He was soon succeeded by General Abe, then Admiral Yonai. The war in Europa was excalating, so the Britain’s position in China was weakened. As Yonai was a staunch opponent of alliance with Germany, he had to resign, and Prince Konoe became again the Premier.
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The road to Pearl Harbor
Konoe launched the Imperial Rule Assistance Movement and proclaimed the establishment of Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Shere. In 1940, the foreign minister Matsuoka was successful in his “blitzkrieg diplomacy” supported by excessive military capacities. There was a growing concern in Japan that the U.S. policy aims are to block Japan’s access to SouthAsian resources, to gain naval superiority and to force out Japan from Manchuria and China. Due to the oil embargo and its aim to get in control of the East Indies, the Konoe government decided on war with the U.S. in case these problems ar not settled. Roosevelt denied Konoe’s proposal to summit a conference, and later turned down the Tōjō cabinet’s offer to withdraw from South Indochina in case the embargo ended, so the diplomacy solution of the case became discernible. According to Crowley, this pushed Japan into the position to attack Pearl Harbor, which can be supported by the history of diplomatic negotiations between the states.

Evaluation
It was a hard task to analyse the historical account of events leading to the turn-point of WW2 without knowing much about other interpretations. However, my overall evaluation of the essay is that it aims to show a mirror to the usual U.S. interpretations, providing a detailed explanation from the Japanese point of view. Though it has merits based in the approach, it commits the same mistakes that American historian made previously, by not giving a balanced view of events. While motivations, inspiration of the Japanese are presented, the other perspectives (of China, the U.K. and the U.S.) are overlooked. Moreover, the first level analysis of events may have needed more attention.

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