Running Head: LEADERSHIP

Leadership
David Berwanger
Central Texas College

Leadership

Introduction The U.S. Army has established the largest active-duty armored post at Fort Hood. It was a major hub for troops deploying to or returning from military service in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fort Hood is 100 miles (160 km) south of Dallas-Fort Worth, and near the town of Killeen. Its citizens deal with violence on their overseas missions. They don't ordinarily expect to encounter carnage in their home base, which lies in the pleasant hill-and-lake country of central Texas. Carnage is just what transpired on Nov. 5, 2009. The Fort Hood shooting was believed to be one of the worst mass shootings ever on a military base in the U.S.; a gunman killed 13 people and wounded some three dozen others (Bergen, 2011). The shooter was a 39-year-old military psychiatrist and was taken into custody after being wounded by base police. Officials identified him as Major Nidal Malik Hasan, a devout adherent of Islam. The incident triggered sharp debate on whether the shooter was a deranged individual, a terrorist, or perhaps both and whether authorities had paid sufficient attention to warning signs in his behavior that might have enabled them to prevent the tragedy (McCullough, 2011). This paper explores the leadership attributes displayed by the officials after the massacre happening.

Part 1

Introduction to Crisis Situation On November 5, 2009 at Fort Hood, Texas, U.S. Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Malik Hasan opened fire on members of the military, killing 13 before he was shot and arrested (CNN, 2009). The Fort Hood shooting event started at about 1:30 in the afternoon at the base's Soldier Readiness Processing Center (CNN, 2009). The gunman, who was wearing an Army uniform, shouted "Allahu Akbar!" (An Arabic term that means “God is great") before opening fire. He had two pistols, one of them a semiautomatic; both were nonmilitary issue. The rampage lasted about ten minutes, ending when the gunman was shot four times by police. Hasan, according to his lawyer, was left paralyzed below his arms. Inasmuch as the crime took place on an Army base, and 12 of the 13 killed were soldiers, Hasan was faced with a military trial. He was charged with 13 counts of murder (Facts on File, 2010a). As the judicial process moved forward, additional charges might be brought--taking account, for instance, of the fact that one of the soldiers killed was pregnant. Armed police responded as the shooting continued, and a civilian police officer, Kimberly Munley, shot Hasan four times; Munley was also wounded in the exchange. Hasan was hospitalized off the base, and placed under guard. Hasan reportedly used two pistols, including one semiautomatic pistol. Military personnel on the base were authorized to keep registered personal weapons, although it was not known if Hasan's pistols were registered (Gates, 2011). Service members on the base generally went unarmed. Hasan was born in Arlington, Virginia, and was single. He belonged to a Palestinian immigrant family. Coworkers and family members said he thought the U.S. should not be fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and had unsuccessfully sought a military discharge for several years after being harassed for his ethnicity and Muslim faith (Lieberman, 2011). They said he had been deeply affected by the horrific injuries and mental trauma suffered there by soldiers he treated for combat-related mental problems at Washington, D.C.'s Walter Reed Medical Center, and then at Fort Hood after he was transferred there in July. Hasan is believed to have been motivated by opposition to wars in the Muslim countries of Afghanistan and Iraq (McCullough, 2011).

Part 2

Transformational Leadership in the Crisis Situation There was a clear evidence of transformational leadership by the attributes set out in this course following the event. Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced on November 19 that the Defense Department would investigate a shooting at Fort Hood, Texas, in early November that had killed 13 people, in order to find whether military policies caused personnel to miss warning signs that might have foreshadowed the incident (Facts on File, 2010b). He also ordered a separate investigation into the military's medical system. Also November 19, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee opened hearings on the shooting, beginning the first such inquiry by Congress (Gates, 2011). Leading transformational leadership roles were played by the Defense Secretary Robert Gates, President Barrack Obama, Senator Joseph Lieberman, and Military Officials. Gates said that the Defense Department would seek to find whether there are internal weaknesses or procedural shortcomings in the department that could make us vulnerable in the future (Bergen, 2011). Authorities before the attack had reportedly failed to pass along warnings about the alleged shooter, Major Nidal Malik Hasan, who had been charged by military prosecutors with 13 counts of murder. Hasan, a Muslim, had reportedly become increasingly and vocally opposed to U.S. military operations against his coreligionists in Iraq and Afghanistan, and had been in contact with Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical Muslim cleric in Yemen who had links to the international terrorist network Al Qaeda (Gates, 2011). President Barrack Obama on November 10, 2009 memorialized 13 people who had been killed a week earlier at Fort Hood, Texas, in a shooting massacre on Fort Hood military base in the U.S.. He stated that government would endure through the life of nation. Meanwhile, investigations continued into the motives shooter, Major Nidal Malik Hasan (an Army psychiatrist), who had been shot by police and was hospitalized under guard (Clark, 2010). Military prosecutors on November 12, 2009 charged Hasan with 13 counts of premeditated murder. President Barrack Obama in a televised address called the shootings “a horrific outburst of violence,” and promised “to get answers to every single question about this horrible incident” (Bergen, 2011, p. 110). He added: “It is difficult enough when we lose these men and women in battles overseas. It is horrifying that they should come under fire at an Army base on American soil” (Bergen, 2011, p. 112). Obama said that neither this country, nor the values that America are founded upon, could exist without men and women like the 13 Americans who were killed in the massacre. He praised the military's diversity, which he said included “man and woman; white, black and brown; of all faiths and all stations - all Americans, serving together to protect our people, while giving others half a world away the chance to lead a better life” (McCullough, 2011, p. 96-97). In addition, Senator John Cornyn of Texas said that Nidal Hasan was driven by a fanatical religious ideology and that the 13 deaths that occurred during the shooting were probably the result of terrorism (Lieberman, 2011). Council on American-Islamic Relations and the Muslim Public Affairs Council released notes for condemning the attack.

Part 3 Trade-offs between liberty and security, and the effectiveness of the tougher anticrime policies that politicians have favored in recent years, remain contentious issues. Following the crisis situation, the leader’s responce quickly and effectively suggesting that change is crucial for emergency response systems. Colonel James Pohl, the investigating officer presiding over a military hearing for Major Nidal Hasan for killing 13 people and wounding 32 in a November 2009 shooting rampage at Fort Hood, Texas, had recommended that Hasan face a Court-Martial and that prosecutors should seek the death penalty (Facts on File, 2010a). The hearing, known as an Article 32, was roughly equivalent to a civilian Grand Jury hearing, and was meant to judge whether there was enough evidence to try Hasan, and whether the death penalty should be sought (Facts on File, 2010b). A commanding general would make the final decision on a trial. The report, which was issued by a panel headed by Admiral Vern Clark (former chief of naval operations) and Togo West (former Army Secretary). They said that the military's systems were still focused on detecting Cold War-era external infiltrators, such as foreign spies, rather than protecting soldiers from individuals who had independently become radicalized (Bergen, 2011). It also recommended that the military take steps to encourage information-sharing between civilian law enforcement agencies and the military, as well as within the military bureaucracy. Those steps would include changing regulations governing information recorded in service members' files, and whether commanders could access such information (Gates, 2011). Additionally, it said the military should develop new procedures to help gauge whether a service member was a threat. Defense Secretary Robert Gates formed a committee to review the case in 45 days. The committee was led by former Army Secretary Togo West and Admiral Vern Clark, the former Chief of Naval Operations. Gates also ordered an extended, four-to-six-month review of possible “systematic institutional shortcomings” in the military's handling of medical issues (Clark, 2010). It would examine treatment of victims of mass-casualty attacks, as well as health care providers' performance and stress in the armed services. The review said the Army should penalize “several officers” who had not properly supervised Hasan and had recommended him for promotion, despite uneven performance in treating patients and signs that he had developed sympathy with Islamist militants (Facts on File, 2010b). However, it did not name the officers or say how many should be penalized. Some analysts attribute the rise in radicalization in part to the Internet, which makes it easier for radical Muslims to spread their message and connect with those who might be receptive to their views. For instance, they point out that Hasan was found to have been in contact with Yemen-based radical Muslim cleric Anwar al-Awlaki through e-mail (CNN, 2009). Difo suggested that the modern media provides them with the means by which to make the jihadist message slick, appealing, and easily accessible to millions. The Associated Press (AP) on November 5, 2009 reported that the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) had become aware of Hasan months earlier after they found Internet postings under the screen name "Nidal Hasan" expressing admiration for suicide bombers (Lieberman, 2011). However, Hasan had not been definitively linked to the screen name. Emergency response adaptation to the changing circumstances was evident in the form of involvement displayed by the President Barrack Obama in the situation (Clark, 2010). He made a review of actions taken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) before the shooting and recommended that the agency improve its systems for reviewing threats and sharing information, and improves training for members of its Joint Terrorism Task Forces (CNN, 2009). The vision of President Obama was to address the threat of homegrown terrorism that is real, which should not be exaggerated (Gates, 2011). Senator Joseph Lieberman (I, Connecticut), the chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, at the November 19 hearing said he thought the shooting had been "a terrorist attack”. He focused on investigating whether that attack could have been prevented, whether the federal agencies and employees involved missed signals or failed to connect the dots. He pledged: “The inquiry would be conducted in a bipartisan and nonpartisan way,”; he also stated that he would “work with the administration and proceed cooperatively as opposed to going into an attack mode” (Bergen, 2011, p. 115). Five terrorism experts and former government officials - including Frances Fragos Townsend, Homeland Security Adviser under former President George W. Bush - testified at the hearing. Several of them said "political correctness" had caused officials to overlook evidence of the danger posed by Hasan, because he was a Muslim (Lieberman, 2011). The Obama administration had refused to allow the Homeland Security Committee to compel current government officials to testify, although it granted the committee access to other evidence (Gates, 2011). Republican legislators had pressed Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (California) to open a full investigation into the shooting (McCullough, 2011). Democrats largely indicated that they would abide by the White House's request to allow the military investigations to run their course, although Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D, Vermont) called on President Barrack Obama to give his panel the results of an initial investigation (Bergen, 2011).

Part 4 Multiple integrated action approach was taken by the government in order to retain the trust for the institutions, leaders, and processes involved. This section presents an analysis of actions that were taken by the leaders and departments in response to the Massacre at Fort Hood. An unnamed senior defense official said intelligence and law-enforcement agencies had not warned the Defense Department or the Army about the e-mails between Hasan and Awlaki (CNN, 2009). This resulted in formation of lack of trust between institutions. A Defense Department review of a November 2009 shooting at Fort Hood, Texas, released in its unclassified form on January 15, 2010. Defense Department stated that the military's systems for monitoring personnel who might pose a danger to other service members were inadequate (Gates, 2011). The Defense Department on August 20, 2010 had released a final report on the Fort Hood shooting. The report called for the military to be more aware of signs of potential workplace violence, and for supervisors to be able to access their subordinates' personnel records (Gates, 2010). It also said emergency response services at military bases should be expanded. Senators Joseph Lieberman (I, Connecticut) and Susan Collins (R, Maine), respectively the chairman and ranking member of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, on April 19, 2010 issued subpoenas to the Defense and Justice Departments seeking access to Hasan's personnel file, performance evaluation and a confidential section of a January report on the shooting (McCullough, 2011). They said the documents were necessary in order to determine if there were any warning signs of the shooting, but Defense Secretary Robert Gates April 16, in response to an earlier, similar request, had said turning them over might jeopardize Hasan's prosecution. The Defense Department on April 27 partially reversed itself, saying it would deliver the personnel file, but the Homeland Security Committee said that was insufficient (Bergen, 2011). This shows some form of lack of trust between departments of Government affairs and Homeland Security. In order to rebuild the trust between defense institutions, Army had chosen General Carter Ham, the commander of U.S. Army Europe, to lead a part of the investigation that would examine whether personnel at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, in Washington, D.C., had improperly failed to pass along evidence during the six years Hasan had worked there, prior to his transfer to Fort Hood in July (Facts on File, 2010b).

Conclusion Those who insist that the U.S. is not safer from terrorism say that, though Al Qaeda may not be able to carry out an attack with such massive numbers of casualties, it has shown several times in the years since 2001 that it can still implement deadly attacks. The Massacre of fort Hood is also linked to allies of Al-Qaeda who urged the killing of 13 American soldiers by Major Nidal Malik Hasan. In that crucial situation, transformation leadership roles were displayed by the Defense Secretary Robert Gates, President Barrack Obama, Senator Joseph Lieberman, and Military Officials. President Obama’s speech to the nation enabled them to maintain the trust of American citizens in American government and security institutions. Military officials actively conducted a large-scale investigation to find the reasons of actions that led to happening of Fort Hood Killings on November 5, 2009.

References

Bergen, P. (2011), Assessing the Terrorist Threat. 1st edition. DIANE Publishing
Clark, V. (2010), Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood. 1st edition. DIANE Publishing
CNN. (2009), Officials: Fort Hood shootings suspect alive; 12 dead. Retrieved on December 2, 2011 from http://articles.cnn.com/2009-11-05/us/texas.fort.hood.shootings_1_gen-robert-cone-nidal-malik-hasan-fort-hood?_s=PM:US
Facts on File. (2010a), Terrorism: U.S. Sued Over Targeting of Citizen; Other Development. Facts On File World News Digest 2 Sept. 2010: Facts On File News Services Retrieved on December 2, 2011 from http://www.2facts.com/article/2010526950
Facts on File. (2010b), Armed Forces: Ft. Hood Shooting Report Faults Monitoring." Facts On File World News Digest 28 Jan. 2010: Facts On File News Services. Retrieved on December 2, 2011 from http://www.2facts.com/article/2010511560
Gates, R. (2011), Final Recommendations of the Fort Hood Follow-on Review: Volume 2. DIANE Publishing
Lieberman, J. (2011), Ticking Time Bomb: Counter-Terrorism Lessons from the U. S. Government's Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack. 1st edition. DIANE Publishing
McCullough, K. (2011), No He Can't: How Barrack Obama Is Dismantling Hope and Change. 1st edition. Thomas Nelson Inc.