Organizational Dynamics, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 128–142, 2004 ß 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. www.organizational-dynamics.com

ISSN 0090-2616/$ – see frontmatter doi:10.1016/j.orgdyn.2004.01.002

Lessons in Organizational Ethics from the Columbia Disaster:

Can a Culture be Lethal?
RICHARD O. MASON
‘‘Houston We Have a Problem.’’ A Message Never Sent or Received. On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia, on its way to its landing site in Florida, blew apart in the skies of East Texas. Its seven-member crew perished. The $2 billion ship was lost; some destruction occurred on the ground, and considerable cost was incurred to recover debris scattered over several states. The disaster sounded an eerie echo from the past. Seventeen years earlier the shuttle Challenger exploded 73 seconds into flight due to an O-ring malfunction. All seven crewmembers were also lost. And, about 11 years before that, the cabin of Apollo 1 burst into flames on its pad. Three crewmembers were killed. Within a day, as NASA policy requires, an internal investigation team of six ex officio members was formed. Harold Gehman Jr., a retired admiral who was NATO supreme allied commander in Europe, was appointed to chair it. A veteran of several military investigations, including the bombing of the U.S. Cole, Gehman, in an initially unpopular move, broadened the inquiry to include the agency’s organization, history and culture. Sean O’Keefe, NASA’s administrator, was incensed that the investigation would reach beyond the confines of the shuttle project alone, and his relations with Gehman became strained and stiff. Based on his experience, however, Gehman persisted. An Accident Investigation Board (hereafter referred to as the Board) was appointed with six additional members who represented a broader set of relevant constituencies. In addition to the chair, the 13 member Board