OUTLINE

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION A. Introductory Statement B. Statement of the Problem C. Significance of the Study D. Theoretical Framework E. Scope and Limitation F. Review of Related Literature

CHAPTER TWO: JOHN RAWLS PHILOSOPHY A. Biography of John Rawls

CHAPTER THREE: PHILIPPINE TAXATION A. Concept of Taxation B. Nature of Taxation and Its purpose C. Concept of Income Taxation D. Purpose of Taxation E. Current Uses of Taxation

CHAPTER FOUR: SOCIAL JUSTICE IN TAXATION A. Social Justice B. Principles of Justice C. Well Ordered Society D. Original Position E. Veil of Ignorance F. Civil Disobedience

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

A. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

The works of John Rawls was basically centered on justice as depicted on his work “Theory of Justice” and “Political Liberalism.

John Rawls is considered to be one of the most influential philosophers during his time as he specialized in the concept of justice and fairness as a tool for attaining social justice in the society.

His works received various criticisms since it may be viewed as unrealistic but though it may be criticized, his works are one of the influential and most bought book and already translated in various language to be used as curriculum in philosophy classes.

Rawls differentiate the concept of justice and fairness as he tried to show that the idea of justice is fairness and in justice we can be assured that equalities can be achieved in a society which inequalities are widespread.

He stated that equality can be attained through protection from the State and thus injustice can be eliminated even the discrepancies in terms of sex, race or religion.

B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

In this work, the researcher centered on the analysis of Philippine Taxation and how the Rawlsian Philosophy has influenced the legislators in crafting tax laws and how it can be used in interpreting these tax laws.

C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY:

This study aims to answer the main problem: “In what way do John Rawls, ‘Theory of Justice” applicable in analyzing Philippine Taxation?”

A. What is Philippine Taxation? B. What is the nature of tax? C. What its purpose? D. What is Income taxation? E. What is the concept of Justice according to John Rawls?
E.1. What is Civil Disobedience?
E.2. What is Veil Ignorance?
F. How social justice of Rawls reflects in Philippine taxation?
G. How civil disobedience helps criticizing taxation assessment?
H. What is the importance of using veil of ignorance in attaining justice in taxation?

D. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The researcher wanted to focus the study using the “Theory of Justice” of John Rawls in interpreting some Sections in Tax Laws and how can social justice be attained through the use of the Legal and Rawlsian Philosophy.

E. SCOPE AND LIMITATION

The researcher will focus on the primary works of John Rawls and will correlate it with Philippine Taxation laws and by also giving some examples and jurisprudential situations for better understanding.

F. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

The works of John Rawls revolves on the concept of Justice and how it affects our society. It shows that our society treats everybody equally. He has developed a particular conception of justice which has two principles to support it. Throughout he considers justice as a virtue of social institutions1. These social institutions have restrictions on how they run the particular position in office. Conception of justice has two principles: first each person participating in practice or affected by it has an equal right to the most extensive liberty for all. Second inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone’s advantage and provided the positions and offices with which they are connected to are open for all.

CHAPTER TWO: JOHN RAWLS PHILOSOPHY

A. BIOGRAPHY

John Bordley Rawls was born on February 21, 1921 in Baltimmore, Maryland, United States of America. He is one of the prominent American Philosopher during his time. Until his death in 2003 he is considered as one of the leading political philosophers in the twentieth century. He was born to Lee Rawls, his father, and Anna Bell Stump, his mother. He was the second son among the five sons of the couple. He first studied at an Episcopalian preparatory school, and he was born to an upper-class family. And he graduated in Kent, Connecticut on the year 1939. He completed his BA in 1943 at Princeton University and he joined the US army where he served as an infantryman and was assigned to different countries in the Pacific like Japan and New Guinea.2

He studied Doctorate in Princeton and during his school year, he focused constructive philosophy rather than metaphysical analysis of moral and graduated on 1950. In the year before he finished his doctoral studies he married Margaret Fox and they had four kids. He then taught as a professor at Princeton until 1952, he became a full bright fellowship at Oxford University and returned to become an assistant professor. Then he went to Harvard to become a professor and stayed there to finish his books. He died on the year 2003.

He is famous for his work, “Theory of Justice”, which focused on the egalitarian liberalism. Other works of his includes “The Law of Peoples”, “Justice as Fairness and “Political Liberalism” which focused on the equality amongst men and justice as fairness.

CHAPTER THREE: PHILIPPINE TAXATION

A. Definition and Concept of Taxation

Taxation according to Cooley is a mode of raising revenue for public purposes.

Taxes, on the other hand, are enforced proportional contribution from persons and property, levied by the state by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of the government and for all its public needs.

Moreover, Taxes is considered to be one of the inherent powers of the state by which the sovereign, through its law-making body raises income to meet the demand in expenditure of the government and by exacting contribution amongst some people who are privilege in life.

B. Nature to Taxation

The nature of power to tax is inherent and legislative.

B.1 Inherent Attribute of Sovereignty

In the case of Pepsi- Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines v. Municipality of Tanuan, Leyte, G.R. No. L-31156, February 27, 1976, its states that: “Taxation is inherent in character because its exercise is guaranteed by the mere existence of the state. It could be exercised even in the absence of a constitutional grant. The power to tax proceeds upon the theory that the existence of a government is a necessity and this power is an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty, belonging as a matter of right to every independent state or government. “ Thus, it means to say that taxation does not need for Constitution because it is incident in a sovereign. No sovereign can exist in the absence of taxes, so, the government will mandate its people to contribute part of their income for the benefit of the government and general welfare.

B.2 Legislative in Character

It is legislative in nature since it involves promulgation of laws. It is the Legislature which determines the coverage, object, nature, extent and situs of the tax to be imposed. (University of Santo Tomas: 2011 Golden Notes)

However, there is an exception where in Constitution provides otherwise (Article VI, Sec.28 (2); Art. X, Sec.5). C. Principles of A sound Tax System

The following are:

1. Fiscal Adequacy is otherwise known as the Lifeblood doctrine wherein the government needs taxes to raise revenues. 2. Theoretical Justice looks on the ability of the taxpayer to pay which must be in consonance with law. The State must also uphold the “Progressive system of Taxation under Art. VI, Section 28 (1) of the Constitution so that taxes are uniformly distributed. 3. Administrative Feasibility, in the Report of the Tax Commission of the Philippines, February 1939, Vol. 1 pp.23-31, it states that taxes must be in a plain language capable of understanding and not to burden the taxpayer as to the manner, time and enforcement.

D. Purpose of Taxation

The important purpose of taxation is to raise revenue funds or property to enable the State to promote the general welfare and protection of the people.

It is also for Non- Revenue purposes which are the following: 1) Promotion of general welfare- taxation may be used as an implement of police power to promote to promote the general welfare of the people.

2) Regulation of activities/ industries

3) Reduction of Social inequality- a progressive system of taxation prevents the undue concentration of wealth in the hands of few individuals. Progressivity is based on the principle that those who are able to pay more should shoulder the bigger portion of the tax burden.

4) Encourage economic growth- the grant of incentives or exemptions encourage investment thereby stimulating economic activity.

5) Protectionism- in case of foreign importations, protective tariffs and customs are imposed to protect local industries. (University of Santo Tomas: 2011 Golden Notes)

E. Current Uses of Taxation

1) Uses of taxation besides revenue.

Taxation may be used to serve other purposes besides revenue. “In wartime, taxes may be increased on such goods as radios and automobiles in order to stabilize prices and stimulate greater production of war materials. Taxes on imports may be increased to favor domestic production, or decreased in order to encourage foreign trade. Some economists have urged that in’ a period of boom, taxes should be increased to curb spending power and halt inflation, while in period of slump taxes should be lowered in order to expand business and ward off depression.”3

2) Taxation a spur to progress.

Taxation may be a spur to progress if handled wisely, as pointed out by the Joint Legislative-Executive Tax Commission as follows:4

Within the last decade or so, the Philippine economy has undergone a significant change. From a traditional, primary economy, it has advanced into a stage where the signs of industrial progress are visible. Income, employment and production have generally risen, and standards of living have improved. The awakening of the people and the government to the realization that only a balanced agro-industrial development can solve our pressing economic problems has become a national phenomenon.

In perspective, we are comparatively more fortunate than other developing countries. We have most, if not all, of the pre-conditions for a vigorous take-off a fairly literate population and intellectual elite, a rising managerial and entrepreneurial class, bountiful natural resources, a potent domestic market, expanding modern banking and other financial institutions, and a modest network of transport and communications.

Above all, we now have a people who no longer supinely believe that poverty is their fate; who are becoming increasingly aware that mass poverty can be abolished; and who now feel strongly that they are entitled to economic relief during their lifetime.

The task before us then is to harness all these latent resources in a coordinated effort to generate the thrust that would launch us toward modernization of the economy in as rapid a manner as possible.

In this crucial undertaking, both the government and the private sector are principal partners. The contribution of each is indispensable to success.

And in both fields―government and private―the instrument of taxation plays a decisive role. Handled wisely, taxation can be a spur to progress; handled carelessly, it can be a drag to progress.

To achieve coherence with the national goal of self-sufficiency and proper economic growth, the tax system must be fitted with the government’s long-range socio-economic programs.

An efficient tax system for instance, can provide the funds for the building of “social overhead capital” ― facilities like transport, communication, power, irrigation, educational and technological schools ― these basic requirements of growth which private capital cannot be expected to provide.

In a positive and active ‘sense, it can mobilize capital to be poured into capital-deficient fields of business and industry, strengthen anemic but necessary business and industrial enterprises through loans or tax incentives and, by means of an updated tariff system, protect infant industries against foreign competition and assure the consumers of a continuous flow of essential goods available at prices within their reach.

By inducing a more equitable distribution of income, taxation can help develop a potential market through an increase in the people purchasing power. Without an adequate domestic market which will absorb the goods to be produced by our industries, the incentive of profit, which is the motivating factor in a free enterprise economy, would be missing.

Within the broad ‘framework of overall economic goals, the tax system can be used to strengthen the political set-up by granting local governments wider taxing powers in consonance with the trend toward greater local autonomy. The strengthening of the financial framework of local governments would enable them to contribute more substantially to the national development effort.

3) Role of taxation in economic growth.

The role of taxation in the economic growth of the Philippines lies in its determinant influence, particularly upon the raising of capital. As pointed out by the Joint Legislative-Executive Tax Commission:5

The dominant problem of our times is that of economic growth. To us, it is not just a matter of necessity; it is a matter of grave urgency. The “revolution of rising expectations” has caught up with us and is bringing to bear upon our government and national, leadership increasing pressures to lift as rapidly as possible the burden of economic poverty from our masses.

Underlying the problem of economic development is the proper and equitable distribution of economic goods. In most developing countries, including the Philippines, the heavy concentration of wealth among a few seems to be a strong hindrance instead of a stimulant to economic development.

4) Use of taxation for ulterior purpose.

Taxation may be used to promote fair competitive conditions and to equalize economic advantages. As explained in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company et al. v. Alice Lee Grosjean,7 as follows:

Our decision need not, however, rest on conceptions of subject, measure and rate of tax. Much broader considerations touching the state’s internal policy of police sustain the exaction. The tax is laid solely upon intrastate commerce. In the exercise of its police power the state may forbid, as inimical to the public welfare, the prosecution of a particular type of business, or regulate a business in such manner as to abate evils deemed to arise from its pursuit. Whatever a state may forbid or regulate it may permit upon condition that a fee be paid in return for the privilege, and such a fee may be exacted to discourage the prosecution of a business or to adjust competitive or economic inequalities. Taxation may be made the implement of the exercise of the state’s police power; and proper and reasonable discrimination between classes to promote fair competitive conditions and to equalize economic advantages is therefore lawful.

If, in the interest of the people of the state, the legislature deemed it necessary either to mitigate evils of competition as between single stores and chains or to neutralize disadvantages of small chains in their competition with larger ones, or to discourage merchandising within the state by chains grown so large as to become a menace to the general welfare, it was at liberty to regulate the matter directly or to resort to the type of taxation evidenced by the Act of 1934 as a means of regulation. The appellants, by incorporating in some other state, or by spreading their business and activities over other states; cannot set at naught the public policy of Louisiana. The claim is, essentially, that even if local evils flow from the appellant’s methods the state cannot control those evils because its power is limited to conditions created by the ‘members of the chain found within the state. The conclusion is that the state must treat these stores as if they were something different from what they really are, since to do otherwise would be to reach beyond the borders of Louisiana for the measure of the tax. The argument answers itself. The policy of Louisiana is free to adopt with respect to the business activities for her own citizens she may apply to the citizens of other states who conduct the same business within her borders, and this respective of whether the evils requiring regulation arise solely from operations in Louisiana or are in part the result of extra-state transactions. It is not a denial of due process to adjust such license taxes as are here involved to meet the local evil resulting from business practices and superior economic power even though those advantages and that power are largely due to the fact that the taxpayer does business not only in Louisiana but in other states.

5) Taxation to implement police power.

Taxation may be made to implement the state’s police power, as decided in the case just studied. (Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company V. Alice Lee Grosjean, supra) and in Lutz v. Araneta,8 wherein the Supreme Court of the Philippines held:

This case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental to test the legality of taxes imposed by Commonwealth Act No. 467, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act. Promulgated in .1940, the law in question opens (sec. 1) with a declaration of emergency, due to the threat to our industry by the imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as provided in the Tydings-McDuffie Act, and the “eventual loss of its preferential position in the United States market”; wherefore, the national policy was expressed “to obtain a readjustment of the benefits derived from the sugar industry by the component elements thereof” and “to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in the U. S. market and the imposition of the export taxes.”

In section 2, Com. Act 467 provides for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar manufactured; while section 3 levies on owners or person in control of lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane and ceded to others for a consideration, on lease or otherwise.

“A tax equivalent to the difference between the money value of the rental or consideration and the amount representing 12 per centum of the assessed value of such land."

6) Taxation as integral part of regulation.

The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 of the United States provides, among others, that “To obtain revenue for extraordinary expenses incurred by reason of the national economic emergency, there shall be levied processing taxes as hereinafter provided.” The levy is a mere incident to regulate agricultural production, as held in United States V. Butler (1935),9 as follows:

In this case we must determine whether certain provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 1933, conflict with the federal Constitution. Title I of the statute is captioned “Agricultural Adjustment.” Section 1 recites that an economic emergency has arisen, due to disparity between the prices of agricultural and other commodities, with consequent destruction of farmer's purchasing power and breakdown in orderly exchange, which in turn, have affected trans- actions in agricultural commodities with a national public interest and burdened and obstructed the normal currents of commerce, calling for the enactment of legislation.

Section 2 declares it to be policy of Congress:

“To establish and maintain such balance between the production and consumption of agricultural commodities, and such marketing conditions therefore as will re-establish prices to farmers at a level that will give agricultural commodities a purchasing power with respect to articles that farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing power of agricultural commodities in the base period.”

The base period, in the case of cotton, and all other commodities except tobacco, is designated as that between August, 1909, and July, 1914.

The further policies announced are an approach to the desired equality by gradual correction of present inequalities “at as rapid a rate as is deemed feasible in view of the current consumptive demand in domestic and foreign markets,” and the protection of consumers’ interest by readjusting farm production at such level as will not increase the percentage of the consumer’s retail expenditures for agricultural commodities or products derived therefrom, which is returned to the farmer, above the percentage returned to him in the base period.

Section 8 provides, amongst other things, that “in order to effectuate the declared policy,” the Secretary of Agriculture shall have power “(1) To provide for reduction in the acreage or reduction for market, or both, of any basic agricultural commodity, through agreements with "producers or by other voluntary methods, and, to provide for rental or benefit payments in connection therewith or upon that part of the production of any basic agricultural commodity required for domestic consumption, in such amounts as the Secretary deems fair and reasonable, to be paid out of any moneys available for such payments.

“(2) To enter into marketing agreements with processors, associations of producers, and others engaged in the handling, in the current of interstate or foreign commerce of any agricultural commodity or product thereof, after due notice and opportunity for hearing to interested parties.

“(3) To issue licenses permitting processors, associations of producers and others to engage in the handling, in the current of interstate or foreign commerce, of any agricultural commodity or product thereof, or any competing commodity or product thereof.”

It will be observed that the Secretary is not required, but is permitted, if, in his uncontrolled judgment, the policy of the act will so be promoted, to make agreements with individual farmers for a reduction of acreage or production upon such terms as he may think fair and reasonable.

7) Taxation may carry out another constitutional power.

The power of the taxation may be used to carry into operation another constitutional power but only to effectuate a legitimate end within the scope of the power aided. In the Butler case, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court said:10

Second. The Government asserts that even if the respondents may question the propriety of the appropriation embodied in the statute their attack must fail because Article 1, Sec. 8 of the Constitution authorizes the contemplated expenditure of the funds raised by the tax. This contention presents the great and the controlling question in the case…

There should be no misunderstanding as to the function of this court in such a case. It is ‘sometimes said that the court assumes a power to overrule or control the action of the people’s representatives. This is a misconception. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land ordained and established by the people. All legislations must conform to the principles it lays down. When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the Government has only one duty - to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former. All the court does, or can do, is to announce its considered judgment upon the question. The only power it has, if such it may be called, is the power of judgment. This court neither approves nor condemns any legislative policy. Its delicate and difficult office is to ascertain and declare whether the legislation is in accordance with or in contravention of, the provisions of the Constitution; and, having done that, its duty ends.

The question is not what power the federal Government ought to have but what powers in fact have been given by the people. It hardly seems necessary to reiterate that ours is a dual form of government; that in every state there are two governments―the state and the United States. Each State has all governmental powers save such as the people, by their Constitution, have conferred upon the United States, denied to the States, or reserved to themselves. The federal union is a government of delegated powers. It has only such as are expressly conferred upon it and such as are reasonably to be implied from those granted. In this respect we differ radically from nations where all legislative power, without restriction or limitation, is vested in a parliament or other legislative body subject to no restrictions except the discretion of its members.

Article I, See. 8, of the Constitution vests sundry powers in the Congress. But two of its clauses have any bearing upon the validity of the statute under review.

The third clause endows the Congress with power “to regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” Despite a reference in its first section to a burden upon, and an obstruction of the normal currents of commerce, the act under review does not purport to regulate transactions in interstate or foreign commerce. Its stated purpose is the control of agricultural production, a purely local activity, in an effort to raise the prices paid the farmer. Indeed, the Government does not attempt to uphold the validity of the act on the basis of the commerce clause, which, for the purpose of the present case, may be put aside as irrelevant.

The clause thought to authorize the legislation, ― the first, ― confers upon the Congress power “to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States . . .” It is not contended that this provision grants power to regulate agricultural production upon the theory that such legislation would pro mote the general welfare. The Government concedes that the phrase “to provide for the general welfare” qualifies the power “to- lay and collect taxes.” The View that the clause grants power to provide for the general welfare, independently of the taxing power, has never been authoritatively accepted. Mr. Justice Story points out that if it were adopted “It is obvious that under color of the generality of the words, to ‘provide for the common defence and general welfare,’ the government of the United States is, in reality, a government of general and unlimited powers, notwithstanding the subsequent enumeration of specific power.” [Story, Commentaries on Constitution of United States, 5th ed. vol. I, Sec. 907]. The true construction undoubtedly is that the only thing granted is the power to tax for the purpose of providing funds for payment of the nation’s debts and making provision for general welfare.

Nevertheless the Government asserts that warrant is found in this clause for the adoption of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The argument is that Congress may appropriate and authorize the spending of moneys for the “general welfare;” that the phrase should be liberally construed to cover anything conducive to national welfare; that decision as to what will promote such welfare rests with Congress alone, and the courts may not review it determination; and finally that the appropriation under attack was in fact for the general welfare of the United States.

The Congress is expressly empowered to lay taxes to provide for the general welfare. Funds in the Treasury as a result of taxation may be expended only through appropriation. Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 7.) They can never accomplish the Objects for which they were collected unless the power to appropriate is as broad as the power to tax. The necessary implication from the terms of the grant is that the public funds may be appropriated “to provide for the general welfare of the United States.” These words cannot be meaningless, else they would not have been used. The conclusion must be that they were intended to limit and define the granted power to raise and to expend money. How shall they be construed to effectuate the intent of the instrument?

Since the foundation of the nation sharp’ differences of opinion have persisted as to the true interpretation of the phrase. Madison asserted it amounted to no more than a reference to the other powers enumerated in the subsequent clauses of the same section; that, as the United States is a government of limited and enumerated powers, the grant of power to tax and spend for the general national welfare must be confined to the enumerated legislative fields committed to the Congress. In this View the phrase is mere tautology, for taxation and appropriation are or may be necessary incidents of the exercise of any of the enumerated legislative powers. Hamilton, on the other hand, maintained the clause confers a power separate and distinct from those later enumerated, is not restricted in meaning by the grant of them, and Congress consequently has‘ a substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare of the, United States. Each contention has had the support of those whose views are entitled to weight. This court has noticed .the question, but has never found it necessary to decide which is the true construction. Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries, espouses the Hamiltonian position.11 We shall not review the writings of public men and commentators or discuss the legislative practice. Study of all these leads us to conclude that the reading advocated by Mr. Justice Story is the correct one. While, therefore, the power to tax is not unlimited. Its confines are set in the clause which confers it, and not in those of Sec. 8 which bestow and define the legislative powers of the Congress. It results that the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.

8) Coercive taxation by economic pressure.

If the taxing power may not be used as the instrument to enforce a regulation of matters of state concern with respect to which Congress has no authority to interfere, it may not be employed to raise the money necessary to purchase a compliance which Congress is powerless to command. In the Butler case, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court said:

…The Government asserts that whatever might be said against the validity of the plan, if compulsory, it is constitutionally sound because the end is accomplished by voluntary cooperation. There are two sufficient answers to the contention. The regulation is not in fact voluntary. The farmer, of course, may refuse to comply, but the price of such refusal is the loss of benefits. The amount offered is intended to be sufficient to exert pressure on him to agree to the proposed regulation. The power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power to coerce or destroy. If the cotton grower elects not to accept the benefits, he will receive less for his crops; those who receive payments will be able to undersell him. The result may well be financial ruin. The coercive purpose and intent of the statute is not obscured by the fact that it has not been perfectly successful. It is pointed out that, because there still remained a minority whom the rental and benefit payments were insufficient to induce to surrender their independence of action, the Congress has gone further and, in the Bankhead Cotton Act, used the taxing power in a more directly minatory fashion to compel submission. This progression only serves more fully to expose the coercive purpose of the so-called tax imposed by the present act. It is clear that the Department of Agriculture has properly described the plan as one to keep a non-cooperating minority in line. This is coercion by economic pressure.

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCEPT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN TAXATION

A. SOCIAL JUSTICE

1. RAWLSIAN CONCEPT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
Social Justice is when it justly divides and distributes the advantages obtained from social cooperation and justly determines and distributes the basic individual rights and duties collectively constituting the terms and conditions of social cooperation (Rawls, Justice and the Income Tax: Charles R.T. O’ Kelley: University of Georgia School of Law, okkelley@uga.edu., p.3)

Thus, Taxation plays an important role on the concept of distributive justice wherein to achieve social justice in a society, it is necessary that right and duties are distributed equally to people of the society.

According to Rawls: “society is cooperative venture for mutual advantage marked by a conflict as well as an identity of interest. There is an identity of interest since social cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any would have if each were to live solely by his own efforts. There is a conflict of interest since persons are not indifferent as to how greater benefits produce by their collaboration or distributed, for in order to pursue their ends they each prefer a larger to a lesser share. A set of principles is required for choosing among various social arrangements which determines this division of advantages and or underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive shares. This principles are the principles of social justice: they provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basis institutions of society and they define the appropriate distribution of benefits and burdens of social cooperation” (Rawls, Georgia review p.15)

2. LEGAL CONCEPT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE,
Article 19 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines provides that:
”Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, gives everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.”

Article 24 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines provides that: “In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.”

Social justice as coined by Justice P. Laurel:,
“means that it is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the state so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the component elements of the society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures of legally justifiable, or extra- constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. “ The aforementioned is an excerpt from the Calalang vs. Williams jurisprudence, wherein it speaks of social justice as equalization of rights for the welfare of the general people and how it can be attained through the use of law and powers of the people.

Moreover, the 1987 Constitution is grounded on the principle of social justice wherein people are protected by the state and they are guaranteed full protection in terms of employment and standard of living to have a just and humane society.

Social justice is the promotion of the welfare of the people and not to be used as a tool in perpetrating injustice.

In the case of Gelos vs. CA, the Supreme Court held that: “This court has stressed more than once that social justice- or any justice for that matter- is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his novel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of law.“

In the above passage, it can be gleaned that social justice favors the poor but not to the extent of injustice. For rich and the poor are equal in the eyes of the law. Penalties, even excessive in nature must be upheld according to the mandate of the law. The court should uphold the law and to decide according to the language of the law. Thus, social justice calls for the reconciliation of equality and justice to promote to well- being of the society.

Social Justice is when people are willing to agree to come up a better society to reach a reflective equilibrium. As what stated by Rawls, an impartial judge will choose original position by using veil of ignorance in order to arrive to a decision which is fair and unbiased from any internal or external influences, namely: a) Mutual cooperation- better- than separately b) No use for someone’s end c) Original agree at all liberty- equally distributed d) Income taxation- e) Original position- helps reflective equilibrium f) Reflects “ a theory of the person, a theory of procedural justice, general social theory, and a theory and a theory of the role of morality in society (including ideal of a well- ordered society). (p.26) g) Distribution of Income- enforced by the people of the state. h) Just- if justly exercised i) Libertarianism and Original Position- deliberators are rational, mutually disinterred, reasonably risk averse individuals, interested in furthering their own life plans, who have come together behind a veil of ignorance to choose, unanimously and once for all, the principles of social justice. j) Society- moderate scarcity k) Justice- willing cooperation- all members of society otherwise stable l) Select- naturally liberty- best chance of reaching goals. m) Deliberators must be characterized as single individuals, without ties of friendship or family which might dampen their enthusiasms for a system of natural liberty.

There are two (2) Principles of Justice, namely:
1. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with a similar scheme for all.
2. Social and economic inequahties are to satisfy two conditions: first, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.

These principles deal with the rights of the people and their claim for equality. It goes without saying that this agreement must be informed and uncoerced, and reached by citizens in ways consistent with their being viewed as free and equal persons."

We can make the idea of social cooperation more specific by noting three of its elements: Cooperation is distinct from merely socially coordinated activity, for example, from activity coordinated by orders issued by some central authority. Cooperation is guided by publicly recognized rules and procedures which those who are cooperating accept and regard as properly regulating their conduct. Cooperation involves the idea of fair terms of cooperation: these are terms that each participant may reasonably accept, provided that everyone else likewise accepts them. Fair terms of cooperation specify an idea of reciprocity or mutuality: all who are engaged in cooperation and who do their part as the rules and procedures require, are to benefit in some appropriate way as assessed by a suitable benchmark of comparison. A conception of political justice characterizes the fair terms of social cooperation.

Since the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, this is accomplished in justice as fairness by formulating principles that specify basic rights and duties within the main institutions of society, and by regulating the institutions of background justice over time so that the benefits produced by everyone's efforts are fairly acquired and divided from one generation to the next. The idea of social cooperation requires an idea of each participant's rational advantage, or good. This idea of good specifies what those who are engaged in cooperation, whether individuals, families, or associations, or even nation-states, are trying to achieve, when the scheme is viewed from their own standpoint.

A sense of justice is the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the public conception of justice which characterizes the fair terms of social cooperation.

The capacity for a conception of the good is the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of one's rational advantage, or good. In the case of social cooperation, this good must not be understood narrowly but rather as a conception of what is valuable in human life.

In sum, the original position is simply a device of representation: it describes the parties, each of whom are responsible for the essential interests of a free and equal person, as fairly situated and as reaching an agreement subject to appropriate restrictions on what are to count as good reasons.

In addition to, John Rawls stated that “background procedural justice” must be included in a society in order to attain equality on the procedural process not only in the present but also for future reference. He cited taxation as a basis for equal opportunity of wealth to avoid monopolies of wealth in one people. The government levied taxes on inheritance and estate taxes to prevent concentration of wealth in one individual.

The basis of justice is to tilt in favour of the less privilege in life to uphold the economic and political for the benefit of the general welfare.

B. PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE

The meaning of the first principle is that the first principle expresses an analogous conception. There is a presumption against the distinctions and classifications made by legal systems and other practices to the extent that they disobey on the original and equal liberty of the persons participating in them. The second principle states that the second principle defines what kinds of inequalities are permissible. It then specifies how the presumptions laid down by the first principle may be set aside.

The role of the principles of justice is to specify the fair terms of social cooperation12. These principles state the basic rights and duties to be handed out by the social and political institutions. They stabilize the division of benefits from the social cooperation of those in society. In a democratic society people are regarded as free and equal individuals. The principles of democratic justice apply to them bounded by the terms of social cooperation. The idea of social cooperation has three essential features13:

(a) Social cooperation is distinct from merely socially coordinated activity – for example, activity coordinated by orders issued by an absolute central authority. Rather, social cooperation is guided by publicly recognized rules and procedures which those cooperating accept as appropriate to regulate their conduct.

(b) The idea of cooperation includes the idea of fair terms of cooperation: these are terms each participant may reasonably accept, and sometimes should accept, provided that everyone else likewise accepts them. Fair terms of cooperation specify an idea of reprocity, or mutuality: all who do their part as the recognized rules require are to benefit as specified by a public and agreed-upon standard.

(c) The idea of cooperation also includes the idea of each participant’s rational advantage, or good. The idea of rational advantage specifies what it is those engaged in cooperation are seeking to advance from the standpoint of their own good.”14

These are the central organizing ideas of social cooperation. He makes a clear difference between the reasonable and the rational. These two are the ideas that enter the fundamental idea of society as a fair system of cooperation15. The principles are needed to state to everyone the fair terms of social cooperation. In these essential features it specifies the fundamental ideas that we need for fair social terms of cooperation. Sensible persons know that they should honor these principles even though that their own interests are at stake, provided those others will honor the principles. It not reasonable that others do not honor the fair terms of cooperation while others are to honor the fair terms of cooperation. It is worse that one accepts and honors the fair terms of cooperation or a least pretends to accept the principles but the individual is ready to violate the principles at any given time to serve his own interests. Though it may be viewed as unreasonable but it is not in irrational at all.

C. WELL-ORDERED SOCIETY

John Rawls also introduced the idea of a well-ordered society – “this is a society effectively regulated by a public conception of justice – a companion used to specify the central organizing idea of society as a fair system of cooperation”16. There are classifications in which we can say that a political society is well-ordered. These classifications can help us understand the ideas of a well ordered society. Here are the three classifications:

“First, and implied by the idea of a public conception of justice, it is a society in which everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the very same political conception of justice (and so the same principles of political justice). Moreover, this knowledge is mutually recognized: that is, people know everything they would know if their acceptance of those principles were a matter of public agreement.

Second, and implied by the idea of effective regulation by a public conception of justice, society’s basic structure – that is, its main political and social institutions and the way they hang together as one system of cooperation – is publicly known, or with reason believed, to satisfy those principles of justice.

Third, and also implied by the idea of effective regulation, citizens have a normally effective sense of justice, that is, one that enables them to understand and apply the publicly recognized principles of justice, and for the most part to act accordingly as their position in society, with its duties and obligations, requires.”17

In his concept of a well-ordered society the public conception of justice provides a known point in which citizens of the state can judge the claims they make to the institutions that represent them and also they can claim their political rights amongst them. This idea of a well-ordered society is an idealization. One of the reasons why this idea is formed is that based on the question “how well it can serve as the publicly recognized and mutually acknowledged conception of justice when society is viewed as a system of cooperation between free and equal citizens from one generation to the next18. The idea of a well-ordered society has two meanings first that a well-ordered society is regulated by the public conception of justice doesn’t matter what concept it may be. The other meaning is referred if we have a particular conception of justice such as that all the citizens of society has accepted the concept of justice and they know that all others have accepted the concept as well.

D. ORIGINAL POSITION

Another idea found in the Theory is the Original Position. The original position is a device of representation in the society. The original position models two things, first is that as a fair condition under the representatives of the citizens, viewed by the free and equal individuals are to agree to the fair terms of social cooperation whereby the basic structure is to be regulated19. The second model is that it implements the restrictions to which the parties have agreed upon and considered to be under the fair conditions and principles of justice. We should always keep in mind that the original position serves different purposes as well. It somehow keeps track of the assumptions we have made. We can also see the assumptions we have made by looking at the parties decisions as well. The beauty of the original position is that it brings out joined force of our assumptions by merging them into one idea that helps us see the outcomes of our joined ideas more easily and effectively.

On the other hand, to Rawls the common ground of a society is an agreement between its inhabitants on what institutions and arrangements are just. He himself defines a liberal society as ’a society that allows for a plurality of different and even incommensurable conceptions of the good…’ (Bojer 2003:36).

To ensure a unanimous agreement, his second and main argument draws on the tradition of a hypothetical ‘social contract’. The main reason for this usage, is to ensure that people is treated as moral equals. Since such a point of departure ensures that none of us is subordinate to the will of others, we might think that the outcome will be somehow fair. But this is not the case, considering the arbitrary contingencies mentioned above, individuals are inclined to abuse their favorable starting points in society and/or their greater natural capacities to their advantage when negotiating the principles of just distribution. At this junction we need a different mechanism that excludes some individuals bargaining power over others. Rawls develops here a construction which he calls ’the original position’ in this position people are no longer aware of there vested interests or their position in society, nor do they know their natural capacities, they are behind a ’veil of ignorance’. Rawls even assumes that they don’t even know their psychological propensities, all to ensure that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or their social circumstances. From this original position no one can design principles who favor them directly or indirectly. Furthermore he assumes that the participants have general knowledge about the nature and human societies, they understand the workings of politics and economic theory, they are also assumed to be acquainted with the laws of human psychology, and they are fully aware of the benefits of social cooperation and organizational life (Kymlicka 2002:63). There are no limitations on general laws and theories, since conceptions of justice must be adjusted to the characteristics of the systems of social cooperation which they are to regulate (??) (Solomon & Murphy 2000:104). Rawls says it is unfair that people's lack of general knowledge should have anything to say, for the outcome of the ’social contract’ (Malnes & Midgaard 2004:239). The principles of justice chosen from this ’original position’ are thus thought to be fair.

This brings us over to his central idea. Rawls argues strongly that justice should be thought about in terms of fairness, ‘justice as fairness‘. Since individuals are assumed to be mutually disinterested, they fail to see just distribution in terms of fairness. Why fairness? Fairness, because central to the concept of fairness is a demand to avoid bias in our evaluations, taking note of the interests and concerns of others as well, and in particular the need to avoid our propensity to be influenced by our respective interests, or by our personal priorities (Sen 2009:54). I would say impartiality is the point, and I think that is what Rawls means by `fairness' So the main purpose of the ‘veil of ignorance’ is that it functions as an intuitive test of fairness, none is able to tip the table in their favor, in addition to this, Rawls claims that the principles chosen behind a ’veil of ignorance’ is also unanimously chosen (Kymlicka 2002:64). E. VEIL OF IGNORANCE

Another concept in the work of John Rawls theory of Justice is the “veil of ignorance”. This idea which is found in the original position sets up a fair procedure so that principles agreed upon will be just. In order to create just principles parties are put under a veil of ignorance during their talks. As we know men can be tempted to create principles for his benefit and not for the citizens. When they do these they exploit the citizens’ right for fair principles. So in order to prevent this the veil of ignorance is used so that those in the original position will not know how the alternatives will affect themselves and for their own particular use and they are required to make principles that are for the general public. In the veil of ignorance it is presumed that the parties that create the principles do not have any ideas on certain facts. No one knows his place in society his social status and position, his assets, his abilities etc. Also no one knows his conception of justice; the people in the original position even don’t have any information on whether what generation they are in. Also the people in the original position do not know some events in their society. These events may be political or economic situations in the society. In these cases they must be prepared to live in whatever circumstances that their principles have brought them. The only thing that they know is that the society is subject to justice and needs justice. However still they do not know general facts happening in the society. With man given the principles of moral learning men’s tendency is to act with the principle. In this case the conception of justice may be stable. This is a kind of general information that is allowed in the original position. The concept of the veil ignorance is not a perfect system and has raised several difficulties.

“. . . some may object that the exclusion of nearly particular information makes it difficult to grasp what is meant by the original position. Thus it may be helpful to observe that one or more persons can at any time enter this position, or perhaps, better, simulate the deliberations of this hypothetical situation, simply by reasoning in accordance with the appropriate restrictions. In arguing for a conception of justice we must be sure that it is among the permitted alternatives and satisfies the stipulated formal constraints. No considerations can be advanced in its favour unless they would be rational ones for us to urge were we lack the kind of knowledge that is excluded. The evaluation of principles must proceed in terms of the general consequences of their public recognition and universal application, it being assumed that they will be complied with by everyone. To say that a certain conception of justice would be chosen in the original position is equivalent to saying that rational deliberation satisfying certain conditions and restrictions would reach a certain conclusion. If necessary, the argument to this result could be set out more formally. I shall, however, speak throughout in terms of the notion of the original position. It is more economical and suggestive, and brings out certain essential features that otherwise one might easily overlook.”20

By these remarks it shows that the original position is not a general assembly who lives at the same time or an assembly of anyone at the same time. It may be contested that the veil of ignorance is irrational. Some may object and say that principles must be chosen under all available knowledge. In the light of this problem all the parties are situated in the veil of ignorance and everyone agreed upon these conditions to make principles for the public.

But as Kymlicka (2002) argues it isn’t clear that individuals behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ would chose the difference principle. Why is Rawls assuming that this would be the case? Well, we have to ask; what is the rational thing to do in such a scenario? Rawls argues, by drawing on the theory of choice under uncertainty that it would be highly unwise to gamble with the means to ones lifetime prospects, since none of the individuals know their position in life they have to choose under uncertainty. The most rational thing to do in a situation like this is according to Rawls, to try to minimize the damage if you were to end up in a disadvantaged position. Even if the were low probability for this to incur. By other means, you should adopt a ‘maximin’ strategy, which is to maximize what you would get if you by chance should end up in the minimum. And this, Rawls concludes, is the same as choosing the difference principle (Kymlicka 2002:66).

F. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

In the “a Theory of Justice” he introduced a concept he called civil disobedience. This is a part of the concept he calls as public justification. This idea as well is part of the well-ordered society, since it can be publicly regulated by a conception of justice.21 This public justification can be viewed as the main reason on how we can justify the use of civil disobedience in a democratic society. On a constitutional democracy the public may oppose any legally established democratic authority22 as long as it is in the boundaries of civil disobedience. The researcher believes that John Rawls’ point is that we are allowed to challenge any establishment in our government as long as we do not use armed resistance against this office but rather than use the majority of the people to get the justice we want. In this case the political action we address to have the sense of justice should be based on the measures of the majority.23

On the other hand he stated that:

“…first of all we have a natural duty not to oppose the establishment of just and efficient institutions and to uphold and comply with them; and second, assuming that we have knowingly accepted the benefits of these institutions and plan to continue to do so, and that we have encouraged and expect others to do their part, we also have an obligation to do our share when, as the arrangement requires, it comes to our turn. Thus, we often have both a natural duty as well as an obligation to support just and efficient institutions, the obligation arising from our voluntary acts while the duty does not.”24

It means that the citizens have a duty not to contest the political systems that are just and efficient and to follow them as ordered since they have been helpful in our society. If ever we have already accepted this institution of the government we should do our natural duty so that we do our share for the institution. He points out that we have the “natural duty as well as an obligation to support just and efficient institutions”25 we don’t oppose these institutions that are just and efficient.

“I shall begin by defining civil disobedience as a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government by acting in this way one addresses the sense of justice of the majority of the community and declares that in one’s considered opinion the principles of social cooperation among free and equal men are not respected…”26

In this definition he doesn’t require the civilians to violate the law that they are protesting about. This definition somehow permits to have a direct or indirect civil disobedience. He suggests that a citizen may disobey some laws pertaining to traffic or ordinances in protest of another case so that he may be able to voice out his grievances to the proper authority. If ever the government acts violently to an individual due to a violation, one can act against this violation but he should be ready for the sanctions to be given to him by the government.

We should take into account that civil disobedience is a political act27 since it is the majority who holds the political power and not the establishments; they are only guided by the political principles which they fight for. In civil disobedience we should not justify it by appealing to the moral principles in the society nor religious doctrines.28 Though it may be said that they can agree on some aspects, we should take in to account that civil disobedience is not solely for a particular group/groups or for their own self-interest.

The Theory of Justice has been designed to work for a just society, a society that is well-ordered and democratic.29 The act of civil disobedience is to legitimate established democratic authority is appropriate only to a democratic form of government. But he doesn’t suggest over-throwing a corrupt or unjust government with this, but rather he shows them how to voice out their problems in the society. Also there should be no difficulty in removing from office a corrupt and unjust government since there is a viable reason in ousting them. A problem that arises in the civil disobedience is those who accept the constitution since they have a conflict with their duties. The conflict that I am saying is that whether or not they will comply with the mandate of law or if they will defend their own liberty and freedom to oppose the injustice they are experiencing. With this conflict it also involves the nature and limits of majority rule.30 With the problems it becomes a challenge to any theory that involves moral basis of a democracy to answer the problems.

We should remember that civil disobedience is a public act that is done by the public and is done publicly. Civil disobedience may be viewed like a public speech or it is a form of political address in which the citizens may express themselves in a public forum.31 Civil disobedience as he said is for the people by the people as a way to openly protest their dismay. But with this the citizens should act against the law they don’t want but they should not use violence as an act of protest.

“… civil disobedience is nonviolent. It tries to avoid the use of violence, especially against persons, not from the abhorrence of the use of force in principle, but because it is a final expression of one’s case. To engage in violent acts likely to injure and to hurt is incompatible with civil disobedience as a mode of address.”32

John Rawls stated this so that the citizens will know the limits of their act. But he didn’t put aside that if the citizens appeal failed then they could use force as a form of resistance to the law. The use of force in civil disobedience is the last resort of the citizens in the state after the government didn’t respond to the calls of the people. There is also another reason why civil disobedience should be nonviolent. The citizens should disobey the law but they should still be loyal to the essence of the law. They can break the law but not their loyalty to the law; it is manifested in their willingness to accept the legal consequences of one’s conduct.33 The loyalty to the law is expressed by the majority in a sense that the act is sincere and is intended for the public. Civil disobedience still falls under the constraints of legal protests, it can be said that it is a refusal and a resistance against a political action. Though it is a kind of resistance it is still different from militant action and obstruction34; first of all militants are those who are opposed to the political systems, and he doesn’t accept something that to him is unjust even though what is offered to him is a nearly perfect system he wants. His actions are not approved by the majority nor that he has the support of those who have power, he believes that the power of the majority or those who have political power don’t have any effect. He just seeks to act to disrupt and resist the concept of justice that is given. Also we see here the difference of militant action and civil disobedience, in civil disobedience we say that the citizen is aware that he is punishable by the law and he complies with the legal consequences of the law. On the other hand a militant tries to avoid the consequences of his actions since he doesn’t trust those who are in power, or he is not prepared for the punishment he will receive, also he tries to avoid being captured since he opposes the constitution and if he surrenders this means that he acknowledges the constitution. With this kind of reaction “militant action is not within the bounds of fidelity to law, but represents a more profound opposition to the legal order.35

The justification of civil disobedience is depended on the theory of political obligation in general.36 When civil disobedience is justified it can be viewed as a political action that voices out the sense of justice of the majority that shows their protest and they want to show them that they are not honoring the decision they have arrived in.

“The first point concerns the kinds of wrongs that are appropriate. Now if one views such disobedience as a political act addressed to the sense of justice of the community, then it seems reasonable, other things equal, to limit it to instances of substantial and clear injustice, and preferably to those which obstruct the path to removing other injustices. For this reason there is a presumption in favour of restricting civil disobedience to serious infringements of the first principle of justice, the principle of equal liberty, and to blatant violations of the second part of the second principle, the principle of fair equality of principle.”37

This first justification of civil disobedience states that somehow has a presumption of restricting civil disobedience to the violations of the first principle of justice and holds the second principle38. We often think that this gives us an upper hand with the political institutions but rather we should think that it assures us of equal political and civil liberties. The citizens although they are practicing civil disobedience should keep in mind that even though they are protesting some laws they still should follow some laws that are mandatory for them to follow, for example paying taxes, this shows that the citizens still recognize some of the laws imposed upon them. During this time a solution of reasonable compromise39 can be agreed upon. It is said that “violation of the principle of equal liberty is, then more appropriate object of civil disobedience.”40 This states that we have equal citizenship on a democratic regime and our status lies at the basis of political order.41 We should think that civil disobedience is best during our appeal is precise and therefore our act is effective, then it corrects the injustices we have encountered.

There are three conditions in which civil disobedience can be justified and the first condition is stated above. This is the second condition of the justification of civil disobedience, it states that:

“We may suppose that the normal appeals to the political majority have already been made with good faith and that they have failed. The legal means of redress have proved of no avail. Thus for example, the existing political parties have shown themselves indifferent to the claims of the minority or have proved unwilling to accommodate them. Attempts to have the laws repealed have been ignored and legal protests and demonstrations have had no success. Since civil disobedience is a last resort, we should be sure that it is necessary…”42

We should take into account that in this condition all legal means have been used and all have failed. All appeals to the government can be repeated but it would still fail, it would just look like that we are voicing out our freedom of speech. And if our actions in the past still didn’t move the majority, all of our actions will still be unproductive, and justification of civil disobedience could be met at these circumstances. However this justification is only a presumption43 because some cases may be so extreme that it needs no legal means of contest, for example if the congress will enact a law that forbids the minority of some religion to do as they please. The law might constrain them in practices new to them, or will stop them from practicing old ceremonies. We cannot expect that this sect will follow the law, and we cannot expect that they will use legal means to oppose the law but rather they might see that civil disobedience is too mild as an act to follow. Even if civil disobedience is seen as a last resort we should think that it can be justified if ever there is grave injustice that is happening. In this case civil disobedience is not a normal political action anymore.

The third and last condition for the justification of civil disobedience states that:

“The third and last condition I shall discuss can be rather complicated. It arises from the fact that while the two preceding conditions are often sufficient to justify civil disobedience, this is not always the case. In certain circumstances the natural duty of justice may require a certain restraint. We can see this as follows. If a certain minority is justified in engaging in civil disobedience, then any other minority in relevantly similar circumstances is likewise justified…”44

In this condition it states that the situation can be justified if ever two groups are experiencing same degree of injustice as to what to the others are experiencing. It also says that both their normal appeals have been used and didn’t work. In this condition it shows that there should be a limit to civil disobedience, this limits the citizens from disrespecting the law and the constitution. A “legitimate civil disobedience properly exercised is a stabilizing device in a constitutional regime, tending to make it firmly more just.”45 This emphasizes that if ever an act if civil disobedience is happening this could stabilize the political system since it was applied properly and it has been justified under the conditions stated by Rawls. However he also stated that the majority has lost sight of its sense of justice, when their intentions are distorted, and that the civilly disobedient groups are distorted in their intentions the “effectiveness of civil disobedience as a form of protest declines beyond a certain point,”46 these certain point he is talking about is happening when the citizens disrespect the fidelity of the law and are no longer held back by the constraints of justice.

The aim of the theory of civil disobedience is to “explain its role within a constitutional system and to account for its connection with a democratic polity”47, Rawls assumes that the society is the one that is nearly just, this points out that the society is a democratic government in which injustices may be minimal or if probable no injustices are occurring at all. By joining civil disobedience a citizen wishes to address the political majority and to be heard by the one’s in power. During protest we want to show that the conditions we are put in are not tolerable and we want them to reconsider their decisions since they are not the ones who are mostly affected by the decision and they couldn’t expect the citizens to comply with the terms they imposed.

Civil disobedience can be seen by some as something that it so unrealistic. But we should think about its conditions wherein we can justify our acts against the government as long as we are willing to be punished by law. And we will not object to this because we have submitted ourselves to the fidelity of the law and the constitution. This presupposes that “the majority has a sense of justice, and one might reply that moral sentiments are not a significant political force.48 Different men move with different motives, their acts are usually based upon their bias and interests. Men in power who does injustice to us to favor their biases are those who we can oppose. We are not sure if the laws he will enact will ensure us of a fair and just society.

The concept of Civil Disobedience by non-payment of taxes is a popular call being suggested by some civil society groups and other sectors of the society including, if not mostly, businessmen who are regularly paying taxes, whenever issues of corruptions are at its peak. This kind of drastic measure has not gained support because most people are afraid of its consequences. Some may agree in principle but are inclined to put into action their sentiments. The researcher is not yet ready to conclude that this will never happen. We have not yet reached the so called peaking point that will finally convince everyone to agree to this concept. But one thing the reasercher believes, the the majority of the people is watching very closely to their government leaders. With the current issues of billions of taxpayers money wasted and misappropriated by the same government leaders sworn to protect and uphold the law, we may be closer, hoepfully, to the society’s peaking point than what these corrupt officials would like to believe.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

Rawls contribution, is no doubt, influential to the topic of social justice. The researcher is even convinced that Rawls work may be the inspiration of the legislature when they introduced the concepts of Theoritical Justice, Equality and Proportional Contribution into the Philippine Tax Laws. But to think that his theory could be extended to capture more diverse cases and meet further challenges that may come in the future is stretching his basic ideas too far. Being subject to critical scrutiny for decades, contemporaries seem to have abandoned this basic ideas. But his fundamental idea that justice is to be viewed in terms of fairness, which is a Rawlsian hallmark, is by large still seen as a common point of departure for further elaboration on distributional justice.
_________________
John Rawls: Collected Papers (Massachusetts, Cambridge) p.47
2 Chandran Kukathas. John Rawls: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers (London: Routledge, 2003)p.2
3 New Standard Encyclopedia. TUV. T-36. 27
4 Third Annual Report 1961, DD. 7, 8.
5 Second Annual Report, pp. 5_8.
6 Fourth Annual Report, pp. 3-4.
7 301 U.S. 412; 81 L. ed. 1193. 1201 (1937). In this case the Legislature of Louisiana adopted an act levying an occupation or license tax upon chain stores, under which the exaction was fifteen dollars upon each of two or more stores, not in excess of five; upon each store in excess of five, but not exceeding ten, twenty-five dollars; and the amount increased in brackets for additional stores the last bracket embracing stores in excess of fifty upon each of which the tax was two hundred dollars, J FR.
8 G. R. L-7859, prom. Dec. 22, r955: 52 0.G. 1955.
9 297 U. S. 1-88; 80 L. ed 477, 484, Mr. Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting, joined by Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Cardozo. Citations omitted.
10 footnotes 33 to 38 are those of the U.S. Supreme Court.
11 Loc. cit., chapter XIV., passim.
12 Chandran Kukathas. John Rawls: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers (London: Routledge, 2003) p.49
13 Rawls, John Justice as Fairness: a restatement (Massachusetts, Cambridge 2003) p.6
14 Ibid p.6
15 Ibid p.6
16 Ibid p. 8
17 Ibid p. 8-9
18 Ibid p. 9
19 Ibid p.81
20 Rawls, John A Theory of Justice (Massachusetts, Cambridge 1971) p. 138
21 Rawls, John Justice as Fairness (Massachusetts, Cambridge 2001) p.26
22 Rawls, John: Collected Papers (Massachusetts, Cambridge 1999) p.176
23 Ibid p.176
24 Ibid p.177
25 Ibid p.177
26 A Theory of Justice (Massachusetts, Cambridge 1971) p. 364
27 Ibid p.365
28 Ibid p.363
29 Ibid p.363
30 Ibid p.163
21 Ibid p.366
32 Ibid p.366
33 Ibid p.366
34 Ibid p. 367
35 Ibid p.367
36 Rawls, John Collected Papers (Massachusetts, Cambridge 1999) p. 176
37 Rawls, John A Theory of Justice (Massachusetts, Cambridge 1971) p.371-372
38 Rawls, John Collected Papers (Massachusetts, Cambridge 1999) p.184
39 A Theory of Justice (Massachusetts, Cambridge 1971) p.373
40 Ibid p. 373
41 Ibid p.373
42 Ibid p. 373
43 Ibid p. 373
44 Ibid p. 373-374
45 John Rawls: Collected Papers (Massachusetts, Cambridge 1999)p. 184
46 Rawls, John A Theory of Justice (Massachusetts, Cambridge 1971)p. 374
47 Ibid p. 382
48 Ibid p.386

BIBLIOGRAPHY:
PRIMARY SOURCES:
Chandran, Kukathas, ed. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers 4 vol. (New York: Harvard University Press, 1999)
Rawls, John. John Rawls: Collected Papers, ed. By Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1999)
A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971)
A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999)
John Rawls: critical assessment of leading political philosophers (London : Routledge, 2003)
Justice as Fairness: a Restatement. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001)
Taxation Self Taught: Basic Principle of Taxation, Juan F. Rivera, 1964 ed.

SECONDARY SOURCES:
The Far Eastern Law Review, 2010. Volume XLI
Kelry, Erin. Ed. Justice as Fairness. (the Belknappress of Harvard University Press:London:England 2001)

INTERNET SOURCES:
Rawls,%20John%C2%A0%5BInternet%20Encyclopedia%20of%20Philosophy%5D.html (Accessed on June 2, 2013)
The Idea of Public Reason Revisited Author(s): John Rawls Source: (The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Summer, 1997), pp. 765-807 Published by: The University of Chicago Law Review ) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1600311 Accessed: 01/07/2013 09:51

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 3 (July 2003), pp. 523–539. Association; published by Blackwell Publishing. http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0092-5853 (Accessed on June 30, 2013)

John Rawls and Affirmative ActionAuthor(s): Thomas NagelSource: The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 39 (Spring, 2003), pp. 82-84Published by: The JBHE Foundation, IncStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3134387 .Accessed: 30/06/2013 14:13Your