Paternalism, as defined by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, is an act that attempts to influence the choices of others in such a way that those others will be better off, and that these others would agree that they are better off. A less coercive form of paternalism is known as libertarian paternalism. Libertarian paternalism is when policies are designed to influence people to make certain choices without limiting their liberty or options. The means by which people are to be influenced to make these decisions are known as nudges. Nudges are factors in a choice that will change individuals’ behaviors in a way that the person nudging has anticipated. Thaler and Sunstein are advocates of nudges and see libertarian paternalism as a nice medium between outright coercion and complete free choice. They make the claim that libertarian paternalism can help anticipate and correct certain instances in which a person does not make decisions in their best interests. Daniel Hausman and Brynn Welch of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, contend that the definition of paternalism put forth by Thaler and Sunstein is wrong and that nudges are, in fact, paternalistic. I will first outline the claims of Thaler and Sunstein and then the criticism of the policies as put forth by Hausman and Welch. Finally, I will argue that libertarian paternalism is essentially the same concept as the paternalism defined by Hausman and Welch. As already stated, according to Thaler and Sunstein, paternalism is an act that attempts to influence choices so the chooser will be better off by his own definition. Thaler and Sunstein argue that people do not always make the decisions in their best interests. This does not imply that people make decisions against their best interests merely out of ignorance or apathy, but rather people do not always have consistent or coherent preferences. People do not always reason through all circumstances when making decisions or consider whether such a decision would be consistent with their overall well-being or previous decisions. Unless an exceptionally strong preference is present when making a decision, Thaler and Sunstein claim that people are overwhelmingly more likely to choose the default or status quo choice, and that framing effects and starting points are equally as influential. The most cited case in the paper is that of 401(k) opting-in versus opting-out. In this example, the effects of a status-quo bias is highlighted. Employees were either automatically enrolled into a 401(k) plan with the option of opting out, or given the option to opt in to the plan or simply stay unenrolled. The initial enrollments for the opt-in plan were 49%, while 86% of those automatically enrolled stayed enrolled. Thaler and Sunstein recognize how influential these factors can be, and see a way for libertarian paternalism to be instituted in order to benefit those without strong preferences. These companies made the determination that most of their employees would prefer to be enrolled in a 401(k) plan, so their automatic enrollment program can indeed be considered paternalistic. The point that must be made to differentiate this case from one of traditionally defined paternalism is that no coercion was required. Traditionally, paternalistic policies, such as laws requiring wearing a seatbelt, require coercion from potentially unwilling parties. There is no such coercion in the example of the 401(k) plans, thus Thaler and Sunstein draw the conclusion that this is an instance of libertarian paternalism. An important aspect in libertarian paternalism is that of nudges. Nudges are defined by Thaler and Sunstein as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviors in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.” (Sunstein and Thaler) Nudges are formulated by those dubbed “choice architects” by Thaler and Sunstein. These are the people who would be framing situations or formulating the status quo that would inevitably influence most choosers’ behaviors. The example given in their paper is that of the cafeteria worker. This worker knows that the arrangement of foods will encourage those eating at the cafeteria to select certain items. If this worker has libertarian paternalistic goals, she can arrange the food so people will make the healthiest selections. Though she has influenced the cafeteria-goers’ food selections, she has not eliminated any options or forced any foods upon anyone.
Hausman and Welch claim to be critical of policies of libertarian paternalism. They argue that the central underpinning of Thaler and Sunstein’s paper, being the definition of paternalism, is incorrect. They contend that the definition given by Thaler and Sunstein gives rise to a host of implications that do not reflect what paternalism really is. Hausman and Welch argue that Thaler and Sunstein’s definition of paternalism implies that rational persuasion and the dissemination of information are paternalistic in that they are nudges. However, Hausman and Welch argue that nudges do not require additional information to be effective; they can be somewhat subconscious, like in the situation of the cafeteria food placement, or biased, like the 401(k) opt-in or opt-out situation. Neither of these situations require additional information or persuasion. They are, by definition, the default that most people won’t venture far from. In situations of increased information or rational persuasion, the chooser is simply armed with more information with which to make a decision. His choices have not been laid out for him by a status-quo bias. If the cafeteria example were altered so the “choice architect” had included nutritional labels along with all of the food items, this would allow the chooser to make the choice of what was in his or her best interest. The chooser would use the information present to make the decision in his best interest, and would not be subject to the nudge of the choice architect. Hausman and Welch also make the claim that libertarian paternalism does not respect individual autonomy. Autonomy was one of the centerpiece ideas of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty and is one of the most important ideas in libertarian thought. Because libertarian paternalism does not limit choices, it does not limit “freedom” in the sense that Thaler and Sunstein define it. While freedom is still retained by those being nudged or influenced, their autonomy is being disregarded. They may still be free to make whatever choice they please, but they are not necessarily sovereign over the situation in which a choice is being made.
Hausman and Welch also warn against the dangers of libertarian paternalistic policies being instituted. They defend the claim that when governments are attempting to influence peoples choices, this is subject to a very high potential for abuse. They maintain that when there is government action to influence choice, the government must have a high amount of publicity surrounding the influences. The third claim Hausman and Welch defend is that the government should not compromise its ability to rationally persuade people. If the government can no longer rationally persuade people, it has turned the people into unthinking consumers of government policy, instead of rationally reasoning individuals. The final claim Hausman and Welch defend is that rational persuasion is the best way for a government to influence the behavior of its citizens. This respects their autonomy and reduces the reality of a “nanny state” style of governing.
I will now defend libertarian paternalism against the criticism of Hausman and Welch on the grounds that libertarian paternalism is essentially the same the paternalism defined by Hausman and Welch. Hausman and Welch seem to be hung up on the inclusion of the word “libertarian” in Thaler and Sunstein’s argument, and thus try to discredit its aims, while they are actually arguing for the same aims. Hausman and Welch openly admit that they feel nudges are acceptable in cases where choice shaping isn’t avoidable, when there are decisions that would be distorted without the nudge, and when nudges don’t push you in one way or the other. I will be arguing that these circumstances, in which nudges are deemed acceptable, are in fact the same as the ones in which Thaler and Sunstein propose nudging. I will look specifically at the third claim, that nudges are acceptable when they don’t push the agent in one direction or the other. The example given in Hausman and Welch’s paper is that of a cooling off period. Hausman and Welch say that cooling off periods “merely counteract foibles in decision making without in any way pushing individuals to choose one alternate rather than the other” (Hausman and Welch, 132). This is the exact same circumstance under which Thaler and Sunstein argue that nudges should be used, as stated that nudges are necessary when “individuals make inferior decisions in terms of their own welfare-decisions that they would change if they had complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack of self-control” (Sunstein and Thaler, 234). Thaler and Sunstein argue that I argue that the mere institution of a cooling off period is a direct attempt to circumvent the individuals will. Hausman and Welch argue earlier in their paper that this is a not acting in the individual’s best interests, and they claim that this argument is the opposite of Thaler and Sunstein’s proposal that an agents will can sometimes be influenced if the agent later comes to agree that this circumvention was appropriate.
Consider a case in which a man’s wife is assaulted. The man wants to get revenge on the perpetrator. Assume he has the means to exact this revenge (say he knows where the perpetrator lives and can find him there). The man determines that revenge is in his best interests. Hausman and Welch’s cooling off period says that the man should not be allowed to exact revenge for a certain amount of time. Now assume that the cooling off period has passed and the man emerges with the same view that revenge is in his best interest. When he goes to find the perpetrator, it turns out that the perpetrator had been hit by a car and killed. As a direct result of the cooling off period, the man has had his autonomy diminished and his will circumvented. He can no longer exact revenge because the perpetrator is dead. While Hausman and Welch claim that they respect individuals’ autonomy and best interests, this case clearly shows that that argument cannot hold up.
Though Hausman and Welch argue against Thaler and Sunstein’s libertarian paternalism, their own brand of paternalism has strikingly similar means and ends. Though they claim that libertarian paternalism is less paternalism and more rational persuasion, Hausman and Welch end up promoting the use of nudges in the same manner that Thaler and Sunstein do. Though both justify their cases of paternalism by saying that they are in the best interests of those affected, they are both promoting the same case for paternalism.

References
Hausman, Daniel, and Brynn Welch. "Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge*." The Journal of Political Philosophy 18.1: Print.
Sunstein, Cass, and Richard Thaler. "Preferences, Paternalism, and Liberty." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59: 23 Print.