Electronic contracts and electronic signatures are just as legal and enforceable as traditional paper contracts signed in ink. Federal legislation enacted in 2000, known as the Electronic Signatures in Global and International Commerce act (ESGICA), removed the uncertainty that earlier afflicted e-contracts.
This 2000 e-signature law made electronic contracts and signatures as legally valid as paper contracts, which was great news for companies that conduct business online, mainly companies that offer financial, insurance, and household services to consumers. The law also benefits B2Bs (business-to-business websites) who need enforceable agreements for ordering supplies and services. For all of these companies, the law helps them conduct business entirely on the Internet. This results in important savings to businesses, which can be passed on to consumers. For example, one online company estimated that eliminating paperwork fees reduced the cost of processing a home loan by $750. An electronic contract is an agreement created and "signed" in electronic form -- in other words, no paper or other hard copies are used. For example, you write a contract on your computer and email it to a business associate, and the business associate emails it back with an electronic signature indicating acceptance. An e-contract can also be in the form of a "Click to Agree" contract, commonly used with downloaded software: The user clicks an "I Agree" button on a page containing the terms of the software license before the transaction can be completed.
Since a traditional ink signature isn't possible on an electronic contract, people use several different ways to indicate their electronic signatures, including typing the signer's name into the signature area, pasting in a scanned version of the signer's signature, clicking an "I accept" button, or using cryptographic "scrambling" technology. Individuals are engaged in many daily transactions that are recorded by some means or the other means. Sometimes, information about these transactions may be useful to someone else. There are numerous examples of situations in which technology, especially in an e-commerce environment, has been used as a tool to abuse individual’s privacy and leave their personal information vulnerable. One example of IT practices which lead to potential privacy abuse is the use of data collection technology. When using the Internet, the individual leaves behind a trail of information which can be collected and then stealing one’s identity is a very easy.

One such noticeable examples of cyber tort is Hacking – it includes theft of information, passwords, and of credit card numbers. Once the hacker has gained access to a computer system they can browse through files, read private information and expand user privileges and intervene into one’s privacy. So the correct disclosure by individuals needs to be monitored to escape these types of crimes. People generally in their youth age become vulnerable to all the misdemeanors. Many people don’t even know what remedies are available nor is there any violation of law. This could be increased by channelizing this information in educational institutions against such offenders.

A credit card fraud which involves the illegal use of credit card and debit card for the benefit of the criminal is a serious cyber tort. Credit card fraud is done by gathering the details of credit/debit cards and then making illegal purchases and using it for unlawful transactions. Sale of such information to counterfeiters of credit cards is extremely lucrative, and difficult to detect and punish. Apart from this, assets in data format, if available by remote access methods, allows wrong-doer to commit fraud without even entering the premises. This leads to the infringement of privacy of the individual added infringing his/her fundamental rights. Proper control of such information is also in the hands of government agencies and companies which can restrict such information related to the individual by proper disclosure. http://www.lawinfowire.com/articleinfo/cyber-tort-as-key-factor-infringement-right-privacy My case study is: MUSIC GROUP MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE LIMITED, Plaintiff, v. DAVID FOOTE, Defendant. Case No. 14-cv-03078-JSC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81415 June 22, 2015, Decided June 23, 2015, Filed
This case is about a cyber-attack on the global computer network and communication systems of Plaintiff Music Group Macao Commercial Offshore Limited. The music group states that the cyber- attack occurred due to the failures of Defendant David Foote, a technology consultant for the company. Plaintiff Music Group is an international company headquartered in the Philippines with over 3,500 employees, offices in seven countries, and $260 million in annual revenues. Defendant David Foote was an employee of Music Group from 2007 to 2008 as its Chief Technology Officer, responsible for development and deployment of software applications. At that time, Music Group also employed a separate individual as Chief Information Officer, and that person was responsible for the company's network infrastructure. In 2010, Plaintiff contacted Defendant seeking assistance with technology issues. In discussions about the possibility of Defendant coming on board, Defendant held himself out as an experienced professional in the ("IT")and ("IS") fields.
On August 27, 2010, Plaintiff entered into a written agreement to provide services to Plaintiff. The Agreement that the parties ultimately entered was based on a standard form that Plaintiff's Human Resources Department used to retain consultants. The Agreement was titled "Consultancy Agreement" and provided that Defendant was "deemed to be an independent contractor and not an employee of Plaintiff. Plaintiff agrees that Defendant was hired as a consultant

The Agreement provided that Plaintiff would pay Defendant a minimum of $5,000 per month for Defendant to work remotely with an expected schedule of one 40-hour work week per month. The Agreement further provided that Plaintiff would pay Defendant $125 per hour for additional time worked beyond that amount. The agreement also stated duties.The Consultant shall perform his obligations hereunder faithfully and to the best of his ability under the direction of the [company's] CEO and COO. The Consultant shall devote such of his business time, energy and skill as may be reasonably necessary for the performance of his duties. Nothing contained herein shall require the Consultant to follow any directive or to perform any act which would violate any laws, ordinances, regulations or rules of any governmental, regulatory or administrative body, agent or authority, any court or judicial authority, or any public, private or industry regulatory authority.
Meet with the COO and work on a strategic plan for the IS departments.

Consultant shall indemnify and hold harmless [Plaintiff] and its officers, agents, employees, successors and authorized assigns from and against any and all liabilities, damages, costs, losses, claims, demands, actions, and expenses (including reasonable attorneys' fees) arising in consequence of the gross negligence or willful misconduct of the Consultant or a breach by the Consultant of any term herein or gross negligence on the part of the Consultant in connection with the performance of his duties.

Other provisions specifically provided that they would apply "during and after the Term of the Agreement. ("This provision shall survive the termination of this Agreement."), ("the Consultant covenants and agrees that for a period of twelve (12) months from termination ("During the term of this Agreement and for a period of six (6) months thereafter ("During and after the Term of this Agreement . . . ").)
By its terms, the Agreement was set to last from August 27, 2010 until either party terminated the agreement in turn, explained the circumstances under which either party could terminate the Agreement. First, either party could terminate the Agreement by giving prior written notice to the other party Plaintiff could also terminate the Agreement if, among other grounds for termination, Defendant "is guilty of gross misconduct or any serious or persistent breach of obligations in the provision of the services; . . . brings or is likely to bring [Music Group's] name into disrepute . . . or has been unable, refused or failed to provide any of the services for fourteen (14) days after being instructed by [Music Group] to do so.
2. Defendant's Work at Music Group
Defendant began his work with Plaintiff on August 27, 2010. Plaintiff issued a press release that Defendant helped write announcing that it had appointed Defendant as Chief Technology Officer. (Defendant listed himself as Chief Technology Officer of Music Group on his LinkedIn page, as well. Defendant used the email address "CTO@music-group.com" for correspondence. Defendant worked more than the single 40-hour week contemplated schedule set forth in the Agreement as evidenced by his income, which exceeds the $5,000 monthly flat rate: Plaintiff paid Defendant $61,540 for 5 months of work in 2010, $189,958.86 in 2011, $240,240 in 2012, and $167,670 for eight months of 2013.
In the course of his work pursuant to the Agreement, in September 2010 Defendant drafted the status report labeled "IS and IT Strategy Document," and provided it to Plaintiff. In the report, Defendant identified certain problems with Music Group's systems and set forth a strategy for moving forward. Some of the problems Defendant identified in this report--namely, (1) IT/IS projects were "incompletely implemented, or misimplemented"; (2) a "high degree of fragmentation in the currently implemented systems"; (3) the "current systems are not updated or upgraded"; and (4) the infrastructure is not centrally managed"--were also identified by Presidio, Inc. ("Presidio"), the company Plaintiff hired to assist in its recovery following the cyber- attack, as barriers to recovery. During the course of his work, Defendant also signed contracts with third party companies as Music Group's Chief Technology Officer and without first consulting with Behringer. Within the company, Defendant reported to Behringer regularly about his work with the IT and IS departments. According to Behringer, during those conversations Defendant regularly assured him that the IT and IS systems and infrastructure were secure. Defendant made similar representations to the employees of the IT and IS departments. In July 2013 when Plaintiff suffered a network outage, Defendant emailed all Music Group employees, noting that the stability of the company's infrastructure was his responsibility. Defendant's email footer listed him as the company's Chief Technology Officer.
According to Behringer, all company employees who worked on cyber security reported up the chain of command to Defendant.

Defendant also advised Plaintiff to hire a team of technology professionals. Plaintiff heeded that recommendation, hiring Jim Ratchford as Senior Vice President of Technology and Tim Driggers as Global Vice President of Technology Operations. Driggers had over 20 direct reports in the company's network technology department. Among them were two individuals Driggers hired, Employee 1 and Employee 2, who both worked out of Music Group's United Kingdom offices. Employee 1 was "the manager directly in charge of the network security." Employee 1 reported to Employee 2, who in turn reported up the chain to Driggers.
At some point prior to the cyber- attack, Defendant recalls recommending to Behringer that Employee 1 and Employee 2 be fired. Music Group did not heed the suggestion at that time.

Behringer recalls Defendant recommending that Employee 1 be fired after Employee 1 filed a complaint against Defendant with Human Resources. Employee 1 was eventually terminated after he failed to appear for a meeting with Human Resources regarding that inquiry in August 2013, before the cyber-attack occurred. Defendant also recommended that Employee 2 be fired. Employee 2 was transferred to out of the IT/IS department into a different division at Music Group and stripped of his network administrator rights before the cyber- attack occurred. Like Employee 1, Employee 2 was eventually terminated after the cyber- attack when he failed to appear at a meeting with Human Resources regarding an administrative investigation.
On August 17, 2013, Plaintiff's computer network was subject to an intentional cyber-attack. The cyber-attack rendered Plaintiff's IT and IS systems inaccessible both internally and externally for about one month and destroyed much of its data. The IT and IS systems themselves were inaccessible for even longer.
By August 18, 2013, all switches and routers in Music Group's data center and offices worldwide were "wiped clean of their configuration, rendering them unusable." A number of servers were also wiped clean and rendered unusable. In addition, the company's "Active Directory" was completely wiped out of all user accounts, save four.

At Defendant's suggestion, Behringer retained Presidio to assist with data recovery efforts. Presidio manager Phil Crook urged Behringer to fire Defendant (as well as Ratchford) because they were hindering and jeopardizing Presidio's recovery efforts. Behringer apparently heeded that recommendation: Plaintiff sent Defendant a termination letter dated August 28, 2013, which stated in relevant part that Defendant's "services to the Music Group . . . are no longer required" effective August 23, 2013. The termination letter directed Defendant to "immediately discontinue using all work products and other property that belongs to the Company" and reminded Defendant of his "legal obligations to the Company, which survive beyond service contract."
Shortly after the cyber- attack Plaintiff conducted an internal investigation and concluded that two IT employees had likely carried out the attack. (identifying the two individuals as the only employees who fit the profile of individuals who might carry out such an attack; ("Our internal investigations are clearly pointing to our employees [Employee 2] and [Employee 1] as suspects.").) The report notes that the conclusions were reached "in the absence of a formal and thorough forensic investigation" and was instead based only on "inputs and comments . . . from [Music Group] staff who was most closely involved in the recovery effort." (Id. at 2.) Behringer reported the cyber attack to the police in the United Kingdom and identified two employees as the company's main suspects; Behringer later learned that one of them had been arrested, and then released after he denied involvement in the attack. Behringer avers that the company still does not know who perpetrated the cyber attack.