At the turn of the 20th century China was the world's oldest continuously extant civilization, being four thousand years old, but, a mere twenty years later that bastion of civilization was thrown into turmoil and discord by the arrival of western civilizations who brought with them a new ethos and dictum on the structure of society that, would open the eyes of the insular Chinese people and awaken the great sleeping dragon, that would propel them into modernity. A number of factors were present in China at the turn of the century that would led to the gradual establishment of Communist rule under the charismatic, enigmatic Mao Zedong. At the time of the CCP's inception in 1920 China was a deeply divided socially, economically and politically backward country ruled by self-serving, despotic war-lords and encumbered by foreign powers who held unequal treaties which entitled them to special economic and territorial privileges in China, a source of great discontent to the Chinese people. This great social upheaval gave rise to new and more radicalized schools of thought, led by disenchanted intellectuals who strove to unify China and rid her of her many tyrannical overlords.The Nationalist KMT Party were the Communists main contender for power; not only were they the public face of politics in China, they also had the backing of Soviet Russia, but, over time Chiang Kai-Shek and the KMT would come to represent consummate despotism; Siphoning of public funds, their brutality towards the people, their liaisons with the U.S.A, and their appeasement of Japan all led Chiang and his Government losing legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The Long March although arduous and cost the lives of many of those who took part in it, but it was also a period of momentous change both in the fortunes of the party as they had now established strong peasant support due to land reforms and for Mao who was now rising through the ranks after the Zunyi conference and the defeat of the 28 Bolsheviks. The Sino-Japanese War in which Japan sought to expand it's imperialist ambitions and dominate China, was vehemently opposed in China and the Communist Party were viewed by the peasantry as the party that was pro-active in it's approach to dealing with the Japanese, rather than the appeasement policy pursued by Chiang. The civil war that followed the defeat of Japan would culminate in the CCP's victory over the KMT and dominance over all China. .

The CCP drew its inspiration from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 as it clearly demonstrated to the Chinese people that radical change in the prevailing social structure could be achieved through the power of the people. The astute Russians keenly aware of the Marxist prediction that for, "...the possibility of a successful socialist revolution...were complimented by similar revolutions in Western Europe.". Engels., and Marx,K.2008.pp,16), were only to happy to advise and assist in China's conversion to communism, they did this by sending a delegate of the Far Eastern Bureau to China, Voitinsky the Russian advisor whom according to Dirlik, "...his visit marks at once a conclusion and a new beginning.", (Dirlik.1989.pp,156), as now the May Fourth period of Marxism had reached its conclusion and a new social revolution was dawning. The key to this was organization of the fledgling party, a task which took two years to implement. Mao Zedong one of the party's founding members believed that a, "commonly shared ideology.". (Schwartz.1970.pp,86), was key to gaining a strong foothold in China. This shared ideology Mao believed to be Nationalism followed by independence and finally social reform.Much debate has arisen over the question of Chinese nationalism and how it catapulted to the fore of Chinese political thinking, Eric Hobsbawn believed it to be, "...the eventual product of Western influence and Western conquest.".(Hobsbawn.1962.pp,39), this concept is reiterated by Johnson, but instead of Western influence he believed that functionalist nationalism was roused by the aggression of Japan, "...masses of China were awakened by the Japanese invasion.". (Johnson.1962.pp,194). This new nationalist conscience however awakened had to be harnessed in order for it work for China as a whole and Mao believed that, "...the great union of the popular masses.", (The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung), would be central to the future of China. The KMT or Nationalist party promoted democracy which was described as being, "...elusive...", (Mitter.1660.pp,97), due to the fact that the term democracy was relatively new to China, but, they based their party on the ideals of nationalism, democracy and socialism. The Comintern pushed for a United Front between the KMT and communists, but they believed the KMT were, "...the appropriate party to carry the revolution out.". (Mitter.2005.pp,143), as the Soviets were ardent when it came to the Marxist principle that, industrial revolution must precede the communist revolution. A precarious alliance followed but, both parties benefited greatly from, "...Soviet aid and especially from the advice on revolutionary, political and military organization provided by Borodin." (Lieberthal.2004.pp,41). In 1927 Chiang Kai-shek organized the Northern Expedition, comprised of both KMT and Communist forces, to rid the country of troublesome warlords and regain Shanghai. The operation was a success, and gained foreign recognition for the Nationalist Party and Chiang, over the militaristic government in Beijing. Chiang also decided that the United Front was no longer a viable option for his party and ordered the massacre of all known CCP members and sympathizers by the opprobrious Green Gang. The massacre lasted for weeks and a approximately 12,000 communists were purged, the most notable of these being Li Dazhao, co-founder of the CCP. This purge and the following ones would decimate the hierarchy of the CCP and therefore making it easier for astute men like Mao to gain control of the party. After the massacre factions of the CCP fled to a stronghold in Jiangxi province of southeastern China to establish a stable base in which to launch their war against Chiang and the KMT.

The Jiangxi-Soviet era marked a new beginning for the communists and Mao, when in 1931 a meeting of the First All-China Soviet Congress was held, it established a national regime and Mao was appointed chair of the government. The new government had under it's control a large part of China, "...containing about three million people,...It adopted a constitution; in the area of its rule, it issued laws and maintained political and military control.". (Schoppa.2005.pp,228). The CCP now recognized that a peasant based revolution was the most pertinent way of achieving a socialist revolution. China was a land dominated by its peasant masses and Mao believed that these masses could be the key to winning the revolution. This could be achieved by winning the support of the local peasantry, Mao intended to realize this by treating the peasants with dignity, respect and as citizens of China, he instructed his revolutionaries to, "...inform them in detail regarding the policies and methods and discuss it with them many times. Display a solicitous and caring attitude and strictly avoid erroneous attitudes such as looking down on them, neglecting them, ridiculing them and treating them with indifference...". (Schram.2005.pp,77). Mao's Jiangxi-Soviet issued a land law that was to become the, "...Heart of the revolution..." (Schoppa.2006.pp,228), it called for the redistribution of land confiscated from landlords to poor and middle peasants. This would have serious ramifications and implications in China for years to come, as this inevitably alienated the whole middle-class strata of society, that would be crucial to the CCPs survival in the coming Japanese invasion. The redistribution of land as Bianco attests, "The economic policy pursued by the CCP did not automatically ensure them of peasant support.".(Bianco.1998.pp,165). The question of peasant support is negligible as, "...deep-seated peasant support was not necessary to produce the CCP's success.".(Jacoby.,and White.1980.pp,38). Saich contends that a more pertinent key was that, "...hostile groups should acquiesce...", (Saich., and Yang.1995.pp,242), whereas Kataoka believes that, "The CCP'S own power rested on a mobilized peasantry.". (kataoka.1974.pp,147). Mao's position had been weakened during this era and his influence on CCP affairs was minimal, due to the returned students commonly referred to as the 28 Bolsheviks in particular, "...Po Ku who handled party affairs and Chou En-Lai, who supervised the military." (Nolan.1966.pp,85). In 1934 after a series of costly strategic defeats and the failures of the CCP leadership, Mao benefited from not being a member of the hierarchy as the blame for the failures could not be his, the blame lay with the 28 Bolsheviks who now lost their control over the party and after it became apparent that the Red Army could not defend the Central Soviet the decision was made to leave the Jiangxi region, what ensued would become almost mythical in the eyes of the Chinese people for decades to come, and, would be instrumental in the rise of Mao and the CCP.

The CCP in order to avoid total annihilation by the KMT had to leave their stronghold and flee the Jiangxi region, the March was described by one historian as, "...a costly strategic defeat...". (Lieberthal.2005.pp,226), whereas another historian maintains that it, "...resulted from the harsh circumstances imposed on the CCP by it's enemy...". (Kataoka.1974.pp,221). Chiang Kai-Shek was determined to eradicate the CCP threat to his imperialist aspirations, Chiang and the KMT were dependent on imperialist powers like the USA who, "...provided free arms and material to those fighting Axis aggressors.". (Schoppa.2005.pp,276), they also received 750 million in aid from America to resist Japanese advances Chiang and his generals pocketed the money, showing both contempt and disdain for the people in who's name they served and, "Chiang's government was not only isolated from the people they were hostile to them...". (Shuzi.1951.pp,7). CCP writers declared of them that the, "Feudal values of the Nationalists and their lackeys meant that they had no concern for the misery in rural areas.". (Mitter.2005.pp,149). This indifference to the populace made the CCP a more attractive, viable option to the morally bankrupt, despotic KMT, the people now viewed the CCP as the party who, "...might better realize Sun Yat-Sen's, 'Three Peoples Principles', than Chaing Kai-shek's KMT.". (Thaxton.2008.pp,32). Mao had to say of them, "...the Koumintang... cannot 'defend the country' nor can they 'protect the people'. (The Selected Works). Chiang and his regime had adopted an appeasement policy towards the Japanese who had held territory in China since 1911 a source of great discontent to the Chinese people, furthering their support for the CCP. It was during the Long March and the Zunyi conference that, "...changes in the party leadership, but also in relations to the Comintern." (Kampen.2000.pp,75), had taken place, the hardship of the March had decimated the approximate 100,000 people who had endured the six thousand mile journey over 368 days, further weakening the leadership of the CCP, as many leaders like so many others succumbed to illness along the journey, allowing ambitious men like Mao to take a more central role. Internal conflicts within the CCP were rife during the long March as different ideas on strategies and tactics were propounded by various leaders, Zhang Guotao and Mao engaged in a rancorous struggle on which revolutionary road to take. Zhang had 80,000 men at his command compared to Mao's paltry 15,000, both men were wrestling for political dominance of the party and an inevitable split ensued. Mao accused Guotao of displaying, "...Warlord tendencies...". (Shoppa.2006.pp,236). Guotao sealed his fate when 75% of his troops were decimated, this disastrous defeat discredited Guotao both to the CCP and the Comintern who now gave greater support to Mao. At the Zunyi conference Mao criticized the military tactics utilized to defeat the KMT and was supported in his analogy by the military who now were, "...The first to rally to support Mao."(Saich.1995.pp,134). Even though Mao had gained the respect and support of the military he did not take over leadership of the CCP, he moved his marchers to the Shanxi Province with the view of establishing a new base. "The Long March did represent a political victory for the Chinese Red Army." (Braun,1982.pp,146), but it decimated that armies numbers but gave them and Mao a greater insight into the implementation of strategic warfare, and his, "...talent as a military thinker developed a strategy of guerrilla warfare psychologically waged." (Nolan.1966.pp,90). The March also served to imbue Mao with the idea that, "He and he alone would be the one to lead China...", (Schoppa.2006.pp,237), Mao's astuteness as a politician is evident in this era also as he realized that his, "...strength lay in the weakness of several politburo members." (Kampen.2000.pp,96). For another four years the power struggle still raged on, before he would gain control for himself he would once again have to join forces with Chiang the KMT and Moscow, to counter the Japanese invasion.

Japanese imperial, expansionist ambitions would have put the aspirations of Hitler to shame due to the expanse of territory they wished to dominate. Japan's economy as that of most nations in the 1930's was in a very precarious position due to the Wall Street crash of 1929. The Japanese had ambitions on China's vast natural resources and in 1937 their intent to dominate the whole of China was made clear with the Marco Polo Bridge incident and the notorious 'Rape of Nanjing', thus began the eight year long Sino-Japanese war. The KMT and the CCP negotiated a second United Front and a cessation to hostilities to counter the Japanese threat was implemented. Kampen debates whether the Second United Front came into being as a consequence of, "CCP policy and independence or a consequence of Comintern or Soviet strategy and dominance.".(Kampen.2000.pp,321). Johnson argues that the mere creation of the United Front, "...supports the contention that the CCP acted as a Soviet tool...". (Johnson.1962.pp,32). The Comintern Congress of 1935 had called for a United front but, Saich argues that it would be difficult to prove, "...that communications existed between the two control centers...".(Saich.,and Yang.1962.pp,137). Otto Braun in his memoirs maintains that radio communications did take place between the two, "...impelled by a radio message...Stalin had personally intervened and sent Mao Tse-Tung an ultimatum...". (Braun.1982.pp,266). Even if evidence of radio communications are hard to establish, the role of Wang Ming and his personal communication of Comintern objectives are not. Ming had traveled to Russia and, "...encouraged closer co-operation with Chiang Kai-shek and criticized...Mao's speech of 12 November.". (kampen.2000.pp,90). Mao's speech was disparaging of Chiang and the KMT and of them he had to say, " The war of partial resistance advocated by the Kuomintang also constitutes a national war and it's revolutionary in character to a certain extent, it's revolutionary character is far from complete. Partial resistance is bound to lead to defeat in war.". (The Selected Works of Mao). As a result Mao's position was once again in a tenuous position due to the influence and dominance the Comintern held over the CCP, the Politburo designated responsibility for the United front work to Ming. When Ming's strategies failed and he lost Wuhan in 1938 the Comintern withdrew support but he wasn't openly criticized or removed from the party. During 'The Peoples War of Resistance', the CCP implemented further social-economic policies such as, rent and interest control and an end to abuses in tax collection. They also educated the peasants in basic reading and writing furthering their standing with the peasants. By the end of the war with Japan the CCP were in control of 19 base areas and party membership stood at 1 million. The CCP that emerged from the war in 1945 had it's own distinct form of communism. The civil war that ensued with Chiang pitted the CCP against a KMT force three times its size, but it was poorly led peasant based force who were prone to defect to the CCP, who's land reforms had a strong appeal to them. Chiang's post-war inflation policies were extremely unpopular and further alienated him from the people and that enabled Mao and the CCP to capitalize on their failings furthering their support.

Saich writing in 1995 informs us that, "...from 1921 to 1937 Communism failed in China because the Chinese people were indifferent to what the Communist Party had to offer.".(Saich., and Yang.1995.pp,354), this could be due to the fact that they were, "...wholly absorbed in local affairs.". (Johnson.1962.pp,5). The question of whether early Soviet intervention into Mao's policy of mobilizing the peasantry may have speeded up the revolution is open to subjection. Schwartz, "...acknowledged the debt owed by the Communists to Bolshevik theory and organization, but, was keenly aware of the traditional influences and originality of Mao that was important after 1927.".(Schwartz.1970.pp,45), but, Schram was keen to stress, "...that much happened in spite of the Comintern influence rather than because of it.".(Schram.1994.pp,249). After the Japanese invasion of 1937 the question to be asked is whether the Chinese people were more open to the ideologies of the CCP due to the fact that they responded as Nationalists to the Japanese threat or, if they were more open to the CCP as their broad socio-economic policies had strong appeal to them or both, Johnson argues that the CCP used the Japanese invasion to, "...portray the CCP as a patriotic party."(Johnson.1962.pp,27), Bianco reiterates that it was the, "...national problem, not the social problem, that acted as a catalyst...",(Bianco.1998.pp,37), whereas Kataoka maintains that it was the, "...CCP's organizational control that led to it's victory.". (kataoka.1974.pp,59). The failures of Chiang and the KMT party were also instrumental in the rise of Mao and the CCP, his appeasement of Japan and harsh economic policies turned the people towards the CCP who were the only viable alternative to his Governments extreme corruption. The CCP through their ability to develop techniques for achieving, "...sustained peasant political development...", (Terrill.1999.pp,129), and mobilizing that peasant force was instrumental in their success also. The CCP by 1949 had catapulted themselves to the fore of Chinese politics and were responsible for, "...the establishment of a new political system, a change in the national character and a reforming of society.". (Schram.1995.pp,126).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bianco, L. (1998). Origins of the Chinese Revolution 1915-1949. Stanford University Press. California.
Braun. O. (1982). A Comintern Agent in China 1932-1939. Stanford University Press. California.
Dirlik, A. (1989). The Origins of Chinese Communism. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
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Lieberthal, K. (2004). Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform. W.W Norton & Company Inc. London.
Mitter, R. (2005). A Bitter Revolution, China's Struggle with the Modern World. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
Saich, T., and Yang., B. (1995). The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party: Documents and Analysis. An East Gate Book. U.S.A.
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Terrill, R. (1999). Mao. A Biography. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
Thaxton, R. (2008). Catastrophe and Contention in Rural China. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.

JOURNALS

Nolan,J, M. (1996) The Long March: Fact and Fancy. Military Affairs. 30 (2). Summer,pp77-90.
Schram, S, R. (1994) Mao Zedong a Hundred Years On: The Legacy of a Ruler. The China Quarterly. 137. Mar, pp125-143.

WEBSITES
The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung.http://www.marxists.org/refrence/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswr_06.html (Accessed 21 March 2015).

Shuzi,P. (1951) The Causes of the Victory of the Chinese Communist Party over Chiang Kai-Shek Availablefrom:http://marxists.org/archive/peng/1951/nov/causes.html (Accessed 29 April 2015)