Marlborough at Ramillies
Marlborough at Ramillies

Marlborough at Ramillies

by
2LT John C. Flanagan
SFC Booth
AOB 10-94
Executive Summary
John Churchill, the Duke of Marlborough, is undoubtedly one of the greatest military commanders ever. Even though he commanded his armies in the early eighteenth century, there are many things we can learn from him. One way to gain this knowledge is by examining the Duke's leadership at the battle of Ramillies through the Principles of War.

Marlborough at Ramillies
1
The Age of Reason was "a time when the ordinary officer preferred anything to fighting, [but] Marlborough . . . preferred fighting to anything."1 John Churchill, the Duke of Marlborough, loved the battlefield and this coupled with his military genius enabled him to defeat the French on every confrontation. One of the best examples of the Duke's outstanding generalship is Ramillies. Even though the Allied and French forces were numerically equivalent, Marlborough's military dexterity and expertise allowed him to defeat Villeroy (also spelled Villeroi) at Ramillies.2 In order to argue this point, I will examine Marlborough in this battle at the tactical level by using the Principles of War.
Europe was weary after the devastation of the Thirty Years' War. The European countries found that war was very costly--in both money and lives. "It was an era dominated by the negativeness of the defensive--conduct a siege, make a march, threaten a flank, but avoid the enemy army."3 Both Churchill and his wife Sarah were good friends of Queen Anne. The Queen allowed him to do whatever he thought necessary; therefore, he was not constrained with the ideals of the Age of Reason. Marlborough, along with Prince Francois Eugene of Savoy, stood out during the Age of Reason because of their "unusual opinions: that wars were to be won, that armies were to fight, that the initiative was to be seized and maintained, and that the enemy army was the supreme objective."4 The War of Spanish Succession allowed each of them to use their expertise to carry out the "unusual opinions."
Indeed, the fight for the throne of Spain--vacated by Charles the Sufferer--provided the setting for Marlborough's campaigns. Both France and the Empire had viable claims to the throne. However, if either side were to gain Spain, the delicate European balance of power would have been disrupted. Diplomats from the two sides and Spain had decided to divide up the spoils equally in order to keep the balance. Just before his death, though, Charles decided that he did not want his empire divided; he changed his will leaving the throne of Spain to the grandson of Louis XIV. Thus began the War of Spanish Succession.5
In order to fully understand this battle, you must analyze the technology of the time. The infantry, as it had always been, remained the centerpiece for tactics. The infantry used flintlock muskets. This advance over the matchlock increased both mobility and firepower because the flintlock was less cumbersome and quicker to fire. The soldier no longer had to use a rest to support the barrel when firing. In addition this musket was outfitted with a socket bayonet rather than the plug type. This allowed for the possibility of firing the weapon while the bayonet was fixed. This in turn alleviated the need for pikemen, thereby increasing firepower even more.2
England entered the war in 1701 and it lasted through about 1712. In this twelve year period, "although Marlborough was pre-eminently a seeker of battles, . . . he conducted thirty sieges and fought only four major actions in the open field."6 There are two reasons for his restriction. First, although Queen Anne gave Marlborough free rein to fight as he wished, he still had to appease the "timorous counsels of his allies."7 On several occasions Marlborough was in a very advantageous position to defeat the French Army, but was stopped by the Dutch Government and other allies.8 Second, the Duke was faced with Louis XIV's bastion system of fortification developed by his chief engineer, Vauban. These fortifications slowed his progress by forcing him to conduct numerous sieges and retain a large battering train. "Marlborough's train of eighteen heavy guns and twenty siege mortars required 16,000 horses and 3,000 wagons to move it and covered thirty miles of highway."9
Even with these obstacles in his way, he still managed to meet up with the French army in the Battle of Ramillies. This battle was fought on 23 May 1706 in northwestern Europe, the Lowlands.3 Although the two armies were looking for each other, this meeting was mutually unexpected--both sides expected that they would meet in a couple more days at the earliest. Marlborough intended to camp for the evening in the town of Ramillies. However, Villeroy already had his troops encamped at this location. At one o'clock in the morning, the opposing sides discovered each other and the battle ensued.4
Both sides brought their men on-line. However, Marlborough used the terrain to his advantage and assumed a convex front forcing Villeroy's army to take up a concave front. This allowed the Duke to transfer men from his flanks much easier than the French. The Duke's Allied forces were also more compact.
The battle began with artillery at about 1:30 in the afternoon on the following day. Marlborough began with cavalry probes from both wings. Then he sent the English unit that was on the right through difficult marshes toward the French. Many historians argue whether this was indeed a failed attack or a feint. The most probable explanation is that the Duke was testing the sector for a possible main attack. Then, he found the marshes on the right impeded the foot soldiers enough so that mutual horse and artillery support were not feasible. Therefore, Marlborough probably decided that he could not attack on the right.5
Villeroy, seeing the red coats of the English unit and thinking that Marlborough would use them for his main attack, transferred men from the center and reserves to the right flank. Taking advantage of this transfer and his convex formation, Marlborough then attacked the weakened French center as he did at Blemheim. He used cavalry charges on the left to support this attack--two of which he led himself.
The Allies crushed the French. The battle lasted through the night as Marlborough pursued Villeroy for over fifteen miles.6 The Duke lost approximately 3,700 men while the French lost about 13,000.7
Many historians consider this battle one of the finest ever fought, yet it lasted only twenty-four hours. Therefore, it is important to examine the battle, specifically the Duke of Marlborough's actions, by using the principles of War: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity.8
Marlborough always kept the overall objective of the War of Spanish Succession in focus. "His war was fought for limited political objectives, not for some romantic ideal."9 The objective was not to gain territory for England, rather it was to "bring the greatest monarchy in Europe to its knees," thus restoring the balance of power in Europe.10 Thus he fought tactical battles of annihilation to gain the strategic goal of attrition.
The Duke also kept the objective in focus during the Battle of Ramillies. To defeat the French, he had to destroy Louis the XIV's army. Therefore, Marlborough was not content, and did not stop, with merely taking over the territory in the Lowlands--this was not the goal. Instead, he sought to deal Villeroy a crushing and costly defeat. As evidence of his intentions, Marlborough made plans to decimate the French Army from the very first indication that the French Army was nearby on 18 May.11 Then, early in the morning on 23 May, when the scouts of the two armies made contact with one another, Marlborough planned accordingly:
Marlborough could not know at this moment whether the enemy would fight or retreat. He resolved forthwith to attack in either event. If he was in the presence only of a rearguard, he would fall upon them with all his cavalry; if, on the other hand, they were prepared to defend the Ramillies position, a general battle would at once be fought.12
The previous quotation leads to the next principle, offensive. As indicated above, Marlborough wanted to seize the opportunity afforded to him "immediately."13 The hastiness at which Marlborough began the attack is indication of his initiative. Immediately after he was informed of the contact, he moved his troops into position, reconnoitered the battlefield with his subordinate commanders, and by 1430 the same day began his attack.14 In addition to his speediness, the Duke also maintained the offensive in his pursuit of Villeroy. This pursuit, which was "a most unusual event in that age of overcautious warfare . . . succeeded in destroying the French army."15
Another aspect of attaining the offensive is exploitation, which can work in conjunction with the next principle of war, mass.16 This is best exemplified in his charging cavalry at the chosen point in the French line. Marlborough led the charge of eighteen squadrons of cavalry from the left wing, and transferred an additional twenty-one squadrons from the right wing to attack here as well.17 (See the map in the appendix.) This transfer gave Marlborough the decisive advantage, for he now had 108 squadrons--thirty-nine of which were fresh--against Villeroy's original sixty-eight that faced the initial charge.18 (As an aside, this is a great example of the Duke's courage. In leading the charge, he "twice came near death--once when he was unhorsed and overridden in a ditch, and later when a French cannonball took the head off the equerry who was assisting him to remount.")19
Throughout the literature dealing with Marlborough, there is little mention of his use of economy of force. However, as evidenced in the Battle of Ramillies, Marlborough never actually outnumbered his opponent by more than a few thousand troops--at Ramillies he had 62,000 men while Villeroy had 60,000.20 However, at the decisive point in the battle, he outnumbered the French five to three.21
Although "neither Marlborough nor [Villeroy] can be credited with selecting [Ramillies] for its tactical possibilities," the Duke did quickly take advantage of the terrain and used excellent maneuver.22 He used the terrain to force Villeroy into a concave formation, thus making his center vulnerable and giving Marlborough interior lines.23 This allowed Churchill to transfer his cavalry easily, and allowed him to divide it up among both the left and the right flanks.24 This is what enabled him to exploit the charge as previously mentioned.
In a battle Marlborough had excellent control and unity of command, which is the sixth principle of war. In the war in general, Marlborough had difficulty "getting permission" from the allied leaders to undergo some missions, but once he engaged the enemy, there was no doubt who was in charge. An excellent example of this is Orkney's initial attack at Ramillies. Marlborough's plan was to feint an attack to the right, and then attack the vulnerable center at the town of Ramillies.25 Orkney's attack had worked so well that he had "an excellent chance of turning the French left wing."26 Indeed, he was "surprised" when numerous messengers conveyed the Duke of Marlborough's order to withdraw to the east bank.27 Even though Orkney did not understand the order--and in fact disagreed with it--he withdrew immediately as ordered.28 (It is important to note that "in order that [the feint] should appear the more convincing the Duke had let Orkney believe that it was the real thing.")29 Furthermore, Marlborough did not let his subordinates persuade him to change his plans as Goslinga tried to do.30
The next two principles, security and surprise, can be discussed simultaneously.31 The key to both of these principles is Marlborough's use and knowledge of terrain. Marlborough used the maps constructed by English and French engineers when planning his operations at Ramillies.32 He knew what to expect from the French because of "his eye, memory for country, and knowledge" he knew where "the French might be inclined to occupy . . . and where the battle might be fought" five days before arriving at Ramillies.33 Furthermore, the Duke used a fold in the terrain to mask the movement of his cavalry to surprise the French.34 This is what made it possible to destroy the center of the French line at the town of Ramillies.
The final principle of war is simplicity. The organization and tactics of Marlborough's army are demonstrative of the principle. "Marlborough was not an innovator, an inventor of completely new tactical systems . . . . He was . . . content to take over and bring to perfection . . . existing tactics and equipment."35 Besides using linear tactics, the Duke's cavalry mimicked that of Gustavius Adolphus.36 Furthermore, Churchill did not invoke elaborate maneuvers during battles. Instead, he chose to use simple flanking movements and envelopments.
The final result was a rout of the French. Marlborough "reached the summit of his military fame."37 This crushing victory cause Vendome to write, "Everyone here is ready to take off his hat at the mere name of Marlborough."38
By analyzing the Duke of Marlborough through the principles of war, it is easy to see that these plaudits are not unfounded. Put quite simply, Marlborough was a military genius. As Sir Winston Churchill writes, "Ramillies will rank for ever 'as an example of what a general can do with men.' The opposing sides were almost equal in numbers, but Marlborough gained the [overwhelming] victory . . . ."39 And, this victory was the beginning of the end of the War of Spanish Succession.

Works Cited
Alger, John I. Definitions and Doctrine of the Military Art, Past and Present. The West Point Military History Series. Edited by Thomas E. Griess. Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1985.
This source will provide background information. It contains many of the terms that will be used in the paper.
Barnett, Correlli. The First Churchill: Marlborough, Soldier and Statesman. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1974.
Contains both bibliographical information and some information on the actual battle. This source will probably be used sparingly, as it is primarily biographical on the entire life of Marlborough.
Britt, Albert Sidney, III et al. The Dawn of Modern Warfare. The West Point Military History Series. Edited by Thomas E. Griess. Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1984.
This source provides background information on Marlborough and his battles. It also discusses other events of the time and the makeup of his army.
Chandler, David. Marlborough as a Military Commander. London: B. T. Batsford LTD, 1973.
Chandler looks at many of the "behind the scenes" decisions. He does not go into the battle of Ramillies extensively, however.
Chidsey, Donald Barr. Marlborough: The Portrait of a Conqueror. New York: The John Day Company, 1929.
This source contains primarily information concerning the diplomatic aspects of Marlborough and biographical information.
Churchill, Winston S. Marlborough: His Life and Times. Abridged by Henry Steele Commager. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968.
This is the best source for bibliographical information. Surprisingly, it also contains nearly 20 pages on the battle of Ramillies alone. Department of History, USMA. "Cadet Notebook, HI 301, AY 92-93."
The Cadet Notebook provides information concerning the art of war. It contains time lines, definitions, and other useful information. It also contains the Principles of War, which is used to asses Marlborough's leadership.
FM 22-100. Military Leadership. U.S. Government Printing Office: 1985.
This field manual describes the "traits of character" that a good leader should display. These "traits" will provide accepted measures upon which Marlborough can be examined.
Fortescue, Sir John William. Marlborough. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1932.
This is a secondary source that contains a great deal of primary materials such as letters and plans. This will prove very beneficial since primary material on this subject is rather difficult to find.
Haythornthwaite, Philip J. Invincible Generals. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991.
Invincible Generals is a very factual account of five of the most successful military leaders of all time: Gustavus Adulphus, Marlborough, Frederik The Great, George Washington, and Wellington. In each section on the individual leader, Haythornthwaite gives an overview of the style of warfare and the current technology.
Nicholson, Gerald W. L. Marlborough and the War of Spanish Succession. Ottawa: Queen's Press, 1955.
The author provides a good account of the entire war. He includes a lot of primary material. He also has an entire chapter on Ramillies, which provides the best account of the battle. There is also a very detailed, yet legible map that is included in the appendix.
Strachan, Hew. European Armies and the Conduct of War. London: Unwin Hyman, 1983.
This contains very little information on Marlborough, per se. However, he puts the Duke in perspective in relation to other great leaders. 1Albert Sidney Britt, III et al., The Dawn of Modern Warfare (Wayne, NJ: Avery, 1984) 76. 2Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London: Unwin Hyman, 1983) 16-19.
3Britt 77.

4Britt 7
7.
5Britt 7
4.

2Philip J. Haythornwaite, Invincible Generals (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991) 63-6
4.
6Strachan 1
1.
7Correlli Barnett, The First Churchill: Marlborough, Soldier and Statesman (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1974) 26
4.
8Britt 7
7.
9Strachan 1
1.
3Sir John William Fortescue, Marlborough (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1932) 8
9.
4 Haythornthwaite 8
2.
5David Chandler, Marlborough as a Military Commander, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973) 17
6.
6Gerald W. L. Nicholson, Marlborough and the War of Spanish Succession (Ottawa: Queen's Press, 1959) 9
6.

7Haythornwaite 8
3.
8Department of History, USMA, "Cadet Notebook" (HI 301, AY 92-93) vii
i.
9Barnett 26
3.
10Barnett 26
3.
11Winston S. Churchill, Marlborough: His Life and Times ed. Henry Steele Commager (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968) 374, 50
7.
12Churchill 50
9.
13Churchill 50
9.
14Churchill 50
9.
15Britt 8
9.
16"Cadet Notebook" vii
i.
17Nicholson 9
4.
18Nicholson 9
4.
19Nicholson 9
4.
20Britt map 6b in chapter
6.
21Nicholson 9
4.
22Nicholson 8
9.
23Nicholson 9
1.
24Nicholson 91-9
2.
25Nicholson 9
3.
26Nicholson 9
3.
27Nicholson 9
3.
28Nicholson 9
3.
29Nicholson 9
3.
30Churchill 51
0.
31"Cadet Notebook" vii
i.
32Churchill 50
7.
33Churchill 50
7.
34Nicholson 91-92; 9
3.
35Barnett 26
2.
36Strachan 1
8.
37Nicholson 10
0.
38Nicholson 10
0.
39Nicholson 10