In that instance, “the Legislature contemplated that those accidents would be part and parcel of workplace hazards covered by workers’ compensation.” Id. Ultimately, the NJSC held that the evidence was insufficient to make a prima facie showing that either of the prongs could be established. Id.

In Tomea, NJSC Justice Zazzali and Albin dissented. Both stated that the Laidlow and Millison doctrine must “recognize that in the year 2003 an employer's willful and knowing removal or disengagement of a safety device intended to protect a worker from serious bodily injury or death is not a “simple fact” of industrial life, that such conduct alone is a total breach of the social contract between the employee and employer, and that under those circumstances the employer should be barred from the safe harbor of the Workers' Compensation Act.” Id, at 384. …show more content…
In 2012, a carpenter brought a cause of action against his employer for an injury while making plunge cuts to six pieces of lumber because the saw guard was removed. Menkevich v. Delta Tools, No. A-1950-10T2, 2012 WL 986995, at *1 (App. Div. Mar. 26, 2012). The Appellate Division held that the defendant’s claims were barred by the Workers' Compensation Act because (1) there was no evidence that any employee was injured using the unguarded saw, (2) there was no evidence of any “close calls,” similar to Laidlow, (3) the employer didn’t install the safety guards because it might slow down work, similar to Laidlow, and (4) the plaintiff admitted that the cuts were made in a riskier fashion with a raised blade and the cuts could have been made using an alternative device that was safer.