Mexico: Drugs or Democracy
Introduction
Illicit drug trade between Mexico and the United States, estimated between $17 billion and $38 billion a year in 2009 by the Drug Intelligence Center, has a long and storied past. Cartels operated with relative impunity from government prosecution during the seventy year reign of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, (PRI). The movement from an authoritarian government system of the PRI to the liberal democracy initiated by the election victory of the National Action Party, (PAN), candidate, Vicente Fox, in 2000, disrupted the status quo. Election gains by PAN Representatives disrupted long standing agreements between the cartels and government officials which led to the increased violence that exists today. This paper will explore the history of the relationship between the cartels and the PRI. The effect of the increased violence from the cartels inhibits the efforts of PAN party officials to establish a lasting democracy.
Literature Review
Research shows the three distinct stages in the development of a cohesive relationship between drug cartels and government in Mexico and identifies the political and economic conditions that have allowed the drug trade to thrive. Comparing Mexico with Columbia, another narcotics state, provides an additional case study on the subject matter and highlights actions utilized successfully. A review of the current political and military efforts to curtail corruption within the government provides a point of reference to facilitate an informed view of the current status. Research cannot predict the outcome of the battle for establishment of a lasting democracy, but seeks to suggest possible outcomes dependent on future elections and success of current political efforts. The following literature review traces the history of the drug trade from post revolutionary Mexico after the turn of the twentieth century to present day. By examining the interaction between Mexico’s government and the drug cartels one can see the impact of the effort to establish and maintain a stable democracy.
Drug Trade in Mexico: Luis Astorga’s article titled “The Limits of Anti-Drug Policy in Mexico” chronicles the history of drug trafficking and the relationship of government control dating back to 1914, when the United States banned opium. The governor of Baja California, Esteban Cantu, was the person of record controlling the opium trade which permitted the traffic of the drug while garnering money for Cantu to pay his troops and subsidize his government. The prohibition of opium marked the beginning of an enterprise that offered incentive and a means of control to government officials responsible for the elimination of drugs. Opium traders were allowed to conduct business in exchange for a share of the profits.
Post revolutionary politics led to the creation of the Institutional Revolutionary Party in 1929. The establishment of the PRI created political authority coupled with authoritarian military rule that established a formidable partner for traffickers to operate in conjunction with willing officials. This stage in history marks the beginning of the institutional weakness that created the foundation for seventy years of cooperation between political authorities and traffickers. In the early stage of the relationship, during the period from early 1920’s through 1947, documentation explored by Astorga reveals records of governors of the northern Mexican states speaking of their direct links to drug trafficking. The Mexican officials saw these transactions as business opportunities afforded them by their position, not corruption.
The second stage of the relationship between drug traffickers and politicians began in 1947 when the responsibility to combat drugs shifted from the Department of Health to the Attorney-General of the Republic (PGR). Concurrently, the Federal Security Directorate (DFS) was established as a political police force to the President and similar to the CIA in U.S. The functions of the DFS included the fight against Communism and the enforcement of anti-drug policies. The DFS was supposed to fight drugs but one of the founders, Senator Colonel Carlos Serrano, was tied to the drug cartels. His appointment provided a direct link between the ruling political party and the drug cartels ensuring a flow of profits to government officials in exchange for protection and also mitigated the need for drug traffickers to participate in politics. This collaborative arrangement produced several decades of minimal drug related violence which was directed at opposing groups and did not affect the general population.
Social changes in the United States during the 1960s and 1970 accompanied increased consumption of marijuana and later cocaine use became more widespread in the 19080s. The proliferation of drug use in American society prompted a change in the political view on drugs and the United States government declared “war” on drugs. The U.S. government focused on the drug producing and trafficking nations and pressured those nations into joining the “war”. Mexico was pressured into heightening its efforts to combat drugs which included military operations to destroy drug trade and growing fields. These efforts focused on migrant workers forced into labor by the drug lords, barely disrupting the cartel’s operations.
The link between the DFS and the Mexican political structure came to an end with the assassination of U.S. DEA agent, Enrique Camarena, in 1985 and the subsequent pressure on the Mexican government. President De la Madrid dismantled the DFS and initiated increased efforts to capture and prosecute cartel members. The actions against the cartels lead to increased arrests, but also increased murders of police commanders in retaliation by the drug cartels.
The third stage in the development of the drug trade occurred in 1980 when the PAN party won the governorship in Baja California during the term of PRI President Salinas. Salinas’ brother Raul was implicated in a government scandal involving a high ranking member of a cartel exposing the level of corruption within the PRI government. Astorga emphasizes the relationship between higher levels of violence in states where the political opposition, PAN, gained power over the established PRI. Elections of opposition party officials weakened the dependent relationship between state and local government officials and the local and federal forces that facilitated control of the state. These violent battles between the reformist political and judicial officials and the drug cartels fuel the ongoing violence experienced today. As stated in Political Science by Hague and Harrop, drug cartels previously kept under control by the PRI killed over 6,000 people in 2008.
Undermining the Rule of Law: Democratization and the Dark Side of Police Reform in Mexico by Diane Davis examines political transformation in Mexico City, where partisan political division between the national and local political and judicial officials created an environment of intensified corruption and lawlessness. In her body of work, she explains Mexico City’s paradox as democracy deepens and political parties share power, insecurity and rule of law diminishes, due in large part to the competition for control and fragmentation of authority. Davis expounds on the difficulty distinguishing the cause and effect between violence and democratization. She argues, “The institutionalized legacies of police power inherited from the one-party rule have placed severe constraints on the newly democratic state’s efforts to reform police, perverting even positive gains”. While her work reinforces the relationship between the escalating violence and competing political parties at the state level, she also considers the deteriorating economic factors brought about by the relocation of industry to border towns as a result of NAFTA and the prolonged institutional weakness within the judicial system. Davis calls for Mexico’s citizenship as a whole to mobilize and move toward a strengthened democracy that values the rule of law.
In the case of Columbia, another narcotics state, the transformation of the political regimes toward democracy and disruption of the status quo mirrored in Mexico’s current situation. The compounding factor present in Columbia, highlighted by authors Ferreyra and Segura, Examining the Military in the Local Sphere, was the existence of paramilitary factions and the partial collapse of the state. The legacy of a clientelistic political system, where politicians rewarded their constituents with resources or positions of authority in exchange for support, is common in both countries and accounts for the weakened civilian institutions. The authors predicted back in 2000, the need for intervention by the armed forces in Mexico due to the illegitimacy of the police and judicial systems. The differences between the two countries must be examined to ensure an accurate comparison. The battle for control over certain territories was much more extreme in Columbia than it is in Mexico due to the presence of guerrilla and paramilitary factions that threatened the control of these territories through their use of military force against the Columbian military. The autonomy of the Columbian military from civilian institutions remains greater than that of the Mexican military. Their autonomy has been reinforced by their authority in the resolution of local conflicts. The need for military intervention in the solution of social and political issues in Columbia is much higher than in Mexico due to level and length of the crisis. Despite these differences Columbia and Mexico share similar paths in the pursuit of functioning democracies.
Research Design
Studying the history of the development of the relationship between Mexican drug cartels and government officials reveals how the combination of authoritarian rule of a single-party in conjunction with a weakened police and judicial system provided the necessary elements to facilitate an enduring cohesive relationship. Throughout the seventy year reign of the PRI the level of corruption deepened as the reach of the drug cartels permeated all levels of government. The collusion between the two groups provided a stable government and relatively low level of violence directed at competing cartels, rather than the general public. The tipping point occurred when the PAN party gained control of the Presidency and upset the existing arrangements. The backlash led to a significant increase in violence and the exposure of corruption at all levels.
This research compared the history of Mexico’s drug problem with another Latin American drug state, Columbia, to determine whether a correlation exists between the cause and effects of that countries rise in violence and corruption. Columbia’s struggle toward a democratic society proved similar to that of Mexico, although the presence of strong paramilitary groups and guerilla factions created an additional obstacle in their transition to a democratic state. Effects of weakened police and judicial institutions, competing political parties, and escalating violence from the cartels hampered the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in both Mexico and Columbia. Research Results
From 1929 to 2000 the authoritarian government of the PRI ruled Mexico as the dominant single party and controlled the presidency and legislature. PRI officials established a system of government participation known as clientelism that fostered peace among party loyalists. In exchange for their support even the poorest citizens were able to interact with political officials and get something out of the system. Sharing this small piece of the pie with the general population solidified the PRIs stranglehold on control of the government.
The defeat of the PRI in the election of 2000 marked a turning point in Mexican politics. Long standing collusion between the drug cartels and the judicial and law enforcement branches at the state and local levels was disrupted. Decentralization of power and greater pluralism upset the corrupt relationships that shielded the drug cartels from competition and law enforcement. An underlying consequence of this disruption was a shift in the power sharing between the drug cartels and government. The traditional relationship whereby the traffickers would subordinate to political authorities reversed with the loss of political clout. PAN officials sought to establish a democratic government using a top down approach. Unfortunately, President Vicente Fox’s lack of political support at local levels and inexperience within the legislature rendered his administration ineffective. His successor, current President Felipe Calderon, assumed control in 2006 and declared war on the drug cartels. Calderon employed the use of 45,000 national soldiers in operations against the cartels, which led to the arrest of three drug kingpins and the deaths of three others. The high profile arrests bolstered support for Calderon’s tactics although the death toll, 28,000 since he took office, has outside observers concerned. Calderon attacked the corruption in the police and judiciary and dismissed more than 10% of the federal police force. His policy requires frequent lie detector tests and examination of financial records of all police and military officials. Calderon enlisted the help of the United States government and a joint drug policy, the Merida Initiative, now provides funding and training to help modernize the police and reform the justice system. The efforts of the Calderon administration have produced some success. However, high profile arrests of officials in his administration, including his appointed head of Interpol, Ricardo Gutierrez, in 2008, demonstrate the depth of the corruption within the government.

Analysis
This paper demonstrated the cause and effects of the change in political structure within Mexico from a single party authoritarian rule with a clientelistic relationship within the government and the drug cartels to a functioning liberal democracy. The research details the relatively low levels of violence that resulted from the legacy of cooperation within the police and judicial branches. Once the new Democratic Party gained power and broke the cycle of cooperation, violence increased as the cartels employed aggressive tactics to retain their political influence and continue the flow of drugs. A comparative analysis of the current situation in Mexico with past struggles in Columbia reinforced the correlation between increased violence and a shift from authoritarian rule toward a more democratic government in drug states. In Essentials to Comparative Politics O’Neil points out two problems that affected the depth of the research for this paper: 1) The limited number of available cases and 2) The variables within each country. Although both countries had to contend with drug cartels and corruption, Columbia experienced the added variable of guerrilla and paramilitary groups that exacerbated the level of violence. A strong military presence employed by the government yielded positive results in Columbia, but Mexico has experienced limited success, although the final outcome remains to be seen.
Conclusion
This study links the cause of violence between the Democratic government and the drug cartels to the change in political structure. Efforts to implement a liberal democracy upset the legacy of corruption that existed between the authoritarian government and the cartels. Reforms within the police and judiciary at the federal level yielded limited success. The use of internal military force, deemed necessary by the current President, displaced cartel kingpins but violence and the flow of drugs continues unabated. The United States continues to provide monetary assistance along with technical training to help modernize the police force. However, Shannon O’Neil, in the article Real War in Mexico, proposes a solution that requires the United States to examine its role in the escalating violence and instability in Mexico. She suggests that greater enforcement of existing gun laws would reduce the availability of assault weapons in Mexico. Over 90% of the guns seized in Mexico are traced back to the United States. O’Neil argues that the governments of both countries should target the illicit funds that would disrupt drug operations and allow for the seizure of ill gotten funds. The final proposal would require the U.S. to reduce the demand for drugs, which would lower profits that corrupt officials, buy guns, and threaten Mexico’s democracy. The danger, if we do nothing, could mean that we will have to face the drug cartels on U.S. soil.

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