David Taylor
Ellis
INTS 2130 Analysis paper
Mar 29, 2015
Modern Pirates In some fictional works pirates are portrayed in a heroic way. For example, Luffy, captain of the main band of pirates in the popular anime cartoon One Piece, is depicted as a fun loving adventurer that chases his dreams. He is a character to be emulated. Unfortunately, the modern day Somali pirates of East Africa have that similar effect on some of the Somali people. According to the African Economic Development Institute (AEDI), the bigger and more sophisticated European and Asian fishing ships took advantage of the governmental collapse and the ensuing civil war in Somalia in 1991. With permission of the corrupt military leaders and landlords, they greedily over-fished leaving the poor Somalian fishermen with very little. By 1997, several European countries had polluted Somali waters with their waste worsening the problem for the locals. This forced the Somali fishermen to become the Somali pirates (AEDI 5). Pirates are very wealthy men in their country. In a place where everyone suffers in poverty, a little wealth can seem like the cowl of a cape crusader. Despite their reasoning, the actions of the Somali Pirates are negatively affecting Somalia, neighboring countries and the countries who are taking anti-piracy measures to stop them.
In 2010 it is estimated that pirates indirectly cost their neighbors about 125 billion dollars (“Maritime piracy costs”). Egypt is losing revenue that comes from the fees they charge ships to use the Suez Canal. What would be Suez Canal bound ships are choosing to re-route to avoid the chance of pirates violently seizing their ships and potentially holding valuable passengers and cargo for ransom. This ultimately results in the increase of the final price of the re-routed ship’s contents executed through increasing the cost of shipping. A notable case is the raise in gas prices that occurred as an effect of the Arab nations’ shared border with pirate-affected waters of the Red Sea. The economy of the many states that rely on the oil in the Middle East are affected (AEDI 5). These geographical issues are only a start of the problem. Any country that sends a ship near the Horn of Africa could have the security of that vessel threatened by pirates. Somali Pirates do not use specific countries as a target; the only target is the potential gain from ransom collected. This leads to western countries, like the United States and France, to take a militant stand against the pirates. The existence of this joint navy affects the security of the states involved in donating their troops and resources. In order to do this the United Nations, an intergovernmental organization that represents 193 countries, made political exceptions that allowed western militaries to police Somali waters (AEDI 6). It is estimated that in 2010 about 2 billion dollars was spent on this navy. The direct cost of pirates include but are not limited to the price of paid ransoms, increase use of anti-piracy technology, and the cost to re-route ships. When the numbers were totaled from 2010, it was estimated somewhere between 7 and 12 billion dollars (“Maritime piracy costs”). In addition to the Somali pirates affecting the world’s economies, the pirates are affecting social programs and politics in their own country. The executive director of the World Food Program (WFP), Josette Sheeran, once said “the growing problem of piracy off Somalia which, if unresolved, will sever the main artery of food assistance to the country – and to the people who rely on it for their survival” (“New Pirate Attack”). Somali pirates do not discriminate against the ships targeted for hijacking, and as a result they often take advantage of resource ships headed for their own shores. In effort to secure resources and money by force, the pirates are diminishing the effectiveness of the programs already in place to assist their country as a whole. According to the United Nations Development Programme Somalia, “Huge amounts of money generated by the Somali militia from piracy have prevented communities in the central regions from establishing local administrations . . . . The presence of pirates seems to prolong the Somali conflict” (40). In a way, a terrible cycle has now emerged. The Somali governmental collapse sparked the conflict and the conflict gave birth to the pirates. Now it seems the pirates are being counterproductive in the establishment of a new government. Pirates are some of the most powerful people in central regions, meaning that bringing them to justice is a lot harder than simply issuing an arrest warrant. Arguably, young people are most affected by the rise in piracy. Even though private business and end-consumers globally are losing money due to this issue, Somali youth are being forced to grow up in a country where piracy is not only an acceptable job, but a prestigious one as well (AEDI 5). The United Nations Development Programme Somalia interviewed and ex-pirate who stated, “After completing secondary education … I had to look for a job, but could not find one. Because of this frustration, I was lured into piracy” (41). This man professes to have desired going about life honestly and with integrity; the opportunity just wasn’t there. Considering this to be an isolated example would be foolish with the current state of the Somali government and economy. Currently, the pirates who operate off of the coast of Somalia are having a much harder time. The recent number of successful attacks has declined due to “better educated maritime industry, a more robust naval strategy and a better protected merchant fleet” (Hart 11). The crisis is not over just yet. Anti-piracy methods are, for the time, effective, but the pirate network is still intact. “[J]ob creation for the youth is the answer to stopping young people from joining piracy” (UNDPS 41). Until this happens Somalis may continue to view piracy as a viable economic solution, and piracy will continue to have negative international effects that far surpass the borders of Somalia and its neighboring countries.

Works Cited
African Economic Development Institute. "Pirates of Somalia." African Economic Development Institute Exclusives 1.1 (2009): 4-7. AEDI. African Economic Development Institute. Web. 30 Mar. 2015.
Hart, Tim. "East and West Africa." Maritime Forecast Report 2015 (2015): 11-14. Control Risks. Control Risks, 2015. Web. 30 Mar. 2015.
"Maritime Piracy Costs Global Community up to $12 Billion a Year." Eft. Eye for Transport, 20 Jan. 2011. Web. 30 Mar. 2015.
"New Pirate Attack on Aid Ship; WFP Urges High-level International Action against Somali Piracy." World Food Programme. World Food Programme, 21 May 2007. Web. 31 Mar. 2015.
United Nations Development Programe Somalia. Somalia Human Development Report 2012. Publication. Nairobi: United Nations Office at Nairobi, Services Section, 2012. Somalia Human Development Report 2012. United Nations Development Programme, 28 Sept. 2012. Web. 31 Mar. 2015.