Judith Thompson presents an interesting slant on the moral permissibility of abortion in that she assumes the fetus is a person from conception, therefore having the right to life. However, the fetus’ right to life does not suggest that it has the right to unlimited means to ensure its survival. An abortion is still permissible if the mother does not grant fetus the right to use her body. Thompson gives several analogies of scenarios in which abortions are morally permissible, in which the right for mother to have an abortion outweighs the fetus’ right to use the mother’s body. In the Jane scenario she would argue that it is ultimately morally impermissible for her to obtain an abortion because the fetus is given the right to use the mother’s body. Jane’s pregnancy can be thought of as an accident, because she and her husband almost always faithfully use condoms to prevent accidental conception. Therefore she did not intend to carry the fetus. Thompson states that if the mother did not intend to conceive, and attempted to follow the proper safeguards, then she does not grant the fetus the use of her body. Some may view Jane’s one instance of not using a condom as culpable because she should understand the risk of pregnancy during unprotected sex, and therefore, she is responsible for the fetus’ existence. Thompson states that it is preposterous to argue that the conception of a fetus due to a misjudgment such as forgetting a condom should be seen as an invitation for the fetus to use the mother’s body to live. She illustrates this through an analogy of a house set up with mesh screens to prevent “people seeds” from sprouting inside. Even if one tries to completely seal the house with seed proof screens, there might be slight chance that seeds accidently go through, and end up rooting. In this situation it would be farfetched to argue that the homeowner invited the