NAXAL MOVEMENT IN INDIA AND THE STATE RESPONSE
BY JAGANNATH DASGUPTA

Introduction
This paper attempts to map the growth of Naxal or Maoist conflict in India from a small socio-political movement to the single largest internal security problem and the response of the state machinery to this movement. It has been divided into five parts. First part talks about the genesis of this movement, second part focuses on its present manifestations, third part stresses on the reasons for which this movement is gaining strength , fourth part is a description of the state response and fifth part is a set of proposals which probably could lead to betterment of the situation .

Genesis
The Communist Party of India (CPI) started out in 1920 and carried a Marxist ideology. The CPI was later divided into factions owing to their ideological differences and also their approaches. While some believed in the political process the others believed in violent revolution. Some members who wanted to be a part of the political process actually led to the formation of Communist Party of India(Marxist) . Some CPI(M) members won state elections in West Bengal in 1967 and also joined the coalition of parties in the United Front. The more radical people of CPI(M) did not like this development and there was a conflict between the police and armed peasants that took place in Naxalbari town in West Bengal that same year . ‘Naxalite’ term was coined from this encounter only . Later on in this year only a

new party called Communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist) was formed under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar .Mazumdar believed that revolution in India had to come from the rural landless peasantry and not the urban places. The revolution according to him had to be targeted against the oppressive social and political systems which had led to dreadful inequality. This ideology along with the terror campaign spread across the states of Bihar and Andhra Pradesh as well over the next few years. With capture and death of Mazumdar the movement temporarily lost its zeal .There were many differences which started to crop up gradually which led to creation of factions and formations of various parties like the MCCI, PWG and CPI (ML)PU. The PWG started in Andhra Pradesh in 1980 and the CPI (ML) PU emerged in Bihar in 1982.
There were few central reasons for the eruption and propulsion of the Naxalite movement which are as follows :- a. Social Inequity and Exploitation:-The oppressed classes were exploited both as sharecroppers and landless labourers by the landlords and moneylenders and there was huge inequity between the landed higher castes and the landless lower caste gentry which was gradually turning into rampant frustration against the existing social order and political system . b. Alienation of Forest Land :- Alienation of Tribal land was a major issue that crippled their economic welfare . This was a result of a nexus between strict government regulations on restricted access to forest resources which led to harassment of tribals
, loss of income from forest produce and the moneylenders trap . This deep discontentment amidst the tribes again acted as a catalyst for the Naxalist regime .

c. Tribals and Agricultural Laborers :- The region in and around Naxalbari had a large population of tribes like Santhals and Oraons who were not only the victims of social oppression but also were the worst affected by agriculture commercialization and forest policies. They along with the landless agricultural labourers had the same concerns as discussed before hence this whole idea of revolution by the landless peasantry really was appealing from the point of view of mass mobilization . d. Support from the urban middle class youth :- The movement had a lot of support from the educated youth who went off to the forests in spite of themselves being highly educated just to mobilize the masses . These students were frustrated with the crisis caused by the capitalist path of development which had in turn resulted in diminishing employment opportunities. This youth found a connect with the Naxalist ideology and some even stayed in Calcutta carrying out acts of violence to overthrow the state.

Build up to the contemporary Maoist conflict and manifestations
Mupalla Lakshmana Rao , alias Ganapathy is the pioneer of the present day CPI-Maoist . He became the leader of PWG in 1992. He saw unity as the main strength and first united PWG and CPI (ML) PU to form the People’s War and later on united with MCCI in 2004 to form the today’s CPI-Maoist with him as the leader. The strategy and tactics employed by Naxalites have changed over the years. Small scale isolated attacks have now been replaced by well planned and organized attacks on the government set up. During the early stages of the struggle the strategy was to annihilate class enemies through terrorist tactics employed by small groups and avoidance of mass organisations but after Mazumdar’s death different

groups adopted different modus operandi to attain their motives. The Maoist activities remained dormant post late 1970s but they have again been on the rise since 2004.
The Maoists armed wing is the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army(PLGA) and its largest part is the People’s Militia which comprises of ordinary villagers. Of late they have also established their own intelligence wing called the People’s security service(PSS) which help them in getting information from the government agencies on counter insurgency operations . The Naxals are now trying to increase their area of operation and also their influence for which they require a big liberated zone and hence their activity has gone up .This zone according to their plans will stretch from Indo-Nepal border to the Dandakarniya region. They are planning to achieve this by hosting mobile wars i.e. carrying out raids at faraway places from their original strongholds by mobilising its armed cadre and taking help from the common people along the way, so basically what we are looking at is a strategy shift where they are taking revolution to another level and are trying to transform PLGA into PLA (Peoples Liberation Army).The exact army size is debateable as different sources give different numbers. As per government sources i.e. Ministry of Home Affairs data it was 9400 in number but now it is believed to have gone up to 25000 or more amongst which at least 10000 are armed cadre and the rest are semi skilled activists .The Naxalites are believed to possess more than 10000 assorted weapons , machine guns and mortars and also have improvised explosive devices .Their power is also being enhanced by external links . They get help in form of men, materials training facilities from Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist , Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia and also they have sympathizers from surrounding regions of China , Myanmar and Bangladesh .In the country itself they have strong links with Revolutionary People’s Front and People’s Liberation Army of Manipur .With all this power they target landlords , moneylenders , security forces personnel and their

informers , in some cases they also do not spare members of the bureaucratic machinery like collectors and MPs .
The following incidents depict the movement has now started to challenge the authority of the state and also show that gradually they are growing in confidence.

a. The attempt to assassinate the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, N. ChandrababuNaidu (October 01, 2003), on a road between Tirupati and Tirumala in Chittoordistrict while he was proceeding to attend the Brahmotsavam celebrations.

b. The raid in Koraput district of Orissa (February 07, 2004), when the extremists overran several government establishments and decamped with about 200 weapons including SLRs and carbines and about 60,000 rounds of ammunition.
c. The attack on the Jehanabad District Jail in Bihar (November 13, 2005), when about 200 cadres of the united Communist Party of India (Maoist) assisted by about 800 sympathisers freed 389 prisoners which included quite a few Naxals while 20 activists of the Ranvir Sena were taken away, out of whom nine were subsequently murdered.
d. The interception and capture of a train in the Latehar district of Jharkhand (March 13,
2006), when 628 Dn. Passenger was stopped between Mughalsarai and Barkana stations.
e. The attack on a police base camp at Rani Bodli village of Bijapur District in Chhattisgarh (March 15, 2007) in which 55 persons including 16 personnel of Chhattisgarh Armed Force and 39 SPOs were killed.

f. The killing of the son of former Chief Minister, Babu Lal Marandi, along with 18 other persons while they were watching a cultural programme in Giridih district of Jharkhand (October 27, 2007).
g. The attack on Nayagarh town in Orissa (February 15, 2008), when the Naxals overran 3 police stations and killed 13 policemen and 2 civilians and decamped with
1100 weapons, though 400 rifles were subsequently recovered by the police.
h. The attack on the combined Andhra Pradesh and Orissa Police parties in
Chitrakonda reservoir of Malkangiri District in Orissa (June 29, 2008), resulting in the killing/drowning of 35 security forces personnel belonging to the elite ‘Greyhounds’ force of Andhra Police.
i.The attack at Silida security camp in West Midnapore district of West Bengal(15 Feb,2010) which led to the death of 25 paramilitary personnel of Eastern frontier rifles .
j. The killing of 75 CRPF jawans in Dantewada district in Chattisgarh .(6 April , 2010)
A jungle ambush where in around 1000 Naxals attacked a convoy of 120 CRPF jawans .
k. The killing of 12 C.R.P.F jawans and tying up explosives in their dead bodies to cause further damage in Latehar.(8 Jan , 2013)

l. The attack on a convoy of Indian National Congress leaders in the Darbha Valley(25 May,2013) in the Sukma district of Chhattisgarh. The attack caused at least 27 deaths, including that of former state minister Mahendra Karma and Chhattisgarh Congress chief Nand Kumar Patel. Vidya Charan Shukla, a senior Congress leader also later succumbed to his injuries on 11 June 2013.
i. The armed attack on a train, a group of around 200 Naxals targeted the Dhanbad-Patna Intercity Express(June13,2013) near Jamui district in Bihar, killing three persons and injuring six passengers.

Reasons behind the Maoist movement gaining strength
These incidents are clear indicators that the menace of Naxalite movement is only growing by the day . Apart from the failure of proper state response which would be examined later stress would now be given on some of the inherent features of contemporary Naxalite movement which make it even more difficult to tackle , but before going there one big reason which has kept the movement alive from 1960s is the deplorable life which the people live in Naxal affected regions even today . In spite of all the pompous claims made by the government the administration in these rural areas has been rendered defunct. a. Presently there is a problem of leadership being faced by the CPI(Maoist) but their strength lies in the fact that while government feels that with the death or capture of an eminent leader the movement will die out the fact is there are always people waiting to man up and take the leadership hence continuation of the movement . e.g.

The death of Kishenji might have caused a major setback in regions of Bengal-Odisha-Jharkand regions but the Maoist have nurtured a second level leadership to take control in case of major setbacks . b. In some states like Jharkand and Orissa the conflict within Maoists and with other Left Wing Extremist groups have resulted in terrible violence as there have been cases of each party proving their dominance over the other through acts of violence .e.g:- Sabyasachi Panda splitting up with Ganapathy forming separate OMP and then kidnapping Italian nationals just to show its party dominance .

c. This very conflict that was being talked about in the earlier point has also resulted in this movement growing in new and different areas . They are spreading throughout, in the north east Upper Assam Leading Committee has been formed. Apart from this the Maoist have links with groups like NSCN-IM and PLA in Nagaland and Manipur respectively .In the west they have framed an agenda of forming a Golden Corridor Committee to connect areas of Gujrat and Maharashtra which are industrialized . Down south also there have been reports of Maoists being active in Wayanad district of Kerela and creating forces in the Kerela –TamilNadu border .Even in Andhra the North Telengana Special Zonal Committee are making efforts to revive the naxal movement . The Maoist have an Urban Perspective Plan in place and they are working according to that to even expand in urban areas so as to have literate people on board who can actually provide impetus and leadership to their movement .

d. The corporates in some regions have joined hands with Maoists .The corporates pay a huge sum of money and provide them with political support in order to keep their

business safe .This in turn help the Maoists in using the money to buy more arms , train more people and gear up to create more havoc .e.g. :- the mining industry.

e. External links of Maoists possibly are getting stronger by the day .
These links specifically include the ISI and the other Islamist extreme groups. It has been established that ISI uses its Bangladesh based operators to get in touch with the Maoist leaders and their aim is to cause harm to the infrastructure and development initiatives in those inert part of the countries where they do not have a network. Also Dawood Ibrahim is said to be interested in the hugely remunerative mining industry so it is believed that he stays in touch with some Maoist leaders . Apart from this the incident in Latehar where explosives were tied to the dead bodies of C.R.P.F jawans .
These explosives were human bomb grenades made in Pakistan and had Pakistani markings on it. f. Another reason for increased Maoist activities is their ability to get into people’s resistance movements like what happened in Lalgarh in West Bengal where Maoist took part in the agitation along with the tribals and inflicted huge number of casualties over the three years between 2008 and 2010.
The State response so far
This section will talk about some of the strategies that have been adopted so far by the government in order to tackle this menace.

a. FROM POLICY MAKING POINT OF VIEW
Ministry of Panchayati Raj had constituted a Committee under the
Chairmanship of Member, Planning Commission to look into the aspects of
Minimum Support Price (MSP), value addition and marketing of Minor Forest
Produce (MFP) . During the financial year 2011 – 12 an amount of Rs. 20 crore has been made available to the Central Armed Police Forces to undertake Civic Action Programme in the Naxal infested states. The Ministry of Rural Development has always been involved with the implementation of development projects in the Naxal infested areas but the Prime Minister's Rural Development Fellowship Scheme and introduction of the ambitious Land Acquisition Bill marked the year 2011 for the Rural Development Ministry .

In the year 2006 the government had come up with a fourteen point plan to combat Naxalism . The main features of this policy were * deal sternly with the Naxals indulging in violence .

* address the problem simultaneously on political, security and development fronts in a holistic manner .

* ensure inter-state coordination in dealing with the problem

* accord priority to faster socio-economic development in the Naxal affected or prone areas

* supplement the efforts and resources of the affected states on both security and development fronts

* promote local resistance groups against the Naxals

* use mass media to highlight the futility of Naxal violence and the loss of life and property caused by it

* have a proper surrender and rehabilitation policy for the Naxals

* affected states not to have any peace dialogue with the Naxal groups unless the atter agree to give up violence and arms

a. CLEAR-HOLD-DEVELOP strategy was employed a couple of years ago where in there was a massive interstate military offensive launch with the aim of first rescuing areas from Maoists then hold the place till government machinery could completely overtake and then development efforts could be carried out henceforth . This effort was not very successful as the movement was obstructed by lack of real time intelligence and lack of experience in jungle warfare . The security forces suffered severe losses. b. SECURITY RELATED INTERVENTIONS: - Security related expenditure scheme (SRE) – The SRE scheme envisages reimbursing the expenditure incurred by the state on ammunition, training, up gradation of police posts, etc. At present 76 districts in 9 states badly affected by Naxal violence are covered by this scheme. A Task force has been created in the Home Ministry to look after the steps needed to deal with Naxalism more effectively and in a coordinated manner . The members of the task force include Nodal officers from the affected states and members of CRPF , BSF , IB and SSB. The government has put in a lot of effort and money in terms of police modernization, security related expenses, improvement in CRPF ,CoBRA and putting in special infrastructure for Maoist infested areas . The Ministry of Home Affairs also claims to have bettered the police population ratio to around 200 per 100,000 in Naxal hit areas but the reality is something different. There have been several cases of CRPF officers and BSF jawans taking voluntary retirement or resigning from the Naxal affected areas . In short the claims of improvements in

capacity in terms of police modernization, training and proper functioning of police stations have still not been achieved , the other security forces are mostly defunct in the strongholds of Naxals .

c. THE DEVELOPMENT AND WELFARE BASED APPROACH: - Development in Maoist prone areas is still a significant part of the government’s efforts. Many welfare schemes like PMGSY, Forest Rights Act 2006, and MNREGA which are prevalent all over India are given special focus and funds for their implementation in these areas. The details of some of the welfare measures taken by the government over the years are as follows :-

Integrated Action Plan(IAP) , 2010
At the time of presentation of the budget for the year 2010-11, the Government had announced its decision to introduce a special scheme to address the development of 33 Left Wing Extremism (LWE) affected districts. It was inter-alia, stated that the Planning Commission would prepare an Integrated Action Plan (IAP) for the affected areas and that adequate funds would be made available to support the action plan. The 33 districts (later expanded to 34) referred to in the Finance Minister’s announcement were a sub-set of the 83 LWE affected districts identified by the Ministry of Home Affairs for coverage under its Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme. This sub-set consisted of those districts where more than 20% of the Police Stations experienced some incidents of naxal violence.

Subsequently, West Medinipur district of West Bengal was added to the list due to the situation prevailing there, taking the total to 35 districts. It was decided on May 30 ,2013 to extend this program for four more years .
Backward Districts Initiative (BDI) and Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF) –
The government had included 55 Naxal affected districts in 9 states under the
Backward Districts Initiative (BDI) component of the Rashtriya Sam VikasYojana
(RSVY). The BRGF scheme covers a total of 250 districts and is administered by the Ministry of Panchayati Raj. The scheme should accelerate socio-economic development in these 250 districts. Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007
- The Government of India announced a new rehabilitation policy on October 11, 2007 to make the displacement of people for industrial growth a less painful experience. Land in return for land for displaced families, preference in project jobs to at least a member of each family, vocational training, scholarships for children and housing benefits including houses to affected families in rural and urban areas are some of the benefits under the new policy.

Forest Rights Act, 2006
- The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, (popularly Forest Rights Act) is a significant step in recognizing and vesting the forest rights of scheduled tribes and other traditional forest dwellers who have been residing in such forests for generations

but whose rights could not be recorded. It provides a framework for recording the forest rights so vested.

National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2006
– The NREGA is the largest ever employment programme visualized in human history. It holds out the “prospect of transforming the livelihoods of the poorest and heralding a revolution in rural governance in India”. However, as brought out by the CAG report, there are “significant deficiencies “in implementation of the Act. There is lack of adequate administrative and technical manpower at the block and gram panchayat levels. This affects the preparation of plans, scrutiny, approval, monitoring and measurement of works, and maintenance of the stipulated records at the block and gram panchayat levels.

Although there are so many welfare schemes on paper for the Naxal affected areas in place but they are only ideologically elegant and whenever it comes to the implementation they have never reached their full potential owing to a lot of factors . One

Proposals for getting rid of Maoists a. First and foremost this movement has survived over 40 years so there have been a lot of things going wrong for which this has not only lasted but gained strength.
Looking at it from a political angle indeed it is a political problem. There is a need

for a consensus between the bureaucrats and the elected representatives so that better policies can be made in quick time and solutions can be arrived at .

b. What has kept this movement alive is the mass underdevelopment and inequity .
No development can happen in an environment of terror and chaos so first human security in these regions need to be addressed which needs to be followed up by time bound development initiatives .

c. Land acquisition by the day is becoming a very contentious issue and this fact is also exploited by the Maoists . Hence there is a need of implementation of land reforms which although is a matter of state government but the central government can always help .Also special care should be taken for people displaced due to land acquisition and industrialization . A proper plan needs to be first in place for Resettlement and Rehabilitation of the people to be displaced and only then should the land acquisition be made .

d. Local self governance in the form of strengthening the Panchayati Raj Institutions should be a big stress point so that the issues troubling the people in day to day life can be effectively addressed.

e. Corruption at the grassroots have hampered the welfare and development schemes of the government in a big way and these corrupt officials have actually joined hands with the Naxalites in turn spooning the money meant for development to the Naxals to carry out their war against the state machinery . The state should take

strict measures by having a proper administrative structure in place so that such malaise can be kept in check .

f. Employment opportunities is something which the government must take very seriously as Maoists make use of this frustration of youth to gain in strength . The implementation of acts like MNREGA and Forest Rights Act needs to be done in the best possible manner to stop the frustration amidst the youth .

g. The process of police modernization needs to be taken very seriously and the state governments should not only look for central assistance but also make best efforts to catalyze this process themselves.

h. Rather than going on an all out offensive like that of Operation Green Hunt the states should look at more intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing .Campaigns should be intelligence based with its aim as destroying the Maoist top rung leadership which in due course of time could lead to internal erosion of the movement.

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