Aurélien de Villiers de La Noue
The Negotiation between Dietrich von Choltitz and Raoul Nordling: Can One Man really change the course of History?
The negotiation between the German general Dietrich von Choltitz and the Swedish consul Raoul Nordling concerning the destruction of Paris is highly controversial and no
Historian come to a consensus. Movies Paris brûle-t-il? by René Clément and Diplomacy by
Volker Schlöndorff rekindled discussion about this quite mysterious negotiation between these two men. How did they manage to reach an agreement? What were the terms of the deal? Was there even a negotiation? This topic caught my attention for it changed the course of History. Had the German burnt Paris, the French would never have forgotten it and the
European Union would not have emerged six years after those events (the CECA was created in 1951). I am deeply pro-European and found of History. As a result it amuses me to the how fragile basis of the Union were. I also like to think that one man, no matter the context and the lack of leverage –we are talking of one man trying to talk a German general out of following
Hitler’s orders- can have so much impact on thanks to his words only.
To me, one of the key factors in the negotiation is time. Here, it is said that Nordling had but one night to settle this issue. Past, present and future are indeed vital with one another as the past experiences, the standards of legitimacy, the previous relationships determine the present time of the negotiation. And they could not have reached an agreement if they did not have taken the possible outcomes into account. This paper might appear quite chronological but I believe it was the best way to prove how everything interconnected.
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I-

Reputation and past relationship as a determinant for bargaining styles, authoritative standards and goals.
A) Personal backgrounds and experiences accounted for their different standards.

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General Von Choltitz was known to be a ruthless character even if he had the manners of an aristocrat. He was responsible for the destruction of Rotterdam in May 1940 and he carried out orders to « liquidate » the Jewish population during the attack of Sevastopol in
19421. He appeared to be a faithful general who never disobey. All of this accounts for his bargaining style depicted in the movie Diplomacy. He refused to be told what he had to do by a diplomat Raoul Nordling. As their tenets were quite different which led to different standards of legitimacy: some data had not the same significance for them2. Nothing could make Choltitz change his mind when he had received an order – no matter the context. That way, he ignored and dismissed non-conforming data3. However loyal he seemed to be and especially emotionless, he evoked his will to carry out revenge for the Germans by reminding
Nordling of German cities such as Hamburg or Manheim the Allies destroyed bombing them4.
That way, he put aside reason and logic of the order and he felt the need for reciprocity: no negotiation seemed possible when there is so much emotional bias on one side.
Nordling’s strengths was to appeal to Choltitz other’s emotions to counterbalance that.
He described the beauty of Paris. He was able to do so for he was born and raised in Paris and felt as a real Parisian. His knowledge of the subject mattered. It could explain his commitment and passion during the negotiation. He questioned Choltitz’s standards by questioning the orders he received and collected evidence that supported his views 5 . According Henri
Amouroux 6 , Nordling used his diplomatic missions as a way to do humanitarian work.
Therefore he did not try to use the authority argument of politics. That influenced the way he negotiated as he wanted to appear more human and intimate and not one of the numerous

1

D. von Choltitz, Soldat unter soldaten, chpter3, (Aubanel 1964)
Paul Carell (trad. R.M, ill. cartes Roger Grosjean), Ils arrivent : la bataille de Normandie vue du côté allemand
[« Sie Kommen »], Paris, Editions J’ai lu, coll. « J’ai lu leur aventure » (no A9), 1969 (1re éd. 1962), 369-371.
3 D. von Choltitz, Soldat unter soldaten, chpter4, (Aubanel 1964)
4Volker Schlöndorff, Diplomatie (2014)
5
Raoul Nordling, Sauver Paris: Mémoires du consul de Suède (1905-1944), 132-134
6 Henri Amouroux, La grande histoire des français sous l'occupation 1940-1944, (R. Laffont 1997) T1, 304-305
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Aurélien de Villiers de La Noue spokesmen of his country. It probably helped him to avoid conflict or tension even before entering a negotiation and to develop a relationship on both the deal and interpersonal levels 7.
B) Previous relations between the two men may have influenced the negotiations
According to Guy de Faramond 8 , Nordling was known for being the regular intercessor of Germans’ wishes. Many of his contemporaries confirmed that his agenda was full of German names. The question is not about whether he is to be blamed or not but this rather proved that he knew them pretty well. Many times he negotiated with them and with the general von Choltitz himself. He contributed to the liberation of thousands of French political prisoners9. Being Swedish, he had all the means to do so and found creative options to negotiate as he put them under the control of the Red Cross. He also served as an intermediary between Choltitz and the Resistance to sign a truce 10 . Nordling and Choltitz were said to have built a relationship based on trust during five meetings and phone conversations since Choltitz’s arrival on August, 9th 1944. They had the time to get to know each other. Even if they did not speak the same language, they succeeded in understanding each other thanks to a translator. That way, they avoided any misunderstanding and vagueness which can appear when there is a gap between what the emitters thinks he says and the receiver thinks he hears. This closeness between the two men turned out to be quite helpful and it is epitomized in the movie when Nordling broached the subject of Choltitz’s family11.
C) The question of Sweden’s neutrality also played a role in this negotiation
Even if the movie Diplomacy evokes Sweden’s neutrality, it is not taken as granted for the historians. Pierre Hervé 12 explained that Nordling was used to welcome French officers at his place and he affirmed that Nordling was friend with Laval. He dedicated his

7

Raoul Nordling, Sauver Paris: Mémoires du consul de Suède (1905-1944), 138-139
Guy de Faramond, ‘Raoul Nordling’ from Sweden abroad archives
9 Henri Amouroux, La grande histoire des français sous l'occupation 1940-1944, (Robert Laffont, 1997) T1 311
10 D. von Choltitz, Soldat unter soldaten, chpter4, (Aubanel 1964)
11 Volker Schlöndorff, Diplomatie (2014)
12 Pierre Hervé in l’Humanité (november 4th 1946)
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Aurélien de Villiers de La Noue entire life to make Sweden and France and then France and Germany closer. That way, he was constantly involved in negotiations as he cared about all countries’ interests. During
WWII he said he « tried to create sympathy and understanding between France and Sweden and to preserve good relationships between those two nations until peace comes »13. Nordling was a good negotiator as he knew how much the relationship matters.
During WWII, his neutrality and his country’s was questioned as the Swedish industry was critical to the Germans with the iron of Kiruna worth 40 billion Reichsmarks or with the canons in the Bofors14. Actually Nordling was the president of a Swedish company critical to the Germans. In brief, Nordling’s interests were probably not limited to the simple content of the subject of the negotiation but also involved personal interests. We might therefore wonder if Nordling’s interests were truly unbiased as shown Diplomacy. Knowing the two parties’ background, personalities and interests helps us see how the negotiation unfolded.
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II-

The context in which the negotiation took place influenced the perceptions of trust and leverage.
A) The context introduced the notion of time pressure and weaknesses
In the movie, the negotiation took place during the night between the 24th and 25th of

August 1944. At that time, 33 bombs were already installed everywhere in Paris and the explosion in the morning was to give birth to a rise in the water level destroying everything on its way and therefore slowing the Allie’s offensive 15. Time was critical. Having everything prepared, the general had some leverage. Indeed Nordling feared the explosion and Choltitz had the means to carry it out. However, this leverage disappeared as Nordling knew about a recent failure of the triggering system the French resistance had sabotaged during the

13

Raoul Nordling, Sauver Paris: Mémoires du consul de Suède (1905-1944), 112
Willemstrasse archives Strategic Assets (1940-1944)
15 Paul Carell, Ils arrivent : la bataille de Normandie vue du côté allemand [« Sie Kommen »], Paris, Editions
J’ai lu, coll. « J’ai lu leur aventure » (no A9), 1969 (1re éd. 1962), 381-382.
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Aurélien de Villiers de La Noue night16.Nordling’s leverage, on the other hand, turned out to be soaring. Nordling was aware of a credible threat for Choltitz: the Allies were at the gates of Paris.
Moreover, Mr Nordling visited the General without notice 17. That way, he didn’t let him time prepare –even mentally- for the negotiation, which he refused to have first. Choltitz was rather caught unaware and was not in his best state as he had not slept of the night.
Therefore, he could not be able to think, talk and decide properly as Stanley Coren evokes18.
To create a cooperative relationship, Nordling revealed strategic secrets he knew.
Indeed, in the movie he had the time to hear the secret conversations between the General and his men, which could have given him significant advantage: and even allow him to reach his goals –preventing the destruction of Paris- without negotiating. Yet he decided to get back on an equal footing with the General by telling him. He wanted to signal trustworthiness to motivate him to reciprocate. It could even been seen as a self-sacrifice when the General accused him of being a spy. But it finally helped Nordling in the negotiation.
B) The military pressure also left some doubts about what should be done.
The general was marked by his past, he felt like he had to obey once more. The same scheme seemed repeat itself. Historians 19 confirm that Hitler gave Choltitz the order to destroy Paris on Wednesday, 23rd August. Yet elements made Choltitz doubt of Hilter’s legitimacy at the time. Destroying Paris was not as strategic for the Wehrmacht as he first purported, and Nordling knew it20. Besides, there was another leverage –fear- that compeled
Choltitz to obey Hitler’s order but made him question them at the same times. The new law
Sippenhaft was enforced right before Choltitz nomination 21 . It stipulated that German officers’ were hostages to the Reich and any attempt to disobey order would result in their
16

Raoul Nordling, Sauver Paris: Mémoires du consul de Suède (1905-1944), 141
D. von Choltitz, Soldat unter soldaten, chpter6, (Aubanel 1964)
18 Stanley Coren Sleep thieves, Free Press, New edition (1997)
19 Henri Amouroux, La grande histoire des français sous l'occupation 1940-1944, (Robert Laffont, 1997)
T1 331
20 Jacques Privat, ‘Nordling, le consul suédois qui a sauvé Paris et ses intérêts’ L’Obs rue 89 (2014)
21 D. von Choltitz, Soldat unter soldaten, chpter6, (Aubanel 1964)
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Aurélien de Villiers de La Noue execution. When Choltitz revealed this to Nordling, the latter became aware of the General’s true interests. From this moment, Nordling could really offer some relevant options.
On the other hand, the 20 July plot to assassinate Hitler cast doubt upon the German army. Soldiers were down and tired of war. Nordling rightly assessed that « one day will come when their despair could be used to free all those poor French » 22 . By taking into account the entire background and then insisting on the right arguments, Nordling talked
Choltitz into acknowledging the absurdity of Hitler’s order –he wanted Paris burnt to the ground for Berlin could never become like Paris- and the dire consequences it would have for the German future in Europe and Choltitz reputation: he would mark him as the man who would have destroyed Paris.
C) The historical reality confirmed most of the tactics the negotiators used but denied the importance of the issue
Historians23 claim that meeting between the 24th and 25th August is pure fiction and it was even impossible as Nordling didn’t speak German, Choltitz didn’t speak French and
Nordling had a heart attack two days before. Therefore the time pressure generated by the upcoming deadline has too much significance in the movie. Moreover they would have need a translator for every negotiation they had that limits the possibility of a close relationship and disclose secrets. Yet the two men actually met during the month of August but nobody knows precisely what they said about the destruction of Paris. The liberation of Paris began August,
19th with fights between the German soldiers and the French Resistance 24. In the afternoon,
Raoul Nordling negotiated with von Choltitz to save the city and its inhabitants. No-one knows what they said but at night, a truce was negotiated as well as ceasefire25: the Germans

22

Raoul Nordling, Sauver Paris: Mémoires du consul de Suède (1905-1944), 123
Ian Buruma, ‘The argument that saved Paris’ the New York review of books
24 Henri Amouroux, La grande histoire des français sous l'occupation 1940-1944, (Robert Laffont, 1997)
T1 311
25 Paul Carell, Ils arrivent : la bataille de Normandie vue du côté allemand [« Sie Kommen »], Paris, Editions
J’ai lu, coll. « J’ai lu leur aventure » (no A9), 1969 (1re éd. 1962), 383-384.
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Aurélien de Villiers de La Noue could evacuate Paris without being shot. All we know is that Nordling talked to the General without any instructions from Stockholm. By taking this responsibility, Nordling, proved his liveliness and his ability to adapt, which are incontestable qualities for a good negotiator.
However, history proved that Paris was not so close to destruction. The order was given but von Choltitz did not have a lot of means available: he only had twenty thousand men and a few explosives26. Moreover, the city could not be flooded with the destruction of the bridges, as it is said in the movie. Nordling himself minimized the issue at stake and he rather insisted on the role he played in the protection of the prisoners27.
On 25th August 1944, the general von Choltitz ordered ceasefire. But this rescue is exaggerated too. The Britons recorded conversations that testify of his real involvement.
Stefan Martens28 explained that the burning question was not the question of heritage but first of all a question of defending the military position of Paris. Choltitz was the only one to decide which building he wanted to preserve, always according to military needs. That said, the negotiation that may have occurred between the general and the consul was probably quickly solved as there was no doubt that destroying all the buildings could not prevent the
Allies from entering Paris. Both of them were well aware of it.

III-

The perspectives of the future certainly altered partie’s goals and behaviour

A) A clear future for both parties facilitates the task but it doesn’t prevent discontent
The Germans were already defeated and it was only a matter of time before the war was over. As a result, Nordling’s obvious arguments to influence von Choltitz were the following ones according to Lucien Steinberg29: von Choltitz was to be imprisoned for life or

26

Aurélien Ferenczi, ‘C’est quoi la vraie histoire derrière Diplomatie ?’ Télérama (2014),
Raoul Nordling, Sauver Paris: Mémoires du consul de Suède (1905-1944), 156
28 Stefan Martens Frankreich und Belgien unter deutscher Besatzung 1940–1944. Die Bestände des
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchivs Stuttgart, (Thorbecke) 2002.
29 Lucien STEINBERG, Les Autorités allemandes en France occupée, inventaire commenté de la collection de documents conservés au CDJC, provenant des archives de l’ambassade d’Allemagne, de l’administration
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Aurélien de Villiers de La Noue executed if he had destroyed Paris. He would also be seen as the man who murdered thousand civilians. He would be forever cursed and loathed. He could not afford to this for himself and for his country as it would have wrecked any chance of reconciliation between France and
Germany. The General must have kept in mind the authority principle and did not take the risk to appear unreasonable under such circumstances, hoping this would help his case. He was right to think so as he was released in 1947.
Considering the situation of August 1944, the general did not have any way out. He had to avoid the defeat of the Germans but it was unavoidable and he knew it. That is why the symbol of the general standing on his balcony in the movie 30 , exposed as if he wanted everything to be over is quite striking. Choltitz’s BATNA was weak and Nordling knew it.
Nordling offered the option of surrendering to the Allies and be able to be free in several years. By putting aside his pride and ego, Choltitz turned out to be a really good negotiator.
He could indeed use his time for a better purpose such as saving himself and his family.
Knowing when you are in a weak position is probably the best way to get well in a negotiation. By committing on preserving Paris, Choltitz offered him and his men a safe exit
B) Accepting defeat is the only way to prepare the future
Rather than standing on his positions, the general took the opportunity to seek options.
The general ordered ceasefire not to be the cause of the destruction of the future relationship between Germany and France. Having the ability to think of the long terms consequences is a key asset in negotiation that makes the heydays of the Pragmatic School. But he did not surrender entirely as he demanded the guarantee that he and his men were not going to be killed without trial once they would be arrested. Having taken a lot in the negotiation with the general, the consul accepted to give back by meeting Choltitz’s request- as a tit-for-tat

militaire allemande et de la Gestapo en France, 2 vol, Paris, (Éditions du Centre de documentation juive contemporaine), 1966.
30 Volker Schlöndorff, Diplomatie (2014)

Aurélien de Villiers de La Noue strategy. As a result, the negotiation was not only concerning the rescue of Paris but also about the future of the general. And he made sure he did not lose on this point.
In the movie, Nordling promised to save the general’s family from the Sippenhaft but it turned out to be that the fate of von Choltitz’s family was never the issue in reality 31.
Furthermore, it would have been hardly credible that von Choltitz would have trusted
Nordling with the fate of his wife and children. It is good to note that Nordling lies in the movie32, he neither had the intention of rescuing Choltitz’s family nor the means to do so.
Negotiating requires a long-term vision. Nordling showed some when he told the
Germans to adopt a less cruel behaviour towards the inhabitants before the liberation: « Do it in your own interest because soon, it will be your turn to claim for human treatment »33.
C) Keeping the truth for oneself and remaining silent is vain as the truth will emerge
Historians knew little about the real terms of the negotiations between Nordling and von Choltitz for a long time as they did not reveal how, what, when and why they negotiated.
But they eventually did. All the aspects of the negotiation they wanted to conceal were brought to light. It just shows that no negotiator ever needs to lie to get what he wants otherwise it might be the only thing he will ever get.
The Swedish newspapers34 evoked that Nordling’s heroic deeds were a way to « save face » and to mask his germano-swedish relations that are nothing but selfless relations. He was proactive but only during the liberation and not before35. According to the council of the
Resistance, it was mostly a way for him to hide his past 36 . By the way, Sweden never recognized his action37. As a consequence, he might have been a great negotiator but it was

31

Aurélien Ferenczi, ‘C’est quoi la vraie histoire derrière Diplomatie ?’ Télérama (2014),
Volker Schlöndorff, Diplomatie (2014)
33 Raoul Nordling, Sauver Paris: Mémoires du consul de Suède (1905-1944), 116
34
Jovan Kurbalija ‘Two Raouls and the great legacy of Swedish diplomacy’ Diplo (2014)
35 Raoul Nordling, Sauver Paris: Mémoires du consul de Suède (1905-1944), 34
36 André ROSSEL-KIRSCHEN Contribution à l’histoire des débuts de la Résistance armée en France, Paris,
(L’Harmattan,) 2002
37 Michèle et Jean-Paul COINTET Dictionnaire historique de la France sous l’Occupation, (Tallandier), 2000.
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Aurélien de Villiers de La Noue maybe because negotiating was his last resort. Maurice Kiegel Valrimont, chief of the
Military action committee (COMAC) declared that « Nordling has clearly been depicted as the representative of some interests that far too often became mixed up with the blameworthy
German circles »38. His impartiality is therefore questioned.
On the other hand, the general von Choltitz tried to play the role of the saviour of the capital. When he was released in 1947, he published his memoirs to explain himself. He knew the hopelessness of his situation and thought he could burnish his reputation once the war was over by refusing to let Paris burn39.
In brief, both the consul and the general wanted to be seen as war heroes rather than war criminals and that is why they reached an agreement and invented options for mutual gain. They both won in this negotiation. After all, as the director of Diplomacy, Mr
Schlöndorff put it « the means of diplomacy are not all that clean and every trick is allowed ».
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According to, the director of Diplomacy « If he –the general- had no intention of following orders right from the beginning was all this–the bombs- done as an elaborate exercise in make-believe? » and he added « It is hard to believe ». Nordling began the negotiation as the man seeking something –abort Paris destruction- and flip the situation over to become the one with something to offer –allegedly a safe conduct for Choltitz family and the hope to clear is reputation. To me, Nordling embodies the Poker school, he lied, used leverage and hide his weaknesses. He claimed to negotiate as a normal Parisian using the supposed neutrality of Sweden as a way to separate the people from the problem and that and
Paris and the entire world are forever grateful for that.

38
39

Maurice Kiegel Valrimont, Archive de la Marie de Paris
Fabrice Virgili in preface of Sauver Paris: Mémoires du consul de Suède (1905-1944) by Raoul Nordling

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Bibliography:
D. von Choltitz, Soldat unter soldaten,, (Aubanel 1964)
Paul Carell (trad. R.M, ill. cartes Roger Grosjean), Ils arrivent : la bataille de Normandie vue du côté allemand [« Sie Kommen »], Paris, Editions J’ai lu, coll. « J’ai lu leur aventure » (no
A9), 1969 (1re éd. 1962)
Volker Schlöndorff, Diplomatie (2014)
Raoul Nordling, Sauver Paris: Mémoires du consul de Suède (1905-1944),
Henri Amouroux, La grande histoire des français sous l'occupation 1940-1944, (R. Laffont
1997)
Guy de Faramond, ‘Raoul Nordling’ from Sweden abroad archives
Pierre Hervé in l’Humanité (november 4th 1946)
Willemstrasse archives Strategic Assets (1940-1944)
Stanley Coren Sleep thieves, Free Press, New edition (1997)
Jacques Privat, ‘Nordling, le consul suédois qui a sauvé Paris et ses intérêts’ L’Obs rue 89
(2014)
Ian Buruma, ‘The argument that saved Paris’ the New York review of books
Aurélien Ferenczi, ‘C’est quoi la vraie histoire derrière Diplomatie ?’ Télérama (2014),
Stefan Martens Frankreich und Belgien unter deutscher Besatzung 1940–1944. Die Bestände des Bundesarchiv-Militärarchivs Stuttgart, (Thorbecke) 2002.
Lucien Steinberg, Les Autorités allemandes en France occupée, inventaire commenté de la collection de documents conservés au CDJC, provenant des archives de l’ambassade d’Allemagne, de l’administration militaire allemande et de la Gestapo en France, 2 vol,
Paris, (Éditions du Centre de documentation juive contemporaine), 1966.
Jovan Kurbalija ‘Two Raouls and the great legacy of Swedish diplomacy’ Diplo (2014)
André Rossel-Kirschen Contribution à l’histoire des débuts de la Résistance armée en
France, Paris, (L’Harmattan,) 2002
Michèle et Jean-Paul COINTET Dictionnaire historique de la France sous l’Occupation, (Tallandier), 2000.
Maurice Kiegel Valrimont, Archive de la Marie de Paris
Fabrice Virgili in preface of Sauver Paris: Mémoires du consul de Suède (1905-1944)