ID - 22780878
Essay #3 – Aristotle’s Function Argument In this essay, I will be discussing Aristotle’s function argument. This argument is found in Nicomachean ethics, in which Aristotle claims that the best human good is “the soul’s rational activity expressing virtue” (1098a16-17). To better understand this claim, we must first discuss the function argument in its entirety. Aristotle prefaces this argument by presuming that the best good is happiness. What we need, however, is a clearer definition of what the best good is (1097b22-24). Beginning with the first premise of his argument, Aristotle states that we will be able to define what the best good is if we first discover what the function of a human being is. This is because the good (i.e. doing well in anything that has a function and characteristic action) depends on the function itself (1097b26-29). If this is true, then we can apply this concept to human beings, if human beings do indeed have a function. Furthermore, Aristotle questions if human beings have a function at all, aside from the functions projected onto them by whatever occupation they serve in society (i.e. farmer, blacksmith). In his argument’s second premise, Aristotle states that if every bodily part in a human being has a function, we can similarly attribute a function to the human being as a whole. This premise acts upon Aristotle’s argument prior to the function argument in Nicomachean ethics, which states that numerous goods can serve higher goods in a hierarchical manner. Thus, each part of the human body has a function, which, in turn, serves a larger part with a different function, which similarly serves the largest part with a different function. The largest part is the human body (i.e. the human being), which must then have a function separate from everything else. This leads us to Aristotle’s third premise, which states that the human function must be unique to human beings themselves, and cannot be shared amongst other things. Acting upon the third premise, Aristotle’s fourth premise states that the function of a human being is not living (i.e. nutrition and growth), for this function is shared between human beings and plants. His fifth premise then, stresses that the function of a human being cannot be any form of sense perception, as this function is shared between human beings and every non-human animal. Thus, in his sixth premise, Aristotle claims that the remaining possibility of human beings having a unique function is that of the life of action of the part of the soul that has reason (1098a2-3). In his final premise, Aristotle explains that the part of the human soul that has reason is divided between two parts: the part of the human soul that obeys reason and the part of the human soul that itself has reason and thinking. He furthers this claim by stating that life is thought of in two ways: as capacity and as activity, and claims that a human being’s special function is life as activity, because it is defined as life to a fuller extent (1098a8-9). Therefore, the function of a human being is the soul’s activity that itself has reason and/or obeys reason. Furthermore, when we pair a function with the ultimate achievement of said function, we express its virtue (i.e. a virtuous farmer then, is one who farms well). Therefore, a good human being is defined as one who performs their function; the soul’s activity that expresses reason, and performs their function well. This is achieved when the function’s completeness expresses the proper virtue (cite1098a15-17). Thus, the best human good is the soul’s rational activity expressing virtue. Now that we have discussed Aristotle’s function argument, we are in an appropriate position to raise objections to it, as well as possible rebuttals to the objections in question. Our first objection is in regards to Aristotle’s teleology, which is the explanation of phenomena by the purpose they serve rather than by postulated causes. Thus, human beings can only have a function given a certain metaphysical assumption (i.e. Aristotle’s teleology). Furthermore, while it seems as though body parts all have separate functions, this can only be true if there is a function of a whole (i.e. a human being) that is relative to the functions of the individual body parts. Thus, we have a teleological issue concerning the possibly incorrect assumption that everything has a function on one end, and a teleological issue concerning the possibly fallacious reasoning behind relative functions (body parts) to absolute functions (human beings). Let us now offer a rebuttal in defense of Aristotle’s metaphysical assumptions. Note that criticism of Aristotle’s metaphysics is valid only if we consider the “function” of something and its “purpose” to be one and the same thing. In truth, a function can have more than one meaning. For Aristotle may define function as “how” something does what it does, as opposed to the definition of purpose, which is “what” something does. For example, a cell phone has multiple purposes, ranging from telephone calls, text messages, taking pictures/videos, etc. To speak of a cell phone’s function, however, is to speak about “how” its internal mechanisms (its functional construction) allow it to do “what” it does (i.e. its purposes). Thus, when we speak about the function of a cell phone, we speak about the transference of electronic signals between programmed microchips; the relationship between the internal mechanisms of an object. In this sense, Aristotle’s first teleological assumption does not bring about any problems. The definition of purpose, however, is rooted in the definition of function (the “what it does” in “how it does what it does”). We can go as far as to say that the purpose of the function of a human being, the soul’s rational activity on the part of the soul (the relative function), is to maintain its own manner of functioning; to be self-maintained (absolute function). Thus, Aristotle’s reasoning is not dichotomous in the sense that it follows from relative function to absolute function or vice versa, but that it follows a circular logic and is self-referential. This brings us to our second objection. Given that human beings do indeed have a function, what prompts Aristotle to claim that what is good for a human being resides in performing said function well? Performing the human function well provides reason for why someone can be considered a good human being. It is not clear, however, whether being a good human being is good for the human being in question. We can say with some certainty that fighting nobly for one’s country makes one a good soldier, but does the soldier achieve a sense of good for himself in doing so? We can definitely imagine an alternate life for the individual in question in which he is in a less perilous situation (living life as a sculptor, for example), making it possible for him to achieve a better quality of life. Perhaps a response to this objection can be constructed when observing what qualities of an individual Aristotle claims as virtuous in character. A virtuous man is one who performs good actions for the sake of the good action itself. This action is also done for the sake of a certain end. The virtuous man’s action, then, is a combination of the act itself and any given end that is done for its own sake. The solder chooses to engage in military conflicts for the sake of protecting his country, and does so based on his conception of what he believes to be an act for the sake of any given end; his chosen conception of what is noble. The end is not ascribed to him by any sort of rational instinct; rather, it is a product of his own choosing combined with his decision to act upon it in a particular way. Therefore, the chosen act done for the sake of the chosen end, the very definition of a virtuous action, is good for the soldier because he chooses what act is good for him (i.e. what he deems a virtuous action). Aristotle’s function argument is persuasive in the sense that his methodology (conception of metaphysics, ethics, etc.) allows it to be self-reflexive. This characteristic of Aristotle’s argumentation is resourceful in combating objections to the function argument itself, yet still suffers from what seems to be a noticeable exploitation of circular reasoning.