The Idea of Pakistan

1. The central question that Stephen Cohen grapples with in his book, The Idea of Pakistan, is what is Pakistan? Is it a ‘rogue state’, ‘a delinquent nation’, ‘Taliban East’ a ‘failing state’ or just ‘misunderstood but an effective US ally’ (p. 2)? To probe beyond these descriptions of Pakistan, Cohen has two purposes in mind. First, he wants to demonstrate why Indian Muslims felt the need for a separate homeland to pursue their ‘civilizational destiny’. Second, he wants to narrate how the state of Pakistan has evolved into a military-dominated entity that has nuclear capabilities, hostile relations with its neighbours and is characterized by weak economic institutions and socio-political strife. It is clear from this narrative, that Cohen wants to understand Pakistan’s past to predict the future - whether Pakistan will fail as a state or manage to scrape through all its troubles and emerge as a ‘normal state at peace with its neighbours’? 2. Cohen’s point of departure is to assess ‘failure’- a term that he thinks is imprecisely used to describe Pakistan. He argues that to make such an accusation one needs a nuanced definition of failure. If failure is defined as the inability to live up to past expectations, to deal with catastrophe, to run a successful economy and to lead the country with a certain vision in mind, then Pakistan’s performance has been dismal. But Cohen pushes the line that it is not a failed state as the possibility of resurrection is not out of reach. 3. To provide evidence for his line of argument Cohen takes a historical approach that traces the evolution of both the idea and state of Pakistan. In subsequent chapters Cohen surveys the role played by the army, Islamists, political parties and regional elites in shaping the polity. Basically, Cohen’s methodological approach derives from historical institutionalism- the precept that institutions, beliefs and actions of the past decisively enabled and constrained the actions and strategies available to actors in the present. More significantly he places a huge emphasis on the role of ideas in severely limiting the options available to leaders for establishing Pakistan as a state post-1947. Since Cohen does not want to neglect the interaction between socio-economic factors and politics he devotes a chapter to a discussion of critical demographic, economic and educational constraints on Pakistan and how they might have contributed to stunted political development. He concludes his study by outlining five different paths that Pakistan could take in the future and how the United States should shape its policy towards Pakistan bearing these plausible ‘futures’ in mind. 4. This book is written with the intention of predicting the country’s future. It is written in a journalistic style, largely meant for the consumption of policy analysts in the United States who need a quick and expedient reference to Pakistan’s intricate politics. To his credit, however, Cohen sifts through a lot of history to give a succinct picture of politics in Pakistan. The book is very clearly and cogently written. Bullet points to summarize findings especially help with the pace of reading. 5. The title of the book is misleading- it is not so much the idea of Pakistan that Cohen wants to discuss. Instead he has different analytical goals; he wants to argue that the current state of Pakistan is the result of the unresolved tensions in the ideas that prevailed at the time Pakistan was founded. Cohen’s entire analysis is geared towards explaining why Pakistan is a so-called ‘failed state’ and how the US can secure its interest in South Asia using Pakistan as an ally. 6. It is not clear from his analysis if Cohen thinks that Pakistan’s development has been path dependent. If so, is Pakistan in the throes of a critical juncture where choices made now will put it on a different developmental trajectory? This is the question that Cohen has in mind when he starts the chapter on ‘Pakistan’s Futures’ (p. 267). He approaches this question not by engaging the concept of critical juncture analytically but by arguing that it is not the first time that Pakistan finds itself at a crossroads and not the first time that the country has resurrected itself from chaos and altered the course of development. The book also raises the question whether Cohen’s ideational argument is about Pakistan being locked-in because the unresolved tension amongst ideas still persists? It is entirely conceivable to argue that the elite or ‘establishment’ will continue to pursue the present course because its interests are too embedded in the status quo as it stands today. 7. Cohen outlines five other scenarios that are likely to arise in the next five to eight years: the emergence of a moderate, democratic state; the rise of authoritarianism; the rise of an Islamist state; Pakistan’s possible breakup and Pakistan after a major war with India (p. 297). While, Cohen discusses the likelihood and impact of each scenario in depth, he is less successful at determining the factors that would result in each possible scenario. For example, when discussing the option of Pakistan becoming a normal democracy, Cohen says that it would be important for a ‘strategic accommodation’ between India and Pakistan. But he says little about the mechanisms that would result in this strategic accommodation. More importantly, the question left partially unanswered is whether only a change in ideas can bring about a change in developmental path or can other exogenous factors also put Pakistan on the right track? Cohen claims that ‘the most important debate raging in Pakistan is that between competing ideas of statehood, Quaid’s original conception pitted against the Islamist conceptions’ (p. 298). In Cohen’s mind a resolution of this debate will determine Pakistan’s future. However, one could also argue that not only does this ideational debate have to be resolved but Pakistan also has to address its strategic position in South Asia and reconcile itself to an alliance with the United States. 8. At this point I would also like to question the value added by outlining the possible scenarios for Pakistan’s future. From the analysis in the book, Cohen implicitly acknowledges that the future of Pakistan does not lie exclusively in one scenario but perhaps in a mixture of all five. In Cohen’s defense, it is a difficult and impractical undertaking to provide a sure recipe for successful outcomes in Pakistan’s political development and the mechanisms by which that change can be made feasible. 9. Clearly institutions are important to Cohen’s analysis yet most political scientists will criticize the book for not having paid enough attention to the interrelation between social, economic and political institutions. For instance one gaping hole in the book is that the role played by the judiciary in legitimizing martial law is a theme barely mentioned. The state of the judiciary as the third organ of state also reflects the importance paid to the rule of law- a significant attribute of political institutions. Secondly, when discussing political parties, Cohen does not delve deeper into the role of the MQM party and how it has been a significant alternative to the PPP in the province of Sindh. One would like to see these topics addressed more comprehensively in future works by the author. 10. My critique of the book should not detract from its virtues. It is a significant achievement on two levels, first because it provides an introduction to Pakistan’s political, economic and social history in broad strokes and second, Cohen is not only descriptive but also prescriptive about Pakistan’s problems.

Pakistan's Road to Disintegration
In the first few days of this year, Pakistan's coalition government was thrust into crisis after losing a coalition partner, and then a top politician--Punjab Governor Salman Taseer--was assassinated. A leading expert on the country, Stephen P. Cohen, says these incidents are symptoms of the profound problems tugging the country apart. "The fundamentals of the state are either failing or questionable, and this applies to both the idea of Pakistan, the ideology of the state, the purpose of the state, and also to the coherence of the state itself," Cohen says. "I wouldn't predict a comprehensive failure soon, but clearly that's the direction in which Pakistan is moving." On a recent trip, he was struck by the growing sense of insecurity in Pakistan, even within the military, and the growing importance of China.
What's the situation in Pakistan these days, given a key partner's withdrawal from the coalition government, and the assassination of a leading member of the ruling coalition, who opposed the blasphemy law which has support among the country's Muslim population?
These are symptoms of a deeper problem in Pakistan. There is not going to be any good news from Pakistan for some time, if ever, because the fundamentals of the state are either failing or questionable. This applies to both the idea of Pakistan, the ideology of the state, the purpose of the state, and also to the coherence of the state itself. Pakistan has lost a lot of its "stateness," that is the qualities that make a modern government function effectively. So there's failure in Pakistan on all counts. I wouldn't predict a comprehensive failure soon but clearly that's the direction in which Pakistan is moving.
Given Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons and its strategic location between Afghanistan and India, for the United States this is a looming crisis, isn't it.
All U.S. policies toward Pakistan are bad, and some are perhaps worse than others. We don't know whether leveling with Pakistan is going to improve things or make it worse. Ideally, we would own a time machine in which we could roll back history and reverse a lot of decisions we made in the past. Hopefully, we won't make any more fundamentally wrong decisions in the future, but that may not prevent Pakistan from going further down the road to disintegration. Someone in the State Department was quoted in a WikiLeaks document [as saying] that if it weren't for nuclear weapons, Pakistan would be the Congo. I would compare it to Nigeria without oil. It wouldn't be a serious state. But the nuclear weapons and the country's organized terrorist machinery do make it quite serious.
If it is anybody's problem in the future, it is going to be China's problem. I just spent several weeks in Pakistan. One thing I discovered was the country insecurity in a way I had never seen it, even in military cantonments. The other was that China's influence in Pakistan was much greater and deeper than I had imagined it to be. In a sense that's India's problem, but in the long run, it will be China's problem.
Describe China's influence.
China is Pakistan's major military supplier. Of course, they supplied military technology and probably put Pakistanis in touch with the North Koreans for missile technology. The Chinese have one concern in Pakistan and that is the training of Chinese militants and extremists inside of Pakistan. The Chinese have no problem with the Tiananmen Square-type of crowd control. When the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) was blown up in Islamabad in 2007, it came after some ten Chinese were kidnapped and the Chinese complained publicly. The Pakistanis had ignored our protests about the Mosque for many years. But they moved quickly when the Chinese protested, killing many women and children in the process. That was one of the turning points in President Pervez Musharraf's career, because that turned many militants against him. Before that time, he had either ignored or supported them, but after Lal Masjid, they became his enemy.
How important are the militants or terrorists? Can they control the state?
Militants--whether you call them anti-American, anti-liberal, or anti-secular--seem to have a veto over politics in Pakistan, but they can't govern the state. The parties control the elections but they can prevent others from governing, and they may prevent the military from governing as well.
Some people have been hoping for a military coup, but you don't think that will happen?
We have to do what we can do and prepare for the failure of Pakistan, which could happen in four or five or six years.
I don't think the military wants to be in that position now. I don't think the military chief Ashfaq Kayani has such a game plan. He is as smart and calculating as President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq [military president from 1977 until his assassination in 1988] was. He is quite different from Musharraf--not an Islamist himself, but he has certainly supported them in the past. I know the Pakistan military cannot govern Pakistan. They've tried it three times in the past and each time failed. This time they would have to deal with more active militants. The liberal forces are in retreat, and I don't see the army supporting the liberal forces in Pakistan.
Talk about the anti-American feeling. How did it develop into such a strong national sentiment?
Historically, the Pakistani elite have created a narrative of U.S.-Pakistan relations which always shows the United States letting Pakistan down. A turning point was the Iranian revolution of 1979, [which] showed a lot of Pakistanis that standing up to the Americans, embarrassing the Americans, humiliating the Americans felt good. Whether they were Sunnis or Shiites in Pakistan, it felt good. It all goes back to everyone in Pakistan concerned about American policy toward Israel and the Middle East. They seem to care more about Israel and Palestine than they do about themselves. The irony of Pakistan is that their major foreign policy obsessions are ones that they can't do anything about, including Israel and Palestine. When the U.S. and NATO forces moved into Iraq and Afghanistan, that was seen as a direct threat to Pakistan. They feared that the Islamist states were being knocked off one after another, beginning with Iraq, and going on to Afghanistan, and winding up with Pakistan. Most of that is imagined, but many Pakistanis believe it is true.
We've had a breakup of the coalition government, which happens all the time around the world, but why was so much gloom and doom expressed in Pakistan?
It's the incapacity of the Pakistani state to educate its own people in a modern fashion; it's the failure of the Pakistani economy to grow at all. If this was an American analogy, you would say Pakistan is a house under water. Except for its territory, which is strategically important, there is not much in Pakistan that is of benefit to anyone. They failed to take advantage of globalization. They use terrorism as an aspect of globalization, which is the negative side of globalization. Go down the list of factors, they are almost all negative. There is not one that is positive. They need outsiders for economic help. The conflict with India drains most of their budget. They can't resolve foreign policy differences with India. They have quarrels with us over Afghanistan, although they are probably right that we don't understand the Afghanis either. The question in my mind is whether these are irreversible so that Pakistan can become a normal state.
Militants--whether you call them anti-American, anti-liberal, or anti-secular--seem to have a veto over politics in Pakistan, but they can't govern the state.
What do you think?
Hope is not a policy, but despair is not a policy either. We have to do what we can do and prepare for the failure of Pakistan, which could happen in four or five or six years.
Talk about the terrorists.
There has been an accommodation with the government. Terrorist attacks are down. There seems to be an agreement by the security forces to accommodate the terrorist groups. I don't see the government regaining its position in the frontiers. The Pakistani Taliban is a designated enemy, but the army cannot move against them. The army is worried about its integrity itself.
Discuss Taseer's assassination.
He was like Sherry Rehman, a close associate of Benazir Bhutto. Rehman had introduced a private member's bill to repeal the blasphemy law, and [Taseer] backed her, and that apparently led to his guard killing him. The blasphemy law makes the medieval Catholic Church look liberal. Anyone who stands up and criticizes the law has his life in danger. Rehman is prominently mentioned in press coverage. I don't think she will back down. She is a lady of strong principles, like Benazir.
Is the fear of India genuine?
It is genuine, because it goes back to the identity of Pakistan. They can't figure out how to reconcile their strategic necessity of accommodation with India. Of course, India takes a hard line on a lot of issues, not just Kashmir. India has allowed China to acquire Pakistan as a strategic asset. It is now a trilateral game between the Chinese and Indians with the Pakistanis on the Chinese side.