AS Philosophy
Revision Pack
Key topics Epistemology | Philosophy of religion | Perception | The concept of God | The definition of knowledge | Arguments for and against God’s existence | Where do our ideas and knowledge come from? | Religious language | Key info Exam date: Time: Revision sessions: Revision tasks * Make a revision timetable * Create revision topic summaries * Create flash cards * Test yourself – complete practice questions * Create 15 mark plans * Attend revision sessions

Don’t leave it until the last minute…start NOW

HOW TO REVISE
Before you start revising * Make sure you have all your notes in order * Create a revision timetable - follow this link and sign up to help you do this. http://getrevising.co.uk/
The 10 step revision process 1. Pick a topic to revise (e.g. innate knowledge) 2. Read through your notes on that topic and summarise it onto one side of A4 3. Now summarise onto a revision card (about a quarter of an A4 piece of paper) 4. Now take a piece of A4 and begin writing everything you can remember about the topic. 5. Look back over your notes and write down all you missed out in a different colour. 6. Keep repeating the process until you are able to write down everything from that topic. 7. Now look at an exam question. 8. Complete a plan (5-10 mins) 9. Complete the timed essay in 30 mins / 15 min depending. 10. Hand into me to mark

MAKE SURE YOU RE-VISIT THE TOPIC YOU JUST REVISED AT THE BEGINNING OF EACH REVISION PERIOD, TO CHECK THE INFORMATION IS STILL THERE IN YOUR HEADS!

EXTRA TIPS

* Make sure you are in a quiet place free from distractions (turn you phone off)

* Make sure you have paper/pens/lap top (if needed) and notes.

* Make sure you have enough water and food so you can concentrate

* Make sure you take regular breaks – every 45 mins take 5. Stand up/ walk around / make a cup of tea etc.

* Make sure you ask for help you get stuck

Exam technique Do Plan all answers carefully, even the two mark questions PRECISION and LACK OF REDUNDANCY are key. Don’t Write everything you can think of, your answer will be imprecise and contain irrelevant info, this will cost you marks. The view that …..is held by, they argue that..

It is clear that x is the case

Philosophers claim that x is the case because (in more depth if required)…

However one reason to challenge this is that….

However many reject this challenge because…

However this solution fails because…

FOLLOW THIS PROCESS TWICE

Therefore it is the case that x because ….R1 and R2

The view that …..is held by, they argue that..

It is clear that x is the case

Philosophers claim that x is the case because (in more depth if required)…

However one reason to challenge this is that….

However many reject this challenge because…

However this solution fails because…

FOLLOW THIS PROCESS TWICE

Therefore it is the case that x because ….R1 and R2

The 15 mark structure
1) Intro * define key term / view in the question * State clear judgement

2) Why do philosophers hold this view (in the Q)?

3) Give an argument for your judgement

4) Criticise the argument/state an argument against it.

5) Explain why the criticism fails

6) Conclusion

When you are arguing for or against a view make sure you are clear about what type of criticism it is: 1) One of the reasons is false (I have an idea of God…. Many argue that this first premise in the Ont arg. is false.)

2) The conclusion does not necessarily follow from the reasons ( Direct realists reject the move from the fact that some properties are mind dependent, it must mean they are properties of sense data)

3) The argument is not clear: one of the reasons is not justified / the meanings are not clear, the argument rests on principles/claims that are not justified. (The Trademark argument rests on, and assumes the truth of the causal principle)

Key terminology You need to be familiar with some general philosophical terms…these are relevant to all topics Necessary and contingent truth | 2+2 = 4
Socrates is mortal
Triangles have 3 sides
2+2 = 4
Socrates is mortal
Triangles have 3 sides
Necessary: Must be true. The opposite would be a contradiction Different types of necessary truths: * Analytic * Through logic/deduction * Because they are true in all possible worlds The sky is blue
All swans are white
The sky is blue
All swans are white Contingent: may be true or false the opposite is not a contradiction Contingent truths: * Synthetic * Through experience | Analytic and synthetic statements/propositions | Triangles have 3 sides
Triangles have 3 sides
Analytic: True or false by definition True or false because of the meanings in the words Opposite is a contradiction Necessarily true The predicate is already in the subject Some bachelors are happy
Some bachelors are happy
Synthetic Their truth is not contained in the meanings of the words They are true or false depending on the way the world is The opposite is not a contradiction The predicates tell us further information about the subject | Deductive and inductive arguments | Inductive arguments: Linked to empiricism Draw inferences from particular instances to make general conclusions – this swan is white…all swans are white Some are analogy The world is like a watch, the watch is designed so we can infer the world is Look from past experiences to make inferences about the future Every morning so far the sun rises…the sun will rise tomorrow Premises support the conclusion to a greater or lesser extent Conclusions are levels or probability Conclusions stretch beyond and give us more than is contained in the premises. Deductive arguments Usually linked to rationalism What are the main problems with inductive arguments? * We cannot rely on the fact that the future has always resembled the past to infer it will continue to do so……it could at any point change. * Conclusions from inductive arguments are no more than probable…we naturally expect x to happen, this is not knowledge though any rational process.

What are the main problems with inductive arguments? * We cannot rely on the fact that the future has always resembled the past to infer it will continue to do so……it could at any point change. * Conclusions from inductive arguments are no more than probable…we naturally expect x to happen, this is not knowledge though any rational process.

If the premises are true then then conclusion must necessarily follow The opposite would be a contradiction The conclusion is contained in the premises. The conclusion is certain Inductive or deductive? All men are mortal Socrates is a man Socrates is mortal Greek people like fish Socrates is Greek Socrates like fish | A priori and a posteriori | A priori knowledge Definition: Knowledge gained prior to and without reference to experience. Truths are necessary Context: Hume claims that ALL a priori knowledge is of analytic statements and is trivial. Descartes argues we can have innate a priori knowledge of the world, and synthetic a priori knowledge. Different types: Intuition: immediately clear to the mind (I exist) Through analysis of the meaning of words – triangles have three sides Synthetic a priori knowledge – Kant Deduction – by reasoning from self- evident truths or true statements Innate knowledge Examples: Triangles have three sides Descartes arguments – trademark/ontological/clear and distinct etc. Kant’s conceptual schemes Plato and the slave boy – innate knowledge. A posteriori knowledge: Definition: Knowledge gained through experience, is true because if the way the world is. Truths are contingent. Context: Hume claimed that all knowledge about the world must come from the world. Examples: All swans are white The sky is blue |

Epistemology Philosophers of perception are divided into realist and idealists. Realists claim that what we perceive are physical objects, which exist independent of our minds and of our perceptions. Idealists argue that physical objects, at least in the sense that realists think of them, don’t exist. What we perceive, they argue, are mental things – ideas of some kind 1) What are the immediate objects of our perception? Direct realism: The immediate objects of our perceptions are mind mind-independent objects and their properties. Explanation: What we perceive through our senses are physical objects that exist in the world outside our minds. When I see a table I see it as it actually is in the world – its’ colour, shape, size, smell and texture etc. Objection 1: the argument from perceptual variation Russell: The problems of Philosophy chapter 1 Russell uses the example of a brown shiny table. The table appears differently to us from different angles and in different lights Russell shows that the argument applies to our other senses. Russell explains that we need a name for the perceptions we have, since they are not the same as the object itself. He names the object of our perceptions SENSE DATA (these are temporary, mental and private) Formal version of the argument: 1) There are variations in perceptions 2) Our perception varies without corresponding changes in the objects we perceive 3) Therefore the properties physical objects have and the properties they appear to have are not identical 4) Therefore, what we are immediately aware of in perception is not exactly the same as what exists independently of our minds Russell writes this reply…remember he is an indirect realist
Russell writes this reply…remember he is an indirect realist
C: Therefore we do not perceive physical objects directly Reply to Russell We could argue that the real ‘colour’ of the table is perceived when looking at the table under ‘normal’ conditions We could check what the ‘real’ shape of the table is by trying to fit it through a door...this would show it is a rectangle ….the same width. Objection This solution fails because how are we to judge what ‘normal conditions are’ – so Russell shows why his reply fails to save direct realism. Reply from direct realism Physical objects have many properties, some are part of the object whether we see the object or not, others are properties that depend on the perceiver. These are called RELATIONAL PROPERTIES, they are properties that the object has in relation to the perceiver. For example the property of ‘looking obtuse’ is a property of the table, not of sense data as claimed by Russell. So just because the premise is true….it doesn’t mean the conclusion is correct.
So just because the premise is true….it doesn’t mean the conclusion is correct.
In addition we can use the science of optics and light to explain WHY the table looks obtuse, this explanation is dependent on properties outside the mind so the properties are not of sense data, but the external physical world. This rejects the inference from premise to conclusion: P: some properties of objects are dependent on the mind C: These properties are properties of the mind (sense data) Objection 2: The argument from illusion There seems to be no difference between the perceptions we have that are VERIDICAL (when we see reality correctly) and the perceptions we have that are illusions, in other words they are SUBJECTIVELY INDISTINGUISHABLE. When we see an illusion, our minds are giving the objects properties they do not really have e.g. the stick is bent. This means that in the case of an illusion these properties are properties of sense data and not the physical objects. If the two perceptions (illusions and veridical perceptions) are indistinguishable then in both cases the properties that we perceive in all perceptions are properties of sense data (in the mind) and not of the objects themselves. Direct realism is false. (For the formal version of the argument see Lacewing p33) Reply: - defending direct realism Direct realist answers the above criticism in the same way as it answers the criticism from perceptual variation. In all cases of perception the properties we perceive are propoerties that belong the the object, however objects have two types of properties: the property of’ being x’ and the proerty of ‘appearing to be x’ The stick has the proerty of being straight and the property of looking crooked. In both cases we are percieving the object directly. EXTRA
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Objection: Descartes, in his ‘meditations,’ would argue that this presents a skeptical problem: how can we be certain when we are percieving the object as ‘being x’ and when we are percieving the objection as ‘appearing to be x’. If all we have to go on is our peceptions? Descartes is an indirect realist

Objection: Descartes, in his ‘meditations,’ would argue that this presents a skeptical problem: how can we be certain when we are percieving the object as ‘being x’ and when we are percieving the objection as ‘appearing to be x’. If all we have to go on is our peceptions? Descartes is an indirect realist

Reply – further defence of direct realism We can apply the common sense argument, and that our senses reveal when we are making mistakes, these can be uncovered eg by taking the bent stick out of the water. Objection3: The argument from hallucination When we have an hallucination or dream, there is something that must have the properties that we percieve. We are not perceiving the physcial world when we perceive therefore, the poperties we perceive must be mental properties of sense data. We cannot tell the difference between hallucinations and veridical perception therefore in all cases of perception we must be perceiving sense data. This means that direct realism is false. Reply from direct realism I can use another sense to check whether my hallucination is veridcal or not eg When macbeth thinks he sees a dagger, he knows there is no dagger because he cannot hold it..it is not really there. Objection Some hallucinations involve all our senses. For example when we are dreaming, we cannot tell that we are at the immediat moment (Descartes) It could also be the case that we are having a dream where we think we are awake etc. Reply – the disjunctive theory of perception There is a difference between veridical perception and dreamining/hallucinating: when we hallucinate we are using our imagination. So in fact dreaming/hallucinating is not a a type of perception as it is created from a different part of the brain to veridical perception which is produced via the senses.

Objection 4: The timelag argument Light takes 8 minutes to travel from the sun. With all perceptions there is a time delay (however small) between the light bouncing from the object and our perception. This means that we do not directly perceive the world as it is. When we perceive, we perceive light waves etc directly and the object indirectly. Therfore direct realism is false. Reply Even though we are always slightly behind, we are still perceiveing the objects directly. The light waves etc are the way the informtation about the proerties of objects reaches us. Eg seeing the light bounce off the paper and seeing the paper are the same thing. We don’t hear soundwaves when we hear sound, soundwaves are the way we hear sound. Objection The brain clearly processes informtaion before you are aware of it in you perception…for example when you tap your nose and your toe, your brain processes this so that you feel it at the same time even though the sensory information reaches your brain form your nose BEFORE the info from you toe because it is further away. This is evidence that there is a difference between the world as it is and the world as you perciev it. Therefore direct realism is false. Reply When we describe what we percieve we do so using the language of physcial objects as if they exist rather than the language of sense data. Our perceptions are produced to us as if physcial objects exist. As an hypothesis this makes the most sense. To argue otherwise will lead to some very complex reasoning which will have to be all the more persuasive than accepting what our intuition tells us…….the cause of my perceptions is the physical world. Create an argument summary below…..only ONE sentence for each argument/criticism/reply

Indirect Realism: The object of my perceptions are mind dependent sense data that are caused by and represent mind independent physical objects. They are similar to DR because they are both realists – they believe the physcial world exists and is the cause of our perceptions They disagree because DR argues that the properties we percieve are properties of the phsycial object in and of itself even if we are not perceiveing it. IR argues that the properties we percieve are properties of sense data which are in our mind, that are caused by the object. The argument for IR: 1. There are many perceptual experiences in which what we percieve are not the properties of physical objects. (eg perceptual variation/illusion) 2. When we percieve something having some property F there is something that has this property 3. In such cases, what we percieve is sense data 4. These cases are subjectively indestinguishable from veridical perception 5. When two experiences are subjectively indestinguishable the best way to explain this is that they are perceptual excperiences of the same thing = sense data C Therefore in all cases we perceive sense data Sense data | Physcial objects | These are properties of the mind/brain * They are the way something appears. * They are produced by the brain * They can lead us to see properties in objects that they do not actually have | The properties we percieve cannot be properties of the objects because they change, we can get them wrong, in some the object does not exist | These are temporary * The perceptions of physcial objects rely on experince. We experience things temporarily so sense data only exist while they are being experienced. | Physcial objects exist when no-one is there to experience them. | These are private * Sense data a produced by your brain, no-one else can experience you brain, so no-one else can have your sense data | These are public, everyone can expreince physical objects | Objection 1: Indirect realism leads to scepticism over the existence of the external world Russell offers this objection (which he offers two solutions to) in his key text the problems of philosophy He states that if our perceptions are made of sense data, and these are products of the mind, then we cannot know that the physcical objects cause these perceptions. We only believe that they do, but Russell questions whether we can justify this if all we have to go on is our perception. Solution 1: we can agree with other people around us that the world exists If I want to know whether there is a table over there, I can ask someone else if they can see the table. I could ask 50 people if they also see the table. If we call agree that there is a table then surely we can say the the cause of our perceptions is the physcial world. Objection: Russell accepts that this solution is not accepable because the only knowledge I have of other people is through my experience and my perceptions of others. If ALL perceptions are made of sense data which are in the mind, then the existence of other people is also open to scepticism I cannot assume the existence of certain elements of the external world (other people) in order to prove the existence of the rest of the external world, therefore this solution fails to overcome scepticism over the existence of physcial objects. Solution 2: The existence of the external world is the best hypothesis Russell recognises that the first solution is weak, so he offers a stronger solution to the problem: 1. Either physical objects exist and cause my sense data, or they do not exist and do not cause my sense data 2. I cannot prove either claim to be true or false 3. Therefore I must treat them as hypothesis 4. The hypothesis that physcial objects exist and cause my sense data is better C Therefore physcial objects exist and cause my perceptions. Russell MUST justify the claim he makes in P4, he does so in the folliwng way: Russell illustrates his argument by referring to a cat. If we see a cat sitting in one corner of the room, then we leave the room and return to see the cat in another part of the room, we must explain this. One explanation is that the cat is a physcial object who exists in the world, and the cat has moved from one corner to another while we were out of the room. An alternative explanation for our perception is that the cat does not exist outside our sense data and does not exist when I am not percieving it. Russell rejects the second option because it does not explain the cause of my sense data of cat Therefore the hypothesis that the world exists is the best hypothesis, therefore the world exists. Solution 3: Lack of choice over our experience and the coherance of various senses Locke: ‘An essay concerning human understanding’ Locke reasons that we cannot control our perceptions in the way that we can control memories and the imagination, this means that our perceptions are most likely to be caused by the physical world. He also argues that the best explanation for why our seses tend to agree with each other is that the physcial world exists and causes our perceptions. This is why I can see a table and then touch the table – the table exists. Locke uses the example of a piece of paper to demonstrate these points: I know that I can change the appearance of the paper in front of me (sight and the feeling of writing) I can plan what to write and I can imagine what the paper will look like I cannot percieve what the paper will look like until I have written on it Once I have written on the paper I cannot change what I perceive This shows that sense data are not in my imagination If someone else reads what I have written I can hear with a different sense what I can see on the paper This leads me to have little doubt that the world exists and causes my perceptions Objection 1: Some argue that Locke shows that my perceptions have an external cause NOT that the external cause must be the existence of physcial objects. The means that Locke has made an unjustifed inference from ‘there must be an external cause’ to ‘the external cause must be physical objects’ Objection 2: The most that Locke has done is strenghten Russell’s argument by adding further features of our percetion that are best explained by the existence of physcial objects: * That sense data are not under my control * That our sense agree with each other * That our we seem to interact with the physcial world, and seem to be able to change it. Objection 3: Direct realists object that IR makes the existence of the external world something that is inferred, but cannot be known with certainty. Direct realism gives us certainty about the external world, because our perceptions are the proof that the world exists, since we directly perceive physcial objects. Allowing the existence of the world to be a hypothesis leaves open the possibility that we may discover an alternative that is just as likely, or even better. EXTRA
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Solution to scepticism over the existence of the external world: * Reject Locke and Russell’s view that sense data come between us and the real world * Argue that sense data are the way we perceive the physical world, they do not block our access to it * The best way to explain illusions and PV are by understanding the relationship between our brains (sense data) and the physical world * If we see things it this way then we do not need to be sceptical about the existence of the external world since sense data are the way we see the world.
Solution to scepticism over the existence of the external world: * Reject Locke and Russell’s view that sense data come between us and the real world * Argue that sense data are the way we perceive the physical world, they do not block our access to it * The best way to explain illusions and PV are by understanding the relationship between our brains (sense data) and the physical world * If we see things it this way then we do not need to be sceptical about the existence of the external world since sense data are the way we see the world.

Argument map

Objection 2: Indirect realism leads to scepticism over the nature of the external world
Locke and Russell both claim that our sense data resembles the external world, so our sense data leads us to believe that physical objects exist, so we can say that physical objects exist.
Many question whether this claim is justified..is it reasonable to infer the cause ONLY by observing the effect?
There are many examples of where this would not work e.g. we could not know anything about what causes smoke by seeing smoke, since the cause is nothing like the effect.
Therefore it may be unreasonable to infer anything about the cause of our sense data, just by looking at our sense data.
Reply: Locke’s primary/secondary quality distinction
The primary qualities we perceive in objects resemble the objects. So we do not need to be sceptical about the nature of the external world
The primary qualities we perceive in objects resemble the objects. So we do not need to be sceptical about the nature of the external world
Locke argues that we perceive the primary qualities of an object directly, and the secondary qualities indirectly, in this way we do not need to be sceptical about the nature of the external world. We know that when we perceive primary qualities they are in the object. Primary Qualities | Secondary Qualities | ‘utterly inseparable from the object’Whatever changes the object goes through it will always have primary qualities (even if they are of differing quantities)EG all physical objects MUST have a size and a shape PQ produce sensations in us, but they are genuine qualities that the object possessesThey do not depend on the perceiver to exist, they exist ‘in and of themselves’ * Extension (size) * Shape * Motion * Number * Solidity (By this Locke means that all physical objects whether they are solid/gas or liquid MUST take up some space, this must also exclude other solid objects. This means that two solid objects e.g. my hand in water cannot take up the same space) | ‘nothing but the powers to produce various sensations in us’Physical objects can cause us to see the secondary qualities, but they are not a necessary quality. E.g. odourless, colourless glassSQ are only present when the object is being perceived * Colours * Sounds * Tastes * Smells * Temperatures – e.g. putting a cold hand in tepid water and a hot hand in tepid water. |

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Objection: Locke is inconsistent in his explanation of the PQ/SQ distinction

Locke describes SQ’s in two different ways: | ‘A quality of the object, or power the object has to produce a sensation’ | Qualities that do not exist in the object. If the object is not perceived the quality vanishes | The reason the object has the power to produce the SQ is down to the combination and arrangement of the PQ’s.The SQ’s are the effect of the PQ’s that cause them.This means that because an object has primary qualities, and secondary qualities are an effect of the primary qualities we can say objects have secondary qualities.SQ = relational properties (this seems to support Direct realism!) | SQ’s do not exist in the object. The colour of the object does not exist if the light from the object does not reach the eye.PQ’s do exist in the object even if it is not perceivedSQ’s are understood as the effect of the object on us they exist in the mind and not in the object. Just because the PQ’s cause the SQ’s it doesn’t mean they SQ’s must exist in the object.E.g. eating white bread makes you ill.Just as we don’t think that the pain you feel exists in the bread, we should also not think that the colour exists in the bread. Pain and colour are SQ’s and do not exist in the object.They are the effect the object has on us |
If we accept the second definition we can stop being sceptical about the nature of the external world
If we accept the second definition we can stop being sceptical about the nature of the external world
The effect of tepid water on a hot hand and tepid water on a cold hand leads us to believe that SQ’s like temp. exist in the mind of the perceiver and are cause by the object, but don’t exist in them
The effect of tepid water on a hot hand and tepid water on a cold hand leads us to believe that SQ’s like temp. exist in the mind of the perceiver and are cause by the object, but don’t exist in them
This definition is consistent with other writings so most people think that this is what he means when he talks of SQ’s
This definition is consistent with other writings so most people think that this is what he means when he talks of SQ’s

Objection: Berkeley, The primary/secondary quality distinction is false ‘Three dialogues between Hylas and Philonous’ (Hylas is a realist, Philonous is the voice of Berkeley, an idealist) Step 1: secondary qualities are mind dependent (he agrees with Locke on this point) Hylas: All qualities exist outside the mind and they exist as we perceive them e.g. heat exists in the object Philonous: Heat and sound can be at extremes experienced as pain, but pain does not exist in the object Hylas: Heat is not pain, heat causes pain Philonous: When we feel painful heat we do not distinguish between the pain and the heat, they are felt as one sensation. All secondary qualities are experienced as degrees of pleasure or pain. Since this is the case and pain is mind dependent all secondary qualities must be mind dependent. He also repeats the argument from perceptual variation…….. The fact that colours change depending on the perceiver means that colour cannot exist within the object. Things that affect the colour include distance, lighting, angle etc. For example a cloud may be grey but can appear to be pink. At this point Hylas accepts that SQ’s are mind dependent and do not exist in the object. Step 2: There is no distinction to be made between SQ and PQ Philonous: The argument from perceptual variation applies as much to PQ as it does to SQ Size – an object can appear to be big or small depending on my distance from it Texture – a table may appear smooth to me, but under a microspore is not Shape – a circular object can appear to be elliptical Movement – the speed an object appears to travel depends on how fast my mind works, it may appear fast to me but slow to a fly who processes movement faster than me. If we argue that an object has no colour because our perception of it can change, then if the same is true for PQ’s we also cannot know which perception is correct. This means that PQ’s must, like SQ’s be mind dependent. Step 3: We cannot say that our perceptions of PQ’s resemble the real object If, as Locke claims, our perceptions are made of sense data that are fleeting and variable, Berkeley asks how can it be said they represent objects that are fixed and constant? Our perceptions of PQ’s are no more constant than our perceptions of SQ’s. E.g. we can see a plate as a circle or as elliptical. If this is the case then how do we know which perception RESEMBLES the plate correctly? The argument from perceptual variation applies to PQ’s and SQ’s and so cannot be used to defend IR in the end! In addition to this Berkeley also questions how we could know that our idea of PQ’s like shape resemble the actual shape. How do I know my idea of a square is the same as what a square actually is? The only thing I have to go on is my perception of the square that I gain through experience. This is the same for pain or colour, these qualities only exist to me if I have experienced them myself. If this is the only access I have to them, then I am unable to say whether my perception of shape resembles the shape in reality or not. Berkeley concluded that IR is still left with scepticism over the nature of the external world. EXTRA
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Reply: Russell, we can talk of the relative aspect of primary and secondary qualities. Russell argues that we can say things about the nature of the external world. We can talk about one perception and its relationship to others E.g. I can tell with my perception of time that one event happened, followed by another… I can correctly put events in the right order. I can know that one shade of colour is lighter or darker or the same as another shade. I can know whether a sound is louder or quitter, higher or lower. In this way I may not know that that an object has x quality and that I perceive the quality correctly, but I can place in correctly in relation to other perceptions that I have had. This causes a further problem…how does the physical world cause sensations in the non-physical mind? Cause and effect only operate between physical objects. Argument map:

Idealism Definition: The objects of our perception are mind dependent objects Berkeley: ‘Three dialogues between Hylas and Philonous’ (Philonous is the voice of Berkeley) He claims that all that exists are minds and what they percieve The argument for Idealism (everything we percieve is mind dependent): * Through vision we percieve colours, shapes, size etc.: through hearing, sounds, through smell, odours-and so on. Each sense perceives particular types of qualities. * When we percieve physical objects, we don’t percieve anything in addition to its primary and secondary qualities * Therefore, everything we percieve is either a primary or a secondary quality. * Both primary and secondary qualities are mind-dependent C Therefore, nothing that we percieve exists independently of the mind: the objects of perception are entirely mind-dependent. One way to challenge Berkeley is to reject this point by arguing that what we percieve is are the physical objects in themselves, not just their qualities …this means that the qualities we perceive are produced by the objects themselves and not our mind.
One way to challenge Berkeley is to reject this point by arguing that what we percieve is are the physical objects in themselves, not just their qualities …this means that the qualities we perceive are produced by the objects themselves and not our mind.

Argument 1: You cannot think of an object with ONLY primary qualities Locke rejects this – he gives the example of odourless, colourless glass
Locke rejects this – he gives the example of odourless, colourless glass
We cannot perceive an object with only primary qualities. This means that our perception of primary and secondary qualities is inseparable. If SQ are mind dependent then PQ must also be mind dependent.
However if we accept Locke’s example then Argument 1 is no convincing

Argument 2: Experience shows that the concept of matter is incoherent
Berkeley agreed with Locke that all concepts must come from experience, if the concept cannot be traced back to an original experience then it is not coherent.
IR argues that matter exists, but that it is beyond our experience, it lies beyond the veil of perception. It causes our experience but cannot be experienced.
Berkeley argues that if it is beyond our experience then we cannot claim to have a concept of it….it is incoherent.

To say that an apple has a particular smell, taste, colour and sound it to say no more than the apple is a cluster of ideas or sense impressions. – these are mind dependent.

Argument 3: Experience leads to idealism * All we perceive are primary and secondary qualities, not mind independent physical objects. * Therefore, our experience cannot verify the hypothesis that there is a mind independent physical world. * Worse still, the hypothesis of physical substance is not one that is even suggested by experience. * So close attention to experience supports the claim that all there is; is what we can experience. * What we experience are ideas
C Therefore, our experience supports idealism, not realism. Argument 4: The master argument Philonous asks Hylas to think of a tree that exists independently of a mind Hylas thinks of a tree that exists deep in a forest, unperceived by anyone. However Philonous claims that Hylas has failed, since the tree is being thought of by Hylas, so it does not exist independently of a mind Hylas cannot think of an object that exists independently of his mind. This shows that the existence of an object depends on it being perceived in a mind. Objection 1: Berkeley has confused the thought with what the thought is about The thought and what the thought is about are two different things Just because my thought is mind dependent it does not follow that what I am thinking of is also mind dependent. Reply: The master argument depends on accepting that only ideas exist – e.g. that PQ and SQ are mind dependent and that there is no matter underlying the objects we perceive. Objection 2: Matter is ‘whatever causes our perceptions’ Hylas makes this claim to defend realism – that physical objects exist and cause our perceptions.

Reply: Berkeley states: the cause of our perceptions must be a mind not matter All we perceive are PQ and SQ, these are mind dependent ideas All ideas are passive, they cannot cause anything Ideas are caused by a mind Therefore the cause of our perceptions must be a mind not matter Reply: The realist view of matter leads to scepticism Realists argue that the physical world exists and causes our perceptions, this raises the sceptical question – ‘how do we know the world exists? Idealism avoids this question as all that exists are ideas, there is nothing beyond ideas. By experiencing ideas, we are experiencing the world. Objection 3: What causes our perceptions? If we accept idealism we are left with a different problem, if the world does not exist independently of the mind, then what is the cause of our perceptions….it’s a bit like the cat problem for Russell. Reply: Berkeley, the cause of my perception of physical objects is God. All perceptions are caused by something: ideas/my mind OR another mind Ideas are passive, so cannot be the cause of my ideas I cannot be the cause of my perceptions because I do not control them, unlike the imagination where I can choose what to picture Therefore my perceptions of physical objects are not caused by me C Given the complexity of my perceptions, the only mind that could do this is God Objections | Replies | How do we know the objects continue to exist when no-one is thinking about them? | God thinks about all things at all times, so objects continue to exist | How do we explain illusions? | We should say that the stick appears to be bent in water, and appears to be straight when out of water – each perception is an idea | How do we explain hallucinations? | They are both involuntary, but hallucinations are less clear and coherent than normal perception. Hallucinations originate In our minds, perceptions originate in the mind of God | How does Idealism account for scientific explanation – the study of the physical world? | Physical objects are bundles of ideas. Science is the study of the relationships between these bundles of ideas. | If there are no physical objects, how can it be said that we see the same tree? | The ideas that make up physical objects, space and time exist in the mind of God, we perceive a copy of the idea from the mind of God. | Idealism leads to solipsism | We know that the mind of God exists, so Solipsism is false. The existence of other finite minds is a matter of inference – we cannot be certain of this. | How can I perceive what is in the mind of God? God is unchanging, he does not have eyes etc. | What I perceive is a copy of what is in the mind of God. I perceive what God wills me to perceive. |

2) What does it mean to say ‘I know’? Different types of knowledge: Practical: knowing HOW TO e.g. how to tie your shoelaces Acquaintance: Knowing OF e.g. knowledge of what an apple tastes like because you have eaten one Propositional: Knowledge THAT e.g. I know that the sky is blue What does it mean to know that a proposition is true or false? Theory 1: The tripartite theory of knowledge The conditions we need to meet to show that we have knowledge are: Justified, True Belief (J+T+B=K
Justified, True Belief (J+T+B=K
1) The proposition p is true 2) You believe that P 3 Your belief that P is justified These conditions are NECESSARY and SUFFICIENT This means that each condition is required for knowledge – if one is missing then the person cannot be said to know that p
This means that each condition is required for knowledge – if one is missing then the person cannot be said to know that p

This means that if all conditions are met then you have knowledge. No other conditions are needed
This means that if all conditions are met then you have knowledge. No other conditions are needed

Are the conditions individually necessary? (Could we do without one of J/T/B and still have knowledge?)
Justification (could knowledge be a true belief?) Justification is a necessary condition | Justification is not a necessary condition | The racist juror example – the juror who decided on the basis of the race of the defendant, that he was guilty. The Juror cannot be said to KNOW the defendant is guilty as they had no grounds for their true belief. In this case the Juror had a lucky true belief, this cannot be knowledge. The true belief is irrational | John has a rare gift, he can correctly state the day of the week for any date in the future. He always gets the right answer, but cannot explain how he does this. This means that he has knowledge without really being able to justify it. Some would say that this counts as knowledge as it has been produced by the brain which is usually a reliable way of producing knowledge. (Reliabilism)Others would reject the example, since the knowledge can be explained and justified, its just that his brain processes info so quickly that he is not aware of the work his brain does in producing the knowledge. So the knowledge is justified. |
Truth (Could knowledge be a justified belief?) Truth is a necessary condition | Truth is not a necessary condition | It is impossible to know something that is false, therefore truth is a necessary condition for knowledge.This is not knowledge, it is just ‘convinced’ which is not the same thing.We need to establish whether our belief, which we feel justified in having is actually true. This requires external criteria. We cannot discover the truth of a proposition without checking it. | What about people who lived a long time ago and ‘knew’ the world was flat. They had justification for the belief, and so they knew the world was flat. |

Belief (Can knowledge be a justified truth?) (What is the difference between knowledge and belief?) Belief is a necessary condition | Belief is not a necessary condition (knowledge and belief are two different things) | You cannot know that p unless you believe it e.g. I cannot know it is raining outside if I don’t believe it.Knowledge entails belief – to know p is t believe p.Most agree that if you know that P, then you will also believe it.So knowledge is belief with added conditions – eg that it is justified and true. – This is the way that the tripartite system interprets knowledge and belief. Most philosopher agree that knowledge requires belief. | Some disagree and argue that they are different ways of seeing the world, they are different mental states.The weak objection – it is possible to have knowledge without beliefI can know without believing – e.g. Answering correctly in an exam, but not being confident that you know the answer even though you have remembered it. So he doesn’t believe he has answered correctly.Either, this is not knowledge because it is not justified OR it is knowledge because unconsciously he does believe it.The strong objection: knowledge is never a form of beliefKnowledge = infallible (certain) more than just belief. If you know then you don’t need to believe because you know. It must be true. Knowledge is seen as being about the way we behave eg you are asked a question, you respond correctly so you have knowledge.Belief = fallible (capable of being wrong) If you believe that p, then it is possible that you are mistaken. So belief can be true or false. Beliefs are thoughts not behaviours.Criticism: What about examples when we think we know but we are mistaken?Reply: Just because the knowledge and belief feel the same (e.g. I believe it and think I know it, but I was mistaken) It doesn’t tell us anything important about what knowledge is. |

Are the conditions jointly sufficient for knowledge?
Even if we accept that we need each of the conditions to have knowledge (individually necessary), philosophers disagree about whether having the three conditions guarantees that we have knowledge (jointly sufficient).
Edmund Gettier Accepts that each condition is necessary, he rejects the view that the conditions are jointly sufficient. He gives two examples to demonstrate this: Smith and Jones | Fake barns | Smith and Jones both apply for the same job.Smith believes that Jones will get the job (his boss told him so)Jones has ten coins in his pocket (Smith has counted them himself)Smith deduces from the above that the man who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket.It turns out that Smith gets the job and that, unknown to him, he has ten coins in his pocket. | Imagine you are driving through ‘fake barn county’ (You don’t know this)Every time you drive past a barn you think ‘oh look there is a barn’ Every time you think ‘oh look there is a barn’ you are mistaken as the barns are fake (they look real from the road)However there is one occasion where you say ‘oh look there is a barn’ and in this case you are correct, this is the only example of a barn. |
Did Smith know that ‘the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket?’
Justification: The boss told him, and he counted the coins.
Truth: It was true
Belief: He believed it to be true
NO: This example shows that JTB are not jointly sufficient to guarantee knowledge because in this case Smith has got his knowledge through luck.

Did Smith know that ‘the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket?’
Justification: The boss told him, and he counted the coins.
Truth: It was true
Belief: He believed it to be true
NO: This example shows that JTB are not jointly sufficient to guarantee knowledge because in this case Smith has got his knowledge through luck.

Does the one time that the statement ‘oh look there is a barn’ was correct count as knowledge?
Justification: You saw a barn
Belief: You believed it was a barn
True: It is a barn
No: This is not knowledge because it is arrived at by luck. In this example again, JTB is not sufficient for knowledge.

Does the one time that the statement ‘oh look there is a barn’ was correct count as knowledge?
Justification: You saw a barn
Belief: You believed it was a barn
True: It is a barn
No: This is not knowledge because it is arrived at by luck. In this example again, JTB is not sufficient for knowledge.

Both examples demonstrate that JTB are not equal to knowledge since even when all conditions are met it is possible not to have knowledge, since in the above examples the truth has been arrived at by luck.
Both examples demonstrate that JTB are not equal to knowledge since even when all conditions are met it is possible not to have knowledge, since in the above examples the truth has been arrived at by luck.